Tier 6-to-Tier 4 Pension Transfers: Comptroller May Use Effective Transfer Date to Limit Contribution Refunds
Case: Matter of Pasinkoff v New York State & Local Retirement Sys., 2026 NY Slip Op 06599
Court: Appellate Division, Third Department, Supreme Court of New York
Decided: November 12, 2026
Opinion: Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.P.; unanimous concurrence
The supplied opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
1. Introduction
This decision addresses whether a public employee who transfers pension membership between New York retirement systems—and thereby moves from tier 6 to tier 4—must receive a refund of contributions dating back to the employee’s initial enrollment in the receiving system. The Third Department held that the Comptroller could reasonably use the transfer’s effective date instead.
Michael Pasinkoff argued that the statutory recognition of his earlier pension membership required the New York State and Local Retirement System to refund approximately $20,000 in contributions, plus interest. The Retirement System instead refunded approximately $2,550, representing contributions made after March 1, 2022, the effective date assigned to his transfer.
The court upheld that determination. Its central distinction was between retroactive recognition of membership and service and retroactive eligibility for contribution cessation. The governing statutes did not expressly resolve how those concepts interacted, and the court deferred to the Comptroller’s reasonable interpretation.
Importantly, the decision establishes a permissible administrative interpretation, not a holding that the statutory language unambiguously requires the agency’s approach in every pension-transfer case.
2. Background and Procedural History
| Date |
Event and significance |
| September 2007 |
Pasinkoff began employment as an assistant district attorney in New York County. |
| June 2009 |
He joined the New York City Employees’ Retirement System, or NYCERS, as a tier 4 member. He later purchased service credit reaching back to the beginning of his employment. |
| January 2020 |
He moved to the State Division of Human Rights and enrolled in the respondent Retirement System as a tier 6 member. |
| March 2022 |
He applied to transfer his NYCERS membership to the Retirement System. |
| June 2022 |
The Retirement System approved the transfer, changed his membership date to June 2009, and reclassified him from tier 6 to tier 4. |
| Following approval |
The Retirement System assigned March 1, 2022 as his contribution cessation date and refunded contributions made after that date. |
Pasinkoff sought an administrative hearing and redetermination under Retirement and Social Security Law § 74. He maintained that his contribution obligation should have ended when he joined the Retirement System in January 2020, rather than when his transfer became effective.
The Hearing Officer rejected that position. Before the transfer became effective, Pasinkoff was a tier 6 member and was not eligible for the tier 4 contribution-cessation benefit. The Hearing Officer also accepted the first day of the effective transfer month as the applicable cessation date, explaining that tier 4 contributions were administered on a first-of-the-month basis.
The Comptroller adopted that determination. Pasinkoff then brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding, which Supreme Court dismissed. The Third Department affirmed the judgment without costs, while correcting the procedural route by which the substantial-evidence challenge should have reached it.
3. Statutory Framework
Transfer of membership: Retirement and Social Security Law § 43
Section 43 permits transfers between retirement systems. Under § 43 (b), a transferring employee is deemed to have belonged to the receiving system throughout the period of membership service credited in the former system.
This provision supported Pasinkoff’s argument: once his earlier membership was recognized, he contended that the consequences of tier 4 membership should also reach back to his January 2020 enrollment in the receiving system.
Different contribution obligations for tiers 6 and 4
Under Retirement and Social Security Law § 613 (a), tier 6 members generally must contribute a prescribed percentage of their annual wages throughout their public service. By contrast, § 902 (b) (1), within article 19, permits qualifying tier 4 members to stop contributing after attaining 10 years of membership or 10 years of credited service.
Consequently, Pasinkoff’s transfer affected more than the historical date shown on his pension record: it moved him into a tier with a materially different contribution obligation.
The cessation date: Retirement and Social Security Law § 900 (f)
The statute defines the cessation date by reference to the latest of three dates:
- The beginning of the employee’s first payroll period commencing on or after October 1, 2000;
- The effective date on which the employee becomes eligible for the benefits provided by § 902 (b); or
- The date the employee attains 10 years of membership or, if earlier, 10 years of credited service.
The second condition was decisive. Even where the required service or membership period has been satisfied, the statute separately requires consideration of when the employee becomes eligible for the benefit.
Refund restriction: Retirement and Social Security Law § 902 (b) (2)
Subject to exceptions not relevant here, contributions made before the cessation date cannot be refunded. Selecting that date therefore determined whether Pasinkoff could recover the disputed contributions.
4. Summary of the Opinion
The court’s reasoning proceeded through five principal conclusions:
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The statutes were ambiguous as applied to this transfer. Section 43 recognizes earlier membership, but does not expressly address contribution refunds under the subsequently enacted article 19. Article 19 likewise does not expressly address § 43 transferees.
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Legislative history did not resolve the gap. The court rejected both parties’ assertions that the statutory language clearly dictated their respective positions.
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The Comptroller’s interpretation was reasonable. The agency could treat the effective transfer date as the date on which a member moving from tier 6 to tier 4 became eligible for contribution cessation.
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Pasinkoff’s competing interpretation did not justify judicial substitution. Although his reading was also reasonable, that did not permit the court to displace a reasonable agency interpretation.
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The limited refund therefore stood. The court upheld March 1, 2022 as the cessation date and affirmed without costs.
5. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning
A. Earlier membership does not automatically establish earlier eligibility for every benefit
Pasinkoff’s argument rested on the retrospective operation of § 43 (b). If the receiving system must treat him as having been a member since June 2009, his claimed entitlement to stop contributing in January 2020 had an understandable textual basis.
The court nevertheless distinguished recognition of earlier membership from the separate question of when contribution-cessation eligibility became effective. Section 900 (f) does not make length of service the sole determinant. Its “later of” structure gives independent significance to the effective date of benefit eligibility.
The agency could therefore conclude that, before his transfer became effective, Pasinkoff remained a tier 6 member without a right to the tier 4 cessation benefit. The later recognition of earlier membership did not necessarily require repayment of every contribution collected during that intervening period.
This is the decision’s central interpretive insight: a statutory provision deeming membership to have existed earlier need not automatically backdate every financial consequence of a later transfer.
B. Ambiguity made administrative deference decisive
The court did not find Pasinkoff’s construction unreasonable. Instead, it found that the relevant enactments left the specific interaction between transfer rights and refund rights unresolved.
Once that gap was identified, the controlling question was whether the Comptroller’s interpretation was irrational, unreasonable, or contrary to the statutory language. Because it was none of those things, the court deferred.
The holding is thus narrower than a declaration that every transferred member’s cessation date must equal the effective transfer date. The court expressly framed its reasoning around circumstances such as these, where a transfer from another retirement system changes the member’s classification from tier 6 to tier 4.
C. Administrative consistency reinforced the interpretation
Hearing testimony and the court’s earlier decisions indicated that the Retirement System had seemingly applied the same approach since article 19’s enactment nearly 30 years earlier. That consistency supported treating the determination as an established administrative construction rather than an ad hoc response to Pasinkoff’s claim.
A longstanding practice cannot override unambiguous statutory language. Here, however, the court had already found ambiguity, making consistent administration relevant to the reasonableness of the agency’s position.
D. Financial stability was a supporting consideration
The court also recognized the Retirement System’s concern that Pasinkoff’s interpretation could generate claims for years or decades of past contributions, together with interest. Such claims could create substantial uncertainty for retirement funds.
The opinion cited Retirement and Social Security Law § 13 (b) generally in connection with that concern. It did not hold that financial consequences alone permit withholding refunds required by law. Rather, potential fiscal disruption reinforced an interpretation already found compatible with the statutory framework.
E. The procedural correction did not eliminate substantive deference
Because the determination followed an evidentiary hearing required by statute, Pasinkoff properly raised a substantial-evidence question under CPLR 7803 (4). Supreme Court should therefore have transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division under CPLR 7804 (g), rather than deciding it itself.
The Third Department treated the proceeding as properly transferred and considered the issues directly, describing that consideration as de novo. In context, this meant that the appellate court undertook the review appropriate to a transferred proceeding. It did not mean that the court abandoned the deferential standards governing review of the Comptroller’s determination.
6. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
A. Authority of the Comptroller and limits on judicial review
- Matter of Ballard v DiNapoli, 250 AD3d 1207, 1208 [3d Dept 2026]
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The court quoted this decision for the rule that exclusive authority to determine retirement-benefit applications rests with the Comptroller and that a determination supported by substantial evidence must be upheld. It supplied the institutional starting point: the reviewing court does not decide the application anew as the benefits administrator.
- Matter of Bohlen v DiNapoli, 34 NY3d 434, 441, 445 [2020]
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This Court of Appeals decision supported both the Comptroller’s authority and the prohibition on judicial substitution where substantial evidence supports an administrative determination. Its importance was particularly clear because the court accepted that Pasinkoff offered a reasonable contrary interpretation.
- Matter of Haug v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, 32 NY3d 1044, 1045-1046 [2018]
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The court relied on this case to define substantial evidence as a minimal standard: less than a preponderance, requiring a reasonable and plausible inference rather than necessarily the most probable one. The citation explained why the existence of a competing position did not itself defeat the agency’s determination.
- Matter of Villalba v Rite Aid Pharm., 248 AD3d 1525, 1526 [3d Dept 2026]
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Cited alongside Matter of Haug v State Univ. of N.Y. at Potsdam, this decision reinforced the limited evidentiary threshold governing administrative review. The opinion used it for the review standard, not as a pension-transfer analogue.
- Matter of Denson v DiNapoli, 129 AD3d 1271, 1272 [3d Dept 2015]
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This decision supplied the formulation that the Comptroller’s statutory interpretation will be upheld if it is not irrational, unreasonable, or contrary to the statutory language. That formulation became the operative test for resolving the ambiguity here.
- Matter of Graziose v DiNapoli, 110 AD3d 1205, 1206 [3d Dept 2013]
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The quoted interpretive standard in Matter of Denson v DiNapoli originated in this decision. Together, the two authorities grounded the court’s deference to the Comptroller’s reasonable construction of the retirement statutes.
- Matter of Glozek v DiNapoli, 221 AD3d 1231, 1232 [3d Dept 2023]
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This case accorded with Matter of Bohlen v DiNapoli on the rule against substituting judicial judgment for a supported administrative determination. It reinforced the conclusion that a plausible competing interpretation was insufficient to obtain annulment.
B. Contribution cessation and established retirement-system practice
- Matter of Mariani v New York State & Local Retirement Sys., 233 AD3d 1404, 1405-1406 [3d Dept 2024]
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This was the most directly influential precedent. It supported deference to a reasonable interpretation of the retirement statutes and had already rejected the proposition that the Retirement System is invariably prohibited from retaining contributions made after 10 years.
That rejection answered an important premise of Pasinkoff’s administrative argument: reaching the 10-year threshold does not, by itself, establish an unconditional right to recover every later contribution. The case also supported treating a challenge following a required evidentiary hearing as a substantial-evidence proceeding.
- Matter of Dear v New York State & Local Retirement Sys., 115 AD3d 1141 [3d Dept 2014], lv denied 23 NY3d 905 [2014]
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The court cited this decision generally, together with the hearing testimony, as support for the longstanding nature of the agency’s approach. Its role was to corroborate administrative continuity; the opinion did not present it as independently resolving every aspect of Pasinkoff’s tier-changing transfer.
C. Proper treatment of the article 78 proceeding
- Matter of Myer Funeral Serv. Corp. v Zucker, 188 AD3d 1488, 1490 & n 3 [3d Dept 2020]
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Cited in the procedural footnote, this decision supported identifying the challenge as one involving substantial evidence where the administrative determination followed a hearing required by law. That classification triggered the transfer requirement.
- Matter of Price v New York State & Local Employees' Retirement Sys., 107 AD3d 1212, 1213-1214 [3d Dept 2013]
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This retirement-system precedent likewise supported the substantial-evidence classification and the conclusion that Supreme Court should have transferred the proceeding to the Appellate Division.
- Matter of Rensselaer Socy. of Engrs. v Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 260 AD2d 992, 993 [3d Dept 1999]
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Introduced with a “compare” citation, this case served as a procedural contrast concerning the proper review framework. The opinion did not discuss its facts or employ it to interpret pension-transfer rights.
- Matter of MacKenzie v Tedford, 208 AD3d 1526, 1527 n [3d Dept 2022]
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This decision supported the appellate court’s ability to treat the matter as properly transferred and address the issues directly, avoiding an unnecessary procedural detour.
- Matter of Sullivan County Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., Inc. v County of Sullivan, 173 AD3d 1545, 1546 [3d Dept 2019]
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This case provided additional authority for the same corrective approach. It explained how the court could resolve the merits despite Supreme Court’s failure to transfer the proceeding.
The court also cited David D. Siegel and Patrick M. Connors, New York Practice § 568, as general secondary authority on the procedural framework.
7. Impact and Limits of the Decision
Guidance for future pension-transfer disputes
The decision strengthens the Comptroller’s position in materially similar cases involving transfers that change membership from tier 6 to tier 4. A member cannot establish entitlement to an earlier cessation date merely by showing that the transfer recognizes more than 10 years of prior membership or credited service.
Future claimants will need to address the independent eligibility component of § 900 (f), not simply the service threshold. They must also overcome the court’s conclusion that using the effective transfer date is a reasonable interpretation in these circumstances.
Practical significance for employees
The timing of a transfer may have substantial financial consequences. Employees should distinguish the date a transfer is approved, its assigned effective date, the membership date recognized after transfer, and the date contributions cease. Those dates need not coincide.
Pasinkoff’s transfer was approved in June 2022, but the Retirement System used March 1, 2022 as the effective date relevant to cessation. The decision should not therefore be read as automatically making the approval date controlling.
Questions the court did not decide
- It did not announce a universal cessation rule for every kind of inter-system transfer.
- It did not hold that financial concerns can override a clear statutory refund entitlement.
- It did not disturb recognition of Pasinkoff’s earlier membership date or tier 4 classification.
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It did not decide whether erroneous advice by retirement-system employees could justify equitable relief. The Hearing Officer rejected that argument, but Pasinkoff did not pursue it in this proceeding.
The unresolved statutory interaction also remains open to legislative clarification. The court’s ruling rests on the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation of the existing provisions, not on a finding that the Legislature expressly answered the question.
8. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Pension tier
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A category of pension membership carrying particular contribution and benefit rules. Moving from tier 6 to tier 4 can change how long an employee must contribute.
- Membership and credited service
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Membership concerns participation in a retirement system; credited service concerns service recognized for pension purposes. They can differ, as illustrated by Pasinkoff’s purchase of credit for employment preceding his NYCERS enrollment.
- Cessation date
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The date from which an eligible employee is no longer required to contribute. Under the statute at issue, it depends on several timing conditions, not solely on completing 10 years.
- “Later of” formula
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When a statute lists several dates and selects the latest, satisfying one condition early does not eliminate a later condition. Ten years of service therefore does not necessarily settle when contribution cessation begins.
- Substantial evidence
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A limited administrative-review standard requiring a reasonable and plausible evidentiary basis, rather than proof that the agency reached the only possible or most probable conclusion.
- Administrative deference
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Judicial acceptance of a reasonable agency interpretation within the framework applied by the court. Here, statutory ambiguity and the reasonableness of the Comptroller’s construction were critical.
- CPLR article 78 proceeding
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A New York judicial proceeding used to challenge government action. A substantial-evidence challenge to a determination following a legally required hearing generally belongs before the Appellate Division through the statutory transfer process.
9. Conclusion
Matter of Pasinkoff v New York State & Local Retirement Sys. establishes that recognition of earlier pension membership does not automatically compel an equally retrospective contribution refund. For a transfer changing membership from tier 6 to tier 4, the Comptroller may reasonably treat the transfer’s effective date as the beginning of contribution-cessation eligibility.
The broader lesson is that service credit, tier classification, and the effective date of a particular benefit are distinct legal questions. Where the statutes leave their interaction unresolved, a reasonable administrative interpretation can prevail even over an alternative reading the court also considers reasonable.