State v. Lee: Mandatory N.J.R.E. 104 Reliability Hearings for Challenged Fingerprint (ACE-V) Evidence Under Olenowski I

1. Introduction

In State v. French G. Lee (N.J. June 29, 2026), the Supreme Court of New Jersey confronted a core question of modern evidence law: what process is required before a jury may hear expert fingerprint-identification testimony when the defense challenges its scientific reliability.

The case arose from two September 2018 burglaries of a Moorestown restaurant. Surveillance video showed a masked intruder in a two-tone hooded sweatshirt. Police lifted five latent fingerprints from the crime scene and compared them through AFIS, with a “hit” pointing to defendant French G. Lee. At trial, the State’s expert used the ACE-V method and opined the latent prints “originat[ed] from the same source as” defendant’s prints. Only the fingerprint evidence directly linked defendant to the burglaries.

Before trial, the defense moved to bar fingerprint testimony, relying heavily on two major scientific critiques: Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward (NAS Report) (2009) and Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison Methods (PCAST Report) (2016). The trial court denied the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. Defendant was convicted.

The Appellate Division reversed on three grounds, led by the failure to hold a reliability hearing under N.J.R.E. 702. The Supreme Court granted certification and focused first on the threshold admissibility framework for fingerprint evidence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court unanimously held that trial courts have a rigorous gatekeeping duty to ensure expert testimony is sufficiently reliable and that, because defendant raised a substantial reliability challenge grounded in reputable scientific reports, the trial court should have conducted a pretrial admissibility hearing under N.J.R.E. 104.

Rather than immediately reversing the convictions, the Court:

  • Appointed a Special Adjudicator (Hon. Carmen Messano, retired Chief Judge of the Appellate Division) to conduct a plenary hearing and develop a full record.
  • Directed the adjudicator to determine:
    1. whether the fingerprint evidence satisfies State v. Olenowski (Olenowski I), 253 N.J. 133 (2023);
    2. whether limitations/guardrails should govern fingerprint testimony; and
    3. if so, what those guardrails should be—explicitly including potential revised model jury charges.
  • Retained jurisdiction and deferred ruling on the Appellate Division’s other two identified errors (voir dire and narration testimony) pending the reliability determination.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion is a synthesis of New Jersey’s evolving expert-evidence doctrine and the Court’s broader reliability jurisprudence. Key cited authorities shaped both the governing standard and the required procedure.

A. The reliability standard: from Frye to Olenowski I

  • Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923): historically, New Jersey criminal courts assessed reliability largely through “general acceptance” within the relevant field. The State argued Frye controlled because fingerprint evidence has long been admitted and, in the State’s view, scientific reliability had not “changed.”
  • Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993): not adopted wholesale as federal doctrine in New Jersey, but its non-exclusive factors (testing, peer review/publication, error rates, general acceptance) now inform the state reliability inquiry.
  • In re Accutane Litig., 234 N.J. 340 (2018): Accutane is the civil-law bridge that clarified New Jersey’s methodological focus—moving away from mere general acceptance and toward “the methodology and reasoning underlying” expert testimony. The Court cited Accutane repeatedly to emphasize that the gatekeeping function is designed to prevent juries from hearing “unsound science through the compelling voice of an expert.”
  • State v. Olenowski (Olenowski I), 253 N.J. 133 (2023): the controlling criminal-law shift. Olenowski I requires courts to examine methodological soundness and invites consideration of the Daubert factors. Critically, Olenowski I declined to disturb pre-existing Frye-based approvals, but expressly contemplated revisiting long-admitted evidence when “the scientific reliability underlying the evidence has changed.”
  • State v. Olenowski (Olenowski II), 255 N.J. 529 (2023): reinforced that reliability “should not be frozen in time” and that new scientific research may justify changes in admissibility law. This principle provided the Court with the doctrinal justification to treat NAS/PCAST critiques as potentially meaningful “new research” rather than mere cross-examination material.

B. The gatekeeping obligation and the hearing mechanism

  • State v. J.L.G., 234 N.J. 265, 307-08 (2018): supplied the opinion’s central formulation: trial courts must ensure “expert testimony is sufficiently reliable before it can be presented to a jury.” Lee deploys J.L.G. to justify why the absence of a hearing was not a minor procedural lapse but a failure of gatekeeping.
  • State v. Nieves, 262 N.J. 161, 219-20 (2025) and State v. Cassidy, 235 N.J. 482, 492 (2018): cited for the proposition that the proponent (here, the State) bears the burden to establish sufficient reliability under N.J.R.E. 702.
  • State v. J.R., 227 N.J. 393, 409 (2017), quoting State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 567 (2005): when a party challenges an expert opinion under N.J.R.E. 702, the trial court “should conduct” a hearing under N.J.R.E. 104 on admissibility. Lee uses this line to convert gatekeeping from an abstract principle into a concrete procedural expectation.
  • State v. Chen, 208 N.J. 307, 318-19 (2011) and State v. Williams, 240 N.J. 225, 234 (2019): reinforce that gatekeeping “ensure[s] that unreliable, misleading evidence is not admitted,” and that Rule 104 hearings are routine instruments for that duty.
  • Beavan v. Allergan U.S.A., Inc., 264 N.J. 99, 107 (2026): cited to stress the gatekeeping role “must be rigorous,” aligning criminal and civil reliability sensibilities.
  • Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999): offered as persuasive parallel authority for a “basic gatekeeping obligation” extending beyond purely “scientific” testimony to technical/specialized knowledge—mirroring Olenowski I’s breadth.
  • State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410, 430 (2016) and Kemp ex rel. Wright v. State, 174 N.J. 412, 428 (2002): cited for the general proposition that whether to conduct a Rule 104 hearing is discretionary—yet Lee clarifies that discretion has limits when the challenge is substantial and well-supported.

C. Prior fingerprint cases and the limits of “historical acceptance”

  • State v. Cerciello, 86 N.J.L. 309, 313-15 (E. & A. 1914): invoked by the State as evidence that fingerprint testimony has been accepted for “nearly 100 years” (indeed more than a century). The Court did not reject Cerciello, but held that longevity alone cannot substitute for a modern reliability analysis where legitimate scientific critiques are raised.
  • Federal admissibility decisions relied on by the State: United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Pena, 586 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2009); United States v. Herrera, 704 F.3d 480 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Straker, 800 F.3d 570 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Lee treated these cases as incomplete answers because they predated the PCAST Report (and two predated the NAS Report), meaning they could not address certain modern concerns like black-box error rates emphasized by PCAST.

D. Analogous New Jersey “special hearing” precedents

The Court justified appointing a Special Adjudicator by analogizing to prior system-wide reliability inquiries:

  • State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208, 305-06 (2011) (eyewitness identification reliability record-building)
  • State v. Moore, 180 N.J. 459, 460-61 (2004) (hypnotically refreshed testimony admissibility)

These cases function as institutional templates: when an evidence domain raises broad reliability concerns, New Jersey may build a comprehensive record with expert testimony to guide admissibility rules and safeguards.

E. Voir dire and narration testimony precedents (deferred issues)

  • State v. Watson, 254 N.J. 558, 603-04 (2023): governed narration limits on video evidence. Lee indicated the challenged testimony crossed into subjective interpretation, but postponed deciding consequences pending the fingerprint hearing outcome.
  • Voir dire authorities: State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 210 (1993); State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 129 (1991); State v. Papasavvas, 163 N.J. 565, 585, 595 (2000); State v. Little, 246 N.J. 402, 413, 417, 420 (2021); State v. Winder, 200 N.J. 231, 252-53 (2009); and State v. Murray, 240 N.J. Super. 378, 391-92 (App. Div. 1990). The Court acknowledged the doctrinal framework but intentionally deferred a final ruling.
  • Invited error: State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013) (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987)). The Court held the parties’ discussion did not amount to invited error because the reliability dispute remained live and required judicial resolution.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The Court’s core move: “Gatekeeping” requires a record

The decisive reasoning is procedural but grounded in substantive reliability doctrine: when a defendant raises a focused, non-frivolous challenge to a forensic method’s reliability—especially by citing major scientific reviews— a trial judge cannot resolve admissibility by pointing to tradition or generic statements that “courts have long allowed this.”

The Court emphasized three linked propositions:

  1. N.J.R.E. 702 requires sufficient reliability (second prong of the Olenowski/J.L.G. test).
  2. The proponent bears the burden (here, the State).
  3. Reliability cannot be determined in the abstract when contested; it requires an evidentiary mechanism—typically a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing.

B. Why tradition and out-of-state precedent were not enough

The trial court relied on two supports: (1) century-long acceptance and (2) federal appellate precedent finding ACE-V reliable. Lee identified why those supports were insufficient in this posture:

  • Time does not immunize an evidence type from renewed scrutiny under Olenowski I and Olenowski II. The Court reiterated that reliability is not “frozen in time.”
  • The federal cases cited were decided before PCAST (and some before NAS), leaving open whether the modern critiques and error-rate discussions would alter a robust reliability analysis.
  • The Court noted the absence of a reported New Jersey decision that had reviewed an evidentiary hearing record on fingerprint reliability in depth. That gap made it harder to treat “New Jersey acceptance” as a modern, evidence-based conclusion rather than an inherited practice.

C. The remedial architecture: Special Adjudicator + retained jurisdiction

The Court’s remedy is notable. It did not simply remand for a hearing to the trial judge and then order a new trial. Instead, it retained jurisdiction and appointed a Special Adjudicator to conduct a “plenary hearing.” This approach signals that the Court views fingerprint admissibility as a potentially systemic issue—like eyewitness identification in Henderson—capable of generating statewide guidance.

The adjudicator’s assignment is not limited to “admit or exclude.” The Court explicitly requested consideration of guardrails and potential revisions to model jury charges, recognizing that admissibility and how evidence is framed for juries are intertwined.

D. Sequencing: why the Court did not immediately reverse

Although “only the fingerprint evidence linked defendant to the burglaries,” the Court declined to reverse immediately because the admissibility question remained unresolved. The Court set a conditional roadmap:

  • If the evidence is ultimately deemed unreliable, “the conviction cannot stand.”
  • If deemed admissible, the Court will then address the remaining issues (voir dire and narration testimony) as needed.

This sequencing reflects institutional caution: the Court first seeks a scientifically and legally grounded record before announcing broader admissibility rules or ordering final relief.

3.3 Impact

A. Fingerprint evidence in New Jersey is no longer “self-proving”

Lee’s immediate doctrinal impact is to reject the notion that fingerprint evidence—because it is old and common—may be admitted without meaningful reliability scrutiny when challenged. The decision elevates fingerprint identification into the post-Olenowski I world: its admissibility must be justified by reliability analysis, not merely tradition.

B. Expect more Rule 104 hearings for feature-comparison forensics

Although Lee is formally about fingerprints, its logic naturally applies to other feature-comparison and pattern disciplines (e.g., toolmarks, footwear impressions, handwriting) when litigants present credible modern critiques. Trial courts may now feel compelled to build records rather than rely on inherited admissibility.

C. Litigation behavior and institutional coordination

The Court admonished both sides: it is “far from ideal” to ask a judge to bar long-admitted evidence without being prepared to present supporting witnesses. Lee thus encourages institutional coordination: defense counsel with the Public Defender’s forensic science unit and prosecutors with the Attorney General. Practically, this should yield better-developed records and more standardized litigation positions statewide.

D. Potential downstream reforms: guardrails and jury instructions

By explicitly directing consideration of “limitations or guardrails” and revised model jury charges, the Court signaled that future New Jersey fingerprint testimony may be shaped not only by whether it is admissible, but also by how conclusions may be expressed (e.g., claims of certainty, source attribution language, treatment of error rates, documentation of verification procedures).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • N.J.R.E. 702 (Expert Testimony): the rule governing when experts may give opinions. It requires that the field be sufficiently reliable and that the expert be qualified.
  • N.J.R.E. 104 hearing: a pretrial (or midtrial) evidentiary hearing where the judge decides admissibility questions—often by hearing expert testimony and reviewing studies—before the jury hears the evidence.
  • Frye vs. Daubert factors (as used in New Jersey): Frye emphasized “general acceptance.” After Accutane and Olenowski I, New Jersey focuses on methodological soundness and invites courts to consider Daubert factors (testing, peer review, error rates, general acceptance) without adopting all federal Daubert case law.
  • ACE-V: a structured workflow for fingerprint examination: Analysis (assessing print quality and features), Comparison (side-by-side feature comparison), Evaluation (reaching a conclusion), Verification (a second examiner reviews). Critics argue key steps involve subjective judgment, and “verification” may not be blind.
  • AFIS “hit”: a database search that suggests candidates; it is typically an investigative lead, not itself a courtroom identification. Human examiners still decide the “match.”
  • Black-box studies: studies that test examiner accuracy by giving them comparisons with known answers and measuring error rates, without evaluating the internal reasoning process.
  • Confirmation bias: the risk that knowing another examiner’s conclusion (or case details) can unconsciously influence one’s own evaluation—one reason “blind” verification procedures are often discussed.
  • Narration testimony (video evidence): under State v. Watson, witnesses may describe what appears in a video (objective facts) but may not provide subjective opinions that decide disputed issues for the jury (e.g., “that’s the same person”).

5. Conclusion

State v. Lee establishes a clear procedural and doctrinal directive for New Jersey courts: when fingerprint evidence is meaningfully challenged on reliability grounds—particularly through credible scientific critiques— the trial court must do more than rely on historical acceptance or older precedent. It must perform its gatekeeping function, typically through a Rule 104 hearing, to decide whether the methodology satisfies Olenowski I.

By appointing a Special Adjudicator, retaining jurisdiction, and inviting consideration of guardrails and jury instructions, the Court positioned this case to shape not only the outcome for one defendant but also the future architecture of forensic proof in New Jersey.