Tenth Circuit clarifies: No immediate appeal from a magistrate judge’s denial of IFP service pending § 1915(e)(2) screening; collateral-order, § 1292, and access-to-courts theories rejected

Introduction

In Lawson v. Bolton, No. 25-3167 (10th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025), a Tenth Circuit panel (Judges McHugh, Eid, and Federico) dismissed a pro se appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The appellant, Angeliina Lynn Lawson, sought to appeal a magistrate judge’s order denying, without prejudice, her motion to compel service of process in a civil action she filed in the District of Kansas after being granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status. The magistrate judge withheld service while the district court conducted the statutorily mandated pre-service screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Lawson argued several theories to support immediate appellate review: that the denial of service was effectively a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because it denied her access to the courts; that it was appealable under the collateral order doctrine; and that the Tenth Circuit should construe her notice of appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. The panel rejected each path, reaffirming core jurisdictional doctrines that limit appellate review of non-final, case-management orders—especially those issued by magistrate judges—and emphasizing the legitimacy of pre-service screening in IFP cases.

The underlying federal suit (D. Kan. No. 2:25-cv-02251-JWB-TJJ) asserted eleven claims arising out of state-court child custody proceedings in Anderson County, Kansas (Case No. 2020-DM-000131). The magistrate judge noted potential subject-matter jurisdiction issues and the presence of related filings by Lawson in the same district court, and declined to order service before the § 1915(e)(2) review was completed.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and declined to construe the notice of appeal as a petition for extraordinary relief. The court held:

The order denying service, issued by a magistrate judge and left unreviewed by the district judge under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), is not a final, appealable decision under § 1291. It is also non-final because it was “without prejudice” and the case remains pending.
The collateral order doctrine does not apply because the order did not conclusively determine the disputed question; it left open the possibility of service after screening.
The order is not appealable under § 1292(a)(1) because it is a case-management directive, not an injunction.
Pre-service screening under § 1915(e)(2) does not deny access to the courts; it is authorized and reviewed after a final judgment, if entered.
The court declined to recharacterize the appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus; mandamus is not a substitute for appeal and requires a clear and indisputable right, which was not presented via a proper petition here.

Result: Appeal dismissed; request to construe the appeal as a mandamus petition denied.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents cited and how they shaped the ruling

1) Final-judgment rule and non-final orders

28 U.S.C. § 1291; Utah v. Norton, 396 F.3d 1281, 1286 (10th Cir. 2005); Albright v. Unum Life Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 1995). These authorities anchor the final-judgment requirement: appellate jurisdiction ordinarily lies only over decisions that end litigation on the merits, leaving nothing but execution of judgment. Here, no final judgment existed; the district court had not dismissed the action and expressly left open renewal of service after screening.
The “without prejudice” nature of the denial reinforced non-finality. Orders that preserve the ability to renew or revisit the request typically do not qualify as final decisions.

2) Magistrate judge authority and review mechanisms

Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). These authorities establish that, absent the parties’ consent to full magistrate jurisdiction, a magistrate judge may not issue a final, directly appealable order on pretrial matters. Instead, the district judge may reconsider such orders, and a party must timely object under Rule 72(a). Lawson did not seek district judge review, foreclosing direct appellate review.

3) Collateral order doctrine

Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949); Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989); Gray v. Baker, 399 F.3d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005). To qualify, an order must conclusively resolve an important issue separate from the merits and be effectively unreviewable after final judgment. The court focused on the first prong: the denial of service “without prejudice” did not conclusively determine whether service would issue after screening. That alone defeats collateral-order status.

4) Interlocutory injunction appeals

28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1); Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 279 (1988). Litigation-management orders are not injunctions. The denial of service pending § 1915 review is a scheduling and case-management decision, not an injunctive order. Section 1292(a)(1) therefore affords no jurisdiction.

5) IFP screening and service

28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), (e)(2); Olsen v. Mapes, 333 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989); White v. Kansas Dep’t of Corr., 664 F. App’x 734, 743 (10th Cir. 2016); Fuller v. Myers, 123 F. App’x 365, 368 (10th Cir. 2005); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001). These authorities collectively confirm that, although IFP status obligates the court to effect service for the plaintiff, district courts may—and often should—screen complaints for merit before service to spare defendants unnecessary costs. Dismissals under § 1915 are frequently entered sua sponte prior to service; such dismissals are reviewable after final judgment, undermining any access-to-courts objection to pre-service screening.

6) Mandamus

John E. Burns Drilling Co. v. Central Bank of Denver, 739 F.2d 1489, 1493 (10th Cir. 1984) (mandamus is not a substitute for appeal); Calderon v. United States District Court, 103 F.3d 72, 74 (9th Cir. 1996) (requiring a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ); Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 36 (1980) (per curiam) (where a decision is discretionary, a litigant’s right to a particular result is not clear and indisputable). The panel stressed both the non-substitutive nature of mandamus and the steep merits standard, and declined to recharacterize the appeal as a mandamus petition—particularly as Lawson had filed a separate mandamus matter in a different case.

The court’s legal reasoning

No final decision under § 1291. Two independent reasons foreclosed finality. First, the order was issued by a magistrate judge, and Lawson did not seek district judge review via Rule 72(a); such magistrate orders are not directly appealable. Second, even on its own terms the order was non-final: it was “without prejudice” and left the case pending. Lawson may renew the motion after § 1915(e)(2) screening if the complaint, in whole or part, survives.
No collateral order jurisdiction. The collateral order doctrine requires a conclusive determination. Here, the denial did not conclusively resolve whether service would occur; the district court explicitly preserved the possibility of service after screening. Because the first Cohen prong failed, the doctrine could not apply.
No interlocutory jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1). The order controlled the sequencing of pre-service proceedings and thus related to the conduct of litigation. Under Gulfstream Aerospace, such orders are not injunctions and are not appealable under § 1292(a)(1).
No access-to-courts violation. The panel explained that § 1915(e)(2) authorizes pre-service screening in IFP cases—a long-recognized tool to winnow meritless claims before imposing the burdens of service on defendants and the court. Because any resulting dismissal is reviewable on appeal after final judgment, pre-service screening does not deny court access to meritorious claims.
Mandamus request denied. The court refused to treat the notice of appeal as a mandamus petition. Mandamus cannot replace ordinary appeals, and any proper mandamus petition must demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to relief—especially difficult where the district court’s sequencing decisions are discretionary. The panel also noted Lawson had already filed a mandamus petition in a separate action and that nothing in this order precluded her from filing a proper petition in this case if warranted.

Practical impact and likely implications

For IFP litigants and pro se parties:

Expect pre-service screening. District courts may defer service to screen complaints under § 1915(e)(2), and a denial of immediate service—particularly one “without prejudice”—will not be immediately appealable.
Preserve issues properly. If a magistrate judge issues an adverse non-dispositive order, the proper next step is to file timely objections with the district judge under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). Skipping this step forecloses direct appeal and may forfeit arguments.
Understand appellate timing. Interlocutory appeals are strictly limited. Most disagreements with case-management orders must await final judgment unless a specific statutory or doctrinal exception applies.
Access-to-courts arguments will rarely justify interlocutory review in this context. Because screening is authorized and final dismissals are reviewable, courts will not view the sequencing of screening and service as a denial of access.
Mandamus is extraordinary. Reframing non-final disputes as mandamus petitions will fail absent a truly clear and indisputable right to relief and a lack of adequate alternative remedies. District courts’ discretionary sequencing will seldom meet that standard.

For district court practice and magistrate judge authority:

The decision endorses the routine sequencing of IFP cases: screen first, serve later if appropriate. It reinforces the protective function of § 1915(e)(2) for both judicial resources and prospective defendants.
The panel’s emphasis on Rule 72(a) channels objections to magistrate orders back to the district judge, promoting intra-court error correction before appellate involvement.

For appellate jurisdiction doctrine:

The ruling exemplifies the Tenth Circuit’s strict adherence to the final-judgment rule and narrow construction of exceptions (collateral orders and § 1292(a)(1)). Non-final, without-prejudice case-management decisions will almost never qualify for immediate appeal.

Case-specific context:

The magistrate judge flagged potential subject-matter jurisdiction problems because the claims arise from state child custody proceedings. The Tenth Circuit, however, did not reach those issues. The district court’s screening under § 1915(e)(2) will address threshold jurisdictional and merits defects in the first instance.
The order noted Lawson’s multiple related filings, reinforcing the prudence of careful screening. But the panel’s jurisdictional ruling does not turn on those filings; it rests on general doctrines applicable to all IFP litigants.

Complex concepts simplified

Final-judgment rule (28 U.S.C. § 1291): Appellate courts ordinarily review only the final decision ending the entire case in the trial court. Midstream rulings generally are not immediately appealable.
Magistrate judge orders and Rule 72(a): Magistrate judges handle many pretrial issues, but their non-dispositive orders are reviewed first by the district judge if a party timely objects. They are not directly appealable unless the parties consent to magistrate jurisdiction for final judgment.
Collateral order doctrine: A narrow exception to the final-judgment rule. It allows immediate appeal only if the order conclusively decides an important, separate issue and would be effectively unreviewable later. “Without prejudice” case-management orders rarely qualify.
Section 1292(a)(1): Allows appeals from orders granting or denying injunctions. Routine litigation management is not an injunction and is not appealable under this provision.
In forma pauperis (IFP) screening: Courts may screen IFP complaints for legal sufficiency before service. If a complaint is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or targets immune defendants, the court may dismiss it before defendants are served.
“Without prejudice”: The decision does not permanently resolve the issue; the party may try again (for example, renewing a motion after certain conditions are met).
Mandamus: An extraordinary remedy used to correct clear abuses where there is no adequate alternative. It is not a way to obtain review of ordinary non-final orders.

Conclusion

Lawson v. Bolton reinforces foundational limits on appellate jurisdiction in the Tenth Circuit: non-final, case-management decisions—especially those by magistrate judges and issued without prejudice—are not immediately appealable. The court rejected attempts to shoehorn such an order into the collateral order doctrine or § 1292(a)(1) and declined to rebrand the appeal as mandamus. The ruling also underscores that pre-service screening under § 1915(e)(2) is both permissible and prudent, and that it does not deny access to the courts because any ultimate dismissal is reviewable after final judgment.

The practical lessons are clear. IFP litigants should anticipate pre-service screening and preserve objections through Rule 72(a) before seeking appellate review. Appeals must abide the final-judgment rule unless a recognized exception squarely applies. And mandamus remains an extraordinary, not routine, device. While the order does not break new legal ground, it cogently synthesizes and applies established principles, providing a clear roadmap for litigants navigating the intersection of IFP screening, magistrate-judge authority, and appellate jurisdiction.

Case details: Lawson v. Bolton, No. 25-3167 (10th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025). Appeal from the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas (No. 2:25-cv-02251-JWB-TJJ). Panel: McHugh, Eid, and Federico, Circuit Judges. Disposition: Appeal dismissed; request to construe as mandamus denied.