Third Circuit’s Brookins Rule: Mandatory Content for Anders Briefs in Supervised Release Revocation Appeals

Introduction

In United States v. Anthony Brookins (3d Cir. Apr. 1, 2025) (precedential), the Third Circuit issued a significant appellate-practice decision at the intersection of Anders v. California and supervised release revocation. The case arose after appellant Anthony Brookins admitted a Grade C violation for failing to comply with court-ordered substance abuse treatment, prompting the district court to revoke supervised release, impose 14 months’ imprisonment, and add a new term of supervision with special conditions including an intensive inpatient drug program and a no-contact order with the alleged victim of domestic incidents.

On appeal, court-appointed counsel filed what the panel described as a “woefully inadequate” Anders brief and moved to withdraw. The Government, by contrast, filed an extensive merits brief that effectively did the work counsel should have done. Rather than adjudicate the appeal on that one-sided presentation, the Third Circuit discharged counsel, directed appointment of substitute counsel under Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a), and—crucially—set out a clear, precedential framework specifying what an Anders brief must contain when an appellant challenges a revocation of supervised release after admitting the violation.

This commentary explains the decision, the legal standards the court synthesized, and the new, practice-shaping “Brookins Rule” for Anders briefs in revocation appeals.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit (Judge Smith, joined by Judges Hardiman and Ambro) held that an Anders brief filed in a supervised release revocation appeal following an admission of violation is inadequate unless it:

• Addresses the sufficiency of the revocation proceeding under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2) and 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), including:
  • whether there is a factual basis for the admitted violation proved by a preponderance of the evidence (§ 3583(e)(3)); and
  • whether the admission was knowing and voluntary, assessed under the totality of the circumstances (drawing on Manuel and analogous due process principles).
• Analyzes the legality and propriety of the revocation sentence under § 3583(e), § 3742(a), and the Chapter 7 policy statements (including the Grade of violation and the § 7B1.4 Revocation Table), and evaluates overall reasonableness (Bungar).
• Considers, as relevant to adequacy, issues flagged by any pro se informal brief filed under 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a) (per Langley).

Finding counsel’s submission failed to meet these obligations and offered only the kind of “bare conclusion” condemned in Anders, the court rejected the brief, discharged counsel, and directed the appointment of substitute counsel. The court declined to decide the merits on the Government’s exhaustive brief alone to avoid condoning deficient Anders practice and to protect the adversarial process and indigent defendants’ right to meaningful appellate advocacy.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

• Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963): Underscored the fundamental right to counsel and the need for non-discriminatory treatment of indigent defendants. Brookins reaffirms that the right to meaningful appellate advocacy persists in Anders contexts.
• Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Established that appointed counsel who finds an appeal frivolous must move to withdraw and file a brief “referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal.” Brookins applies Anders rigorously, rejecting “bare conclusions.”
• Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988): Identified Anders “safeguards”: counsel’s conscientious review, the Anders brief’s assistance to the court, and the appellate court’s own “full examination.” Brookins relies on Penson to insist that courts should not proceed rudderless without a compliant Anders brief.
• McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U.S. 429 (1988); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000): Clarified that “wholly frivolous” means lacking any basis in law or fact, and that adversarial presentation is still required unless the appeal is truly frivolous. Brookins uses these definitions to calibrate adequacy review.
• Third Circuit Anders line: United States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 2000); United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Langley, 52 F.4th 564 (3d Cir. 2022). These cases define counsel’s duties (scour the record; explain why identified issues are frivolous) and the court’s two-step review (adequacy of counsel’s submission; independent review for non-frivolous issues). Brookins extends this framework to the revocation context and clarifies how pro se submissions figure into adequacy.
• Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973): Established minimum due process protections in revocations. Brookins channels Morrissey/Gagnon via Rule 32.1 to define what an Anders brief must evaluate about the revocation hearing.
• United States v. Manuel, 732 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2013): Applied a knowing-and-voluntary standard to waivers of Rule 32.1 rights in revocation proceedings. Brookins leverages Manuel to require Anders briefs to discuss the knowing and voluntary nature of an admission, even though Boykin has not been formally extended to revocation admissions.
• Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000): Confirmed revocation is part of the original sentence and may involve conduct that is not itself a new crime. Brookins employs this to frame standards applicable to revocation factfinding and process.
• United States v. Dees, 467 F.3d 847 (3d Cir. 2006): Described Chapter 7’s Revocation Table for imprisonment ranges. Brookins requires counsel to engage with Ch. 7 when assessing the sentence’s legality/propriety.
• United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2007): Set reasonableness review for revocation sentences. Brookins incorporates reasonableness into Anders adequacy for sentencing.
• Ancillary procedural precedents: Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (prison mailbox rule, ensuring timely notice of appeal); United States v. Muhammud, 701 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 2012) (criminal appeal timeliness non-jurisdictional). Included to confirm jurisdiction and timeliness in Brookins.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three integrated steps:

1. Anchoring in Anders/Penson and Third Circuit precedents (Marvin/Youla/Langley), the panel reiterates that adequacy turns on two core duties:
   • Counsel must thoroughly examine the record and identify anything that might arguably support the appeal; and
   • Counsel must explain why any potential issues are frivolous.
   Brookins emphasizes that perfunctory, conclusory filings—especially those omitting core record materials like the revocation transcript—violate these duties.
2. Translating these duties to the revocation context, the court draws an analogy to guilty-plea Anders practice (Langley) and articulates a structured, two-part analysis Anders counsel must perform in revocation appeals after an admission:
   • Revocation hearing sufficiency: Because Rule 32.1(b)(2) embodies Morrissey/Gagnon due process safeguards, counsel must discuss the district court’s compliance with that rule. Since Rule 32.1 does not identify the burden of proof, counsel must evaluate the § 3583(e)(3) preponderance standard and the existence of a factual basis for the violation. Further, while Boykin’s formal plea colloquy requirements have not been extended to revocation admissions, due process still requires a knowing and voluntary admission; counsel’s Anders brief must analyze that requirement under the totality of the circumstances (Manuel).
   • Revocation sentence legality/propriety: Counsel must test the sentence against § 3583(e) (including consideration of relevant § 3553(a) factors), § 3742(a) (appellate standards for sentencing error), and Chapter 7’s classification and advisory ranges (e.g., Grade C violations; § 7B1.4), and assess reasonableness (Bungar). This includes imprisonment, any reimposed supervised release term, and special conditions.
3. Addressing pro se participation: Echoing Langley, the panel clarifies that counsel’s failure to rebut arguments in a pro se informal brief is not per se inadequate, but silence may evidence a broader failure to identify and discuss potentially appealable issues. In Brookins, the court did not need to rely on this point because counsel’s brief was plainly deficient on its face.

Finally, the court applies Local Appellate Rule 109.2(a): When an Anders brief is inadequate to assist the court, the remedy is to appoint substitute counsel, order supplemental briefing, and restore the case to the calendar. The court declined to proceed on the Government’s comprehensive merits brief alone to avoid normalizing deficient defense submissions and to preserve the adversarial structure Anders is designed to protect.

Impact and Practical Significance

Brookins is a watershed Third Circuit opinion for appellate practice in supervised release revocation cases. It establishes a concrete, precedential checklist for Anders briefs in this setting, with several practical consequences:

• Defense counsel obligations:
  • Transcripts and record: Counsel must obtain and review the revocation hearing transcript and all relevant materials. Filing an Anders brief without the transcript is virtually per se suspect.
  • Revocation sufficiency analysis: Counsel must address Rule 32.1(b)(2) compliance, the preponderance/factual basis standard (§ 3583(e)(3)), and the knowing-and-voluntary nature of any admission (totality of circumstances, per Manuel). Omission of any of these elements jeopardizes adequacy.
  • Sentencing review: Counsel must evaluate the grade of violation, the advisory range under § 7B1.4, the statutory caps and “after considering” factors under § 3583(e), the appellant’s grounds for appellate review (§ 3742(a)), and overall reasonableness. Special conditions (e.g., inpatient treatment, no-contact orders) must be tied to § 3553(a) factors and § 3583(d)’s “reasonably related/no greater deprivation than necessary” limits.
  • Pro se submissions: Counsel should anticipate and, where appropriate, respond to issues pro se appellants raise, as silence can weigh against adequacy.
• District courts: Although the opinion regulates appellate briefs, it will likely prompt trial judges to more clearly:
  • Build a record confirming the factual basis for the violation by a preponderance of the evidence; and
  • Establish on the record the defendant’s understanding and voluntariness when an admission is made, even if formal Rule 11 procedures do not apply.
  • Articulate reasons for imprisonment terms and special conditions, to support reasonableness review.
• Government briefing: The court’s refusal to decide merits on a Government brief alone signals that prosecutors should not expect to shoulder defense counsel’s Anders obligations by default.
• Indigent appellants: Brookins strengthens the assurance that indigent defendants receive the functional equivalent of paid appellate advocacy—“a diligent and thorough review of the record and an identification of any arguable issues”—before a court deems an appeal wholly frivolous.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anders brief: If appointed counsel thinks an appeal is frivolous, counsel cannot simply “quit.” Counsel must move to withdraw and file a brief pointing to anything in the record that could arguably support the appeal, enabling the court to independently confirm whether the appeal truly lacks merit.
• “Wholly frivolous”: An appeal with no arguable basis in law or fact. If any issue is debatable on the merits, the appeal is not wholly frivolous, and full adversarial briefing is required.
• Revocation vs. criminal prosecution: Revocation is not a new prosecution; it addresses a breach of the court’s trust and is part of the original sentence. Thus, full criminal trial rights do not apply, but minimum due process does.
• Rule 32.1(b)(2): Codifies due process protections in revocation hearings, including notice, disclosure of evidence, an opportunity to be heard and to question adverse witnesses, and a right to counsel.
• Preponderance of the evidence (§ 3583(e)(3)): The factfinder must be at least 51% persuaded that the violation occurred—a lower threshold than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
• Knowing and voluntary admission (revocation): While Boykin formalities do not govern, the defendant’s admission must still be made with awareness of the nature and consequences, evaluated under the totality of the circumstances.
• Grade C violation; § 7B1.4 Revocation Table: The Guidelines classify violations (A/B/C) and provide advisory imprisonment ranges based on the grade and criminal history; these ranges guide, but do not control, the revocation sentence.
• Reasonableness review (Bungar): The appellate court examines whether the revocation sentence is procedurally and substantively reasonable in light of § 3553(a) factors incorporated by § 3583(e).
• Special conditions of supervised release: Must be reasonably related to rehabilitation, deterrence, public protection, and the defendant’s needs, and must not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary (§ 3583(d)).
• 3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a): If an Anders brief is inadequate, the court appoints substitute counsel and restores the case for proper adversarial briefing.

Case Background and Application

Brookins was convicted in 2009 of firearm and drug offenses (sentences concurrent; later reduced under the First Step Act). After release, he began supervised release in December 2019. In 2023, a revocation petition alleged six violations. At the hearing, the Government withdrew five allegations (including new-law domestic assault/harassment charges and positive drug tests), and the case proceeded solely on violation 5—a failure to comply with required substance abuse testing and treatment (Grade C). Brookins admitted the violation, acknowledged substance use in the context of domestic incidents, and expressed a desire for help. The district court imposed 14 months’ imprisonment and reimposed supervision with special conditions including intensive inpatient treatment and a no-contact order.

On appeal, appointed counsel filed a skeletal Anders brief lacking basic facts (e.g., what the violation was, what the sentence was), omitted the hearing transcript, and failed to analyze revocation sufficiency or sentencing legality/reasonableness. The appellant’s pro se brief raised concrete issues (no-contact condition, the top-of-range sentence, inpatient treatment mandate, procedural adequacy of pronouncing conditions, and discovery), while the Government filed a thorough merits brief. The Third Circuit held counsel’s submission was unacceptable under Anders, rejected it, and appointed new counsel for proper adversarial briefing—explicitly declining to resolve the merits on the Government’s presentation so as not to erode Anders safeguards.

The Brookins Rule: A Practical Checklist

For Anders briefs in supervised release revocation appeals after an admission, counsel should ensure the brief—backed by the full record and transcript—addresses at least:

• Revocation Hearing Sufficiency
  • Rule 32.1(b)(2) compliance: notice; disclosure of adverse evidence; opportunity to speak, present evidence, and question adverse witnesses; representation by counsel; statement of reasons.
  • Standard and factual basis: Whether the record (including any admissions and corroborating evidence) supports the violation by a preponderance of the evidence (§ 3583(e)(3)).
  • Knowing and voluntary admission: Under the totality of circumstances (Manuel), did the defendant understand the nature of the violation, the consequences, and the rights being relinquished?
• Sentence Legality and Reasonableness
  • Correct grading (§ 7B1.1) and advisory range (§ 7B1.4); accurate criminal history category.
  • Statutory caps and authorized sanctions under § 3583(e) (and § 3583(h) if a new supervision term is imposed).
  • Consideration of relevant § 3553(a) factors “after considering” language of § 3583(e); procedural soundness.
  • Special conditions: Whether conditions (e.g., no-contact; inpatient treatment) are reasonably related to statutory goals and no more restrictive than necessary (§ 3583(d)).
  • Overall reasonableness (Bungar), addressing any pro se arguments that are not facially frivolous.
• Pro Se Informal Brief
  • Identify and discuss material issues the appellant raises pro se, or explain why they are frivolous or outside the permissible scope of review; silence may evidence inadequacy (Langley).
• Record Sufficiency
  • Append all critical documents, including the revocation hearing transcript, judgment, petitions, and any exhibits necessary to evaluate factual basis and sentencing.

Conclusion

United States v. Brookins establishes a clear, precedential framework in the Third Circuit for Anders practice in appeals from revocation of supervised release following an admission of violation. The court holds that adequacy demands a two-part analysis: (1) the sufficiency of the revocation proceeding under Rule 32.1 and § 3583(e), including a factual basis by preponderance and a knowing and voluntary admission; and (2) the legality, propriety, and reasonableness of the revocation sentence under § 3583(e), § 3742(a), and Chapter 7, including any reimposed supervision and special conditions. The court also emphasizes that pro se submissions can illuminate unaddressed non-frivolous issues and that, when an Anders brief is inadequate, substitute counsel must be appointed under L.A.R. 109.2(a).

Beyond setting guardrails for counsel, Brookins reinforces core constitutional values: indigent defendants are entitled to the functional equivalent of retained appellate advocacy; the adversarial system must not be short-circuited by perfunctory filings; and appellate courts require meaningful assistance to determine whether an appeal is truly “wholly frivolous.” As a practical matter, Brookins will improve the quality of Anders submissions, encourage more robust revocation records in district courts, and safeguard the fairness of appellate review in the supervised release context.