State v. Macormac: Minimal On‑the‑Record Justification Is Sufficient to Sustain Consecutive Sentences in Kansas

I. Introduction

The Kansas Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Macormac, No. 128,361 (Kan. Dec. 5, 2025), clarifies and reinforces a significant rule in Kansas sentencing law: a district court does not abuse its discretion by ordering consecutive sentences merely because it provides only a brief explanation for doing so. So long as the court identifies a reasonable basis on the record and acts within statutory limits, a minimal statement—such as recognizing that multiple victims are “entitled to their own sentence”—is sufficient.

The case arises from a violent “crime spree” over approximately a year, culminating in two homicides. After a consolidated plea, Justin Earl Macormac received:

A life sentence for premeditated first-degree murder with a mandatory minimum of 620 months before parole eligibility; and
A consecutive 233-month prison term for voluntary manslaughter of a second victim.

The central issue on appeal was whether the district court abused its discretion by:

Refusing to make the voluntary manslaughter sentence concurrent with the murder sentence; and
Providing only a brief explanation for imposing consecutive terms despite extensive mitigation evidence (youth, drug-related neurodevelopmental impairment, and potential for reform).

The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed. The opinion, authored by Justice Standridge, firmly situates Kansas within a line of authority that:

Gives sentencing judges wide discretion to choose concurrent or consecutive sentences in multi-conviction cases; and
Requires only a succinct on-the-record justification—here, the fact of two separate deceased victims—rather than a detailed discussion of all mitigating evidence.

This commentary examines the decision’s background, reasoning, use of precedent, and its broader impact on Kansas sentencing law, particularly for multi-victim violent offenses and off-grid crimes.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Supreme Court’s core holding is captured in the syllabus:

“The lack of a lengthy explanation by a district court ordering a defendant to serve sentences consecutively does not imply an impermissible basis for that decision constituting an abuse of discretion.”

Key points from the decision are:

Jurisdiction and standard of review. Because the sentence involved life imprisonment for an off-grid offense, the Kansas Supreme Court had direct appellate jurisdiction. The imposition of consecutive versus concurrent sentences is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Discretion to impose consecutive sentences. Under Kansas law, and particularly K.S.A. 21-6819, trial courts generally have discretion to determine whether sentences run concurrently or consecutively, subject to statutory limits. There are no mandatory statutory criteria the court must weigh, although proportionality to harm and culpability may be considered.
No obligation to weigh or accept mitigating evidence. Even where compelling mitigation is presented, an appellate court will not reweigh that evidence. In this case, the main minimum-sentence statute—K.S.A. 21-6620(c)(1)(B)—does not require consideration of mitigating circumstances in setting the mandatory minimum and, in fact, bars certain downward departures based on mitigating factors.
Brief explanation is sufficient. The sentencing judge expressly acknowledged the expert report on the defendant’s brain development and counsel’s brief, then stated he would impose consecutive sentences because there were two victims, and “both were entitled to their own sentence.” The Supreme Court held that this minimal justification satisfies K.S.A. 21-6819(b) and is not arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable.
Comparison to prior cases. The Court rejected the argument that consecutive sentences are reserved only for especially brutal or highly planned crimes (for example, murders of children or killings involving prolonged suffering). Citing State v. Goens and State v. Mitchell, the Court reaffirmed that “simply not being the worst of the worst does not require” concurrent sentences.

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the district court’s decision to impose a 620‑month mandatory minimum for the first-degree murder and a consecutive 233‑month term for voluntary manslaughter was within its lawful discretion and did not rest on any legal or factual error.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The charges and the “crime spree”

In 2022, the State charged Justin Earl Macormac in several Sedgwick County cases arising from violent conduct committed between February 2021 and early February 2022. Across those cases, he faced numerous charges, including:

Criminal possession of a firearm;
Criminal discharge of a firearm;
Criminal damage to property;
Illegal drug possession and theft;
Kidnapping and attempted murder;
Voluntary manslaughter; and
Premeditated first-degree murder.

The State characterized this pattern as a “crime spree” over roughly one year.

B. The consolidated plea agreement

After a preliminary hearing, the parties reached a global resolution across four cases:

Case 2022-CR-1300:
- Premeditated first-degree murder (K.S.A. 21-5402[a][1]); and
- Voluntary manslaughter (K.S.A. 21-5404[a][1]).
Case 2022-CR-328: Attempted second-degree murder (K.S.A. 21-5403).
Case 2022-CR-276: Criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling (K.S.A. 21-6308[a][1][A]).
Case 2022-CR-277: Criminal discharge of a firearm at an occupied dwelling (same statute).

In exchange, the State dismissed all remaining counts in those cases and dismissed another case entirely (2021‑CR‑568).

C. The off-grid first-degree murder and K.S.A. 21-6620(c)(1)(B)

Both parties agreed that the first-degree murder conviction was an off-grid crime. Ordinarily, under K.S.A. 21-6620(c)(1)(A), premeditated first-degree murder carries a “Hard 50” sentence: life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for 50 years (600 months), subject to potential downward departures based on “substantial and compelling reasons” after considering mitigating circumstances.

But a different provision—K.S.A. 21-6620(c)(1)(B)—applied to this case. That subsection covers defendants who, because of their extensive criminal history, would face a longer minimum under the sentencing grid (for a severity level 1 person felony) than the 600-month Hard 50. In that scenario, the statute requires the court to impose a mandatory minimum equal to that longer guideline sentence and bars downward departure under the mitigating-circumstances framework used in subsection (c)(1)(A) and (2)(A).

Because Macormac had a criminal history score of “A” (the highest category under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines), the parties agreed that the applicable mandatory minimum before parole eligibility on the first-degree murder count was 620 months, not 600.

D. Sentencing positions of the parties

The plea agreement provided that:

The State would recommend the mid-number in the applicable guideline grid box for the grid-based sentences; and
Critically, the State would recommend that the voluntary manslaughter sentence (233 months) run consecutive to the 620-month mandatory minimum for murder; all other sentences would run concurrent to the controlling term in case 2022‑CR‑1300.

As anticipated, this would yield:

620 months before parole eligibility for first-degree murder; plus
233 months for voluntary manslaughter;
For a total controlling term of 853 months (71 years).

Under the agreement, Macormac was free to argue for concurrent sentencing, particularly between the two homicide convictions.

E. The mitigation case

Before and at sentencing, defense counsel urged the court to run all sentences concurrently, emphasizing three core mitigating themes:

Drug-induced neurodevelopmental impairment. An expert report concluded that early and chronic substance use had adversely affected Macormac’s brain development, including learning and decision-making functions.
Youth and reduced culpability. At age 25, counsel argued, his executive functioning was still developing, making him less culpable than an older adult for his impulsive, reckless acts.
Potential for reform. Given his age, a 620-month sentence (over 51 years) was portrayed as sufficiently long to allow both punishment and meaningful prospects for rehabilitation.

The district court:

Acknowledged receiving and reading the expert report and defense brief;
Heard victim impact statements and Macormac’s own expression of responsibility and apology;
Heard arguments from both sides regarding concurrent versus consecutive sentencing; and
Accepted the sentencing structure largely as contemplated by the plea agreement.

F. The sentencing decision

The district court imposed:

620 months before parole eligibility for first-degree murder; and
A consecutive 233-month term for voluntary manslaughter;
With all remaining sentences ordered concurrent.

On the record, the court explained the decision to make the two homicide sentences consecutive by noting that there were two victims and that each was “entitled to their own sentence.”

On appeal, Macormac argued that:

The district court abused its discretion by ignoring or improperly discounting the “compelling” mitigation evidence—neurodevelopmental impairment, youth, and rehabilitative potential; and
His conduct did not involve the prolonged planning, extreme brutality, or victimization of children present in other cases where consecutive sentences had been affirmed by the Kansas Supreme Court.

IV. Precedents and Statutory Framework

A. Statutory framework: K.S.A. 21-6819 and 21-6620

1. Discretion over concurrent vs. consecutive sentences (K.S.A. 21-6819)

K.S.A. 21-6819 governs concurrent and consecutive sentencing in Kansas. Key features relevant here are:

Outside of specific mandatory rules (not applicable here), sentencing judges have discretion to decide whether multiple sentences will run concurrently or consecutively.
Under subsection (b), the judge may consider the need for an overall sentence proportional to the offender’s harm and culpability.
The only explicit requirement is that the sentencing judge must state on the record whether the sentences are concurrent or consecutive.

Critically, the statute does not require:

Consideration of mitigating factors when deciding concurrency versus consecutivity; or
A detailed explanation of the court’s weighing of various factors.

2. Mandatory minimums for first-degree murder (K.S.A. 21-6620)

K.S.A. 21-6620 establishes mandatory minimum terms for premeditated first-degree murder:

Subsection (c)(1)(A) – The standard “Hard 50”:
- Life imprisonment with no possibility of parole for 50 years (600 months);
- Permits downward departures based on “substantial and compelling reasons” after reviewing mitigating circumstances.
Subsection (c)(1)(B) – Enhanced minimum where criminal history would yield more than 600 months:
- If the guidelines grid sentence for a severity level 1 person felony exceeds 600 months, the court must impose that longer minimum as the parole ineligibility period.
- This subsection expressly precludes downward departures based on compelling mitigating reasons in the way subsection (c)(1)(A) allows.

Macormac’s case falls under subsection (c)(1)(B); thus, there was:

No statutory mechanism to reduce his 620‑month mandatory minimum based on mitigation; and
No statutory requirement that the court weigh mitigation when deciding whether to stack the manslaughter sentence on top of the murder sentence.

B. Kansas Supreme Court precedents shaping the decision

The Court’s reasoning in Macormac relies heavily on its prior decisions, which collectively define:

The scope of trial court discretion over concurrent vs. consecutive sentences; and
The limited role of appellate courts in second-guessing sentencing judgments.

1. State v. Baker, 297 Kan. 482, 301 P.3d 706 (2013)

Baker is cited for the foundational rule that it is within the trial court’s “sound discretion” to determine whether sentences run concurrent or consecutive. It is also the source for the modern Kansas formulation of the abuse-of-discretion standard, now repeatedly quoted:

Judicial action is an abuse of discretion if it:

Is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable—meaning no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court;

Is based on an error of law; or

Is based on an error of fact not supported by substantial competent evidence.

In Macormac, the Court applies this test to evaluate whether the decision to stack the voluntary manslaughter sentence atop the life sentence was outside the range of reasonable outcomes.

2. State v. Goens, 317 Kan. 616, 535 P.3d 1116 (2023)

Goens is central in several respects:

It confirms that appellate courts may review sentences for off-grid crimes for abuse of discretion when the question is concurrent vs. consecutive, even though some sentencing decisions are otherwise presumptive under the guidelines.
It restates that Kansas law does not provide definitive criteria for concurrency vs. consecutivity; judges have broad discretion within statutory limits.
It emphasizes that:
“Simply not being the worst of the worst does not require the lower court to order [defendant’s] sentences to run concurrent.”
This line is quoted and applied directly in Macormac.

In Goens, the defendant was convicted of felony murder and related crimes arising from a drug deal gone wrong. The district court imposed:

A life sentence with a hard 25 for felony murder; and
A consecutive 142‑month grid sentence for remaining offenses.

The sentencing judge justified the consecutive sentences by noting that:

The conduct involved several distinct events, not a single occurrence; and
The defendant had multiple opportunities to abandon the criminal plan but did not.

The Supreme Court upheld that decision, finding no abuse of discretion. Macormac analogizes strongly to Goens and extends its reasoning to a scenario involving multiple homicides and a longer minimum term.

3. State v. Frecks, 294 Kan. 738, 280 P.3d 217 (2012)

Frecks is important for the proposition that a sentencing court’s minimal on-the-record justification can still be sufficient to sustain consecutive sentences.

In Frecks, the defendant received consecutive life sentences for aggravated indecent liberties involving two child victims. The district court did not articulate detailed reasons for imposing consecutive terms, but it referenced:

Plea negotiations;
The allegations; and
The filed documents.

The Supreme Court upheld the sentence, holding that such limited references, against the backdrop of the record, satisfied the requirement to provide at least a “minimal justification.”

In Macormac, this precedent is used to emphasize that:

A sentencing judge is not required to deliver a lengthy or elaborate sentencing rationale; and
Brief but clear reasons can suffice, especially where the basis is evident—such as multiple victims.

4. State v. McNabb, 312 Kan. 609, 478 P.3d 769 (2021)

McNabb addressed another multiple-homicide scenario. The district court justified its decision to impose consecutive sentences by stating that “the defendant killed two separate people.”

The Kansas Supreme Court held this reasoning to be both logical and reasonable and thus well within the court’s discretion. Macormac adopts this approach, reaffirming that:

The mere fact of multiple deceased victims is itself a valid and sufficient justification for consecutive sentences;
Appellate courts do not require more elaborate explanation to uphold such a decision.

5. State v. Mitchell, 320 Kan. 775, 571 P.3d 604 (2025)

Mitchell, decided earlier the same year, is closely analogous to Macormac and heavily relied upon:

The defendant, age 25, was convicted of premeditatedly murdering two family members.
The applicable statute (then under subsection [c][1][A]) allowed downward departures based on mitigating circumstances but set a presumptive life sentence with extended parole ineligibility.
Mitchell argued that his mental illness should be considered a mitigating factor justifying concurrent sentences and that consecutivity undermined rehabilitation goals.

The Kansas Supreme Court acknowledged that mental illness was “a sympathetic factor” but held that the district court’s core rationale—again, that he killed “two separate people”—was a sound and reasonable basis for consecutive terms. No abuse of discretion was found.

Macormac builds on Mitchell in three important ways:

It applies the same reasoning (multiple victims justify consecutive sentences) to a case governed by K.S.A. 21-6620(c)(1)(B), where downward departures are statutorily barred.
It rejects the claim that youth and mental-health-related factors—here framed through brain development and drug use—compel a different result.
It confirms that a short statement referencing the existence of two victims is sufficient even in the face of extensive mitigation evidence.

6. Other cited precedents: Brune, Horn, Mosher, Ross

Several additional cases are cited primarily to address, and reject, Macormac’s argument that his conduct was less egregious than in prior cases affirming consecutive sentences:

State v. Brune, 307 Kan. 370, 409 P.3d 862 (2018): A planned robbery escalated into a double murder by stabbing, executed in a particularly brutal manner.
State v. Horn, 302 Kan. 255, 352 P.3d 549 (2015): After strangling his girlfriend, the defendant set the apartment on fire, also killing the girlfriend’s two-year-old niece. The Court described the conduct as “troubling” and “horrific” and reflective of reckless disregard for others’ safety.
State v. Mosher, 299 Kan. 1, 319 P.3d 1253 (2014): The violent murder of a family member involved significant planning and could have been abandoned at multiple stages.
State v. Ross, 295 Kan. 1126, 289 P.3d 76 (2012): The victim suffered during a kidnapping prior to being murdered; the defendant’s lack of compassion and the harm to the victim’s family were emphasized.

Macormac argued that, because his crimes were comparatively “impulsive,” directed at adults, and less prolonged or brutal, the rationale for consecutive sentences in those cases did not apply in his. The Court relied on Goens to reject this comparative-atrocity approach, holding that:

Consecutive sentences are not reserved only for the most horrific or most planned crimes; and
Merely being “less bad” than prior cases does not require concurrent sentences.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Standard of review and the burden on the defendant

The Court reiterates the familiar abuse-of-discretion standard:

A judicial decision is an abuse of discretion if it:

Is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable (no reasonable person would have taken that view);

Is based on an error of law; or

Is based on a factual error not supported by substantial competent evidence.

Critically, the burden rests on the defendant to demonstrate such an abuse. In sentencing appeals, this means the defendant must do more than show that a different sentence would also have been reasonable; he must show that no reasonable judge could have imposed the sentence actually given under the circumstances.

B. No statutory requirement to consider mitigating factors when choosing consecutivity

A cornerstone of the Court’s reasoning is the distinction between:

Statutory schemes that require or invite consideration of mitigating circumstances; and
Those that simply vest discretionary power in the court without specifying particular factors.

In this case:

K.S.A. 21-6819(b) allows the sentencing judge to consider proportionality to harm and culpability but does not:
- Mandate consideration of mitigating factors; or
- Require a specific balancing of mitigation against aggravation.
K.S.A. 21-6620(c)(1)(B) explicitly precludes downward departures based on “compelling reasons” following a “review of mitigating circumstances” in the way subsection (c)(1)(A) does.

The Court thus characterizes Macormac’s argument as essentially a disagreement with the weight the sentencing judge gave to the expert report and youthfulness, rather than an assertion that the judge failed to perform a statutory duty.

Because appellate courts do not reweigh evidence, the fact that the district court mentioned mitigating materials only briefly—and did not accept their implications as defense counsel urged—does not itself indicate error.

C. Adequacy of the sentencing explanation

The Court acknowledges that “it is best practice” for sentencing courts to state the basis for their decisions on the record. Nonetheless, relying on Frecks and Goens, the Court holds that:

A lengthy explanation is not required; and
A minimal justification is still sufficient, provided it is logically connected to the harm and culpability at issue.

Here, the district court:

Recognized the plea agreement;
Acknowledged the expert’s report and defense brief (“I appreciate Dr. Roache’s report and the brief submitted by Mr. Frieden”); and
Stated its reason for consecutive sentences: there were two victims, and each was “entitled to their own sentence.”

The Supreme Court stresses that the brevity of this explanation does not suggest a “cavalier rejection” of the defense’s mitigation, just as a short reference to the plea agreement does not indicate the court ignored the terms of that agreement. Instead, the sentencing judge must be presumed to have considered the record before him unless there is affirmative indication otherwise.

D. Multiple victims as a reasonable basis for consecutive sentences

The Court builds on McNabb and Mitchell to reaffirm that sentencing courts may reasonably impose consecutive terms based solely on the fact that:

There are multiple deceased victims; and
Each victim is “entitled to their own sentence.”

In other words, the number of victims and the separate harms inflicted provide a self-sufficient rationale for consecutive sentences, even:

Without detailed discussion of comparative brutality; and
Despite the presence of significant mitigating evidence such as youth, mental illness, or brain impairment.

This is a crucial doctrinal point: it signals that in multi-victim homicide cases, Kansas courts are likely to treat consecutive sentences as a presumptively reasonable exercise of discretion, so long as the sentencing judge identifies the separate victims as the basis.

E. Rejection of the “comparative egregiousness” argument

A major pillar of the defense’s appellate strategy was:

To demonstrate that prior cases upholding consecutive sentences—such as Brune, Horn, Mosher, Ross, and Baker—involved more shocking or aggravated conduct (brutal stabbings, child victims, prolonged suffering, arson, etc.); and
To argue that because his crimes were more impulsive and less brutal, imposing consecutive sentences here was unreasonable by comparison.

The Court firmly rejects this reasoning, leaning on Goens:

“Simply not being the worst of the worst does not require the lower court to order his sentences to run concurrent.”

This has several doctrinal implications:

Appellate review is not comparative in the sense of ranking cases along a severity spectrum and then requiring consistency in outcomes based on that ranking.
The question remains whether the sentence in this case falls within the broad range of reasonable options, not whether it is harsher than in some more aggravated case.
Consequently, defendants cannot secure reversal simply by showing that their case is less egregious than past cases where consecutive sentences were upheld.

F. Treatment of youth, drug use, and brain development

The Court does not dismiss the mitigation evidence as irrelevant or unfounded. Instead, it treats these factors as:

Potentially sympathetic;
Properly presented to and acknowledged by the sentencing court; but
Not controlling and not legally required to produce concurrent sentences.

Two particular aspects are noteworthy:

The State rebutted the mitigation by pointing to:
- Macormac’s gang involvement;
- His failure to abstain from substances (including synthetic marijuana use in prison and shortly after release); and
- His prior mental-health interventions and prescriptions, undercutting the narrative that his condition was wholly untreated.
The Supreme Court mentions these points to show that the record was contested, not one-sided, regarding mitigation.
The expert report’s explanation of brain development stated that the brain reaches full maturity for rational decision-making in the mid-to-late twenties. The Court notes that Macormac was 25 at the time of the killings, suggesting that his age does not place him at the very boundary of immature decision-making.

By emphasizing the statutory structure (which does not require mitigation to be weighed here) and the contested nature of the record, the Court situates youth- and brain-based arguments as policy considerations left largely to the sentencing court’s judgment, not constitutional or statutory mandates constraining its discretion.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. Concurrent vs. consecutive sentences

Concurrent sentences: Multiple sentences run at the same time. A defendant serves only the longest sentence, effectively, because the shorter ones are completed “within” it.
Consecutive sentences: One sentence begins only after another has been completed. This “stacks” the terms, resulting in a longer overall period of incarceration.

In Macormac, the difference was dramatic:

Concurrent homicide sentences would have meant a controlling minimum of 620 months (just over 51 years);
Consecutive homicide sentences produced a controlling minimum of 853 months (71 years).

B. Off-grid crimes and the sentencing grid

Kansas uses a sentencing guidelines grid for most felonies. The grid combines:

Severity level of the crime; and
Criminal history score of the offender (from “A” – most serious, to “I” – least serious).

For each combination, the grid yields a range of months, and the court typically selects a number within that range (low, mid, or high).

Some crimes, however, are off-grid—they fall outside the grid and have their own statutory sentencing scheme. Premeditated first-degree murder is one such off-grid crime, structured around life imprisonment with mandatory minimums before parole eligibility (e.g., “Hard 50,” “Hard 25,” etc.).

C. “Hard” sentences and mandatory minimums

A “Hard 50” (or equivalent) is a shorthand for:

Life imprisonment; and
A requirement that the defendant serve at least 50 years (600 months) before becoming eligible for parole.

Under K.S.A. 21-6620(c)(1)(B), the minimum can be longer than 50 years if the sentencing grid, applied to the defendant’s criminal history, would require a greater minimum for a severity level 1 felony. That is what happened in Macormac: the mandatory minimum became 620 months.

D. Abuse-of-discretion review

When an appellate court reviews for abuse of discretion, it does not ask whether it would have made the same decision. Instead, it asks whether the trial judge’s decision:

Was one that a reasonable person could make, given the facts and law;
Was free from legal error; and
Was based on facts supported by the record.

If any of those fail—if the decision is outside the range of reasonable options, misapplies the law, or relies on unsupported facts—then the appellate court may find an abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the sentencing court’s decision stands, even if the appellate judges might personally have imposed a different sentence.

E. Mitigating factors and downward departures

A mitigating factor is a circumstance that tends to reduce a defendant’s moral or legal culpability (for example, mental illness, youth, addiction, minor role in the offense, remorse, etc.). A downward departure is a sentence lower than the presumptive range, granted because of such factors.

In this case:

The statute governing the mandatory minimum for murder (K.S.A. 21-6620[c][1][B]) expressly prohibits downward departures based on mitigation, unlike subsection (c)(1)(A).
The statute addressing concurrent vs. consecutive sentences (K.S.A. 21-6819) does not require specific consideration of mitigating factors in choosing between those options.

Thus, while the defense could present mitigation to urge concurrent sentences, the judge had no legal obligation to treat those mitigating factors as determinative—or even to explain, in detail, how they were weighed.

VII. Impact and Significance

A. Reinforcing wide trial-court discretion in multi-victim cases

Macormac reinforces a trend in Kansas jurisprudence: in cases involving multiple victims—especially multiple deceased victims—sentencing courts enjoy very broad discretion to impose consecutive terms, and minimal explanation is needed to uphold those decisions.

Practically, this means:

Trial judges may be confident that:
- Identifying the existence of multiple victims as the basis for consecutive sentences is sufficient; and
- They are not required to articulate a lengthy comparative analysis of aggravating and mitigating factors to survive appellate review.
Defendants will find it difficult to challenge consecutive sentences on appeal by:
- Arguing that the trial court inadequately discussed mitigation; or
- Claiming that their conduct was less egregious than in other published cases.

B. Limited role of neuroscience- and youth-based mitigation in Kansas sentencing law

While not directly a constitutional case, Macormac implicitly addresses arguments increasingly made across jurisdictions: that young adults (18–25) and those with neurodevelopmental impairments should be treated differently at sentencing.

The opinion signals that, under current Kansas statutory and decisional law:

Youth and brain-development evidence, though relevant, do not create a special category of diminished culpability that constrains judicial discretion;
Such evidence is, at most, a discretionary factor that the sentencing judge may choose to credit or discount; and
Appellate courts will rarely intervene on the basis that the trial judge did not give sufficient weight to such mitigation.

In other words, Macormac maintains a traditional, highly deferential approach to trial court discretion in this area, rather than expanding protections based on neuroscience or developmental psychology.

C. Clarifying the interaction between K.S.A. 21-6620(c)(1)(B) and consecutive sentencing

The decision clarifies that:

The statutory bar on downward departures in K.S.A. 21-6620(c)(1)(B) operates at the mandatory minimum stage, not at the concurrency/ consecutivity stage—yet the same statute underscores that mitigating factors are not central to the minimum term in such cases.
When determining whether to run additional sentences consecutively to that mandatory minimum, judges remain free to:
- Consider mitigation; or
- Give it little or no weight, so long as their reasoning is not arbitrary or grounded in legal/factual error.

This structure creates a two-tiered framework:

Mandatory minimum for the off-grid crime: Determined by statute; in (c)(1)(B) cases, downward departures for mitigation are barred.
Decision to stack or merge additional sentences: Left to judicial discretion under K.S.A. 21-6819; minimal on-the-record justification (e.g., multiple victims) is sufficient.

D. Effects on plea negotiations and sentencing advocacy

For practitioners, Macormac has several strategic implications:

Plea negotiations. Prosecutors can confidently bargain for consecutive sentences in multi-victim cases, knowing appellate courts are unlikely to overturn such sentences if the trial judge references the separate victims or distinct harms.
Defense advocacy at sentencing. Defense counsel should still present robust mitigation (for sentencing discretion and possible future executive clemency or parole review), but must recognize:
- Appeals based on the trial court “ignoring” mitigation will rarely succeed absent a clear legal or factual error; and
- It may be more productive to focus on persuading the sentencing judge at the hearing itself, rather than planning for appellate relief.
Record-building by judges. Although the Court says a lengthy explanation is not required, it reiterates that articulating reasons remains “best practice.” Judges who briefly but explicitly tie their decision to recognizable factors (number of victims, distinct episodes, opportunities to desist, etc.) will almost certainly be upheld.

VIII. Conclusion

State v. Macormac solidifies an important principle in Kansas sentencing law:

A district court’s brief explanation for imposing consecutive sentences—particularly where multiple victims are involved—does not, by itself, suggest an impermissible basis or an abuse of discretion.

The decision:

Affirms broad trial-court discretion to choose consecutive sentences for multiple homicides, even where substantial mitigating evidence is presented;
Clarifies that, under K.S.A. 21-6819 and 21-6620(c)(1)(B), sentencing judges are not required to weigh or respond in detail to mitigation when deciding concurrency vs. consecutivity;
Reiterates that appellate courts will not reweigh mitigation and will uphold sentences so long as they are within statutory limits and are supported by a reasonable, on-the-record basis; and
Rejects the notion that only the most brutal, highly premeditated, or child-victim cases justify consecutive terms, emphasizing instead that “simply not being the worst of the worst” does not entitle a defendant to concurrent sentencing.

In the broader legal landscape, Macormac stands as a clear reaffirmation of deference to sentencing judges in multi-victim violent cases and signals that, absent legislative change, Kansas courts will continue to treat youth, mental illness, and brain-development evidence as important but ultimately discretionary considerations at sentencing, not as constraints on the imposition of lengthy consecutive terms.