Turner Applies to SVPA Detainees’ First Amendment Claims; State Procedures Alone Do Not Create Federal Due Process Rights

Introduction

In Merryfield v. Fleet, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a pro se civil-rights action brought by a long-term civilly committed individual under the Kansas Sexually Violent Predators Act (SVPA). The plaintiff, Dustin J. Merryfield, challenged various restrictions on media possession and mail monitoring at Larned State Hospital, alleging violations of the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause.

The appeal presented recurring issues at the intersection of civil commitment, institutional security and treatment, and constitutional rights: (1) what standard governs a civil detainee’s First Amendment challenges to media restrictions; (2) whether state-law procedures under the SVPA create a federal procedural due process right; and (3) how a civilly committed SVPA detainee can frame a “class-of-one” equal protection claim. The Tenth Circuit’s order—nonprecedential but citable for persuasive value—aligns this circuit with others in applying Turner v. Safley to civil detainees’ First Amendment claims and reiterates that violations of state procedures do not, by themselves, establish a federal due process violation.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Merryfield’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. The panel held:

First Amendment: Restrictions on detainee media at Larned State Hospital are evaluated under Turner v. Safley’s “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” standard, which applies to civilly committed SVPA detainees’ speech claims. Merryfield’s complaint did not plausibly allege that the policy and its application— including a blanket ban on “M”-rated video games and the facility’s definition of “sexually explicit” media—were unrelated to legitimate institutional interests.
Due Process: A facial challenge to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a22 failed both for inadequate development and because the SVPA comports with due process under Kansas v. Hendricks. Procedural due process claims predicated on the facility’s alleged noncompliance with state procedures (e.g., reading mail) failed because state procedural mandates do not themselves create a federally protected liberty interest. The court relied on Sandin v. Conner’s “atypical and significant hardship” framework and found no such hardship pleaded.
Equal Protection: The “class-of-one” theory failed because Merryfield did not identify comparators “similarly situated in every material respect.” Adult prisoners, juvenile offenders, and federal prisoners are not proper comparators to an SVPA detainee; in any event, the state has rational bases for treating sexually violent detainees differently.

The court also emphasized pleading standards under Twombly and Iqbal: a plaintiff must allege facts allowing a plausible inference that the challenged action is not reasonably related to legitimate institutional interests; conclusory assertions and examples of inconsistent application are insufficient.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The opinion is anchored in a set of well-established precedents that, together, structure constitutional analysis for institutionalized persons:

Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987): A prison regulation that impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights is valid if reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. The panel expressly extends Turner’s framework to civilly committed SVPA detainees for First Amendment claims, aligning with the Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits (Ahlers; Matherly; Brown; Beaulieu; Pesci).
Al-Owhali v. Holder, 687 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2012) and Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010): At the pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege facts supporting a plausible inference that the challenged policy is not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests; bare disagreement is insufficient.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990): Turner applies broadly wherever the needs of prison (or analogous institutional) administration implicate constitutional rights. The panel cites Harper to underscore Turner’s reach in institutional settings.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) and Steffey v. Orman, 461 F.3d 1218 (10th Cir. 2006): A deprivation does not implicate a protected liberty interest for procedural due process purposes unless it imposes an “atypical and significant hardship” compared to ordinary prison life. The court uses this framework to evaluate due process claims by a civil detainee in a secure facility.
Templeman v. Gunter, 16 F.3d 367 (10th Cir. 1994) and Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983): Violations of state procedures do not, by themselves, create a federal due process claim; “process is not an end in itself.” This directly defeats the claim that the SVPA’s mail procedures automatically confer a federal liberty interest when allegedly violated.
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997): The SVPA comports with due process. The panel relies on Hendricks in rejecting a facial due process challenge to Kan. Stat. Ann. § 59-29a22.
Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Utah v. Herbert, 828 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2016) and Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2011): For a “class-of-one” equal protection claim, the plaintiff must identify comparators “similarly situated in every material respect” and show the difference in treatment lacks any rational basis.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Complaints must plead “plausible” claims; labels, conclusions, and threadbare recitals will not do.
Rivero v. Board of Regents, 950 F.3d 754 (10th Cir. 2020): If a district court provides alternative bases for dismissal and the appellant fails to challenge all of them on appeal, affirmance is appropriate.

Collectively, these cases reinforce institutional deference for First Amendment claims, the high bar for converting state procedural rules into federal due process rights, and a stringent comparator and rational-basis framework for equal protection in individualized settings.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s analysis proceeds claim-by-claim under familiar standards.

First Amendment
- Governing Standard: Though Merryfield is a civilly committed SVPA detainee rather than a prisoner, the court applies Turner’s “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests” test to his First Amendment challenges—a point the court describes as consistent with every other circuit to consider the issue. This is a significant clarification within the Tenth Circuit’s jurisprudence for civil commitment settings.
- Pleading Burden: Under Al-Owhali and Gee, Merryfield was required to plead facts from which a plausible inference could be drawn that Larned’s media restrictions—including the ban on “M”-rated video games and the facility’s definition of “sexually explicit” content—are not reasonably related to legitimate institutional interests (security and treatment). The complaint’s descriptions and examples (e.g., disallowing Yellowstone while allowing Law & Order: SVU) did not negate a rational connection between the policy and the state’s interests. Allegations of inconsistency or disagreement with therapy-driven discretion did not suffice.
- Specific Rulings:
  - The “M”-rated video game ban was deemed an administrative decision plausibly grounded in treatment and security, and therefore reasonably related to legitimate interests under Turner.
  - The challenge to the denial of media lacking “industry standard ratings” was waived due to inadequate presentation, illustrating the importance of properly preserving and briefing issues.
  - The attack on the breadth of “sexually explicit” as defined by Larned failed at the pleading stage for lack of facts plausibly showing the policy was unrelated to legitimate institutional aims.
Fourteenth Amendment – Due Process
- Facial Challenge to § 59-29a22: The district court found the challenge undeveloped; the panel added that even if properly raised, it fails under Hendricks (and prior circuit precedent involving Merryfield) because the SVPA comports with due process. Merryfield did not confront the district court’s alternative basis for dismissal on appeal, warranting affirmance under Rivero.
- Procedural Due Process and State Procedures: Invoking Templeman and Olim, the court reiterated that an alleged failure to follow state procedures (e.g., mail-reading authorization and notice provisions under § 59-29a22(b)(15) and (c)) does not itself create a federal due process violation. Due process protects against deprivations of liberty or property; it does not guarantee adherence to state procedures for their own sake.
- Sandin’s Framework in Institutional Confinement: The court evaluated whether the alleged deprivations (e.g., delays in media determinations; mail reading) imposed an “atypical and significant hardship” vis-à-vis the ordinary incidents of institutional confinement. No such showing was pleaded. This places a substantive threshold in front of procedural due process claims by civil detainees challenging institutional policies: without an atypical-and-significant hardship, there is no protected liberty interest triggering procedural protections.
Fourteenth Amendment – Equal Protection (Class-of-One)
- Comparators: The complaint identified adult prisoners, juvenile offenders, and federal prisoners. The court held these are not similarly situated to SVPA detainees “in every material respect,” given the distinct legal status and treatment-and-security imperatives of civil commitment for sexually violent predators.
- Rational Basis: The district court recognized multiple rational bases for distinguishing SVPA detainees from those comparators; Merryfield did not challenge that conclusion in his opening appellate brief, which independently supports affirmance. Even if proper comparators existed, the state’s interests in treatment needs, risk management, and institutional security readily supply rational bases for differential policies.

Impact

Although designated as nonprecedential, the decision has notable persuasive significance and practical effects:

Alignment on Turner for Civil Detainees’ Speech Claims: The Tenth Circuit now explicitly joins other circuits in applying Turner to civilly committed SVPA detainees’ First Amendment challenges. Facilities can craft and enforce content restrictions tied to treatment and security with confidence that courts will apply Turner’s deferential framework at least at the pleading stage.
Pleading Standards Elevated: Plaintiffs must do more than point to inconsistent application or personal disagreement with staff discretion. To survive Rule 12(b)(6), they must allege facts plausibly showing a lack of reasonable relation to legitimate institutional objectives—e.g., by detailing how a restriction undermines, rather than advances, treatment and security, or by identifying realistic and obvious less-restrictive alternatives that do not compromise those objectives.
Procedural Due Process Claims Narrowed: The opinion reaffirms that state-law procedural schemes (like the SVPA’s mail provisions) do not automatically create federal due process rights. Without an underlying liberty interest (typically shown via “atypical and significant hardship”), alleged noncompliance with state procedures is not actionable under § 1983.
Equal Protection Guardrails: “Class-of-one” claims will rarely succeed absent nearly identical comparators and a lack of any rational basis. For SVPA detainees, appropriate comparators will likely be other SVPA detainees at similar treatment phases and security levels—not prisoners or detainees in different legal categories.
Practical Drafting Implications for Institutions: The decision tacitly approves blanket, administratively simple rules (e.g., “M”-rated game bans) where they plausibly connect to treatment and security goals and are applied facility-wide with notice. Clear articulation of the institutional rationale—and documentation by treatment professionals—fortifies such policies against facial challenge.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Turner’s Reasonableness Test: Courts ask whether a restriction on speech has a rational link to a legitimate institutional purpose (security, treatment, order), whether inmates/detainees have alternative ways to exercise the right, what impact accommodation would have on staff and other residents, and whether there are easy alternatives that would work as well with less impact on rights. At the pleading stage, the plaintiff must plausibly allege facts indicating the restriction fails this test.
Twombly/Iqbal “Plausibility”: A complaint must present factual content that makes a legal violation reasonably believable, not just possible. Conclusory statements—e.g., “the policy is unconstitutional” without supportive facts—will be dismissed.
Facial vs. As-Applied Challenges: A facial challenge argues a statute or policy is invalid in all its applications; an as-applied challenge argues it is unconstitutional as enforced against the plaintiff. Facial challenges are difficult to win and often fail where a law can be constitutionally applied in some contexts.
Procedural Due Process and State Procedures: Federal due process protects against deprivations of life, liberty, or property without adequate procedures. But a state’s failure to follow its own procedures does not, by itself, amount to a federal due process violation. The question is whether the plaintiff had a protected liberty interest at stake—and post-Sandin, that typically requires showing an “atypical and significant hardship” compared to ordinary institutional life.
Class-of-One Equal Protection: This theory requires proof that the plaintiff was treated differently from others in nearly identical circumstances and that there was no rational reason for the difference. Identifying truly comparable individuals or groups is often the hardest part; broad categories (like “prisoners”) are usually not close enough comparators for SVPA detainees.
Waiver on Appeal: If the district court gives multiple reasons for dismissal, the appellant must challenge each one. Failure to do so can result in automatic affirmance of the judgment.

Conclusion

Merryfield v. Fleet offers clear guidance on three fronts. First, in line with every other circuit to consider the question, the Tenth Circuit applies Turner’s deferential standard to First Amendment challenges by civilly committed SVPA detainees, emphasizing a plaintiff’s obligation at the pleading stage to allege facts negating a reasonable relationship to legitimate institutional aims. Second, the court reaffirms that violations of state procedural schemes (including the SVPA’s mail provisions) do not, standing alone, create federal due process claims; a protected liberty interest generally requires an “atypical and significant hardship.” Third, the court underscores the demanding comparator requirement and rational-basis review applicable to “class-of-one” equal protection claims in this context.

The decision is nonprecedential but important: it harmonizes Tenth Circuit practice with national consensus on civil detainees’ speech claims, solidifies the role of Sandin and Templeman/Olim in cabining procedural due process theories premised on state-law violations, and provides practical signposts for both institutional policymakers and litigants. For future SVPA litigation, successful constitutional challenges will likely require detailed, fact-specific allegations demonstrating how a given restriction undermines, rather than advances, treatment and security objectives, and how similarly situated SVPA detainees are treated differently without rational justification.