Torres Limits “Missed-Shot” Seizure: No Fourth Amendment Seizure Without Physical Contact or Actual Control Over a Fleeing Suspect

Introduction

In Jamal Ward v. Charles Brotzke (6th Cir. June 12, 2026), Jamal Ward sued Detroit police officers Charles Brotzke, Aaron Thompson, and Bailey Rumschlag under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Michigan law, alleging excessive force after officers fired at him during a confrontation inside a convenience store. Ward survived multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by Brotzke and challenged summary judgment entered for the officers on qualified immunity (federal) and official immunity (state) grounds.

The appeal distilled to two core issues: (1) whether Officer Thompson—who fired and missed—“seized” Ward for Fourth Amendment purposes, and (2) whether Officer Brotzke’s deadly force was objectively reasonable when Ward ran toward the exit and dropped his gun less than a second before Brotzke began shooting.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that:

  • No Fourth Amendment “seizure” by Thompson: because Thompson’s shots did not hit Ward and Thompson did not otherwise acquire control over Ward, who continued fleeing.
  • Qualified immunity for Brotzke: Brotzke’s use of deadly force was reasonable under the circumstances, including the rapid, uncertain timeframe and Brotzke’s perception that Ward was armed and potentially the shooter.
  • Michigan official immunity for both officers: Ward failed to show lack of good faith (subjective malice) under Michigan’s intentional-tort immunity test; Thompson’s statement “I’ll shoot you, bro” did not establish malice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Video-evidence framing and summary judgment

  • Jackson-Gibson v. Beasley, 118 F.4th 848 (6th Cir. 2024): reaffirmed de novo review and instructed courts to credit the video depiction when footage exists.
  • Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): supplied the canonical rule that courts need not adopt a version of facts “blatantly contradicted” by video evidence.

2) Qualified immunity framework

  • Thompson v. City of Lebanon, 831 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2016): provided the two-step qualified immunity framework (constitutional violation + clearly established law). The panel later used this case as part of its discussion of older Sixth Circuit “missed-shot” seizure reasoning, while distinguishing it on the facts.
  • Jones v. Naert, 121 F.4th 558 (6th Cir. 2024): cited for the proposition that if no constitutional violation occurred, qualified immunity applies.

3) The opinion’s central doctrinal move: defining “seizure” post-Torres

  • Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306 (2021): the key authority. The opinion treats Torres as clarifying that the Fourth Amendment recognizes only two seizure types:
    1. Seizure by force with intent to restrain (e.g., shooting and hitting), and
    2. Seizure by show of authority with acquisition of control (submission or termination of movement).
    The panel relied on Torres to reject any theory that an officer “seizes” a fleeing suspect merely by firing and missing without gaining control.
  • Campbell v. Cheatham Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 47 F.4th 468 (6th Cir. 2020): used to operationalize the seizure taxonomy later anchored explicitly in Torres, including the principle that shooting and hitting is a seizure by force.
  • California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991): supplied the foundational rule that absent physical force, a show-of-authority seizure requires submission.
  • Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007): quoted for the proposition that a fleeing person is not seized until physically overpowered.
  • Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 US. 593 (1989): supported the “instrumentality” concept—control must be achieved by the means set in motion to stop the person.
  • Hopkins v. Nichols, 37 F.4th 1110 (6th Cir. 2022): cited for the objective inquiry into whether conduct manifests an intent to restrain (within the Torres framework).
  • Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200 (6th Cir. 1986): invoked for the threshold principle that an unreasonable seizure claim requires a seizure in the first place.

4) Sixth Circuit “missed-shot” and participation cases—recast through Torres

The opinion catalogued earlier Sixth Circuit decisions that had, in certain circumstances, allowed liability where an officer’s missed shots contributed to restraint or where officers “actively participated” in another’s force. The panel’s key move was to confine those cases to scenarios where the suspect actually stopped/submitted/was controlled, and to warn that broad readings would be inconsistent with Torres.

  • Adams v. City of Auburn Hills, 336 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2003): directly supported the conclusion that shooting at a fleeing felon and missing is not a seizure.
  • Cameron v. City of Pontiac, 813 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1987): similarly recognized that pursuit without capture does not equal seizure.
  • Turner v. Scott, 119 F.3d 425 (6th Cir. 1997): supplied the “actively participated” concept for excessive-force liability in a multi-officer setting.
  • Bletz v. Gribble, 641 F.3d 743 (6th Cir. 2011): cited both for active participation language and for the time-frame sensitivity in excessive-force analysis.
  • Jacobs v. Alam, 915 F.3d 1028 (6th Cir. 2019): discussed as a prior case where missed shots were deemed to contribute to restraint; the panel distinguished it because the suspect was not actively fleeing and eventually surrendered.
  • Floyd v. City of Detroit, 518 F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 2008): distinguished because the suspect “halted” after the missed shot, i.e., the show of authority produced submission/control.
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): anchored the individual-liability requirement in § 1983 suits—each official is liable only for his own unconstitutional actions. This principle reinforced the panel’s refusal to recognize a de facto “seizure by presence alone.”

5) Excessive force standards and deadly force

  • Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): supplied the objective-reasonableness factors (severity, immediate threat, resistance/flight).
  • Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985): cited for the totality-of-circumstances approach and deadly-force principles.
  • Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (per curiam): invoked in discussing the “probable cause to believe an immediate threat” standard in deadly-force contexts.
  • Shumate v. City of Adrian, 44 F.4th 427 (6th Cir. 2022): used to evaluate the crime’s severity (felony status) and how escalation increases seriousness.
  • Mullins v. Cyranek, 805 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2015): central to the “just dropped the gun” dispute; held it can be reasonable to shoot where the suspect discarded the gun only seconds earlier and the officer could reasonably believe the suspect still held it.
  • White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73 (2017) (per curiam): supported the proposition that qualified immunity allows room for reasonable mistakes in tense situations.
  • Eastep v. City of Nashville, 156 F.4th 819 (6th Cir. 2025): reiterated the objective viewpoint (reasonable officer) and the split-second judgment principle.
  • Cunningham v. Shelby County, 994 F.3d 761 (6th Cir. 2021): reinforced avoidance of hindsight and the on-scene perspective.

6) Michigan official immunity for intentional torts

  • Odom v. Wayne County, 760 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. 2008): supplied the three-element test (scope of authority, good faith, discretionary act).
  • Brown v. Lewis, 779 F.3d 401 (6th Cir. 2015): quoted (via Shumate) for the contrast between Michigan’s subjective good-faith inquiry and federal objective qualified immunity.
  • Latits v. Phillips, 826 N.W.2d 190 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012): explained that good faith shields honest belief and exposes malicious intent; also emphasized immunity even if the belief is mistaken, so long as honestly held.

7) Issues the panel declined to reach

  • Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994): raised as an alternative bar but not decided.
  • Kitchen v. Whitmer, 106 F.4th 525 (6th Cir. 2024): cited to note the Sixth Circuit’s suggestion that the Heck bar is not jurisdictional.

Legal Reasoning

1) The “seizure” gateway: separating officer-by-officer liability

Applying Frenchko v. Monroe, 160 F.4th 784 (6th Cir. 2025), the court evaluated each officer separately. The opinion treated “seizure” as a threshold element under Galas v. McKee: without a seizure attributable to a defendant, there is no Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim against that defendant.

2) Thompson: missed shots + continued flight = no seizure post-Torres

The panel held Thompson did not seize Ward because:

  • No seizure by force: Thompson’s bullets did not hit Ward (no physical force applied).
  • No seizure by show of authority with acquisition of control: Ward did not submit, and Thompson did not terminate Ward’s movement—Ward kept running out the door.

Crucially, the court confronted older Sixth Circuit language suggesting that an officer’s shots might “contribute” to a colleague’s later seizure. The court read Torres v. Madrid as foreclosing any third seizure category (beyond force and control), warning against an approach that would resemble “seizure by presence alone.” It then narrowed the earlier cases (Thompson v. City of Lebanon, Bletz v. Gribble, Jacobs v. Alam, Floyd v. City of Detroit) to their facts—each involved submission, incapacitation, or otherwise a termination of movement—unlike Ward’s uninterrupted flight after Thompson’s missed shots.

Because Thompson did not seize Ward, the court did not reach whether Thompson’s decision to fire was reasonable under Graham v. Connor.

3) Brotzke: reasonableness of deadly force in a sub-second, gun-in-hand scenario

The court applied Graham v. Connor and Tennessee v. Garner, focusing heavily on the immediate-threat factor and the compressed time frame:

  • Severity of the crime: carrying a gun without a permit is a felony in Michigan (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227(3)), and Ward escalated by pulling the gun and moving it toward officers, consistent with Shumate v. City of Adrian.
  • Immediate threat: Brotzke heard commotion and gunshots, then saw Ward with a firearm moving toward the exit where Brotzke stood. Even if Ward dropped the gun, the video showed this occurred less than a second before Brotzke fired, and Brotzke testified he did not see the drop. Under Mullins v. Cyranek, an officer may reasonably fire believing the suspect is still armed when disarmament occurs only moments earlier.
  • Active resistance/flight: Ward was undisputedly fleeing after resisting commands.

The court emphasized that the analysis is objective and does not adopt Ward’s subjective explanation that he was “just trying to exit.” Under Eastep v. City of Nashville and Cunningham v. Shelby County, officers may make split-second decisions in tense and rapidly evolving circumstances. With those constraints, the panel concluded Brotzke had probable cause to perceive an immediate threat (citing Brosseau v. Haugen) and was entitled to qualified immunity (also consistent with White v. Pauly’s tolerance for reasonable mistakes).

4) Michigan official immunity: subjective good faith not defeated by heated language

For the state-law assault and battery claims, the panel applied Odom v. Wayne County. Ward contested only the “good faith” prong, pointing to Thompson’s remark “I’ll shoot you, bro.” The court held this did not demonstrate malice; rather, the record supported that Thompson (and Brotzke) honestly believed deadly force was necessary to prevent harm, which is sufficient for immunity under Latits v. Phillips even if that belief later proves mistaken.

Impact

1) A clearer Sixth Circuit rule after Torres: no “seizure” from missed shots where the suspect keeps fleeing

The most consequential aspect of the opinion is its treatment of missed shots and multi-officer encounters. The court effectively announces (and applies) a limiting principle:

  • If an officer fires, misses, and does not cause submission or otherwise acquire control over a fleeing suspect, that officer has not “seized” the suspect—and therefore cannot be liable for Fourth Amendment excessive force predicated on that officer’s non-seizure conduct.

Practically, plaintiffs in the Sixth Circuit should expect heightened attention to who actually seized the plaintiff and how (hit-by-bullet force; or show-of-authority plus actual control). Claims against officers who fired but did not hit—where the plaintiff never stopped—will face a threshold “no seizure” barrier rather than proceeding to Graham reasonableness.

2) Continued vitality (but narrowed use) of earlier Sixth Circuit “contribution” cases

The court did not overrule Thompson v. City of Lebanon, Bletz v. Gribble, Jacobs v. Alam, or Floyd v. City of Detroit outright. Instead, it confined them to circumstances where missed shots (or related conduct) actually resulted in submission or termination of movement. Litigants can still cite those cases, but this opinion provides defendants a strong argument that they do not apply when a suspect continues fleeing uninterrupted.

3) Deadly force where a gun is dropped “almost simultaneously”

On the merits for the seizing officer, the court underscores that when a suspect drops a gun within fractions of a second before shots, officers may receive qualified immunity if they reasonably did not perceive the discard, reinforcing Mullins v. Cyranek in a rapid-action context.

4) State-law implications: Michigan “good faith” remains a high hurdle for plaintiffs

The state-law holding confirms that Michigan official immunity for intentional torts is difficult to defeat absent evidence of subjective malicious intent. Aggressive verbalizations alone, without more, are unlikely to show bad faith where the officer testifies to a perceived threat.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity (federal): A rule that protects officials from damages unless they violated the Constitution and the violated right was clearly established at the time. Here, the court resolved the federal claims largely at the “no constitutional violation” step for Thompson (no seizure) and the “reasonable use of force” step for Brotzke.
  • “Seizure” (Fourth Amendment): Not every police attempt to stop someone is a seizure. After Torres v. Madrid, a seizure happens only if (a) the officer applies physical force with intent to restrain (e.g., bullet hits), or (b) the officer shows authority and actually gains control (the person submits or is stopped).
  • Show of authority vs. acquisition of control: Police commands or gunfire may be a “show of authority,” but it becomes a seizure only if it results in submission or otherwise stops the person.
  • Objective reasonableness: Excessive force is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, not with hindsight, and not based on the suspect’s personal intent.
  • Official immunity (Michigan): For intentional torts, Michigan uses a subjective “good faith” test—plaintiffs must show the officer acted with malicious intent rather than an honest belief that the conduct was justified.

Conclusion

Ward v. Brotzke is most significant for its seizure analysis: applying Torres v. Madrid, the Sixth Circuit held that an officer who fires and misses does not “seize” a suspect who continues fleeing, and cautioned against any expansive “contribution” theory that would function like a third category of seizure. For the officer whose bullets did hit, the court reaffirmed the broad protection qualified immunity affords in split-second, gun-involved encounters—particularly where disarmament occurs nearly simultaneously with the shooting and may not be perceived. The decision also reinforces the resilience of Michigan official immunity absent concrete evidence of subjective malice.