Town Authority to Maintain “Public Right-of-Way” Trails Despite 1986 Title 19 Recodification

1. Introduction

In John Echeverria and Carin Pratt v. Town of Tunbridge, 2026 VT 5 (Feb. 20, 2026), the Vermont Supreme Court addressed whether a town has legal authority to maintain and repair public trails that cross private property when the relevant provisions of Title 19 do not expressly assign “maintenance” duties for trails the way they do for “highways.”

Plaintiffs-appellants John Echeverria and Carin Pratt (landowners) own “Dodge Farm,” a historic property spanning Tunbridge and Strafford. Two public trails created in 1987 cross their Tunbridge land. After a dispute arose over whether bicycles should be allowed on the trails, the Town adopted procedures to allow private individuals to seek permission to maintain/repair the trails on the Town’s behalf. The landowners sued for a declaration that the Town lacked authority to perform maintenance or repairs on these trails.

The central legal issue was one of statutory interpretation: whether the 1986 recodification of Title 19—removing “trails” from the definition of “highway” and stating the town is not responsible for “any maintenance”—divested towns of the power to maintain/repair trails that are nevertheless defined as “public right-of-way[s]”.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed summary judgment for the Town, holding that town trails are “public rights-of-way” under the controlling statute and that, consistent with the common-law incidents of easements, a town has authority to maintain and repair such trails to ensure the public’s access for the intended purposes (access to abutting properties or recreational use).

The Court rejected the argument that the 1986 changes implicitly stripped towns of this authority, reasoning that the Legislature did not use “clear and unambiguous language” to overturn common-law meaning and incidents of a right-of-way, and that the statutory scheme (including regulatory authority over trail use and continued immunity from liability) presupposes the existence of maintenance authority.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • Echeverria v. Town of Tunbridge, 2024 VT 47, ¶ 19, 219 Vt. 585, 325 A.3d 98: The Court relied on this earlier appeal for the justiciability posture (ripeness), where it held the landowners alleged a sufficiently concrete threat of invasion/interference. In 2026 VT 5, that earlier decision sets the stage: the merits were now properly reached on remand.
  • Bartlett v. Roberts, 2020 VT 24, ¶ 9, 212 Vt. 50, 231 A.3d 171: Provided the standard of review for summary judgment and reinforced that the Supreme Court applies the same standard as the trial court. This matters because the case turns on law (statutory meaning), with no genuine disputes of material fact.
  • Brennan v. Town of Colchester, 169 Vt. 175, 177, 730 A.2d 601, 603 (1999): Supplied the Court’s interpretive methodology—effectuating legislative intent through the plain, ordinary meaning of statutory language. This is the gateway to the opinion’s core move: focusing on “public right-of-way.”
  • City of Montpelier v. Barnett, 2012 VT 32, ¶ 20, 191 Vt. 441, 49 A.3d 120: Cited for the principle that municipalities possess only powers granted by the state. The landowners invoked it to demand an express statutory maintenance grant for trails. The Court distinguished this context by finding authority embedded in the statutory definition and incident to other expressly granted powers.
  • Town of Calais v. Cnty. Rd. Comm'rs, 173 Vt. 620, 621-22, 795 A.2d 1267, 1268-70 (2002) (mem.): Used to underscore plain-meaning reliance and to describe the historical development of road classification, supporting the Court’s discussion of how trails historically fit within “highway” concepts and public access.
  • Perrin v. Town of Berlin, 138 Vt. 306, 307, 415 A.2d 221, 222 (1980): Demonstrated that even before 1986, towns were not liable for trail maintenance. This precedent undercuts the landowners’ argument that 1986 aimed to save money by eliminating maintenance authority—towns already had immunity from liability while trails remained public ways.
  • Barrett v. Kunz, 158 Vt. 15, 18, 604 A.2d 1278, 1280 (1992): Supplied the common-law easement principle that scope is determined by circumstances and the object/purpose of the easement. The Court used this framework to tie trail maintenance authority to the statutory purposes of trails (access/recreation).
  • Khan v. Alpine Haven Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 2020 VT 90, ¶ 40, 213 Vt. 453, 245 A.3d 1234: Cited to show the Court’s prior use of the Restatement on servitudes, lending legitimacy to its reliance here on Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 4.13 concerning a holder’s right to repair and maintain.
  • Ran-Mar, Inc. v. Town of Berlin, 2006 VT 117, ¶ 5, 181 Vt. 26, 912 A.2d 984: Supported the canon against interpretations that render legislation ineffective or irrational. The Court used it to reject a reading that would allow a landowner to “veto” a public right-of-way by refusing upkeep, collapsing public access in practice.
  • Sagar v. Warren Selectboard, 170 Vt. 167, 176, 744 A.2d 422, 429 (1999): Key to the opinion’s treatment of the 1986 recodification: Act 269 was meant to “clean up” and “recodify” Title 19 rather than change substance. This weakens the claimed negative inference that removing “trail” from “highway” silently removed maintenance authority.
  • State v. Richards, 2021 VT 40, ¶ 14, 215 Vt. 1, 256 A.3d 94: Provided the rule that statutes overturn common law only with “clear and unambiguous language.” Because “public right-of-way” is a legally loaded term at common law, the Court required explicit legislative displacement—absent here.
  • Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Hinesburg, 135 Vt. 484, 486, 380 A.2d 64, 66 (1977): Quoted for Dillon’s Rule (limited municipal powers). The Court used Dillon’s Rule not to narrow but to support implied authority: maintenance is incident/subordinate/necessary to exercising expressly granted powers over public trails.
  • In re Ball Mountain Dam Hydroelectric Project, 154 Vt. 189, 192-93, 576 A.2d 124, 126 (1990): Offered a contrast case where municipal action exceeded statutory authority (selling power outside borders). The Court distinguished it to show trail maintenance is not outside the statutory field but is naturally connected to the town’s trail powers.
  • Vt. N. Props. v. Vill. of Derby Ctr., 2014 VT 73, ¶ 54, 197 Vt. 130, 102 A.3d 1084: Supported the proposition that express statutory authority can carry implied enforcement/implementation powers. Analogously, authority to regulate trail use implies authority to maintain/repair to make that regulation meaningful.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. The statutory definition of “trail” as a “public right-of-way” is the fulcrum. The Court began with 19 V.S.A. § 301(8), defining a trail as “a public right-of-way that is not a highway,” established for access to abutting properties or for recreational use. The Court treated “public right-of-way” as a term with established common-law content—i.e., an easement-like interest.
  2. Common-law incidents of easements include reasonable repair and maintenance. Using Black’s Law Dictionary and Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 4.13, the Court reasoned that the holder of an easement may construct, improve, repair, and maintain improvements reasonably necessary to enjoy the servitude. By defining trails as public rights-of-way, the Legislature incorporated (rather than rejected) this background rule.
  3. Purpose defines scope; maintenance must be “to the extent necessary” to serve statutory purposes. Drawing on Barrett v. Kunz, the Court linked the permissible maintenance/repair to the trail’s statutory purposes: access to abutting properties or recreational use. This is not a blank check; it is purposive and reasonableness-bound.
  4. A contrary reading would make public trails practically defeasible by private inaction. The Court adopted the trial court’s practical point: if a landowner can prevent upkeep and the town is powerless to maintain, then public access is functionally subject to landowner veto—an interpretation the Court rejected as rendering the trail regime ineffective (Ran-Mar, Inc. v. Town of Berlin).
  5. Other provisions reinforce that maintenance authority exists. The Court relied on:
    • 19 V.S.A. § 304(a)(5): the selectboard’s duty/responsibility to “make regulations governing the use of pent roads and trails.” Regulation without the power to keep a trail passable would be anomalous.
    • 19 V.S.A. § 310(c): towns are not liable for construction/maintenance/repair/safety of trails. The Court inferred this immunity would be purposeless if towns lacked the power to do maintenance at all.
  6. The 1986 recodification did not clearly abrogate common-law meaning. While 19 V.S.A. § 302(a)(5) states trails are not highways and towns are not responsible for “any maintenance,” the Court treated that language as addressing obligation (and related classification), not authority. With Sagar v. Warren Selectboard and State v. Richards, the Court required explicit language to eliminate a long-standing incident of a right-of-way; it found none.
  7. Dillon’s Rule supports implied powers here, rather than defeating them. The Court accepted the framework that municipal powers are limited, but concluded maintenance is “incident, subordinate or necessary” (Hinesburg Sand & Gravel Co. v. Town of Hinesburg) to the town’s express authority to regulate trail use and to manage a public right-of-way. The Court analogized to implied enforcement authority recognized in Vt. N. Props. v. Vill. of Derby Ctr..

C. Impact

  • Clarifies town power over trails as easement-like public rights. The decision squarely establishes that, even prior to the 2025 amendment’s effective date, a town may maintain and repair public trails crossing private land when reasonably necessary to ensure the public can use the trail for its intended access/recreational purposes.
  • Limits landowner “self-help” as a de facto closure mechanism. Landowners cannot effectively negate a public trail by ceasing maintenance and allowing overgrowth if the town (or authorized agents) can lawfully restore passability.
  • Frames maintenance authority as bounded by purpose and reasonableness. Because the Court anchors authority in easement principles and statutory purpose, disputes may shift to questions of scope (what level/type of work is “reasonably necessary”), rather than existence of power.
  • Interacts with the 2025 amendment (effective April 1, 2026) but does not depend on it. The Court noted the Legislature “recently amended the statute to explicitly provide” towns “have the authority to exclusively or cooperatively maintain” trails, but treated the case as live because that amendment was not yet effective. Practically, the opinion supplies a pre-effective-date rule and also informs how the new explicit authorization may be construed (as consistent with, not necessarily altering, prior law).
  • Potential downstream disputes: user conflicts and regulatory tailoring. The factual context involved bicycles versus hiking. While this opinion focuses on maintenance authority, it reinforces the selectboard’s regulatory role over uses, suggesting future litigation may center on whether specific regulations (and the maintenance supporting them) are reasonable and consistent with the trail’s laid-out purpose.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Public right-of-way
A legal right held by the public to pass over land for travel. The Court treated it like a public easement: the land is privately owned, but the public has a legally protected corridor of use.
Easement / servient estate
An easement is a right to use someone else’s land for a limited purpose (e.g., to pass). The land burdened by the easement is the “servient estate.” The Court used easement law to infer that the easement holder may do reasonable maintenance needed to enjoy the right.
Maintenance authority vs. maintenance obligation
The statutes can say a town is not “responsible” for maintenance (no duty, and often no liability) while still allowing the town to do maintenance if it chooses to preserve a public right-of-way.
Dillon’s Rule
A doctrine limiting municipal powers to those expressly granted plus those necessarily implied. Here, the Court concluded maintenance is implied by the town’s express authority to regulate trail use and by the legal meaning of “public right-of-way.”
Recodification
A legislative reorganization/cleanup of statutes. The Court relied on precedent indicating the 1986 Act’s purpose was cleanup, making it less plausible that the Legislature silently removed a major municipal power without clear language.
Summary judgment
A decision without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This case was decided on legal interpretation, not fact-finding.

5. Conclusion

2026 VT 5 establishes (and clarifies) that Vermont towns possess authority to maintain and repair public trails crossing private property because such trails are statutorily defined as “public right-of-way[s]”—a term carrying common-law incidents that include reasonable repair and maintenance. The Court refused to read the 1986 Title 19 recodification as an implicit repeal of that authority, emphasizing that abrogation of common law requires clear language and that the broader statutory scheme (including regulatory authority and liability immunity) presupposes municipal power to keep public trails passable for their intended purposes.