U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) Enhancement Applies to Purported “Diplomats” of a Nonexistent Government Entity; PSR-Based Intended-Loss Findings Stand Absent “Real Doubt”

1. Introduction

In United States v. Aziz Bey (7th Cir. July 17, 2026) (nonprecedential disposition), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the fraud convictions and sentences of Aziz Hassan Bey and Minister Zakar Ali, who (along with codefendants) represented themselves at trial. The prosecution arose from a multi-pronged fraud conspiracy involving: (i) false COVID-relief loan applications (PPP/EIDL), (ii) unemployment insurance fraud, and (iii) a vehicle-title/lien-removal scheme.

The appeals raised recurring federal sentencing and preservation issues: how intended loss is proved for U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1); when a PSR can carry the government’s burden; whether the “government or charitable affiliation” enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) applies when the “government entity” is not real; how substantive reasonableness challenges operate for below-guidelines sentences; and how forfeiture constrains appellate review when arguments were not raised in the district court.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Loss amount (Bey): The court upheld the district court’s adoption of the PSR’s intended-loss figure (nearly $11 million) and the resulting 20-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(K), concluding Bey failed to cast “real doubt” on the PSR’s reliability.
  • Government-role misrepresentation enhancement (Bey; Ali by adoption): The court affirmed the 2-level increase under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A), holding it applies even though the “Consulate of al Moroc” was not an actual foreign government agency; the panel analogized to the guideline commentary example involving solicitation for a non-existent charity.
  • Substantive reasonableness (Ali): The court rejected Ali’s attack on his below-guidelines 140-month sentence as “undeveloped and frivolous” because he did not grapple with the presumption of reasonableness and had not presented mitigation arguments at sentencing.
  • Forfeited issues (Ali): Challenges to discovery handling, sufficiency, restitution, and a minor-role reduction were reviewed for plain error and rejected, largely because Ali had not preserved them (including by failing to make a Rule 29 motion).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Loss methodology and intended loss

  • United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022): Cited as the Third Circuit’s approach favoring actual loss over intended loss under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1). The panel noted the issue but treated it as abandoned on appeal and, in any event, clarified Seventh Circuit practice post-Ponle.
  • United States v. Ponle, 110 F.4th 958 (7th Cir. 2024): The panel relied on Ponle to state the controlling Seventh Circuit rule: district courts use “the greater of the actual loss or intended loss” (tracking the guideline commentary and noting the 2025 amendments moved the definition into the guideline text).
  • United States v. Griffin, 76 F.4th 724 (7th Cir. 2023): Served two functions. First, it supplied the standard of review (clear error) for loss factfinding. Second, it anchored the burden-shifting framework for PSR-reliant sentencing determinations: the government may meet its burden through a reliable PSR; the defendant must then show inaccuracy and cast “real doubt,” otherwise the PSR stands.
  • United States v. Salem, 597 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2010): Invoked for the foreseeability principle in conspiracy sentencing (a defendant may argue certain losses caused by codefendants were not reasonably foreseeable). The panel rejected Ali’s foreseeability argument because trial evidence corroborated his involvement.

Guidelines application and standards of review

  • United States v. Cohen, 159 F.4th 1121 (7th Cir. 2025): Cited for de novo review of a preserved guidelines-calculation issue and also later for the rule that failure to object to guidelines application at sentencing triggers forfeiture/plain-error review.
  • United States v. Sunmola, 887 F.3d 830 (7th Cir. 2018): Interpreted U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) broadly: it reaches defendants who purport to act on behalf of a government agency while intending personal benefit. The panel extended that logic to the “fake consulate” context.
  • United States v. Martin, 122 F.4th 286 (7th Cir. 2024): Cited for the proposition that a substantive reasonableness challenge is reviewed de novo.
  • United States v. Guzman-Ramirez, 949 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2020): Supplied the presumption of reasonableness for within- or below-guidelines sentences—an analytical step the panel found Ali ignored.
  • United States v. Butler, 58 F.4th 364 (7th Cir. 2023): Used to label an appellate sentencing argument “undeveloped and frivolous” when the defendant fails to confront the presumption of reasonableness.
  • United States v. Washington, 178 F.4th 360 (7th Cir. 2026): Cited for the duty to address properly presented mitigating arguments and to make an individualized § 3553(a) assessment—then distinguished because Ali offered no mitigation at sentencing when invited to do so.

Preservation, forfeiture, and plain error

  • United States v. Wright, 85 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2023): Reinforced that a sufficiency challenge is forfeited absent a Rule 29 motion at trial or post-trial.
  • United States v. Grusd, 164 F.4th 635 (7th Cir. 2026): Provided the forfeiture rule for restitution objections and restated the plain-error framework.
  • United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc): Quoted for the four-part plain-error standard (error, plainness, effect on substantial rights, and effect on the fairness/integrity/public reputation of proceedings).
  • United States v. Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th 473 (7th Cir. 2021): Quoted via Griffin for the “nearly insurmountable hurdle” defendants face when challenging the sufficiency of evidence on appeal (especially under plain-error constraints).
  • United States v. Hofschulz, 105 F.4th 923 (7th Cir. 2024): Cited for the deference owed to jury verdicts in sufficiency review.
  • United States v. Gan, 54 F.4th 467 (7th Cir. 2022): Cited to correct a doctrinal misunderstanding: conspiracy acquittal does not preclude conviction on substantive counts; verdicts can be mixed.
  • Harris, 102 F.4th at 852: Quoted to explain why plain-error reversal is inappropriate where it would require the judge to raise and resolve complex, fact-bound issues sua sponte—used here to reject Ali’s restitution accounting critique.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) Intended loss proved through a reliable PSR; “real doubt” required to dislodge it

The panel treated the PSR as the centerpiece of the government’s proof on loss amount. Following United States v. Griffin, it articulated a pragmatic burden-shifting approach: (i) the government must establish loss by a preponderance; (ii) a well-supported PSR can satisfy that burden; (iii) the defendant must then show inaccuracy and cast “real doubt”; (iv) only then does the burden shift back to the government to prove up the PSR’s figures.

Bey attempted to use an FBI agent’s grand jury testimony reflecting a much smaller actual loss figure. The panel held this did not undermine the PSR because the PSR aggregated intended losses across all three schemes (COVID-relief applications, UI fraud, and vehicle-title fraud). The grand jury figure, in the panel’s view, was “less comprehensive” rather than contradictory.

(B) U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A) applies even if the “government agency” is fictitious

The most distinctive interpretive move in the order concerns the enhancement for misrepresenting action on behalf of a government agency. Bey argued the “Consulate of al Moroc” was not actually a foreign government agency. The panel nevertheless affirmed the enhancement, reasoning:

  1. Under United States v. Sunmola, the enhancement targets defendants who purport to act for a government agency while seeking personal benefit.
  2. The guideline commentary’s example of soliciting for a “non-existent famine relief organization” (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.8(B)(i)) shows that the enhancement is not limited to bona fide entities.
  3. Therefore, there is “no reason to distinguish a non-existent charity from a non-existent government agency.”

On the facts, the panel pointed to corporate records listing “Diplomat Aziz Hassan Bey” as the registered agent and to Ali’s possession/use of “diplomatic credentials.” This evidentiary framing matters: the enhancement turned not on formal international recognition but on the defendants’ claimed status and how it functioned in the fraud.

(C) Substantive reasonableness requires engagement with the presumption and the sentencing record

Ali’s below-guidelines sentence was treated as presumptively reasonable under United States v. Guzman-Ramirez. The panel faulted Ali for not acknowledging the presumption or developing an argument to overcome it, citing United States v. Butler.

When counsel reframed the issue at oral argument as a procedural failure to address mitigation, the panel relied on United States v. Washington but concluded the premise failed: Ali did not actually present mitigating arguments at sentencing when invited, and the district court had considered PSR material covering the themes he later advanced on appeal.

(D) Forfeiture doctrine is outcome-determinative where defendants do not preserve trial/sentencing claims

The panel’s final section is a cautionary application of preservation rules: United States v. Wright (Rule 29 required to preserve sufficiency), United States v. Grusd (restitution objections), and United States v. Cohen (guidelines objections). Plain-error review—defined through United States v. Page—proved fatal to Ali’s remaining arguments, particularly where adjudicating them would require granular factual reconstruction (restitution attribution) that the district court was never asked to perform.

3.3. Impact

Although designated nonprecedential, the order offers persuasive guidance on three recurring issues:

  • “Fictitious government entity” enhancement theory: By explicitly analogizing a non-existent charity to a non-existent government agency, the court reinforces an effects-based reading of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A): what matters is the defendant’s claimed governmental mantle and its role in facilitating fraud, not the legal reality of the entity.
  • PSR-centered proof mechanics for loss: The discussion underscores that defendants must do more than point to alternative numbers; they must specifically undermine the PSR’s methodology or reliability to trigger further proof obligations.
  • Preservation as strategy, especially for pro se defendants: The decision illustrates how the lack of Rule 29 motions, sentencing objections, and developed mitigation can sharply narrow appellate relief.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Intended loss vs. actual loss
“Actual loss” is the money actually taken; “intended loss” is the loss the defendant meant to cause, even if not achieved. In this case the guideline increase was driven by intended losses reflected in fraudulent applications, not merely amounts paid out.
Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) reliability and “real doubt”
Courts may rely on a PSR if it is well-supported. To defeat it, a defendant must point to concrete errors or omissions that create “real doubt” about the PSR’s accuracy—mere disagreement or a smaller alternative estimate may be insufficient.
Standards of review
  • Clear error: appellate court defers unless the finding is plainly wrong (used for loss factfinding).
  • De novo: no deference (used for certain preserved guidelines/legal issues and substantive reasonableness as framed here).
  • Plain error: very hard to win; requires an obvious error affecting substantial rights and the integrity of proceedings (used for forfeited claims).
Joint and several restitution
Multiple defendants can be ordered to pay the same total amount, with the government permitted to collect the full amount from any of them (subject to crediting payments by others).
Minor-role reduction (U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2)
A defendant can receive a reduced offense level if substantially less culpable than average participants. The panel rejected the claim under plain-error review given evidence of Ali’s involvement.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Aziz Bey affirms significant fraud sentences by applying orthodox Seventh Circuit sentencing doctrines: intended loss may be adopted from a reliable PSR absent a showing of “real doubt,” and preservation failures channel most late-raised issues into unforgiving plain-error review. Its most notable interpretive takeaway is the court’s willingness to treat a purported “consulate” that is not a real government entity as sufficient to trigger U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A), aligning the enhancement’s application with the practical deception the defendants used rather than the formal existence of the institution they invoked.