Third Circuit Reaffirms Enforcement of Broad Plea-Agreement Appellate Waivers Absent a “Miscarriage of Justice”

Introduction

In United States v. Leroy Roebuck, Jr. (3d Cir. May 27, 2026), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit enforced a plea-agreement appellate waiver and affirmed a 97-month sentence imposed by the District Court of the Virgin Islands. The case arose after Leroy Roebuck, Jr. pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and (b)(1)(C), an offense carrying a statutory maximum of 20 years (240 months).

The plea agreement reflected a familiar bargain: the Government promised to recommend a sentence of no more than 71 months, and Roebuck agreed—expressly and broadly—to waive his right to appeal (and to collaterally attack) any sentence within the statutory maximum and the manner by which it was determined. Although the Government recommended 71 months at sentencing, the District Court imposed 97 months (the low end of the advisory Guidelines range). Roebuck appealed anyway, challenging the sentence length by disputing the weight given to mitigating factors.

The core issues on appeal were (1) whether Roebuck’s claim fell within the waiver’s scope, (2) whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and (3) whether enforcing the waiver would work a “miscarriage of justice.”

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed, holding that Roebuck’s appellate waiver was enforceable. Applying its established framework, the court concluded:

  • Roebuck’s challenge to the District Court’s weighing of mitigating factors directly fell within the waiver’s scope.
  • The waiver was entered knowingly and voluntarily, as confirmed by the plea agreement’s text and the Rule 11 plea colloquy.
  • No “miscarriage of justice” would result from enforcing the waiver, particularly where the sentence was below the statutory maximum and at the bottom of the advisory Guidelines range.

Accordingly, the court enforced the appellate waiver and affirmed the judgment.

Note: The panel labeled the disposition “not … binding precedent” under I.O.P. 5.7, but it applies and synthesizes established Third Circuit waiver doctrine.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The opinion is best read as a disciplined application of an existing line of Third Circuit appellate-waiver decisions rather than the creation of a new test. The cited authorities supply each step of the court’s framework.

1) The governing three-part enforceability test

The court anchored its analysis in United States v. Grimes, which restates the Third Circuit’s standard: enforce an appellate waiver if (1) the issue falls within the waiver’s scope, (2) the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and (3) enforcing it would not work a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Wilson is cited within that formulation and functions as supporting authority for the same three-part structure.

2) Scope: “any sentence within the maximum” includes challenges to sentencing discretion

To confirm that Roebuck’s claim was covered, the panel relied on the waiver’s breadth (waiving appeal of “any sentence within the maximum” and “the manner in which that sentence was determined”). It then invoked United States v. Goodson, which enforced a similar waiver where the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum (there, 240 months). The Roebuck panel used Goodson to reinforce a straightforward proposition: when a sentence is within the statutory ceiling and the waiver language is broad, challenges to the sentence’s length or methodology are ordinarily barred.

3) Knowing and voluntary: text + colloquy, with Rule 11 safeguards

The knowing-and-voluntary inquiry drew from three cases:

  • United States v. Gwinnett—supports examining both the plea agreement and the plea colloquy, and validates enforcement where waiver terms are clear and acknowledged.
  • United States v. Mabry—provides detail on what courts look for (breadth, counsel’s explanation, defendant’s acknowledgement) and ties the colloquy inquiry to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N) (the rule requiring the court to ensure the defendant understands any appellate-waiver provision).
  • Garza v. Idaho—is cited parenthetically in connection with Mabry as “abrogated on other grounds,” signaling that the core waiver-enforcement framework used here remains intact, even if some distinct aspect of Mabry has been superseded in another context.

Applying these cases, the panel emphasized that Roebuck affirmed in writing and orally that he understood he was waiving appeal of any within-max sentence, and the colloquy confirmed the maximum penalties and the possibility that the sentencing court could impose a higher sentence than any estimate or recommendation.

4) Miscarriage-of-justice safety valve: narrow, factor-based, and rarely satisfied by routine sentencing complaints

The opinion’s final step relied on United States v. Khattak, the Third Circuit’s foundational “miscarriage of justice” case. Khattak rejected a categorical approach and instead adopted a flexible, multi-factor inquiry (quoting United States v. Teeter) considering: the clarity, gravity, and character of the error; the impact on the defendant and the government; and the extent of defendant’s acquiescence.

In concluding that no miscarriage of justice existed, the panel cited United States v. Banks, which rejected the notion that enforcing a waiver to bar a challenge to a sentence well below the statutory maximum can constitute a miscarriage of justice. The panel also quoted Mabry for the proposition that enforcing a valid waiver is often “in line with justice,” not contrary to it.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Scope: Roebuck’s claim—arguing the District Court misweighed mitigating factors—attacked “the manner in which [the] sentence was determined.” Because the waiver extended to “any sentence within the maximum” and the 97-month sentence was far below 240 months, the claim was covered.
  2. Knowing and voluntary: The court treated the waiver as a contract-like term of the plea bargain, enforceable when the record shows comprehension and assent. The plea colloquy confirmed Roebuck was advised of (a) the maximum penalties, (b) the non-binding nature of estimates and recommendations, and (c) the existence and effect of the appellate waiver, satisfying the court’s Rule 11(b)(1)(N) expectations as described in Mabry.
  3. Miscarriage of justice: The panel framed Roebuck’s argument as a routine sentencing dispute (weight of mitigation) rather than an extraordinary error. The sentence was (a) within the statutory range and (b) at the low end of the advisory Guidelines range—facts that strongly cut against finding “unusual circumstances” under Khattak and Teeter. The court thus declined to use the safety valve to undo an otherwise valid waiver.

A notable subtext is institutional: the opinion defends the stability of plea bargaining. If defendants could freely disregard waivers whenever disappointed by sentencing outcomes, prosecutors would have diminished incentive to make concessions. Enforcing waivers preserves the reliability of negotiated resolutions.

Impact

Although designated nonprecedential, the decision consolidates several practical takeaways that will likely influence how parties litigate and administer plea agreements in the Third Circuit:

  • Routine sentencing disagreements remain poor vehicles for escaping waivers. Challenges to the weighing of mitigating factors—especially when the sentence is within the statutory maximum and within (or at the bottom of) the advisory Guidelines range—are unlikely to qualify as “miscarriage of justice” claims.
  • Clear waiver drafting plus a careful colloquy is decisive. The panel’s reliance on the written waiver and the magistrate’s questioning underscores that meticulous Rule 11 practice (explicit acknowledgment of waiver effect and statutory exposure) substantially insulates waivers from later attack.
  • Government recommendations do not narrow the waiver unless the agreement says so. Roebuck’s disappointment stemmed from the District Court’s higher sentence than the Government’s recommendation, yet the court treated that outcome as an assumed risk under an agreement that explicitly warned the court could impose up to the statutory maximum.
  • District of the Virgin Islands practice: The opinion’s description of the magistrate judge’s role under Local Rule 59.1 signals that waiver validity will be assessed by the same standard so long as the record reflects a proper advisement and understanding.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Appellate waiver
A provision in a plea agreement where the defendant gives up (waives) the right to appeal certain issues—often including any sentence that stays within the statutory maximum. Courts generally enforce these waivers if the defendant understood and agreed to them.
Plea colloquy
The in-court question-and-answer proceeding where the judge (or magistrate judge) confirms the defendant understands the plea, the rights being waived, the potential penalties, and key terms like an appellate waiver.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1)(N)
A rule requiring the court to inform the defendant of, and ensure the defendant understands, any plea-agreement term waiving the right to appeal (or collaterally attack) the sentence.
Advisory Guidelines range
A sentencing range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines that informs—but does not control—the court’s sentencing decision after Booker. A sentence at the “low end” is at the bottom of that calculated range.
Miscarriage of justice (waiver context)
A narrow safety valve allowing a court to refuse enforcement of an otherwise valid waiver in unusual, extreme situations—assessed using factors described in United States v. Khattak (quoting United States v. Teeter). Ordinary dissatisfaction with the court’s sentencing discretion usually does not qualify.
De novo review
An appellate standard of review meaning the court considers an issue anew, without deferring to the district court’s conclusions—used here for the validity and scope of the waiver.

Conclusion

United States v. Leroy Roebuck, Jr. reinforces the Third Circuit’s consistent approach: a broad appellate waiver will be enforced when the defendant’s claim falls within its scope, the waiver was entered knowingly and voluntarily (as verified through the agreement and the Rule 11 colloquy), and enforcement does not produce a “miscarriage of justice.” The opinion underscores that routine sentencing challenges—such as disputes over the weight of mitigating factors—do not ordinarily justify bypassing a valid waiver, even when the ultimate sentence exceeds the Government’s recommendation but remains within the statutory maximum and within the advisory Guidelines range.