Unambiguous “Southern District Only” Plea Clauses Limit Non‑Prosecution Promises to the Drafting U.S. Attorney’s Office

Introduction

In United States v. Babajide Adefusi (7th Cir. July 2, 2026), the Seventh Circuit addressed whether a non-prosecution promise in a prior plea agreement entered in one district (the Southern District of Texas) barred a later prosecution brought by a different U.S. Attorney’s Office (the Central District of Illinois) when the later case had at least some factual overlap with the earlier conduct.

The defendant, Babajide G. Adefusi, pleaded guilty in 2018 to aiding and abetting passport fraud under a plea agreement with the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas (USAO-SDTX). Five years later, the United States Attorney's Office for the Central District of Illinois charged him with conspiracy to commit wire fraud related to an alleged scheme defrauding a pharmacy billing intermediary, E-MedRx. Adefusi moved to dismiss, arguing the 2018 plea agreement’s non-prosecution language barred the Illinois case.

The core issue on appeal was interpretive: whether the 2018 plea agreement unambiguously bound only USAO-SDTX (thus permitting Illinois to prosecute) or instead contained a broader promise binding “the United States” generally.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Adefusi’s motion to dismiss. It held that the 2018 USAO-SDTX plea agreement unambiguously bound only the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas, because the agreement expressly stated: “This plea agreement binds only the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas and Defendant. It does not bind any other United States Attorney.”

Because the agreement was unambiguous, the court declined to consider extrinsic evidence and also declined to decide whether one U.S. Attorney’s Office can bind another without prior approval. The court further noted—without resolving—a recognized circuit split over how to interpret ambiguous references to “the United States” or “the government.”

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Chanu, 40 F.4th 528, 539 (7th Cir. 2022): Cited for the standard that legal questions in rulings on motions to dismiss indictments are reviewed de novo. This framed the appellate court’s approach to the plea-agreement interpretation question.
  • United States v. Taylor, 909 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2018): Cited for the proposition that whether the government breached a plea agreement is a legal question reviewed de novo. This reinforced that the Seventh Circuit would independently evaluate the alleged breach.
  • United States v. Ingram, 979 F.2d 1179, 1184 (7th Cir. 1992): A central authority. The court drew multiple contract-interpretation rules from Ingram (promise-enforcement, ambiguity standards, and exclusion of extrinsic evidence when unambiguous) and analogized the “district-only” language in Adefusi’s agreement to the clear limiting language deemed unambiguous in Ingram. The court used Ingram to support the conclusion that explicit office-limiting language forecloses broader binding effect.
  • United States v. Rourke, 74 F.3d 802, 805 (7th Cir. 1996): Cited for clear-error review of a district court’s interpretation of disputed plea terms; also cited (at 810) by analogy regarding limits on a prosecutor’s authority to bind other entities. The court invoked Rourke to explain why it would not reach the authority question here: the agreement was unambiguous, so the authority issue was unnecessary to decide.
  • Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971): Cited (via Ingram) for the foundational principle that the government must honor promises made in exchange for a guilty plea. This is the constitutional and fairness backdrop for strict enforcement of plea bargains.
  • United States v. Colbert, 54 F.4th 521, 527 (7th Cir. 2022): Cited for the principle that plea agreements are contracts interpreted under general contract law. It supports the court’s textual approach.
  • United States v. Munoz, 718 F.3d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 2013): Cited to emphasize that contract interpretation in plea agreements is performed “with an eye to” special public-interest concerns. The court used this to acknowledge the due-process sensitivity of plea bargaining while still applying ordinary textual rules.
  • United States v. Monroe, 580 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2009): Cited for “literal terms” enforcement and for the rule that unambiguous plea agreements are interpreted according to plain meaning.
  • United States v. Schilling, 142 F.3d 388, 395 (7th Cir. 1998): Cited for the canon that contracts should be construed as a whole and provisions harmonized so none are rendered meaningless. This was key to rejecting Adefusi’s theory because it would nullify Paragraph 11’s express limitation that the agreement binds only USAO-SDTX.
  • United States v. Davis, 761 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 2014): Cited for the rule that ambiguities are construed against the government as drafter. The court acknowledged this defendant-friendly rule but found no ambiguity to trigger it.
  • United States v. Kingcade, 562 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir. 2009): Cited for the rule that extrinsic evidence is considered only if the written agreement is ambiguous.

Circuit Split Noted (But Not Resolved)

  • United States v. Gebbie, 294 F.3d 540, 550-51 (3d Cir. 2002): Describes a broader-binding approach—absent express limitations, ambiguous references to “the United States” can bind other U.S. Attorneys.
  • United States v. Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 303 (4th Cir. 1986): Similar broad-binding view for ambiguous “United States” language.
  • Margalli-Olvera v. I.N.S., 43 F.3d 345, 352 (8th Cir. 1994): Similar broad-binding view.
  • United States v. Maxwell, 118 F.4th 256, 263 (2d Cir. 2024): Takes a narrower approach—plea agreements bind only the office where entered unless it affirmatively appears broader restrictions were contemplated.

The Seventh Circuit treated these authorities as “not relevant” because Adefusi’s agreement contained an express, unequivocal limitation—meaning the interpretive fight over ambiguity never arose.

Impact

  • Reinforces enforceability of explicit “district-only” clauses. The opinion strengthens the practical lesson that when a plea agreement expressly states it binds only a specified U.S. Attorney’s Office—and disclaims binding “any other United States Attorney”—later prosecutions by other districts are generally not barred, even if there is factual overlap between the underlying episodes.
  • Encourages careful drafting and negotiation over cross-district exposure. Defendants seeking global peace must negotiate for explicit multi-district or nationwide non-prosecution language; prosecutors who want to avoid unintended nationwide commitments can rely on clear limitation clauses like Paragraph 11.
  • Limits litigation over intent by keeping the inquiry textual. By insisting that unambiguous text forecloses extrinsic evidence, the decision reduces the utility of after-the-fact disputes about what the parties “really meant,” channeling future disputes into textual clarity at the front end.
  • Preserves (but does not resolve) the broader circuit split. The Seventh Circuit again avoided choosing between the broad-binding and narrow-binding approaches for ambiguous “United States” language. The practical implication is that, in the Seventh Circuit, litigants should expect outcomes to turn on whether the agreement includes express limitations; in ambiguous cases, the split remains a live question for future panels.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Plea agreement “binds only” clause
A contractual sentence stating who is obligated by the deal. Here, “binds only the United States Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Texas” means only that office promises not to prosecute further; other districts remain free to bring charges unless the agreement clearly says otherwise.
Ambiguity and contra proferentem
A term is “ambiguous” if it has more than one reasonable meaning. If ambiguous, courts often interpret it against the drafter (here, the government). But that rule matters only if the text is genuinely unclear.
Extrinsic evidence
Evidence outside the written agreement—emails, negotiations, subjective understandings—used to show intent. The court said it is considered only when the written deal is ambiguous.
De novo vs. clear error review
“De novo” means the appellate court decides the legal question fresh. “Clear error” is a more deferential standard for certain factual or interpretive determinations. The court emphasized it was addressing a legal interpretive question primarily through the agreement’s text.
Conditional guilty plea
A plea that preserves the right to appeal specified pretrial rulings. Adefusi pleaded guilty while reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.
Superseding indictment
A new indictment that replaces an earlier one, often adding detail, charges, or defendants. The operative charging document here was the May 2023 Superseding Indictment.

Conclusion

United States v. Babajide Adefusi establishes—at least as a practical, text-driven rule in the Seventh Circuit—that an express clause stating a plea agreement “binds only” a particular U.S. Attorney’s Office and “does not bind any other United States Attorney” will be enforced according to its plain meaning, notwithstanding other references to “the United States” elsewhere in the document.

The decision’s significance lies in its insistence on whole-text harmonization and its refusal to entertain extrinsic evidence where the agreement is unambiguous. For defendants, the key takeaway is that achieving nationwide non-prosecution protection requires explicit, bargained-for language; for prosecutors, the case underscores that clear limitation clauses effectively cabin the scope of non-prosecution promises and reduce collateral disputes.