B. Legal Reasoning
1. Sentencing Quantity Was Not Limited to an Incomplete Spreadsheet
The Presentence Report initially attributed 730 kilograms of converted drug weight to Richardson, relying on an FBI spreadsheet. The Government later offered additional calculations and supporting evidence. Richardson argued that the court should have remained bound to the original figure.
The panel rejected that argument because the initial spreadsheet was incomplete. It omitted prescriptions obtained between 2012 and 2015, and the FBI agent testified that it was not intended to calculate all relevant conduct attributable to Richardson. Its inclusion in the Presentence Report did not transform it into a binding ceiling.
The District Court instead relied on two evidentiary sources:
- Wiretap evidence from April and May 2016 supporting an average monthly quantity equivalent to 230 kilograms of converted drug weight.
- Pharmacy prescription data supporting at least 5,860 kilograms of converted drug weight.
The opinion describes the District Court as limiting its estimate to the twenty-two-month period charged in Count Three and arriving at a “rational and fair estimate” of 4,400 kilograms. That amount fell within the 3,000-to-10,000-kilogram bracket supporting base offense level 32 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(6). The opinion does not reproduce the complete arithmetic behind the final estimate; its reasoning rests on the evidentiary support for the selected quantity range.
The holding is evidence-specific. It supports the use of corroborated estimates, not unrestricted extrapolation from any brief period of criminal activity.
2. Judicial Estoppel Requires More Than a Changed Calculation
Richardson’s estoppel argument failed for two independent reasons. First, the Government had not previously argued that 730 kilograms represented the proper total; it expressly said otherwise. Second, the District Court had never accepted that figure.
Accordingly, the Government was not abandoning a position on which it had already prevailed. The decision illustrates that judicial estoppel protects the integrity of judicial proceedings against inconsistent successful positions; it does not freeze the evidentiary record at an early stage.
3. Relevant Conduct Extended Beyond the 2014 Investigation
Richardson sought to confine the sentencing calculation to drug amounts associated with the 2014 investigation. His guilty plea to Count Three defeated that position because the count covered conduct from August 2014 through June 2016.
The court also supplied an independent Guidelines rationale. Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(2), sentencing may account for acts forming part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. On this record, Richardson’s trafficking before and after 2014 was not excluded merely because investigators initially focused on particular transactions.
The grouping rules reinforced that conclusion. The five drug counts were properly grouped under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d) because the dealing was ongoing or continuous. The firearm count was grouped under § 3D1.2(c) because it embodied conduct treated as a specific offense characteristic of the drug offenses under § 2D1.1(b)(1).
This reasoning does not establish that every act of every conspirator is automatically attributable to a defendant. The opinion addressed Richardson’s continuing conduct and the particular grouping decisions before it.
4. The Court Distinguished Career-Offender Status from a Statutory Recidivist Enhancement
Richardson described his sentence as involving a career-offender enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 851. That argument conflated different sentencing mechanisms. Career-offender treatment is governed by U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1; § 851 concerns the procedure for seeking certain increased statutory punishments based on prior convictions.
The panel found that no career-offender enhancement had been applied, noting that Richardson’s criminal history category was III rather than VI. An objection to an enhancement that was not imposed could not establish error.
The separate prior-felony-drug enhancement under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) did apply. Richardson had qualifying prior cocaine-trafficking convictions, and the relevant offenses reached the statutory enhancement through three routes:
- Substantive liability: Count Six directly charged a controlled-substance offense under § 841(b)(1)(C).
- Aiding and abetting: Counts Four and Five implicated 18 U.S.C. § 2, which makes an aider and abettor punishable as a principal.
- Conspiracy: Count Three implicated 21 U.S.C. § 846, which prescribes the same penalties as the underlying drug offense.
The panel therefore found no error in applying the statutory enhancement. Its discussion did not undertake a broader examination of every procedural or classification issue that might arise under § 851.
5. Contempt Notice Was Adequate
Richardson’s assertion that there was “no Contempt Count” appeared in the appeal from his drug-related judgment rather than the separate contempt appeal. The panel identified that procedural mismatch but nevertheless construed his argument liberally and addressed it.
The argument failed because Richardson had received the notice required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 42. The opinion’s holding on this issue is narrow: it establishes adequate notice on this record, without providing an extended analysis of the contempt offense’s elements or every procedural requirement governing criminal contempt.
6. A Litigant Cannot Establish Apparent Bias Merely by Attacking the Judge
Section 455(a) requires recusal whenever a judge’s impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.” Richardson argued that his own filings accusing Judge Hornak of corruption and criminal conduct had created an adversarial relationship requiring disqualification.
The panel rejected that reasoning because unilateral attacks do not automatically establish apparent bias. Otherwise, a dissatisfied litigant could manipulate judicial assignments by directing increasingly hostile accusations at the presiding judge.
The court also examined the judicial statement Richardson identified as evidence of bias. Judge Hornak had declined to repeat Richardson’s profanity and personal attacks, explaining:
“I have a thick skin, Mr. Richardson. The fact that you said those things doesn’t affect my judgment on the merits of your case.”
Read in context, this was a measured response demonstrating that the judge separated Richardson’s conduct from the merits. The panel accordingly found no abuse of discretion.
The distinction is important: the opinion does not make a judge’s assertion of impartiality conclusive. Rather, the objective circumstances identified by Richardson did not reasonably establish partiality, and the quoted response reinforced that conclusion.