Third Circuit Reaffirms: Public Defender Appeal Filings Are Not “State Action” Under § 1983; Conclusory Supervisory “Policy” Allegations Fail Under Iqbal

Case: Ashley Georges v. Helen C. Godby; Yvonne Smith Segars (3d Cir. No. 24-1884)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

Panel: Restrepo, Freeman, and Nygaard, Circuit Judges

Disposition: Summary affirmance of dismissal; opinion filed March 24, 2025 (not precedential)

Introduction

This appeal arises from a pro se state prisoner’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that delays and miscommunication by personnel within the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender (NJOPD) during state post-conviction relief (PCR) proceedings caused him to miss the one-year federal limitation period under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) for filing a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. The plaintiff, Ashley Georges, sought damages and relief on the theory that his right of access to the courts was impeded by various state and county entities, prosecutors, and public defenders.

Over several iterations, the District Court screened and dismissed his complaints under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Ultimately, Georges’ third amended complaint narrowed the defendants to two public defender officials—Helen C. Godby (an NJOPD Intake Unit attorney) and Yvonne Smith Segars (then the NJOPD supervisor). He alleged that Godby misinformed him about the filing of his notice of appeal (NOA) in his PCR case and filed it late, which in turn allowed AEDPA’s one-year period to expire; and that Segars maintained a policy or practice that tolerated late filings or failed to train and supervise to prevent them.

The Third Circuit summarily affirmed the District Court’s dismissal with prejudice, holding that: (1) public defenders are not state actors for § 1983 purposes when performing traditional advocacy functions, such as filing notices of appeal and communicating with clients; (2) conclusory assertions of an office-wide “policy” or a failure-to-train/supervise theory—unsupported by factual content beyond a single incident—do not satisfy federal pleading standards; and (3) previously dismissed claims against state agencies and prosecutors were barred by sovereign and absolute immunity doctrines. Although designated “not precedential,” the opinion reinforces settled doctrines that shape prisoner civil-rights litigation at the intersection of post-conviction practice, prosecutorial immunity, and § 1983’s state-action requirement.

Summary of the Opinion

The court exercised plenary review of the § 1915(e)(2) dismissal and concluded the appeal presented no substantial question, warranting summary affirmance.
Public defenders as non-state actors: Applying Polk County v. Dodson, the court held that Godby’s alleged misadvice and the late filing of a PCR notice of appeal are traditional functions of defense counsel and therefore not “under color of state law” for § 1983 purposes.
Supervisory “policy/failure-to-train” claim inadequately pled: Even assuming Segars’ conduct could be characterized as administrative, Georges offered only bare assertions of an office-wide policy or training deficiency, unsupported by factual allegations beyond his own case. Under Iqbal and Santiago, that is insufficient.
Immunities bar claims against previously named defendants:
- State agencies (NJOPD, New Jersey Supreme Court, NJ DOC) are immune under the Eleventh Amendment.
- The Essex County Prosecutor’s Office (ECPO) is an arm of the State when performing law enforcement and investigative functions and is not a “person” under § 1983 in that capacity.
- Individual prosecutors (McTigue and Rosenkrans) have absolute immunity for advocative acts, including withholding exculpatory evidence and litigation conduct during post-conviction proceedings.
- Public defenders Bohrod and Buckley are not state actors when litigating PCR matters.
No abuse of discretion in denying further leave to amend: After multiple prior amendments and dismissals, the District Court properly found further amendment would be futile.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): The court applied Iqbal’s plausibility standard, requiring factual matter that nudges claims across the line from conceivable to plausible. Georges’ allegations against Segars—asserting a policy/custom or training failure—were conclusory and lacked supporting facts, falling short under Iqbal.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam): While pro se pleadings are liberally construed, they must still satisfy minimal pleading standards. The court acknowledged liberal construction but enforced Iqbal’s requirements.
Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 2012): Confirmed that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, factual allegations are accepted as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam): Authorized summary affirmance where the appeal presents no substantial question, as here.
Estate of Lagano v. Bergen County Prosecutor’s Office, 769 F.3d 850 (3d Cir. 2014): Provided the “arm of the State” framework for New Jersey county prosecutors: when engaged in classic law enforcement and investigative functions, they act as State officials. Thus, ECPO is not a “person” for § 1983 in that capacity, and state agencies (NJOPD, NJSC, NJDOC) are Eleventh Amendment-immune.
Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1996): Quoted to underscore that New Jersey county prosecutors act as State officers in their law enforcement/investigative roles.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976): The cornerstone of absolute prosecutorial immunity for advocative functions intimately associated with the judicial process.
Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2006): Clarified that absolute immunity can extend to post-conviction proceedings where the prosecutor remains an advocate, including in alleged suppression of exculpatory material.
Odd v. Malone, 538 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2008): Reaffirmed prosecutorial immunity for initiating prosecutions and presenting the State’s case, including malicious prosecution claims.
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981): Established that public defenders do not act under color of state law when performing traditional defense functions. The court applied Polk County to conclude that filing (or failing to file) a notice of appeal and communicating with a client are quintessential defense functions.
Powell v. Davis, 415 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2005): Cited as persuasive authority narrowing the so-called “administrative” exception in Polk County; public defender case-management priorities are not the type of administrative acts (e.g., hiring, budgeting) that would convert the office into a state actor for § 1983 purposes.
Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2010): Used to reject bare assertions of policy/custom or failure-to-train/supervise. A single incident (the late filing of one NOA) does not plausibly establish an office-wide practice or deliberate indifference.
Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103 (3d Cir. 2002): Supports the District Court’s decision to deny further leave to amend where amendment would be futile—particularly after multiple opportunities to cure deficiencies.
U.S. ex rel. Atkinson v. Pennsylvania Shipbuilding Co., 473 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2007): Addresses preservation on appeal: claims previously dismissed with prejudice remained reviewable; those dismissed without prejudice did not.

Legal Reasoning

The court proceeded in three principal steps: (1) disposing of previously dismissed sets of claims via immunity and state-action doctrines; (2) addressing the third amended complaint’s two claims against NJOPD personnel; and (3) affirming denial of further leave to amend.

Immunities and non-person status (previously dismissed defendants):
- Eleventh Amendment immunity: The NJOPD, the New Jersey Supreme Court, and the NJ Department of Corrections are state agencies and thus immune from suit in federal court. This erects a jurisdictional bar in § 1983 damages actions against the State and its arms.
- County prosecutors as arms of the State: Under Lagano and Coleman, when undertaking quintessential law enforcement or investigative tasks, the ECPO functions as an arm of the State. As such, it is not a “person” under § 1983 for those acts, and cannot be sued for damages on that basis.
- Absolute prosecutorial immunity: Individual prosecutors McTigue and Rosenkrans were alleged to have concealed exculpatory evidence and engaged in malicious prosecution or post-conviction misconduct. Imbler, Yarris, and Odd collectively establish that such advocative conduct is cloaked with absolute immunity, even during post-conviction proceedings if the prosecutor continues in the role of advocate.
- Public defenders performing litigation: Public defenders Bohrod and Buckley were sued for their PCR and PCR-appeal work. Polk County forecloses § 1983 claims premised on a defender’s core advocacy functions; they do not act “under color of state law” in those roles.
Third amended complaint against Godby and Segars:
- Godby (NJOPD Intake Unit): Georges alleged that Godby misrepresented the status of his PCR notice of appeal and filed it late, which purportedly allowed his federal habeas limitations period to expire. The court held that both filing an NOA and communicating with a client are traditional defense functions, squarely within Polk County’s non-state-actor rule. The narrow suggestion in Polk County that a defender might act under color of law in certain “administrative” or “investigative” capacities did not apply to these allegations.
- Segars (NJOPD supervisor): Georges advanced two theories: (a) Segars created or tolerated an office-wide “policy or custom” of late PCR appeal filings; and/or (b) Segars failed to train or supervise staff to prevent such delays. The court gave Georges the benefit of the doubt by assuming, arguendo, that supervisory acts can be “administrative” in the Polk County sense. Even so, the complaint still failed Iqbal’s plausibility threshold. The only concrete factual allegation was a single late filing in Georges’ own case. That lone instance does not plausibly establish a policy/custom or deliberate indifference in training or supervision. Powell v. Davis reinforced that routine case-management choices do not transform a public defender’s office into a state actor, and Santiago demands factual content beyond bare conclusions to support policy/failure-to-train claims.
Futility and leave to amend:
- After multiple prior amendments and targeted dismissals, the District Court concluded further amendment would be futile. Applying Grayson, the Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion in denying additional leave to amend.

Impact and Implications

While not precedential, the opinion reinforces several settled, practice-shaping propositions in the Third Circuit:

Limits of § 1983 for post-conviction defense errors: Claims that public defenders mishandled PCR filings—even where adverse downstream consequences are alleged, such as the loss of federal habeas timeliness—generally cannot proceed under § 1983 because defenders are not state actors when performing traditional advocacy and client-communication functions.
Narrow scope of any “administrative” exception for public defenders: The decision cautions that merely labeling supervisory choices “administrative” is insufficient. Case-management decisions and isolated missteps will not convert a public defender office into a state actor under § 1983.
Pleading rigor for policy/custom and failure-to-train claims: Plaintiffs must allege concrete facts (e.g., patterns, prior incidents, specific directives or omissions) to plausibly infer an office-wide custom or deliberate indifference. A single incident, without more, will not suffice under Iqbal and Santiago.
Prosecutorial and sovereign immunities remain robust: Prosecutors retain absolute immunity for advocative acts at trial and in post-conviction proceedings; state agencies are shielded by the Eleventh Amendment. Plaintiffs must carefully identify non-immune actors and non-advocative conduct to state a viable claim.
Procedural posture matters: The court’s reliance on Local Appellate Rule 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 underscores that appeals lacking a substantial question will be resolved summarily—especially where multiple opportunities to amend have not cured foundational defects like immunity or state-action bars.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Under color of state law” (state action): To sue under § 1983, the defendant must be a state actor. Public defenders, when performing typical defense-lawyer tasks (investigating, advising, filing motions/appeals), are considered adversaries of the State—not state actors. Thus, their ordinary lawyering cannot ground a § 1983 claim.
Administrative exception for public defenders: Polk County left a narrow door open for potential state action when public defenders perform certain administrative tasks. Courts construe this exception tightly. Routine case management, prioritization, or an isolated late filing does not meet it.
Eleventh Amendment immunity: This doctrine protects States and their agencies from suits in federal court, typically barring damages claims against entities like a state supreme court, a state department of corrections, or a state public defender office.
“Arm of the State” and county prosecutors (New Jersey): When county prosecutors perform law enforcement or investigative functions, they act for the State. In those capacities, their offices are not “persons” under § 1983, and individual prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity for advocative acts.
Absolute prosecutorial immunity: Prosecutors cannot be sued for damages for actions intimately associated with the judicial process—such as decisions related to charging, advocacy in court, or even post-conviction litigation activities like responding to PCR claims—because these functions are considered “advocative.”
Policy/custom and failure-to-train/supervise: To plausibly allege an office policy or a training/supervision failure, a complaint needs facts suggesting a pattern or deliberate indifference—not just conclusions or a single error. Courts look for multiple incidents, identifiable practices, or specific training deficiencies tied to the injury.
AEDPA’s one-year limitation: Federal habeas petitions under § 2254 must generally be filed within one year of a state conviction becoming final, subject to limited tolling rules. A late state appellate filing can affect the tolling calculus, but alleged defender errors in that process do not automatically create a federal § 1983 claim.
Summary affirmance: Under the Third Circuit’s internal operating procedures, an appeal that presents no substantial legal question can be affirmed quickly, without full briefing or argument.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision in Georges confirms, once again, that § 1983 is a poor vehicle for challenging a public defender’s litigation-related performance in post-conviction practice. Filing a notice of appeal and communicating with a client are archetypal defense functions under Polk County, foreclosing state-action arguments. Efforts to reframe such a dispute as a systemic “policy” or a failure-to-train claim must clear Iqbal’s plausibility bar with concrete factual content—something a single late filing cannot supply.

On the enforcement side, the opinion underscores the continued vitality of sovereign and absolute immunity doctrines in screening out claims against state agencies and prosecutorial actors performing advocative roles. Procedurally, it illustrates the Third Circuit’s willingness to summarily affirm dismissals where multiple amendments fail to overcome threshold barriers like state action and immunity.

Though not precedential, the opinion offers clear guidance for litigants: identify non-immune defendants, allege state action with specificity, and support any “policy” or “failure to train” theories with facts indicating more than an isolated error. Absent such showings, § 1983 claims premised on post-conviction defense missteps will not proceed in federal court.