Undefined “Windstorm” Unambiguously Includes Tornadoes in Texas Homeowners Policies

Case: Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Jeff Mankoff and Staci Mankoff
Court: Supreme Court of Texas
Date: February 13, 2026
Procedural posture: Petition for review from the Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas (Dallas), which had reversed summary judgment for the insurer.

I. Introduction

This decision resolves a recurring coverage-dispute question in Texas property insurance: when a homeowners policy applies a special deductible for losses caused by “Windstorm or Hail,” but does not define “windstorm,” does that deductible apply to tornado damage?

The parties were the insurer, Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange, and the insured homeowners, Jeff and Staci Mankoff. A 2019 tornado damaged the Mankoffs’ home. The insurer applied the policy’s large “Windstorm or Hail Deductible” ($87,156), asserting a tornado is a windstorm. The insureds sued for breach of contract, arguing “windstorm” is ambiguous (or distinct from tornado), so the deductible should not apply.

The key issue was purely interpretive and suitable for summary judgment: whether the undefined term “windstorm,” used in a deductible provision, unambiguously encompasses a tornado under Texas contract and insurance-coverage principles.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Court reversed the court of appeals (which had found ambiguity and construed the deductible against the insurer) and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment for the insurer.

The Court reached that conclusion primarily by (1) anchoring “windstorm” in consistent dictionary definitions and (2) rejecting the notion that references to “little or no precipitation” create a reasonable reading excluding tornadoes. The Court also discounted arguments based on statutory lists that mention “tornado” and “windstorm” separately, explaining that legislative repetition does not necessarily narrow ordinary meaning.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

1) Summary judgment framework

• Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005): cited for de novo review of summary judgments, reinforcing that the Supreme Court independently assesses the legal question.
• Guynes v. Galveston County, 861 S.W.2d 861, 862 (Tex. 1993): used to frame how courts evaluate cross-motions for summary judgment when facts are undisputed—each party must establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

2) Core contract/insurance interpretation rules

• Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995): the foundational proposition that insurance policies are interpreted like contracts and that ambiguity is a question of law.
• URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755, 763 (Tex. 2018): cited for the “primary objective” of contract interpretation—effectuate parties’ intent as expressed in the text.
• RSUI Indem. Co. v. Lynd Co., 466 S.W.3d 113, 118–19 (Tex. 2015): supplied two critical guardrails: (i) “ambiguity” is not mere imprecision; and (ii) if a limitation on coverage is ambiguous, courts adopt the construction favoring the insured.
• Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1991) (quoted via RSUI): emphasized that ambiguity in exclusions/limitations is resolved for insureds “even if” the insurer’s reading seems more reasonable—making the ambiguity finding outcome-determinative. The Court’s insistence on “no ambiguity here” reflects awareness of this interpretive consequence.

3) Determining “plain, ordinary meaning” of undefined terms

• Tanner v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 289 S.W.3d 828, 831 (Tex. 2009): cited for the rule that undefined terms receive plain meaning unless the policy signals a different, technical meaning.
• Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Crocker, 246 S.W.3d 603, 606 (Tex. 2008): reinforced that absent a technical intent, courts apply “plain meaning.”
• Tex. State Bd. of Exam'rs of Marriage & Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass'n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2017): supplied the Court’s methodology—look first to dictionary definitions, then to usage in statutes, court decisions, and similar authorities.
• City of Fort Worth v. Pridgen, 653 S.W.3d 176, 184 (Tex. 2022): used to support extracting a “common thread” across dictionary definitions rather than cherry-picking individual words.

4) Statutory context and the meaning of enumerations

• Pharr-San Juan-Alamo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Pol. Subdivision Prop./Cas. Joint Self Ins. Fund, 642 S.W.3d 466, 474–76 (Tex. 2022): cited by analogy for how statutory definitions of a term and related terms can inform ordinary meaning; here, the Court noted the relevant codes do not define “windstorm” or “tornado,” reducing statutory interpretive traction.
• In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 336 (Tex. 2001): invoked for the idea that legislatures may repeat terms for emphasis, undermining the insureds’ argument that separate listing (“tornado” and “windstorm”) necessarily implies mutual exclusivity.
• EBS Sols., Inc. v. Hegar, 601 S.W.3d 744, 758 (Tex. 2020): cited for the presumption favoring broader meanings when a term is susceptible to broad or narrow readings, especially absent narrowing context.
• Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n, 518 S.W.3d 318, 328 (Tex. 2017): referenced for the importance of narrowing modifiers and context; because the code provisions had no narrowing modifier, the Court refused to infer that “windstorm” excludes tornadoes.

5) Prior “windstorm” case law and the tornado question

• Landmark American Insurance Co. v. SCD Memorial Place, L.L.C., 25 F.4th 283 (5th Cir. 2022): distinguished. The Court treated Landmark as context-specific to a policy’s “Perils Covered” phrasing and not a holding on the ordinary meaning of “windstorm.” Importantly, the Court read Landmark as supporting the idea that “windstorm” is a peril that can exist within a broader storm system—not that it is categorically a separate type of storm.
• Fireman's Insurance Co. v. Weatherman, 193 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.): treated as historically supportive. Although the Court acknowledged it was not an express “ordinary meaning as a matter of law” decision, it highlighted Weatherman’s jury-charge definition that windstorm need not have “the whirling features which usually accompany tornadoes and cyclones,” implying tornadoes are within the windstorm category.
• Emps.' Fire Ins. Co. v. Howsley, 432 S.W.2d 578, 580 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1968, no writ); Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pittser, 399 S.W.2d 901, 904 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.): cited as examples of courts favorably citing Weatherman, supporting continuity in how Texas courts and litigants have approached “windstorm.”

6) Limits of technical/expert meaning when the contract is general-audience

• Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 568 S.W.3d 650, 657 (Tex. 2019): cited in support of the Court’s skepticism toward importing a technical, expert-driven meaning (meteorological distinctions) into an insurance policy that did not adopt technical definitions.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The interpretive starting point: plain meaning, not “manufactured” ambiguity

The Court emphasized that ambiguity requires two or more reasonable interpretations, not merely competing advocacy. Because the deductible provision used a common word (“windstorm”) without any sign the parties intended a specialized meaning, the Court applied ordinary usage, following Tanner and Crocker.

2) Dictionaries supply a stable baseline

The Court treated multiple dictionaries as converging on a consistent core definition: a windstorm is a storm “marked by high wind” with “little or no precipitation.” From that, the Court extracted the “common thread” (per City of Fort Worth v. Pridgen)—violent/strong winds as the defining feature.

3) “Little or no precipitation” does not carve out tornadoes

The insureds attempted to use the precipitation component as a limiting rule: because tornadoes occur within storms that may have heavy precipitation (and here rain “likely” followed for two minutes), tornadoes should fall outside “windstorm.” The Court rejected that as a category mistake.

• The Court treated a tornado as an event defined by violent, destructive wind—indeed, some dictionaries explicitly describe a tornado as a “windstorm.”
• Even if a broader weather system involves precipitation, that does not change whether the tornado itself fits the “windstorm” concept; a storm system may contain multiple elements (precipitation, hail, tornado), and “windstorm” captures the wind-driven peril.
• Thus, “a weather event may not qualify as a windstorm” depending on precipitation, but “a tornado is always a windstorm” in ordinary meaning.

4) Statutory lists did not narrow ordinary meaning

The insureds pointed to Insurance Code and Property Code provisions that list “tornado” and “windstorm” separately. The Court read those lists as non-definitional enumerations that often pair broad and narrow terms for emphasis or clarity, invoking In re City of Georgetown. Absent a narrowing modifier (see Cadena Comercial USA Corp. v. Tex. Alcoholic Beverage Comm'n), the Court refused to infer that “windstorm” was meant to exclude tornadoes.

5) Case law did not support an exclusionary reading

The Court declined to treat Landmark American Insurance Co. v. SCD Memorial Place, L.L.C. as supporting the insureds because it addressed a different question (which perils a policy covers within a “Named Storm”), not whether a tornado is a windstorm.

By contrast, Fireman's Insurance Co. v. Weatherman provided historical confirmation that Texas courts have long treated tornado-like features as compatible with windstorm coverage concepts—and that rainfall is “immaterial” to recovery under such policies.

6) Extra-legal sources and experts were not controlling

The Court confronted a modern litigation tactic: invoking media usage, encyclopedia entries, and a meteorologist’s expert opinion to create competing meanings. Even assuming such sources could be consulted, the Court found they did not support a definition excluding tornadoes. More importantly, under Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., a technical meteorological distinction cannot rewrite a consumer insurance term that was not adopted as technical by the policy.

C. Impact

1) Texas insurance litigation: clearer deductibles for tornado losses

The holding supplies a bright-line rule for homeowners policies using “Windstorm or Hail” language without a definition: tornado damage falls under the windstorm deductible as a matter of law, reducing jury questions and limiting insureds’ ability to avoid higher wind deductibles by labeling tornadoes as distinct perils.

2) Contract interpretation: reinforcing “ordinary meaning” discipline

The decision strengthens Texas courts’ resistance to “false ambiguity” arguments. Litigants frequently attempt to manufacture ambiguity by assembling selective non-contractual materials. The Court re-centered the inquiry on ordinary meaning derived from dictionaries and legal context, and on whether an alternative meaning is truly “reasonable” in contract law.

3) Drafting and underwriting consequences

• Insurers may view the opinion as validation that “windstorm” is sufficiently encompassing for tornado risk without listing “tornado” explicitly in deductibles.
• Policyholders (and regulators) may press for clearer declarations or endorsements if they want tornado-specific deductibles disclosed more explicitly—though the Court’s approach suggests undefined common terms can still have determinate legal meaning.

4) Evidence battles: limits on technical experts for ordinary-language terms

The Court’s treatment of the meteorologist’s opinion signals that expert testimony will carry limited weight in determining ordinary meaning when the contract does not adopt a technical vocabulary—potentially narrowing discovery and expert practice in similar disputes.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• De novo review: The appellate court decides the legal issue fresh, without deferring to the lower court’s interpretation.
• Cross-motions for summary judgment: Both sides claim the law entitles them to win without trial; if facts are undisputed, the court resolves the legal meaning of the contract.
• Ambiguity (in Texas contract law): Not just “unclear.” A term is ambiguous only if it reasonably supports two or more meanings when read in context.
• Contra proferentem / construction favoring the insured: If a limitation on coverage is ambiguous, Texas courts adopt the insured-friendly construction—even if the insurer’s seems more reasonable (RSUI Indem. Co. v. Lynd Co. quoting Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Hudson Energy Co.).
• Ordinary meaning vs. technical meaning: Undefined policy terms are read as an average reader would understand them unless the policy indicates the parties adopted a technical definition.
• Why “tornado” can be separately named yet still be a “windstorm”: Lists often include both a general category (“windstorm”) and a well-known example (“tornado”) for emphasis or specificity; separate listing does not automatically mean mutual exclusivity.

V. Conclusion

The Supreme Court of Texas established a clear interpretive rule: in Texas homeowners insurance, an undefined “windstorm” deductible provision unambiguously applies to tornado damage. The Court reached that result by grounding interpretation in ordinary meaning (especially consistent dictionary usage), rejecting precipitation-based carve-outs, and declining to infer narrowing meanings from statutory enumerations or technical expert distinctions.

In the broader legal context, the opinion is a strong statement of Texas contract-interpretation discipline: ambiguity must be real, not litigated into existence, and common terms in insurance contracts can carry definite legal meaning even when undefined.