Statistics Alone Do Not Prove Unwarranted Disparity; Upward Variance Sustained When Guidelines Understate Egregious Assault Conduct

1. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision reviews the substantive reasonableness of an 84-month prison sentence imposed on Terry S. Carrington after he pleaded guilty to two federal assaults within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States: assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) and assault resulting in serious bodily harm under 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6).

The offense arose from a violent incident aboard a commercial fishing vessel in the Gulf of Mexico. According to the agreed factual basis and sentencing testimony, Carrington knocked one deckhand (S.S.) unconscious, severely injuring his jaw, then repeatedly attempted to shoot the other deckhand (C.W.) with a bolt-action rifle during a struggle. The district court found the conduct and victim impact unusually egregious and varied upward from the advisory Guidelines range of 57–71 months to 84 months.

On appeal, Carrington argued the upward variance was substantively unreasonable because (i) the court allegedly underweighted mitigation (family ties, aberrational conduct driven by addiction), (ii) the court relied on aggravating facts already accounted for by the Guidelines, and (iii) the sentence created an unwarranted disparity based on national sentencing statistics.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Applying deferential abuse-of-discretion review, the court held Carrington failed to show his sentence fell outside the permissible range of outcomes. Key points:

• The 84-month sentence was well below the 120-month statutory maximum, an “indicator of reasonableness.”
• The district court permissibly gave greater weight to offense severity and victim impact than to mitigation evidence.
• The court permissibly varied upward even if some facts overlapped with Guidelines considerations, because it explained why the Guidelines understated the egregiousness and harm.
• National averages and medians, without identified comparable defendants and comparable facts, did not establish an unwarranted disparity.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The panel’s analysis is largely an application—and synthesis—of established Eleventh Circuit sentencing review principles:

• United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016): Sets the “two-step process” for reviewing sentences—procedural reasonableness first, then substantive reasonableness. Here, Carrington raised no procedural challenge, so the appeal focused solely on step two.
• United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022): Supplies the abuse-of-discretion standard, the “ballpark of permissible outcomes” framing (via Rosales-Bruno), and the three principal ways a court can impose a substantively unreasonable sentence (misweighting relevant factors, weighing irrelevant factors, or clear error of judgment). Butler also supports the proposition that a district court need not explicitly discuss every mitigating fact as long as it acknowledges considering the parties’ arguments and the § 3553(a) factors.
• United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015): Provides the “ballpark” language and reinforces deference to district courts’ weighing of § 3553(a) factors.
• United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010): Place the burden on the appellant to show unreasonableness in light of the record and § 3553(a).
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Cited for the substantive-reasonableness abuse framework and, later, for rejecting any across-the-board rule requiring specified deference to the Guidelines.
• Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007): Emphasizes § 3553(a)’s “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” command and recognizes that variances may be especially defensible where a case is outside the Guidelines “heartland.”
• United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Sarras, 575 F.3d 1191 (11th Cir. 2009); and United States v. Leibowitz, 676 F.3d 1000 (11th Cir. 2012): Stand for the proposition that failure to discuss each mitigating item does not imply the court ignored it, and that an acknowledgment of considering arguments and § 3553(a) is typically enough.
• United States v. Bungar, 478 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 2007): Quoted (through Leibowitz) for the widely accepted principle that disagreement with the weight a judge assigned to mitigation does not itself establish unreasonableness.
• United States v. Dougherty, 754 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 2014): Reinforces that a sentence well below the statutory maximum is a reasonableness indicator.
• United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Mateo-Espejo, 426 F.3d 508 (1st Cir. 2005): Supply the “apples to apples” requirement for disparity claims under § 3553(a)(6).
• United States v. Azmat, 805 F.3d 1018 (11th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807 (11th Cir. 2011): Emphasize that disparity analysis requires attention to underlying facts and individual characteristics; broad national comparisons are “difficult to gauge.”
• United States v. Shaw, 560 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2009) and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Require that reasons for a variance be sufficiently compelling and explained to permit meaningful appellate review.
• United States v. Oudomsine, 57 F.4th 1262 (11th Cir. 2023): Directly supports the rule that a district court may vary upward based on conduct already accounted for in the advisory Guidelines, so long as the § 3553(a) analysis warrants it and the court explains why.
• United States v. Hunt, 459 F.3d 1180 (11th Cir. 2006) and United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2025): Confirm that courts have discretion in how much weight to assign the Guidelines and other § 3553(a) factors, and need not weigh factors equally.
• Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007): Quoted through Kimbrough for the “heartland” concept supporting respect for variances in atypical cases.
• United States v. Beaufils, 160 F.4th 1147 (11th Cir. 2025): Reiterates that abuse-of-discretion allows a “range of choice” absent a clear error of judgment.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning tracks the structure of substantive-reasonableness review and, within that framework, resolves three recurring sentencing arguments.

A. Mitigation evidence and judicial “weighting” discretion

Carrington argued the court undervalued his mitigation case (fatherhood, character testimony, aberrational behavior linked to addiction). The Eleventh Circuit rejected this as a disagreement over weight rather than an abuse of discretion. Relying on United States v. Butler, United States v. Amedeo, and United States v. Leibowitz, the panel emphasized:

• District courts may attach “great weight” to some § 3553(a) factors over others.
• Courts need not address each mitigating detail explicitly so long as they show consideration of arguments and § 3553(a).
• Here, the district court expressly acknowledged mitigation (drug problem; aberrational conduct; good father/provider) but concluded the offense’s egregiousness and harm dominated.

B. Upward variance despite overlap with Guidelines factors

Carrington contended the aggravating facts the court cited were already “captured” by the Guidelines, making an upward variance unnecessary. The panel treated this as foreclosed by United States v. Oudomsine: overlap does not bar a variance. The controlling question is whether the district court explained why the Guidelines did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the conduct and the § 3553(a) objectives.

The district court’s explanation—credited on appeal—was that:

• The assault conduct was “demonstrably worse” than other firearm-discharge cases the judge had seen (repeated shots; close-range threat; rifle pointed toward the victim’s head; multiple attempts).
• Victim impact was unusually severe (including additional surgery for C.W. and significant lasting harm to S.S.).
• Obstruction-type conduct (concealment/minimization) was more egregious than typical cases receiving an enhancement—“not all obstruction is created equal.”

In short, the variance was upheld because the district court supplied a case-specific account of why the advisory range understated culpability and harm, satisfying United States v. Shaw and Gall v. United States (variance reasons must be “compelling” and reviewable).

C. Unwarranted disparity: “apples to apples” and the limits of statistics

Carrington relied on national “average and median” sentence statistics for defendants he characterized as similarly situated. The panel rejected this under United States v. Docampo and United States v. Azmat:

• A disparity claim assumes “apples are being compared to apples.”
• Similarity requires more than offense label, criminal history category, or Guidelines zone; underlying facts and individual characteristics matter.
• Statistics without identified comparable cases do not demonstrate that similarly situated defendants (with similarly egregious facts) received materially lower sentences.

The panel also invoked United States v. Hill to underscore the difficulty of evaluating broad claims comparing a defendant to “similar crimes elsewhere in the nation” absent fact-level comparators.

D. “Below statutory maximum” as an additional reasonableness signal

Consistent with United States v. Dougherty and United States v. Gonzalez, the panel noted the 84-month sentence was well below the 120-month maximum, which—while not dispositive—supports reasonableness.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished and therefore not binding precedent in the same way as a published opinion, the decision is a clear, practical restatement of how the Eleventh Circuit will evaluate three frequent sentencing challenges:

• Mitigation reweighing is hard to win on appeal. Unless the record shows the court ignored a significant factor, relied on an improper factor, or made a clear judgment error, the appellate court will not “substitute” its own sentencing judgment.
• Overlap with the Guidelines does not immunize a defendant from a variance. Sentencing judges may conclude the Guidelines inadequately reflect severity, victim impact, or atypical obstructive behavior, as long as they articulate why.
• Disparity arguments need comparators, not just aggregates. National averages and medians may inform policy discussions, but they rarely prove an unwarranted disparity without factually comparable defendants and cases.

For district courts, the opinion highlights best practices: clearly link the variance to concrete facts (e.g., number of shots, proximity, extent of injuries, concealment steps) and explain why the case falls outside the typical (“heartland”) scenario contemplated by the Guideline.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Substantive reasonableness: Whether the length of the sentence makes sense given the whole record and the purposes of sentencing in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)—not whether the appellate judges would have chosen the same number.
• Abuse of discretion: A highly deferential standard. The sentence is reversed only if the district court’s choice is outside the permissible range—i.e., a clear error in judgment, improper factor, or failure to consider an important factor.
• Advisory Guidelines range: A recommended sentencing range calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. It guides but does not control the final sentence after United States v. Booker (not cited here, but the advisory framework is assumed).
• Variance (upward): A sentence above the advisory Guidelines range based on the judge’s application of § 3553(a) factors (distinct from a “departure,” which is a Guidelines-structured adjustment).
• § 3553(a)(6) unwarranted disparity: The goal is avoiding unjustified differences among similarly situated defendants. Courts require true comparability (“apples to apples”), not just the same statute or general category.
• “Heartland” case: A typical case the Sentencing Commission had in mind when designing a guideline. Atypical cases can justify variance if explained (Kimbrough/Rita concept).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Terry Carrington affirms an upward variance in a violent maritime assault case by reiterating three central principles of Eleventh Circuit sentencing review: (1) appellate courts defer heavily to district courts’ weighing of § 3553(a) factors, including mitigation; (2) judges may vary upward even when some aggravating facts overlap with the Guidelines, if they explain why the range understates severity and harm; and (3) unwarranted-disparity claims generally require concrete, factually comparable defendants—national averages alone will not suffice.