Third Circuit: No Duty to Accommodate or Provide FMLA Leave Without Clear, Timely Notice—Disability Laws Do Not Excuse Misconduct
I. Introduction
In Cheryl Hileman v. West Penn Allegheny Health System Inc., d/b/a Forbes Hospital
(3d Cir. July 20, 2026), the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer on claims under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), and the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA).
The case arose after Cheryl Hileman, a midnight-shift CAT-scan technologist, was terminated for alleged misconduct—most notably,
sleeping on duty in violation of hospital policy.
The appeal presented two clusters of issues:
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Merits: Whether West Penn unlawfully discriminated, retaliated, failed to accommodate, wrongfully terminated,
or interfered with FMLA rights when Hileman disclosed diabetes and medication-related fatigue only after being confronted
in an investigation for sleeping on the job—and never clearly requested an accommodation or leave.
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Appellate practice and professionalism: Whether the record could be supplemented on appeal, and whether sanctions
were warranted for a motion containing misquotations (potentially attributable to unreliable secondary preparation).
The court framed the core principle succinctly: disability-discrimination and medical-leave laws are “shields against discrimination,
not get-out-of-discipline-free cards.” An employer’s duty to accommodate or provide leave is triggered by adequate notice and a clear
request (or obvious need), not by post hoc reframing of discipline as discrimination.
II. Summary of the Opinion
The Third Circuit held:
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No supplementation of the record: The court refused to expand the appellate record with materials not presented at
summary judgment, finding no “exceptional circumstances” under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10 and associated precedent.
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Sanctions: Due to misquotations in the motion to supplement and counsel’s failure to verify authorities, the court ordered
appellant’s counsel Joshua P. Ward to reimburse West Penn $14,636.50 in attorney’s fees incurred responding to the motion,
prohibiting recoupment from the client.
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Merits affirmed: Hileman’s ADA/PHRA accommodation, discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination claims failed because
she did not timely disclose her condition in a way that clearly communicated a need for assistance, nor did she request accommodation or leave.
Her FMLA-interference claim failed for lack of a leave request and notice. The termination was supported by a legitimate, neutral misconduct reason
(sleeping on duty), with no sufficient evidence of pretext.
III. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
1. Standards of review and appellate record limits
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Tundo v. County of Passaic, 923 F.3d 283, 286-87 (3d Cir. 2019):
Cited for de novo review of summary judgment, reinforcing that the appellate court evaluates the record as it existed below.
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Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 435-36 (3d Cir. 2013):
Used to frame the strict rule that appellate review is confined to the district court record, with supplementation permitted only in
“exceptional circumstances.”
2. Sanctions, citation integrity, and counsel’s duty to verify
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McCarthy v. United States Drug Enf't Admin., 171 F.4th 245 (3d Cir. 2026):
The court leaned on this decision for two related propositions: (i) the seriousness of submitting work “summarized by a non-attorney,” and
(ii) the Third Circuit’s authority under its disciplinary rules to impose sanctions (including monetary sanctions) after providing an opportunity
to be heard.
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Sofaly v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 155 F.4th 289 (3d Cir. 2025):
Cited to underscore counsel’s prior misconduct and the court’s inference that repeated problems reflect a pattern rather than an isolated lapse.
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Flament v. Allegheny Health Network, No. 2:24-cv-977 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2026), ECF No. 147:
Referenced as another pending sanctions-related matter, reinforcing why the court took the misquotation episode seriously.
3. Notice and request requirements for ADA/PHRA accommodation
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Lawrence v. Nat'l Westminster Bank N.J., 98 F.3d 61, 69 (3d Cir. 1996):
Anchors the requirement that, to prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim, the employee must show the employer
knew of the need for a reasonable accommodation and failed to provide it.
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Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., 334 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2003):
Provides the Third Circuit’s key articulation that no “magic words” are required, but the employee must make clear—through direct communication
or other appropriate means—that she wants assistance for her disability. It also supports the proposition that employers may enforce neutral rules
and that belated requests after discipline (or termination) generally come too late.
4. When employers must construe vague remarks and follow up
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Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313-14 (3d Cir. 1999):
The court used this as the paradigmatic “obvious need/known disability” case—where the employer already knew of a serious condition and a crisis
episode—so even an indirect communication (a family note) could suffice as an accommodation request.
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Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 507 (3d Cir. 2010):
Cited as another instance where the need for accommodation was readily apparent from known disability-related facts.
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Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100 F.3d 1281, 1286-87 (7th Cir. 1996):
Used to illustrate situations where the employer must take a more active role because the disability and need are evident (often involving
conditions that affect communication).
5. No duty to “hunt” for accommodations absent a clear request or obvious need
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Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir. 1996), and
Taylor v. Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996):
Cited for the principle that employers are not required to search for or infer an accommodation request that was never made.
6. Misconduct and timing: disclosure at the brink of termination
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Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 63 F.4th 555, 571 (6th Cir. 2023);
Schaffhauser v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 794 F.3d 899, 906 (8th Cir. 2015);
Jones v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 696 F.3d 78, 90 (1st Cir. 2012):
These cases collectively support the Third Circuit’s conclusion that a last-minute disclosure—made when discipline is imminent—does not
obligate an employer to unwind or excuse misconduct, and weighs against finding adequate notice of an accommodation-related need.
7. Comparator and pretext evidentiary requirements
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Salley v. Cir. City Stores, Inc., 160 F.3d 977, 981 (3d Cir. 1998):
Used to reinforce that a plaintiff claiming discriminatory enforcement of rules typically must identify comparators who committed similar violations
but were treated more favorably—something Hileman did not do in a meaningful, decisionmaker-linked way.
B. Legal Reasoning
1. The “known limitations” and “clear request” framework (ADA/PHRA)
The court grounded its analysis in the statutory text and the Third Circuit’s established doctrine: the ADA prohibits discrimination against a
qualified individual “on the basis of disability,” and defines discrimination to include failure to accommodate
known limitations. This “known” requirement does the work in the case: West Penn’s duty to accommodate could not arise until it had
adequate notice that Hileman had a disability-related limitation requiring workplace assistance.
On these facts, the court held there was no triable issue because:
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Hileman did not disclose diabetes until she was being confronted about sleeping on the job, despite earlier discipline for attendance and an explicit
written notice explaining how to request accommodation or leave.
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Even when she disclosed diabetes and medication-related fatigue/dry eye, she did not request accommodation and did not communicate
that she wanted “assistance” for a disability; she continued to deny that she fell asleep.
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The symptoms described (fatigue and dry eye) were not so distinctive or visible that they made a disability-related need “obvious” such that West Penn
had to treat vague remarks as an accommodation request.
The opinion’s practical line-drawing is central: while Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. and Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist.
prevent employers from demanding formal “magic words,” they still require enough clarity to put the employer on notice that the employee is seeking
workplace assistance for a disability. Absent that, the employer need not speculate.
2. FMLA leave: request and notice for “foreseeable” leave
The court applied the statutory and regulatory notice rules: before taking foreseeable FMLA leave, an employee must ask for it and provide at least
30 days’ notice (or as practicable). Because Hileman did not request leave or provide reasonable notice, the interference theory failed at the threshold.
3. Neutral misconduct enforcement is generally permissible
A key theme is the separation between disability protection and misconduct immunity. The court treated sleeping on duty as a violation of a neutral rule
that carried termination risk. Even if the misconduct had some causal link to medication side effects, the court emphasized (with reference to
Conneen v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A.) that employers may enforce neutral rules and are not generally required to excuse misconduct as an accommodation—
particularly when the employee did not seek accommodation before the discipline process.
4. Discrimination/retaliation/pretext: absence of comparator evidence and decisionmaker linkage
The court credited West Penn’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reason: misconduct. Hileman’s rebuttal failed because she did not produce evidence that the
proffered reason was pretext for disability bias. The comparator she identified (another technologist allegedly sleeping) did not help because that person
was not reported to the relevant decisionmakers or investigated by the manager/HR who decided to terminate Hileman—undercutting any inference of disparate
treatment by the same decision structure.
5. Appellate record discipline and sanctions for misquotation
The opinion is also a warning shot on appellate practice. The Third Circuit refused to let a party add materials on appeal that were available but not
submitted at summary judgment, reaffirming that Rule 10 is not a vehicle to redo the evidentiary record. Separately, the court treated misquotations in the
motion to supplement as serious misconduct—whether attributable to artificial intelligence “hallucinations” or other unreliable preparation. Relying on
McCarthy v. United States Drug Enf't Admin. and counsel’s prior history noted in Sofaly v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, the court
imposed a compensatory fee-shifting sanction payable by counsel personally, not the client.
C. Potential Impact
1. Workplace accommodation litigation: clearer emphasis on employee-side clarity and timing
The decision reinforces a pragmatic evidentiary baseline in ADA/PHRA cases: employees must communicate disability status and the desire for assistance
with sufficient clarity—before discipline culminates—unless the need is obvious from known facts. The opinion is likely to be cited to defeat
“after-the-fact” accommodation theories where the first disclosure occurs during an investigation into serious misconduct.
2. Strengthening the “obviousness” boundary
By contrasting cases like Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist. with non-obvious symptoms like fatigue and dry eye, the court provides a more concrete
boundary: common, non-specific symptoms rarely force employers to infer disability-related need absent prior disclosure or contextual red flags.
3. FMLA interference claims: early procedural gatekeeping
The opinion highlights that FMLA interference claims can fail simply because the employee never requested leave or gave the required notice—keeping courts
focused on statutory prerequisites rather than post-termination rationalizations.
4. Appellate sanctions: verification duties in the era of outsourced drafting and AI tools
The sanctions portion may have broad ripple effects. The court signaled that misquoting authorities—regardless of whether the source is AI, a clerk, or a
non-attorney summary—can warrant monetary sanctions, especially when counsel has prior discipline. This incentivizes robust cite-checking and direct review
of quoted material before filing.
IV. Complex Concepts Simplified
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Reasonable accommodation (ADA/PHRA): A workplace adjustment enabling a qualified employee with a disability to perform essential job
functions. The employer’s duty generally begins only once it knows of the disability-related limitation and the employee signals a need for assistance.
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“Magic words” not required: An employee need not cite the ADA or use formal language, but must still clearly communicate that she wants
help because of a medical/disability-related limitation.
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Interactive process: The back-and-forth between employer and employee to identify workable accommodations. The court’s logic implies the
process cannot start if the employee never meaningfully triggers it with notice and a request (or an obvious need).
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Neutral workplace rule: A policy applied to all employees regardless of disability (e.g., no sleeping on duty). Enforcing such a rule is
typically lawful absent proof it is a pretext for discrimination or selectively enforced.
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Pretext: Evidence that the employer’s stated reason (misconduct) is not the real reason and masks unlawful discrimination. Comparator
evidence is one common way to show pretext, but it must meaningfully connect to similar conduct and similar decisionmakers.
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FMLA “foreseeable” leave notice: If leave is foreseeable, the employee generally must provide 30 days’ notice (or as practicable) and
request leave; without that, an “interference” claim often fails at the starting line.
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Record on appeal: Appellate courts normally review only what was presented to the trial court. Rule 10(e) is not a do-over; it is a narrow
mechanism to ensure the record accurately reflects what happened below.
V. Conclusion
Hileman v. West Penn Allegheny Health System Inc. tightens and clarifies two important messages. Substantively, it reiterates that ADA/PHRA and FMLA
protections do not immunize employees from discipline for neutral-rule misconduct, and that employers’ accommodation and leave obligations are triggered by
timely, clear notice (or an obvious, already-known need)—not by last-minute disclosures made during a misconduct investigation. Procedurally, the opinion
underscores appellate rigor: parties cannot expand the record on appeal without exceptional circumstances, and counsel who submit filings containing
misquotations risk personal monetary sanctions, particularly where verification lapses reflect a broader pattern.