Third Circuit En Banc: De Facto Bans on Commonly Used Semi-Automatic Rifles and >10-Round Magazines Violate the Second Amendment

Case: Association of New Jersey Rifle and Pistol Clubs I v. Attorney General New Jersey (consolidated appeals Nos. 24-2415, 24-2450 & 24-2506) (3d Cir. en banc, July 17, 2026)

1. Introduction

This en banc Third Circuit decision addresses the constitutionality of two long-standing New Jersey firearm regulations enacted in 1990 and later amended in 2018: (1) the “Assault Firearm Provisions,” which criminalize unlicensed possession of firearms the State labels “assault firearms,” including a list of named models and “substantially identical” firearms; and (2) the “LCM Provisions,” which restrict possession of “large capacity ammunition magazines,” defined since 2018 as magazines holding more than 10 rounds.

The consolidated lawsuits were brought by gun owners and gun-rights organizations (including the Association of New Jersey Rifle & Pistol Clubs and Firearms Policy Coalition affiliates) against New Jersey’s Attorney General and related state and local officials. The plaintiffs asserted that both the assault-firearm restrictions and the magazine-capacity limits violate the Second Amendment; one suit also asserted a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause claim against the LCM Provisions.

The core issues were:

  • Scope of Second Amendment protection after New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)—in particular, how to evaluate bans and capacity limits under a history-and-tradition test.
  • Whether semi-automatic rifles (including AR-15–platform rifles) and magazines >10 rounds are protected “Arms” and, if so, whether New Jersey could justify its restrictions by historical analogues.
  • Whether the LCM Provisions effect a taking under the Fifth Amendment (an issue the Third Circuit ultimately did not need to reach).

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit (Freeman, J.) applied the Supreme Court’s post-Bruen framework as refined in United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) and Wolford v. Lopez, --- S. Ct. ----, 2026 WL 1825723 (U.S. June 25, 2026). It held:

  • Assault Firearm Provisions: unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as applied to the entire class of semi-automatic rifles (not merely “Colt AR-15s”). The court modified the district court’s narrower AR-15-only relief, concluding the record supported extending relief to all semi-automatic rifles covered by the challenged provisions.
  • LCM Provisions: unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reversed the district court’s ruling upholding the magazine restrictions.
  • Takings Clause: not reached, because the Second Amendment ruling disposed of the LCM Provisions.
  • Remand: for further proceedings, including resolution of Second Amendment challenges to other “assault firearm” categories (e.g., semi-automatic pistols and shotguns) not adequately supported by the record.

Two doctrinal moves are central to the majority’s analysis:

  • “Common use” is treated as part of Step Two (the historical-analogue inquiry) rather than as part of Step One’s “plain text” coverage.
  • De facto bans (and severe restrictions) on arms in common use for lawful purposes are impermissible absent strong Founding-era historical support, which the State did not provide.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. The Supreme Court’s Second Amendment framework

  • District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
    The opinion relies on Heller for (i) the individual-right holding, (ii) the “core lawful purpose” of self-defense in the home, and (iii) the rule that bans on an “entire class” of arms overwhelmingly chosen for lawful purposes are unconstitutional. The Third Circuit treats New Jersey’s semi-automatic rifle restrictions as “like” the handgun ban in Heller because, given New Jersey’s unattainable licensing standard and narrow exemptions, the statute functions as a de facto ban.
  • McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010)
    Used for incorporation: the Second Amendment applies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)
    The central methodological authority. The Third Circuit implements Bruen’s two-step approach: (1) whether the “plain text” covers the conduct; (2) whether the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition. Importantly, the court emphasizes Bruen’s rejection of means-end scrutiny and its focus on analogical reasoning (“how” and “why”).
  • United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
    Provides the opinion’s key instruction that the Second Amendment is “not trapped in amber” and that courts must ask whether modern regulations are consistent with the “principles that underpin our regulatory tradition.” The Third Circuit adopts Rahimi’s “why” and “how” metrics and uses Rahimi’s discussion of surety and affray laws to situate the general legitimacy of violence-prevention objectives, while still invalidating New Jersey’s chosen means.
  • United States v. Hemani, 146 S. Ct. 1677 (2026)
    Cited for the Supreme Court’s application of the Bruen/Rahimi approach and for rejecting mismatched analogues where the “why” and “how” do not align.
  • Wolford v. Lopez, --- S. Ct. ----, 2026 WL 1825723 (U.S. June 25, 2026)
    Highly influential to the Third Circuit’s structuring of Step One. Wolford supplies “three subsidiary questions” for the textual inquiry—(i) “the people,” (ii) “Arms,” and (iii) “keep”/“bear”—and offers a three-factor gloss for weighing historical analogues (breadth of adoption, acceptance, relevant similarity). The Third Circuit leverages Wolford to support its decision to place “common use” in Step Two (because “common use” is not in the Second Amendment’s text and does not define “Arms”).

B. “Common use,” “dangerous and unusual,” and the scope of “Arms”

  • United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)
    Used for the historical phrase “in common use at the time” and the linkage between militia-era expectations and protected weapons. The Third Circuit reads later Supreme Court cases as clarifying that the relevant “common use” inquiry is present-day common use for lawful purposes (not colonial-era popularity).
  • Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600 (1994)
    Cited to distinguish semi-automatic rifles from machineguns and to underscore that some weapon categories have been “widely accepted as lawful possessions,” contrasting with “quasi-suspect” machinegun ownership.
  • Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406 (2024) and Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Estados Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U.S. 280 (2025)
    Invoked to support the proposition that an AR-15 is not the same as an automatic weapon and to recognize its widespread legality and consumer ownership—facts feeding into the majority’s “common use” analysis.

C. Third Circuit’s own pre- and post-Bruen jurisprudence

  • United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010)
    Identified as the old (now rejected) intermediate-scrutiny era framework applied in earlier magazine litigation.
  • Ass'n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att'y Gen. N.J. ("ANJRPC II"), 910 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 2018)
    Previously upheld New Jersey’s magazine-capacity restrictions under intermediate scrutiny and held magazines are “Arms” because they feed ammunition necessary for a firearm to function. The en banc court reaffirms that textual conclusion (magazines are “Arms”), but rejects the earlier means-end approach as superseded by Bruen.
  • Ass'n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs Inc. v. Att'y Gen. N.J. ("ANJRPC IV"), 974 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2020) and Ass'n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Bruck, 142 S. Ct. 2894 (2022)
    ANJRPC IV had treated the earlier merits holding as binding under law-of-the-case; Bruck vacated and remanded after Bruen, opening the door to reconsideration.
  • Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police, 125 F.4th 428 (3d Cir. 2025)
    Supplies a major historical-method rule: when Founding-era and Reconstruction-era evidence conflict, Founding-era meaning controls. The en banc court uses Lara to privilege Founding-era analogues and discount later 19th-century regulations offered by New Jersey.

D. Method and party-presentation

  • United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371 (2020)
    Cited to justify the court’s decision to decide the questions the parties presented rather than adopt the district court’s narrow, Colt-only framing.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Assault Firearm Provisions (as applied to semi-automatic rifles)

  1. Step One (text): semi-automatic rifles are “Arms.”
    The court adopts Wolford v. Lopez’s Step One sub-questions and concludes the only real dispute is whether semi-automatic rifles are “Arms.” Relying on Heller’s broad definition—“all instruments that constitute bearable arms”—and Bruen’s statement that modern instruments facilitating self-defense are included, the court holds semi-automatic rifles qualify as “Arms.” The right to possess them is thus “presumptively protected.”
  2. Step Two (history & tradition): New Jersey’s law functions as a de facto ban on a class of arms in common use.
    The court treats New Jersey’s regime as effectively prohibiting civilian possession because:
    • licenses require a court finding that “public safety and welfare … require” issuance;
    • the record shows no civilian has ever received such a license;
    • civilian exemptions are narrow and time-locked to 1990-era registration criteria.
    The “how” is therefore a near-total prohibition, and the court deems that comparable to the categorical handgun ban invalidated in District of Columbia v. Heller.
  3. “Common use” is evaluated at Step Two, and the record shows common use.
    The court finds the record supports that AR-15–style semi-automatic rifles are possessed in the tens of millions and used for lawful purposes (self-defense, target shooting, hunting, pest control). It then extends relief from “Colt AR-15s” to the “full class of semi-automatic rifles,” reasoning the record does not show meaningful differences among the banned semi-automatic rifles and New Jersey did not argue for different treatment.
  4. Analogues offered by the State fail (especially at Founding-era priority).
    The opinion rejects:
    • Founding-era gunpowder aggregation laws as aimed at fire safety (a different “why”).
    • Trap gun regulation as a lone and non-comparable outlier (and not a possession ban).
    • 19th-century Bowie knife / slungshot / pistol and revolver laws as too late in time (given Lara) and, in any event, mostly carry restrictions rather than possession bans; it also notes a Georgia Bowie-knife ban was struck down in Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243 (1846).
  5. No “nuanced approach” rescue.
    The court holds this is a “straightforward” Bruen case: the societal concern (preventing weapon misuse) existed at the Founding, so the absence of relevantly similar Founding-era bans weighs against the statute. Even if technological change were considered, the court says that cannot justify leaping from historical carry or misuse regulations to a modern de facto possession ban.

B. LCM Provisions

  1. Step One (text): magazines (including >10-round magazines) are “Arms.”
    The court reaffirms its earlier textual holding from Ass'n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs, Inc. v. Att'y Gen. N.J. ("ANJRPC II"): magazines are “Arms” because they feed ammunition necessary for many firearms to function as intended. It rejects the argument that magazines are merely “accoutrements” outside the Second Amendment’s coverage, and it declines to let New Jersey’s changing statutory label (“large capacity”) define constitutional scope.
  2. Step Two: the 10-round cap is a de facto ban / severe restriction on arms in common use for lawful purposes.
    The court characterizes New Jersey’s magazine law as effectively:
    • a de facto ban on >15-round magazines,
    • and a severe restriction on 11–15-round magazines, given narrow exemptions.
    On common use, the court cites evidence that AR-15–platform rifles typically come standard with 20- or 30-round magazines and that “over 100 million 30-round AR-15 magazines” are in circulation. It adopts the D.C. Circuit’s observation in Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011) that, whatever the threshold is, “that capacity surely is not ten.”
  3. Historical analogues again fail.
    The court repeats why gunpowder storage laws are not relevantly similar (fire safety vs. anti-violence “why”), and why later 19th-century weapon restrictions (often concealed-carry restrictions) cannot support a broad restriction on commonly used arms, especially under Founding-era primacy.
  4. Takings Clause avoided.
    Because the magazine restriction violates the Second Amendment, the court does not reach the Fifth Amendment claim.

3.3 Impact

  • Immediate legal effect in New Jersey: The ruling invalidates enforcement of the Assault Firearm Provisions as to semi-automatic rifles and invalidates the LCM Provisions. The case is remanded for further proceedings on other categories (semi-automatic pistols, shotguns, and other “assault firearm” items not sufficiently developed in the record).
  • Doctrinal impact in the Third Circuit:
    • It cements a post-Bruen approach that treats “common use” as part of Step Two’s “how the regulation burdens the right,” not Step One’s textual coverage.
    • It frames “de facto bans” and “severe restrictions” on arms in common use as presumptively unlawful absent strong Founding-era analogues—expanding Heller’s anti-ban logic beyond handguns to other commonly owned categories.
    • It reinforces Lara v. Commissioner Pennsylvania State Police’s Founding-era priority rule in state-law Second Amendment cases.
  • Inter-circuit and Supreme Court dynamics: The decision explicitly notes the Supreme Court has granted certiorari on AR-15 bans in other cases, and several concurrences/dissents urge restraint. Nonetheless, this opinion creates (or deepens) a split on assault-weapon and magazine-capacity restrictions—particularly significant because the majority also resolves the magazine issue, a question the opinion suggests the Supreme Court had not yet “committed to addressing.”
  • Regulatory design consequences: The court’s emphasis on de facto bans suggests states seeking to regulate certain arms may need to:
    • avoid licensing structures that are functionally unattainable for ordinary citizens,
    • avoid near-categorical possession prohibitions for widely owned arms,
    • and craft regulations with historical “how”/“why” analogues that do not depend on late-19th-century restrictions alone.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • The Bruen test (two steps):
    1. Text: Is the regulated activity (keeping/bearing something) covered by the Second Amendment’s words (“the people,” “keep/bear,” and “Arms”)? If yes, it’s presumptively protected.
    2. History & tradition: Can the government point to a well-established historical tradition of similar regulation—similar in “how” it burdens the right and “why” it was adopted?
  • “Common use for lawful purposes”: A Supreme Court-derived concept used to assess whether modern prohibitions can be justified. Here, the majority treats it as relevant to the Step Two “how” inquiry: restricting a widely owned arm burdens the right more severely than restricting an uncommon arm.
  • “De facto ban”: A law that is not labeled an outright ban but functions like one in practice—e.g., because the licensing standard is effectively impossible to satisfy, or exemptions are so narrow that ordinary citizens cannot lawfully possess the item.
  • Historical analogue (not a “historical twin”): The government does not need to produce an identical old law. It must show a representative historical regulation that is relevantly similar in its mechanism (“how”) and justification (“why”).
  • Law-of-the-case doctrine: A principle that a court should generally follow its prior rulings in the same case. Here, earlier merits holdings upholding magazine restrictions were undone because the Supreme Court vacated and remanded after Bruen, changing the governing methodology.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit en banc opinion announces a consequential post-Bruen application: New Jersey’s “assault firearm” restrictions are unconstitutional as applied to semi-automatic rifles because they amount to a de facto ban on a class of arms the court deems in common use for lawful purposes, and New Jersey’s >10-round magazine restriction likewise violates the Second Amendment as an unjustified severe restriction on commonly used “Arms.”

Methodologically, the court (i) reaffirms that magazines are “Arms,” (ii) places “common use” within Step Two’s assessment of the “how” of the burden, and (iii) demands Founding-era-consistent analogues—rejecting fire-safety gunpowder laws and discounting later 19th-century knife and carry restrictions as insufficient support for modern possession bans and severe capacity limits.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its extension of Heller’s anti-ban principle from handguns to semi-automatic rifles and in its invalidation of a 10-round magazine ceiling—an issue the majority treats as distinct from the Supreme Court’s pending review of AR-15 prohibitions. The remand signals that future litigation will turn on weapon-by-weapon record development for other “assault firearm” categories still within New Jersey’s statutory definition.