Standing Turns on Abandonment at the Time of Search in Bus-Luggage Cases; A Reliable Drug-Dog Alert Supplies Probable Cause Under the Automobile Exception

Case: United States v. Jose Duran Garcia (No. 23-4631) (4th Cir. Mar. 5, 2026) (unpublished)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Disposition: Affirmed (denial of motion to suppress)

1. Introduction

This appeal arises from a traffic stop of a commercial bus traveling from Atlanta to New York. Officers obtained the bus driver’s consent to open and search the bus’s exterior luggage hold. While one officer wrote a traffic ticket, another deployed a trained drug-detection dog (Kaos) to sniff the open luggage area. The officer interpreted Kaos’s behavior as an alert, searched suitcases in the compartment, and recovered large quantities of cocaine.

The defendant, Jose Gabriel Duran Garcia, was later connected to two identical black suitcases containing cocaine (eventually supported by terminal surveillance footage showing him loading them). He moved to suppress the cocaine, arguing the searches violated the Fourth Amendment. The district court denied suppression, concluding (among other things) that Duran lacked “standing” because he disclaimed ownership, and alternatively that the dog’s alert provided probable cause.

On appeal, the Fourth Circuit addressed two central issues: (1) whether Duran had a reasonable expectation of privacy (and thus standing) to challenge the suitcase searches, given the timing of his disclaimer; and (2) whether Kaos’s alert—despite not performing a “final response” sit—was reliable enough to establish probable cause for a warrantless search.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit held that the district court clearly erred in concluding Duran lacked standing to challenge the search of the first suitcase, because standing is assessed at the time of the search, and Duran’s disclaimer occurred after that first search. However, the court agreed Duran did abandon (and thus lacked standing as to) the second suitcase because he disclaimed ownership before that search.

Reaching the merits for the first suitcase, the court affirmed denial of suppression. It concluded the district court did not clearly err in finding Kaos “alerted” based on handler testimony plus training/certification records. Under the totality-of-the-circumstances framework, the alert supplied probable cause, and the warrantless search was permissible under the automobile exception (which the panel reasoned applies to buses as well).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

(i) Fourth Amendment basics: personal rights and expectations of privacy

  • Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996): Cited for the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, providing the constitutional baseline for the suppression analysis.
  • Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998): Reinforces that Fourth Amendment rights are “personal” and must be invoked by the individual asserting them—foundational to “standing” analysis.
  • Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980): Supplies the “legitimate expectation of privacy” requirement to contest a search.

(ii) Standing, abandonment, and timing

  • United States v. Daniels, 41 F.4th 412 (4th Cir. 2022): Places the burden on the defendant to establish standing by a preponderance of the evidence.
  • United States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 2013) and United States v. Denny, 441 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2006): Cited for the complementary principle that the government bears the burden of showing a warrantless seizure/search was reasonable.
  • United States v. Castellanos, 716 F.3d 828 (4th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868 (4th Cir. 1992)): Provides the circuit’s two-factor framing—ownership/possessory claim and steps to exclude others—used to evaluate a reasonable expectation of privacy.
  • United States v. Ferebee, 957 F.3d 406 (4th Cir. 2020): Establishes that abandonment relinquishes a privacy interest and that abandonment is a fact question reviewed for clear error.
  • United States v. Smith, 21 F.4th 122 (4th Cir. 2021): Critical to the panel’s correction of the district court—standing is assessed at the time of the search, so a later disclaimer cannot retroactively eliminate standing for an earlier search.
  • United States v. Mayberry, 125 F.4th 132 (4th Cir. 2025): Used to articulate the “clear weight of the evidence” standard supporting the panel’s conclusion that the district court’s abandonment finding (as to the first suitcase) was clearly erroneous.
  • United States v. Rose, 3 F.4th 722 (2021): Referenced to emphasize that the government’s evidence of a defendant’s “possession” or “control” can be used to establish an interest sufficient for standing.
  • Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000): Recognizes a privacy interest in luggage on a bus—supporting the conclusion that, absent abandonment, a passenger may retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in a bag.

(iii) Miranda and “custody” (raised in a footnote)

  • United States v. Leggette, 57 F.4th 406 (4th Cir. 2023): Supports rejecting the argument that the disclaimer statements should be suppressed; Miranda warnings are required only for custodial interrogation.

(iv) Dog sniffs, probable cause, and vehicle-search doctrine

  • United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 2008): Cited for the proposition that a dog sniff is not a “search,” and thus may be used during a lawful traffic stop without separate justification (as framed in the opinion).
  • Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)): States the default rule—warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable absent well-delineated exceptions.
  • Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938 (1996) (per curiam): Provides the automobile exception’s core formulation—readily mobile vehicle + probable cause permits warrantless search.
  • United States v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 586 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982)): Sets out scope—once probable cause exists, officers may search every part of the vehicle and contents that may conceal the object of the search; also used to reject any requirement that a dog precisely pinpoint drugs.
  • California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991): Confirms the automobile exception extends to containers within vehicles.
  • California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985): Supports the rationale for the automobile exception—mobility and diminished expectations of privacy due to pervasive regulation.
  • United States v. Tuton, 893 F.3d 562 (8th Cir. 2018) and United States v. Pina, 648 F. App’x 899 (11th Cir. 2016): Persuasive authority used to support applying the automobile exception to buses and bus luggage during traffic stops.
  • United States v. Green, 740 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2014): Fourth Circuit application of the Supreme Court’s dog-reliability framework; demonstrates that field accuracy rates do not necessarily defeat reliability where training/certification support it.
  • Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013): The governing framework for assessing dog-alert reliability and probable cause under the totality of circumstances, emphasizing controlled testing, certification/training evidence, and defendant’s ability to challenge adequacy or claim cueing/unfamiliar conditions.
  • United States v. Curry, 478 F. App’x 42 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Mason, 628 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 2010)): Supports treating “whether the dog reliably alerted” as a question of fact.
  • Varner v. Roane, 981 F.3d 288 (4th Cir. 2020): Used to crystallize the practical upshot—if a dog is certified and generally reliable, a key remaining question is whether police “manufactured” the alert (e.g., cueing).
  • United States v. Patiutka, 804 F.3d 684 (4th Cir. 2015): Supplies the deference rule for credibility findings at suppression hearings, reinforcing the panel’s refusal to disturb the district court’s acceptance of the handler’s testimony over the defense expert.

(v) Appellate preservation

  • Richardson v. Clarke, 52 F.4th 614 (4th Cir. 2022): Cited to reject a newly raised appellate theory (a “bailee” property-interest argument) as forfeited.
  • United States v. Rush, 808 F.3d 1007 (4th Cir. 2015): Provides the standard of viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government after a suppression denial.

B. Legal Reasoning

(i) Standing and abandonment: the timing rule does the heavy lifting

The panel’s most concrete doctrinal move is its correction of the district court’s standing analysis. The district court treated Duran’s later on-scene disclaimer (“I don’t have a bag,” “no” checked bags) as eliminating standing across the board, and it “ignored the timing of Duran’s disavowal.” The Fourth Circuit held that approach conflicts with United States v. Smith, which requires assessing standing “at the time of the search.”

Applying that timing principle:

  • Second suitcase: Duran disclaimed ownership before it was searched. Under United States v. Ferebee, that amounts to abandonment; abandonment destroys a reasonable expectation of privacy; therefore, no standing.
  • First suitcase: It was searched before any disclaimer. At that time, there was no abandonment evidence. The government—bearing the burden to justify the warrantless search—could not use a later disclaimer to retroactively defeat standing. The district court’s contrary finding was “against the clear weight of the evidence” (invoking United States v. Mayberry).

Notably, the panel also grounded standing in the government’s own proof linking Duran to the suitcases (surveillance footage of him loading them). That evidence supported an “ownership or possessory interest” and therefore a legitimate expectation of privacy under United States v. Castellanos and Bond v. United States.

(ii) Merits: extending (or at least applying) the automobile exception logic to buses

The opinion states the Fourth Circuit had “not explicitly determined” that the automobile exception applies to buses, but then reasons that the exception’s justifications—mobility and reduced privacy expectations in heavily regulated vehicles—apply “with equal, if not greater, force to buses.” It also aligns with sister-circuit authority (United States v. Tuton; United States v. Pina).

The functional consequence is clear: if probable cause exists, officers may conduct a warrantless search of a bus’s relevant compartments and containers that might conceal contraband, consistent with Pennsylvania v. Labron, United States v. Ross, California v. Acevedo, and United States v. Kelly.

(iii) Probable cause from a “non-final” dog alert: deference + Harris framework

Duran’s core suppression argument was that Kaos did not give a final trained “sit” response and thus did not reliably alert. The panel treated “whether Kaos alerted” as a fact question and deferred to the district court’s credibility findings under United States v. Patiutka.

Under Florida v. Harris, the court emphasized controlled-setting evidence: Kaos was certified in 2020, recertified annually, and had training records indicating 100% accuracy in a controlled environment. The district court also considered field deployments (14 positive alerts out of 19 deployments), though Harris warns field results can be a less reliable metric. The panel concluded this record was “robust” enough to support finding reliability and probable cause.

The panel also relied on United States v. Kelly to reject any suggestion that an alert must pinpoint the precise suitcase: probable cause is not “so exacting” that it requires a dog to locate drugs within a foot or two, especially in a confined luggage-hold area.

(iv) Built-in limiting principle: no “unbounded authority”

While affirming, the court acknowledged the defense expert’s cueing argument and the possibility a court could find such an alert unreliable on a different record. It also cited United States v. Tuton to stress that a general alert does not authorize indiscriminate searching of “hundreds of bags” without considering the totality of the circumstances. This signals that the holding is not a blanket rule, but a fact-sensitive application of Harris.

C. Impact

Although the decision is unpublished and expressly “not binding precedent,” it is still instructive on three recurring issues in narcotics interdiction cases involving commercial travel:

  1. Standing depends on the moment of the search: The opinion reinforces that abandonment/disclaimer analysis is time-specific. A post-search disclaimer cannot erase standing for a prior search, and district courts must sequence events carefully.
  2. Bus searches fit comfortably within vehicle-search doctrine: The panel’s reasoning strongly indicates that, in the Fourth Circuit, courts will be receptive to applying the automobile exception’s logic to buses, especially where compartments are external and the vehicle is readily mobile.
  3. “Non-final” dog alerts can still create probable cause: Where training and certification are strong, courts may accept handler-interpreted behavioral alerts (breathing, pace, tail pattern) as sufficient, even absent a final sit—subject to cross-examination, cueing challenges, and totality-of-the-circumstances review.

Practically, defense litigation will likely focus more on (a) contesting the adequacy/independence of certification and training programs; (b) demonstrating cueing or contamination in the search environment; and (c) pressing courts to confine the geographic and container scope of any alert in crowded luggage settings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Standing” (Fourth Amendment)
A shorthand for whether a person can complain about a search. The person must show a “legitimate expectation of privacy” in the place or item searched.
Legitimate expectation of privacy
Generally, whether society would recognize your privacy interest as reasonable—often shown by ownership/possession and steps to keep others out (for luggage, that usually exists unless you give it up).
Abandonment
If you voluntarily relinquish your interest (for example, by clearly disclaiming ownership), you typically lose any privacy claim and cannot challenge a search—but the key is whether you abandoned it before the search occurred.
Automobile exception
A rule allowing warrantless searches of vehicles when they are readily mobile and police have probable cause to think contraband is inside. It can extend to containers in the vehicle that could conceal the object of the search.
Probable cause
A “fair probability,” based on common sense and the totality of circumstances, that evidence or contraband will be found in the place searched.
Dog sniff / dog alert reliability
A dog sniff itself is treated differently from many other investigative techniques. For probable cause, courts focus heavily on training/certification and whether anything suggests the alert was unreliable (e.g., cueing by the handler).
“Clear error” vs. “de novo” review
Appellate courts review legal issues anew (“de novo”) but are highly deferential on factual findings (“clear error”), especially witness-credibility calls.
Miranda / custodial interrogation
Miranda warnings are required only if a suspect is interrogated while “in custody.” Noncustodial roadside questioning generally does not trigger Miranda.

5. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision delivers a pointed procedural correction—abandonment (and thus standing) must be evaluated at the time of the search—while ultimately affirming the denial of suppression because the search of the first suitcase was supported by probable cause derived from a reliable drug-dog alert. The opinion also strongly signals that bus luggage-hold searches during lawful traffic stops can be analyzed under the automobile exception, with Harris’s reliability framework governing dog-alert probable cause. Even as an unpublished decision, it provides a structured roadmap for how courts may sequence standing, abandonment, and dog-alert probable cause in commercial bus interdiction cases.