Tenth Circuit Affirms Upward Variance Based on Child Endangerment and Inadequately Captured Seriousness in § 922(g) Sentencing: United States v. Ransom

Introduction

In United States v. Ransom, the Tenth Circuit affirmed an above-Guidelines sentence imposed on a defendant who pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Although the advisory Sentencing Guidelines yielded a range of 63–78 months, the district court varied upward to 90 months, emphasizing the defendant’s “reckless disregard for life,” the endangerment of children during a drive-by shooting connected to the offense conduct, and the need for deterrence and public protection. On appeal, Amber Nicole Ransom challenged the substantive reasonableness of that sentence, arguing that the risk and seriousness were already captured by the Guidelines enhancements and that her addiction and mental health history warranted leniency instead of an upward variance.

The panel (Hartz, Kelly, and Rossman, JJ.) affirmed. The decision underscores three recurring principles in federal sentencing review: (1) appellate deference to a district court’s reasoned application of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors; (2) the permissibility of relying on facts already accounted for in the Guidelines when deciding whether and how far to vary; and (3) the limited force of mitigation arguments on appeal where the district court expressly considered them but reasonably concluded that the seriousness of the offense and the need for deterrence and protection of the public require a higher sentence.

Though issued as a nonprecedential “Order and Judgment,” the opinion may be cited for its persuasive value under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1, and it meaningfully illustrates how child endangerment and inadequately captured offense seriousness can justify an upward variance in § 922(g) cases.

Case Background

The case stems from a May 2023 drive-by shooting at the apartment of Unique Maxwell in Oklahoma City. Bullets traveled through a wall into the occupied apartment, where Ms. Maxwell and her daughter were present. Investigators linked a white sedan—owned by Ransom’s boyfriend, Gordon Horner—to the shooting; during a stop of that vehicle days later, police recovered a stolen, loaded Glock. A subsequent search of the couple’s shared residence turned up an additional firearm and related items. In an interview, Mr. Horner admitted he drove while Ransom fired from the back seat; critically, his two-year-old grandson was seated next to Ransom at the time. Ransom denied firing the gun but pled guilty to being a felon in possession (based on a 2009 Oklahoma second-degree robbery conviction).

The Presentence Investigation Report calculated a total offense level of 25, criminal history category II, yielding a 63–78 month range. The defense sought a downward variance based on longstanding substance abuse and trauma. The district court acknowledged those struggles but emphasized the “senseless” nature of the drive-by, the acute risk to multiple children and bystanders, and the need for deterrence and public protection. Concluding that the Guidelines did not adequately reflect the nature and seriousness of the offense conduct, the court imposed 90 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed the sentence as substantively reasonable under an abuse-of-discretion standard. The court held that:

The district court permissibly relied on aggravating facts—most notably, the endangerment to children and bystanders—that were already considered in the Guidelines computation. A court may still give those facts additional weight when applying the § 3553(a) factors to justify a variance (citing United States v. Barnes).
The district court reasonably concluded that the Guidelines did not fully capture the seriousness of the offense conduct, given the drive-by nature of the shooting, the presence of children (including a toddler in the car and a child inside the residence), and the “senseless” motive.
Mitigation based on addiction, mental health, and a difficult upbringing was expressly considered but did not render the variance unreasonable. The court’s holistic, individualized assessment of § 3553(a)—including deterrence and public protection—supported the upward variance.
The imposed sentence fell within “the range of rationally available choices” supported by the record and the law (citing United States v. Blair and Gall v. United States). There was no indication of arbitrary or capricious decision-making (citing United States v. Haley).

Detailed Analysis

Standard of Review and Analytical Framework

The panel applied the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard for substantive reasonableness challenges. Under this standard, a sentence is reversible only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable” (Haley). Appellate courts do not reweigh the § 3553(a) factors; they defer to the district court’s superior vantage point, asking whether the sentence fits within “the range of rationally available choices” supported by the facts and law (Gall; Blair). The Guidelines are advisory and serve as the “starting point and initial benchmark” (Kimbrough), but a district court retains broad discretion to vary up or down provided it offers a reasoned explanation grounded in § 3553(a).

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) — Established the two-step reasonableness review (procedural then substantive) and emphasized district court discretion and the advisory nature of the Guidelines. Here, the panel relied on Gall’s deference to a sentencing judge’s individualized assessment and its directive that the Guidelines are a starting point, not a capstone.
United States v. Haley, 529 F.3d 1308 (10th Cir. 2008) — Articulated the Tenth Circuit’s abuse-of-discretion phrasing and applied deferential review to sentencing. The panel quoted Haley’s “arbitrary, capricious… or manifestly unreasonable” standard and found no such error.
United States v. Walker, 844 F.3d 1253 (10th Cir. 2017) — Clarified that “substantive reasonableness” assesses whether the length of a sentence is too long or too short in light of § 3553(a). The panel framed the appeal accordingly.
United States v. Blair, 933 F.3d 1271 (10th Cir. 2019) — Emphasized that appellate courts ask only whether the sentence falls within a rational range of choices, rather than substituting their judgment for the district court’s. The panel leaned on Blair to refuse reweighing.
United States v. Barnes, 890 F.3d 910 (10th Cir. 2018) — Held that a sentencing court may consider facts already included in the Guidelines when applying § 3553(a) and deciding whether to vary. Barnes directly undercuts Ransom’s “double-counting” style argument and is the key authority supporting the district court’s reliance on endangerment and seriousness beyond the enhancement.
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) — Reinforced that the Guidelines are advisory and that courts can vary based on case-specific § 3553(a) considerations. This supports the judge’s conclusion that the Guidelines range did not capture the gravity of the offense.
United States v. Pinson, 542 F.3d 822 (10th Cir. 2008) — Reminded that appellate review is not a rubber stamp, but deference still applies to reasoned, record-based variances. The panel affirmed after verifying the district court’s careful explanation.
United States v. Carrillo, No. 23-2105, 2024 WL 887072 (10th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) & United States v. Cade, 766 F. App’x 686 (10th Cir. 2019) — Both affirmances of above-Guidelines sentences where mitigation (trauma, addiction) was acknowledged but outweighed by seriousness, deterrence, and protection of the public. These cases show the Tenth Circuit’s unwillingness to disturb upward variances when the district court meaningfully engages the defendant’s mitigation and explains why, on balance, a higher sentence advances § 3553(a) goals.
United States v. Crosby, 119 F.4th 1239 (10th Cir. 2024) — Found substantive unreasonableness where the district court largely fixated on one § 3553(a) factor without discussing others. By contrast, Ransom’s sentencing transcript reflected a multi-factor analysis; the panel cited Crosby to explain what would have been error and why this case was different.

Legal Reasoning Applied to the Facts

The panel resolved two principal arguments:

“The Guidelines already accounted for the seriousness and danger”. Ransom argued that the four-level increase for using a firearm in connection with another felony offense captured the risk and thus an upward variance was unwarranted. The panel rejected this, reaffirming that a sentencing court may:
- Reconsider facts embedded in the Guidelines when applying § 3553(a), including to justify a variance (Barnes); and
- Conclude that the applicable enhancement still does not adequately reflect the particular nature and seriousness of the offense conduct—here, a drive-by shooting at an occupied apartment in which a child lived, while a two-year-old sat next to the shooter in the car, with multiple potential bystanders at risk.
The court emphasized the district judge’s reasonable determination that the Guidelines did not “reflect the nature and serious[ness] of the offense,” a conclusion bolstered by the “senseless” motive (a dispute over a dog) and the extreme risk imposed on children.
“Mitigation from trauma, addiction, and mental health required leniency”. The panel acknowledged that the district court expressed “no doubt” those issues contributed to Ransom’s criminal behavior and further recognized that they “have not been sufficiently addressed.” Yet the court also noted:
- Ransom’s history suggested that general deterrence and specific deterrence had not succeeded;
- Public protection was a prominent concern under § 3553(a)(2)(C); and
- The nature and circumstances of the offense (§ 3553(a)(1))—including endangering at least two children—were extraordinarily aggravating.
Having weighed all of these considerations, the district court concluded that “a more robust sentence and period of supervision” were necessary. Because the court demonstrably balanced multiple § 3553(a) factors, the upward variance was within the rational range and not substantively unreasonable (see Carrillo, Cade; cf. Crosby).

What the Decision Does—and Does Not—Hold

- The decision affirms that a district court may (1) rely on facts already present in the Guidelines calculation to justify an upward variance and (2) determine that the Guidelines insufficiently capture the gravity of conduct that endangers children and the public. It also accepts a sentencing court’s reasoned view that deterrence and protection of the public can outweigh substantial mitigation such as addiction and mental-health struggles, so long as the court addresses those issues on the record.
- The decision does not require an upward variance in similar cases; it validates the reasonableness of one in light of the district court’s explanations. Nor does it license a court to ignore mitigation; to the contrary, the panel relied on the district court’s explicit acknowledgment of Ransom’s traumatic background and substance abuse issues, and its choice to balance them against offsetting concerns.

Impact and Practical Implications

Though nonprecedential, Ransom will be cited for persuasive authority in several recurring contexts:

Child endangerment and bystander risk as aggravators in § 922(g) cases. The opinion illustrates that the presence of children—both in the target dwelling and in the offender’s vehicle—can justify viewing a firearms offense as exceptionally serious and support an upward variance beyond standard enhancements.
“Double-counting” objections to variances. Ransom reinforces the Barnes principle that it is not impermissible double counting for a court to give further weight at the variance stage to facts that also increased the offense level.
Mitigation grounded in trauma, addiction, and mental health. While such evidence can be powerful in the district court, its capacity to win on appeal is limited when the judge has meaningfully acknowledged it and still decided that § 3553(a)(2) factors (deterrence, protection of the public, just punishment) predominate.
Appellate deference. The panel’s use of “range of rationally available choices” underscores that even a significant upward variance—here, 12 months above the top of the range—will be affirmed when the district court ties the sentence to specific facts and the statutory factors.
Sentencing advocacy. For prosecutors, Ransom supports emphasizing concrete risks to identifiable victims and the community, especially children. For defense counsel, it highlights the importance of (a) proposing specific, verifiable treatment plans and supervision conditions that address addiction and mental health; (b) challenging or mitigating uncharged conduct through the record where feasible; and (c) preserving objections, but recognizing the uphill nature of substantive reasonableness appeals when the district court’s explanation is robust.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive vs. procedural reasonableness: Procedural reasonableness asks whether the court followed correct steps (e.g., calculated the Guidelines correctly, considered § 3553(a), explained the sentence). Substantive reasonableness asks whether the sentence’s length is reasonable given the case’s facts and the statutory purposes of sentencing. Ransom involved only substantive reasonableness.
Variance vs. departure: A “departure” is an adjustment under the Guidelines’ own provisions; a “variance” is a sentence outside the Guidelines based on the broader statutory factors in § 3553(a). The district court here imposed an upward variance.
Abuse-of-discretion review: The appellate court upholds the sentence unless it is outside the range of reasonable choices—i.e., “arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable.” Appellate courts do not reweigh the factors; they look for a rational, well-explained balance by the district judge.
“Facts already accounted for”: Even if certain facts increased the offense level (e.g., using a firearm in connection with another felony), a judge may still give those facts added significance under § 3553(a)—for example, because the specific way those facts manifested (such as endangering children in a drive-by) is more serious than the enhancement alone captures.
§ 3553(a) factors: These include the nature and circumstances of the offense; the history and characteristics of the defendant; the need for the sentence to reflect seriousness, promote respect for law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide correctional treatment; the Guidelines range; policy statements; the need to avoid unwarranted disparities; and restitution.

Conclusion

United States v. Ransom is a clear, practical reaffirmation of sentencing principles in the Tenth Circuit: district courts retain broad discretion to vary upward when the § 3553(a) factors—here, the extraordinary risk to children and bystanders, the senseless and dangerous nature of the conduct, and the need for deterrence and protection of the public—demonstrate that the advisory Guidelines do not fully capture the offense’s gravity. The panel rejected arguments that enhancements foreclose reliance on those same facts at the variance stage and confirmed that mitigation rooted in trauma and addiction, while important, does not compel leniency when a court has considered it and reasonably found other factors controlling.

As persuasive authority, Ransom will aid district courts in explaining upward variances where child endangerment or community risk is acute, and it signals to litigants that well-explained, fact-grounded variances—up or down—will receive substantial appellate deference. It also serves as a cautionary contrast to Crosby: thorough engagement with multiple § 3553(a) factors is the key to affirmance.