Statutory Presumptions Under NRS 128.109 Control When a Parent Fails to Rebut Token-Efforts and Best-Interest Presumptions After 14 of 20 Months Out of Home

1. Introduction

In IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO: K.C. (Nev. Feb. 12, 2026) (Order of Affirmance), the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the Eighth Judicial District Court’s termination of Richard’dnae C.’s parental rights to her infant child, K.C.. The child was removed shortly after birth in November 2022 due to concerns about the mother’s untreated mental health issues. DFS implemented a reunification case plan centered on basic parenting capacity, mental health and substance abuse evaluations, and compliance with recommendations; the mother also had a guardian ad litem appointed. After a July 2024 termination trial, the district court found multiple grounds of parental fault and that termination was in K.C.’s best interests.

On appeal, the key issues were whether substantial evidence supported (1) at least one statutory ground of parental fault under NRS 128.105(1)(b), and (2) that termination served K.C.’s best interests—particularly in light of NRS 128.109’s presumptions tied to the child’s prolonged out-of-home placement.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that substantial evidence supported three grounds of parental fault: unfitness, failure of parental adjustment, and token efforts. Because one ground is enough under NRS 128.105(1)(b), the court declined to review the district court’s other fault findings. The court also held that termination was presumed to be in K.C.’s best interests under NRS 128.109(2) because K.C. had been outside the mother’s home for more than 14 of 20 consecutive months, and that the mother failed to rebut the presumption.

The Supreme Court emphasized appellate restraint: it would not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for the district court’s. It also declined to consider arguments about the mother’s older children because those prior terminations were not before the court.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • In re Termination of Parental Rts. as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800-01, 8 P.3d 126, 132-33 (2000)
    Used for the fundamental framework: termination requires clear and convincing evidence of (1) at least one parental-fault ground and (2) best interests. The court treated this as the controlling two-prong structure for reviewing the termination order under NRS 128.105(1).
  • In re Parental Rts. as to A.L., 130 Nev. 914, 918, 337 P.3d 758, 761 (2014)
    Cited for the standards of review: questions of law are reviewed de novo; factual findings for substantial evidence. This precedent framed the appellate lens that ultimately favored affirmance given the district court’s evidentiary record.
  • Ellis v. Carucci, 123 Nev. 145, 149, 161 P.3d 239, 242 (2007)
    Provided the definition of “substantial evidence” (“a reasonable person may accept as adequate”). By invoking this general civil standard, the court reinforced that it was not deciding the “best” view of the facts, but only whether the district court’s view was reasonably supported.
  • Matter of T.M.R., 137 Nev. 262, 267, 487 P.3d 783, 789 (2021)
    Quoted for the appellate principle that the Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for the district court’s. This was central to rejecting the mother’s fact-driven challenges.
  • Matter of MM.L., Jr., 133 Nev. 147, 152, 393 P.3d 1079, 1082-83 (2017)
    Cited for the proposition that mental illness can be a factor supporting parental fault in termination proceedings. This precedent helped validate the district court’s reliance on the mother’s schizophrenia/bipolar diagnoses and refusal of treatment as a basis for unfitness.
  • In re Parental Rts. as to K.D.L., 118 Nev. 737, 747-48, 58 P.3d 181, 187-88 (2002)
    Used to connect “failure of parental adjustment” to a parent’s failure to make the behavioral changes required by the case plan. The court analogized the mother’s partial/poor engagement—without meaningful behavioral change—to the deficiency recognized in K.D.L.
  • Matter of S.L., 134 Nev. 490, 497, 422 P.3d 1253, 1259 (2018)
    Quoted for the insight that without acknowledging the need for change, a parent cannot demonstrate that change will occur. This supported the conclusion that the mother’s refusal to acknowledge mental health issues undermined reunification prospects.
  • In re N.J., 125 Nev. 835, 846, 221 P.3d 1255, 1263 2009)
    Cited to support a token-efforts finding where a parent fell asleep during visits—paralleling the evidence that the mother dozed off and did not engage with K.C. during visitation.
  • In re J.D.N., 128 Nev. 462, 474, 283 P.3d 842, 850 (2012)
    Critical to the burden-shifting effect of NRS 128.109: once statutory presumptions apply, the burden shifts to the parent to present evidence relating to the NRS 128.107 factors to rebut them. The court relied on J.D.N. to affirm the district court’s conclusion that the mother did not carry that rebuttal burden.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Threshold statutory structure (NRS 128.105(1))
    The court applied the two required findings: at least one parental-fault ground plus best interests, both by clear and convincing evidence. On appeal, the question became whether the district court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.
  2. Parental fault—Unfitness tied to untreated mental illness (NRS 128.105(1)(b)(3); NRS 128.018; NRS 128.106(1)(a))
    The record showed diagnoses of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder; persistent refusal to take medication; refusal to acknowledge the conditions; and deterioration in functioning. Using NRS 128.106(1)(a), the court treated the mother’s mental illness as rendering her consistently unable to meet the child’s needs, supporting unfitness under NRS 128.018 and NRS 128.105(1)(b)(3).
  3. Parental fault—Failure of parental adjustment (NRS 128.105(1)(b)(4); NRS 128.0126; NRS 128.109(1)(b))
    The court focused on the mismatch between nominal attendance and meaningful participation: the mother attended some psychiatric appointments but was uncooperative and combative; she did not complete all required services and did not make the behavioral changes needed for safe parenting. The opinion also highlighted NRS 128.109(1)(b): failure to comply with a case plan within six months may evidence failure of adjustment.
  4. Parental fault—Token efforts and statutory presumption (NRS 128.105(1)(b)(6); NRS 128.109(1)(a))
    Because K.C. lived outside the mother’s care for 20 consecutive months, the statutory presumption of token efforts applied. The court held the mother failed to rebut it, pointing to (a) lack of meaningful case-plan engagement, (b) ongoing untreated mental health issues, and (c) inconsistent and poor-quality visitation (including dozing off and not engaging K.C.).
  5. Best interests—Presumption and failure to rebut (NRS 128.109(2); NRS 128.107; NRS 128.108)
    The court approved the district court’s use of the best-interest presumption after 14 of 20 months out of home. Relying on In re J.D.N., it emphasized that the mother bore the burden to rebut the presumption with evidence aligned to NRS 128.107 considerations. The court also noted the district court’s practical findings consistent with NRS 128.108 (even without citing it expressly): K.C.’s long-term placement with a foster family, the foster family’s adoption of K.C.’s siblings, and the mother’s inability to care for herself or a vulnerable child—supporting stability and permanency through termination.
  6. Appellate limitation—Sufficiency of one ground; no reweighing
    Having found three supported grounds, the court declined to review additional grounds. It also refused to re-litigate prior terminations involving the mother’s older children, as those cases were not before the court in this appeal.

C. Impact

This decision reinforces several practical rules likely to shape Nevada termination litigation:

  • NRS 128.109 presumptions are decisive if unrebutted: once the child has been out of the home for the statutory period, the analysis becomes strongly burden-driven—parents must affirmatively produce evidence under NRS 128.107 to rebut presumptions on token efforts and best interests.
  • Mental health evidence supports unfitness when it links to functional inability: the opinion underscores that diagnoses plus refusal of treatment and deterioration can collectively constitute substantial evidence of consistent inability to meet a child’s needs under NRS 128.106(1)(a).
  • “Participation” is not “progress”: partial attendance at services (e.g., appointments) may not counter findings of failure of adjustment if the parent is uncooperative or fails to make behavioral changes required for safe parenting.
  • Stability and sibling placement matter: the court treated the child’s near-lifelong placement and co-placement with siblings in an adoptive foster home as substantial best-interest evidence, aligning with the permanency focus of NRS 128.108.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Clear and convincing evidence”: a heightened proof standard—more than “more likely than not,” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” It requires the evidence to be highly persuasive.
  • “Substantial evidence” (on appeal): not “the most convincing” evidence—just enough that a reasonable person could accept it. If substantial evidence supports the district court, the Supreme Court will not second-guess the factfinding.
  • “Unfitness”: a parent’s fault or conduct results in failure to provide proper care, guidance, and support; mental illness can qualify when it consistently prevents meeting the child’s needs.
  • “Failure of parental adjustment”: inability or unwillingness, within a reasonable time, to correct the problems that led to removal (often measured by genuine completion and benefit from the case plan).
  • “Token efforts”: minimal or superficial efforts that do not show real change or commitment—especially when the child remains out of home for long periods.
  • “Statutory presumption”: a rule that the court must assume a fact is true (here, token efforts and best interests) once certain conditions are met (here, time out of home), unless the parent produces enough evidence to rebut it.
  • “Guardian ad litem”: a court-appointed advocate who represents the interests of a person (here, appointed for the mother) in the litigation context.

5. Conclusion

The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed termination because substantial evidence supported three independent parental-fault grounds—unfitness, failure of parental adjustment, and token efforts—and because statutory presumptions under NRS 128.109 established best interests where the child spent far more than 14 of 20 months outside the home and the mother failed to rebut those presumptions. The opinion’s broader significance lies in its strict, burden-focused application of NRS 128.109 and its insistence that meaningful behavioral change—especially where untreated mental illness undermines parenting capacity—is central to resisting termination once the statutory timelines and presumptions are triggered.