Unilateral Attacks Do Not Alone Require Judicial Recusal: Sentencing and Impartiality in United States v. William Richardson

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Decided: November 10, 2026
Appeals: Nos. 22-2302 and 23-1146
Opinion by: Circuit Judge Ambro

Precedential status: The opinion is expressly nonprecedential under Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedure 5.7. It applies existing legal principles rather than establishing a new binding rule.

1. Introduction

The Third Circuit affirmed William Richardson’s drug-related judgment and his separate criminal-contempt judgment, rejecting challenges to drug-quantity calculations, sentencing enhancements, contempt notice, and judicial impartiality. The decision’s central themes are evidentiary flexibility in sentencing and the limits of a litigant’s ability to manufacture grounds for judicial recusal.

The prosecution arose from Richardson’s distribution of oxycodone and oxymorphone. Police conducted three controlled purchases in August 2014 and subsequently searched his home, discovering drugs and five firearms. Richardson continued dealing. In 2016, he and others also participated in a scheme to obtain prescription opioids through false representations to health insurers, intending to sell rather than consume the pills. Wiretaps and a further search supplied additional evidence.

Richardson ultimately pleaded guilty without a plea agreement to all charged counts except Count Eight, the firearm-in-furtherance charge, which was dismissed without prejudice. After several appointed attorneys withdrew, he represented himself with standby counsel. His fifth appointed lawyer later withdrew after Richardson sent threatening letters concerning the lawyer and his family, leading to separate indirect criminal-contempt proceedings.

The District Court imposed a drug-related sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment followed by eight years of supervised release. Richardson appealed that judgment and the contempt judgment. The appeals were consolidated for disposition only. He proceeded without counsel in the drug-related appeal and with counsel in the contempt appeal.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit rejected every challenge before it:

  • Drug quantity: Wiretap evidence and prescription records supported a converted drug weight between 3,000 and 10,000 kilograms. An earlier, incomplete 730-kilogram spreadsheet did not cap the sentencing calculation.
  • Judicial estoppel: The Government had neither advocated the preliminary figure as its position nor obtained judicial acceptance of it.
  • Relevant conduct and grouping: The court could consider the continuing drug activity rather than limiting the calculation to the 2014 investigation.
  • Sentencing enhancements: No career-offender enhancement had been imposed. The separate statutory enhancement for a prior felony drug conviction applied to the relevant substantive, aiding-and-abetting, and conspiracy offenses.
  • Wiretap suppression: Richardson’s valid, unconditional guilty plea foreclosed the particular challenge to the pretrial suppression ruling.
  • Criminal contempt: Richardson received the notice required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42.
  • Recusal: Richardson’s own accusations against the judge did not, without more, establish an appearance of partiality. The judge’s response supported, rather than undermined, his impartiality.

The court therefore affirmed both judgments.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion relies on existing authorities to resolve discrete procedural, sentencing, and recusal questions. Their roles are as follows.

Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)

This authority supports liberal construction of filings by litigants who represent themselves. The Third Circuit applied that approach to Richardson’s arguments in No. 22-2302, including his inartfully expressed objection to the contempt conviction. Liberal construction allowed the court to identify and address his claims; it did not relieve him of the substantive requirements for obtaining relief.

United States v. Gray, 942 F.3d 627, 630–31 (3d Cir. 2019)

The court cited this decision for the distinction between clear-error review of sentencing factual findings and de novo review of legal determinations. That distinction shaped the drug-quantity analysis: the appellate court assessed whether the District Court’s factual estimate was clearly erroneous rather than independently recalculating the quantity.

New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001)

This case supplied the judicial-estoppel principle that generally prevents a party from prevailing on one position and later prevailing on a contradictory position. Richardson could not invoke that principle because the Government expressly disclaimed the 730-kilogram figure as its position and the District Court never accepted that figure. The opinion thus distinguishes an evolving evidentiary calculation from a successful, inconsistent litigation position.

United States v. Guyton, 144 F.4th 449, 458 (3d Cir. 2025)

This decision provided the plain-error framework for Richardson’s unpreserved sentencing objections. Its importance was procedural: because those objections had not been preserved below, identifying a debatable sentencing issue would not itself justify reversal.

United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)

Quoted through United States v. Guyton, this Supreme Court decision supplied the four requirements for plain-error relief: an error that is plain, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The panel found no underlying sentencing error, making further analysis of the remaining requirements unnecessary.

United States v. Porter, 933 F.3d 226, 232 (3d Cir. 2019)

The panel relied on this authority to reject Richardson’s wiretap-suppression challenge. As the opinion explained, an unconditional guilty plea prevents an appeal from pretrial rulings irrelevant to the resulting judgment of conviction. The court treated Richardson’s valid plea as dispositive of this particular suppression argument, rather than deciding whether the wiretap evidence was lawfully obtained.

United States v. Dorsey, 105 F.4th 526, 528 (3d Cir. 2024)

The court cited this decision when applying plain-error review to Richardson’s unpreserved objection to calculating his offense level from the broader conspiracy. It reinforces the importance of preserving sentencing objections in the District Court.

Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302, 303 (3d Cir. 2006)

This case supplied abuse-of-discretion review for the denial of recusal. The appellate inquiry was whether the District Court permissibly applied the impartiality standard, not whether the panel would have handled Richardson’s accusations in precisely the same manner.

Selkridge v. United of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 360 F.3d 155, 168 (3d Cir. 2004)

This precedent provided the central rationale for rejecting recusal based solely on Richardson’s attacks. Allowing a litigant’s accusations to compel disqualification would effectively give litigants a veto over judicial assignments. The principle does not excuse genuine bias; it prevents accusations themselves from automatically proving it.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Sentencing Quantity Was Not Limited to an Incomplete Spreadsheet

The Presentence Report initially attributed 730 kilograms of converted drug weight to Richardson, relying on an FBI spreadsheet. The Government later offered additional calculations and supporting evidence. Richardson argued that the court should have remained bound to the original figure.

The panel rejected that argument because the initial spreadsheet was incomplete. It omitted prescriptions obtained between 2012 and 2015, and the FBI agent testified that it was not intended to calculate all relevant conduct attributable to Richardson. Its inclusion in the Presentence Report did not transform it into a binding ceiling.

The District Court instead relied on two evidentiary sources:

  • Wiretap evidence from April and May 2016 supporting an average monthly quantity equivalent to 230 kilograms of converted drug weight.
  • Pharmacy prescription data supporting at least 5,860 kilograms of converted drug weight.

The opinion describes the District Court as limiting its estimate to the twenty-two-month period charged in Count Three and arriving at a “rational and fair estimate” of 4,400 kilograms. That amount fell within the 3,000-to-10,000-kilogram bracket supporting base offense level 32 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6). The opinion does not reproduce the complete arithmetic behind the final estimate; its reasoning rests on the evidentiary support for the selected quantity range.

The holding is evidence-specific. It supports the use of corroborated estimates, not unrestricted extrapolation from any brief period of criminal activity.

2. Judicial Estoppel Requires More Than a Changed Calculation

Richardson’s estoppel argument failed for two independent reasons. First, the Government had not previously argued that 730 kilograms represented the proper total; it expressly said otherwise. Second, the District Court had never accepted that figure.

Accordingly, the Government was not abandoning a position on which it had already prevailed. The decision illustrates that judicial estoppel protects the integrity of judicial proceedings against inconsistent successful positions; it does not freeze the evidentiary record at an early stage.

3. Relevant Conduct Extended Beyond the 2014 Investigation

Richardson sought to confine the sentencing calculation to drug amounts associated with the 2014 investigation. His guilty plea to Count Three defeated that position because the count covered conduct from August 2014 through June 2016.

The court also supplied an independent Guidelines rationale. Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), sentencing may account for acts forming part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. On this record, Richardson’s trafficking before and after 2014 was not excluded merely because investigators initially focused on particular transactions.

The grouping rules reinforced that conclusion. The five drug counts were properly grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) because the dealing was ongoing or continuous. The firearm count was grouped under § 3D1.2(c) because it embodied conduct treated as a specific offense characteristic of the drug offenses under § 2D1.1(b)(1).

This reasoning does not establish that every act of every conspirator is automatically attributable to a defendant. The opinion addressed Richardson’s continuing conduct and the particular grouping decisions before it.

4. The Court Distinguished Career-Offender Status from a Statutory Recidivist Enhancement

Richardson described his sentence as involving a career-offender enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851. That argument conflated different sentencing mechanisms. Career-offender treatment is governed by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1; § 851 concerns the procedure for seeking certain increased statutory punishments based on prior convictions.

The panel found that no career-offender enhancement had been applied, noting that Richardson’s criminal history category was III rather than VI. An objection to an enhancement that was not imposed could not establish error.

The separate prior-felony-drug enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) did apply. Richardson had qualifying prior cocaine-trafficking convictions, and the relevant offenses reached the statutory enhancement through three routes:

  • Substantive liability: Count Six directly charged a controlled-substance offense under § 841(b)(1)(C).
  • Aiding and abetting: Counts Four and Five implicated 18 U.S.C. § 2, which makes an aider and abettor punishable as a principal.
  • Conspiracy: Count Three implicated 21 U.S.C. § 846, which prescribes the same penalties as the underlying drug offense.

The panel therefore found no error in applying the statutory enhancement. Its discussion did not undertake a broader examination of every procedural or classification issue that might arise under § 851.

5. Contempt Notice Was Adequate

Richardson’s assertion that there was “no Contempt Count” appeared in the appeal from his drug-related judgment rather than the separate contempt appeal. The panel identified that procedural mismatch but nevertheless construed his argument liberally and addressed it.

The argument failed because Richardson had received the notice required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42. The opinion’s holding on this issue is narrow: it establishes adequate notice on this record, without providing an extended analysis of the contempt offense’s elements or every procedural requirement governing criminal contempt.

6. A Litigant Cannot Establish Apparent Bias Merely by Attacking the Judge

Section 455(a) requires recusal whenever a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” Richardson argued that his own filings accusing Judge Hornak of corruption and criminal conduct had created an adversarial relationship requiring disqualification.

The panel rejected that reasoning because unilateral attacks do not automatically establish apparent bias. Otherwise, a dissatisfied litigant could manipulate judicial assignments by directing increasingly hostile accusations at the presiding judge.

The court also examined the judicial statement Richardson identified as evidence of bias. Judge Hornak had declined to repeat Richardson’s profanity and personal attacks, explaining:

“I have a thick skin, Mr. Richardson. The fact that you said those things doesn’t affect my judgment on the merits of your case.”

Read in context, this was a measured response demonstrating that the judge separated Richardson’s conduct from the merits. The panel accordingly found no abuse of discretion.

The distinction is important: the opinion does not make a judge’s assertion of impartiality conclusive. Rather, the objective circumstances identified by Richardson did not reasonably establish partiality, and the quoted response reinforced that conclusion.

C. Potential Impact and Limits

Because the decision is nonprecedential, its significance is principally illustrative and persuasive. It provides several practical lessons without creating a binding new Third Circuit rule.

  • Preliminary sentencing figures remain contestable. Defendants and prosecutors should examine what an initial calculation actually includes before treating it as a complete accounting.
  • Corroboration matters in quantity estimation. The combination of intercepted communications and prescription records supported the sentencing finding more strongly than an unexplained projection alone would have.
  • Objections should be preserved. Unpreserved sentencing arguments face the demanding plain-error framework.
  • Sentencing mechanisms must be distinguished. Guidelines career-offender status and statutory prior-conviction enhancements require separate analysis.
  • Guilty pleas have appellate consequences. An unconditional plea can foreclose later challenges to antecedent evidentiary rulings.
  • Recusal requires more than manufactured hostility. Personal attacks cannot, by themselves, give a litigant control over judicial assignment.

The opinion should not be read as authorizing arbitrary drug estimates, dispensing with contempt safeguards, or insulating genuinely biased judges from recusal. Each ruling depended on the record and the particular appellate challenge presented.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Converted drug weight
A Guidelines measurement that translates different controlled substances into a common scale for sentencing. The kilogram figures here do not mean Richardson possessed that physical weight of opioid pills.
Relevant conduct
Related criminal activity that the Guidelines permit a court to consider beyond an isolated transaction underlying a conviction.
Grouping
A Guidelines method for treating related counts together when calculating the offense level.
Judicial estoppel
A doctrine generally preventing a party from succeeding on one position and later seeking success through a contradictory position.
Clear error and de novo review
Clear-error review defers to supported factual findings; de novo review independently examines legal questions.
Plain error
A demanding standard for correcting errors not properly raised below. A clear mistake alone is insufficient; additional requirements concerning prejudice and judicial integrity must be met.
Indirect criminal contempt
Punishable interference with judicial authority occurring outside the judge’s immediate presence, requiring applicable notice and procedural protections.
Appearance of impartiality
The objective question whether circumstances reasonably call a judge’s neutrality into doubt—not merely whether a litigant distrusts or insults the judge.

5. Conclusion

United States v. William Richardson applies established principles to uphold supported sentencing findings and reject an attempted recusal based on self-generated hostility. An incomplete preliminary drug estimate did not bind the sentencing court, related continuing conduct properly informed the Guidelines calculation, and Richardson’s accusations did not themselves establish judicial partiality. Although nonbinding, the opinion offers useful guidance on sentencing proof, preservation of appellate issues, and the boundary between genuine concerns about impartiality and attempts to manufacture them.