Specific Leadership Findings and Undisputed Losses Can Support Full Conspiracy Restitution

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from a large unemployment-insurance fraud scheme operated through accounts associated with Down N Dirty Transportation LLC, a company registered by Malcolm Jeffrey. Although Jeffrey said the company stopped operating in December 2019, an employer account appeared in its name on Georgia’s unemployment portal six months later. Over approximately sixteen months, the account submitted roughly 7,300 claims using about 4,900 Social Security numbers, producing approximately $16 million in benefit payments.

The government connected Jeffrey to the scheme through account-registration information, his admissions, victims’ identifying information stored in his email, photographs of benefit cards and cash, communications concerning unemployment cards, and evidence of similar activity in other states. Many benefit cards were mailed to his mother’s address. Two co-conspirators pleaded guilty; Jeffrey proceeded to trial and was convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1349.

Jeffrey challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, testimony connecting him to the nickname “Big Boy,” the weight of the evidence, and restitution covering the conspiracy’s losses. The Eleventh Circuit rejected every challenge. The decision illustrates both the strength of circumstantial proof in conspiracy prosecutions and the importance of preserving objections and post-trial requests in the district court.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The conviction

The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find Jeffrey knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. His role went beyond merely owning the company: he created the portal, identified himself as administrator, shared access credentials, retained victims’ personal information, and admitted creating another state account to obtain unemployment money. His initial false denials and flight supplied additional support for the verdict.

The disputed nickname testimony

Jeffrey’s evidentiary argument rested partly on an inaccurate account of the trial. The agent’s detailed testimony about information supplied by Jeffrey’s cellmate occurred after the jury had been excused. Although the jury heard earlier testimony identifying Jeffrey as “Big Boy,” the court held that any evidentiary error was harmless given the overwhelming independent evidence and the nickname’s limited significance. It did not decide that the disputed statements were admissible hearsay exceptions or categorically nonhearsay.

The requested new trial

Jeffrey never moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. That omission prevented him from obtaining the requested weight-of-the-evidence relief on appeal. Independently, the evidence did not heavily preponderate against the verdict.

The sentence and restitution

The district court imposed 120 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, varying downward from an advisory range of 168 to 210 months. It ordered restitution totaling $16,958,372:

• $16,683,612 to the Georgia Department of Labor, jointly and severally with Jeffrey’s co-conspirators; and
• $274,760 to the unemployment-insurance administrators of Nevada and Massachusetts.

Reviewing the unpreserved restitution challenge for plain error, the court upheld the award. The district court’s findings that Jeffrey created the portals and managed participants, combined with uncontested actual-loss figures in the presentence report, supported attributing the full losses to him. Proof that he personally received every dollar was unnecessary.

3. Analysis: Sufficiency of the Conspiracy Evidence

Applicable legal principles

The underlying mail-fraud offense requires intentional participation in a scheme to obtain money or property by fraud and use of the mails in furtherance of that scheme. Here, online claim submissions generated mailed debit cards, supplying the mailing component of the fraudulent operation.

For conspiracy under § 1349, the government had to establish a conspiracy to commit mail fraud, Jeffrey’s knowledge of it, and his knowing and voluntary participation. It did not have to prove that he understood every detail, participated in every transaction, or committed an overt act.

Although sufficiency review is de novo, the appellate court views the evidence favorably to the government. It does not conduct a fresh trial or substitute its preferred factual interpretation for a reasonable jury’s assessment.

Precedents cited and their influence

• United States v. Bryan, 159 F.4th 1274 (11th Cir. 2025) supplied the principal framework for reviewing evidentiary sufficiency and a denied acquittal motion. It also collected the authorities recognizing that direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, and reasonable inferences can establish criminal elements.
• United States v. Lander, 668 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2012) supported viewing evidentiary conflicts in the government’s favor and provided the two elements of substantive mail fraud. Those elements connected the fabricated claims and mailed benefit cards to the conspiracy’s unlawful objective.
• United States v. Descent, 292 F.3d 703 (11th Cir. 2002) supported applying the same sufficiency standard to review of the denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
• United States v. Utter, 97 F.3d 509 (11th Cir. 1996) recognized that conduct-based inferences and circumstantial evidence may prove an element. That principle permitted the jury to draw conclusions from Jeffrey’s account creation, possession of identifying information, and communications.
• United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652 (11th Cir. 1990) rejected a categorical difference in the weight accorded direct and circumstantial evidence. Jeffrey therefore could not defeat the conviction merely by identifying forms of direct proof the government had not produced.
• United States v. Rodriguez, 732 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013), citing United States v. Herrera, 931 F.2d 761 (11th Cir. 1991), supplied the controlling ultimate question: whether any reasonable construction of the evidence permitted guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The existence of a competing interpretation would not itself require acquittal.
• United States v. Alli, 184 F.4th 1280 (11th Cir. 2026) identified the conspiracy elements and confirmed that agreement may be inferred from indirect evidence. It directly answered Jeffrey’s insistence on communications or other direct proof documenting his agreement with co-conspirators.
• United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 2015) established that knowledge of the conspiracy’s essential nature suffices and that § 1349 does not require an overt act. Its discussion of conspiracy as predominantly mental explained why circumstantial proof is particularly important.
• United States v. Vernon, 723 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2013), cited through United States v. Moran, supported proving conspiracy through inferences and circumstantial evidence rather than an express documented agreement.
• United States v. Shabazz, 887 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2018) was cited by analogy for the evidentiary significance of disbelieved statements, particularly concerning knowledge or intent. Jeffrey’s initial denials, followed by admissions, supported an inference of culpability alongside the other evidence.

Why the evidence satisfied those principles

The court’s reasoning was cumulative. No isolated fact carried the entire prosecution. Instead, several categories of evidence reinforced one another:

1. Creation and control: Jeffrey opened the employer portal after his company had ceased operating, designated himself administrator, and used his own email address.
2. Coordination: He admitted sharing credentials with his mother and stepfather, while co-conspirators exchanged messages containing the portal’s username and apparent passwords.
3. Connection to actual fraudulent claims: Five witnesses denied working for the company or authorizing claims. Their identifying details appeared in photographed handwritten lists in Jeffrey’s email, some annotated with acceptance notations and dollar amounts.
4. Access to benefits: Cards were mailed to his mother’s home, and his communications referred to possessing numerous unemployment cards.
5. Replication and consciousness of guilt: Other-state accounts, an admission concerning Texas, initial false denials, and flight supported knowing participation.

Consequently, the absence of ATM photographs or direct messages expressly agreeing to commit fraud did not create a legal deficiency. The evidence supported participation in the scheme, not merely association with people who committed it.

4. Analysis: The “Big Boy” Evidence and Harmless Error

The critical distinction between the jury record and the outside-jury examination

The jury heard Agent Barnes identify Jeffrey as someone known as “Big Boy.” Jeffrey initially did not object. Later questioning produced a hearsay objection and revealed that the information came from a cellmate.

After the jury left, further examination explored the cellmate’s account of the prison nickname and a woman’s message referring to “Big Boy.” Jeffrey argued on appeal that the government had placed this multilayered account before the jury. The appellate court rejected that factual premise: the jury was absent when those details were developed.

The district court had offered Jeffrey the opportunity to introduce both relevant aspects of that account or neither. He chose not to pursue it. The appellate decision therefore must not be read as approving the admission of the complete cellmate narrative before the jury.

Precedents cited and their influence

• United States v. Cremades, 160 F.4th 1296 (11th Cir. 2025) supplied the nonconstitutional harmless-error framework under Rule 52(a). An evidentiary mistake warrants relief only if it affects substantial rights; the court relied on this principle rather than resolving the underlying hearsay question.
• United States v. Guzman, 167 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 1999), quoted through United States v. Cremades, recognized that overwhelming evidence of guilt may render an erroneous evidentiary ruling harmless.
• United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717 (11th Cir. 1992) directed attention to highly probative evidence unaffected by the alleged error. Jeffrey’s admissions, account information, victims’ data, and card-routing evidence remained independently available.
• United States v. Dicks, 338 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2003) supported the court’s observation that a defendant cannot attribute prejudice to the prosecution when defense counsel introduces or emphasizes the relevant information. Here, only Jeffrey mentioned the nickname during closing argument.

The limits of the holding

The nickname at most connected Jeffrey to one apparent portal password. It added little because substantial independent evidence already identified him as the account’s creator and administrator. The government did not rely on the nickname in closing, and Jeffrey neither requested a limiting instruction nor objected to the instructions given.

The court also declined to address the Confrontation Clause because Jeffrey mentioned it only in passing without developing an argument. Accordingly, the opinion establishes neither a constitutional ruling on the cellmate’s statements nor a general rule that nickname testimony is admissible.

5. Analysis: A Weight-of-the-Evidence Challenge Requires a New-Trial Motion

A sufficiency challenge and a weight-of-the-evidence challenge serve different functions. Rule 29 asks whether the evidence legally permits conviction. Rule 33 permits a new trial in the interests of justice, but a weight-based request is reserved for exceptional cases in which the evidence heavily favors a result contrary to the verdict.

Precedents cited and their influence

• United States v. Moore, 76 F.4th 1355 (11th Cir. 2023) supplied abuse-of-discretion review for new-trial rulings, with greater deference to denials.
• United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019) articulated the demanding substantive threshold: weight-based new trials are reserved for “really exceptional cases” in which the evidence heavily preponderates against the verdict.
• United States v. DiBernardo, 880 F.2d 1216 (11th Cir. 1989) established the decisive procedural limitation. The district court cannot grant this relief without a defendant’s motion, and the appellate court cannot bypass that omission by ordering the requested new trial on appeal.
• United States v. Brown, 587 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979) and United States v. Eaton, 501 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1974) reinforced that a district court lacks authority to order a new trial when the defendant has not requested one.

Jeffrey repeatedly stated that he had no further motions and never filed a Rule 33 motion. His earlier Rule 29 motion did not substitute for one. The court therefore rejected his request on procedural grounds and also explained that the overwhelming evidence independently defeated its merits.

6. Analysis: Restitution for the Conspiracy’s Full Actual Loss

The statutory framework

The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act requires restitution for qualifying property offenses, including fraud. When the offense includes a conspiracy or scheme, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) extends victim status to those directly harmed by criminal conduct occurring in its course.

Several limitations and authorizations operate together:

• Restitution compensates actual loss, not merely intended loss.
• The loss must have the necessary causal connection to the defendant’s conduct and the relevant scheme.
• Under § 3664(f)(1)(A), the award ordinarily covers the victim’s full loss without reducing that amount because of the defendant’s financial circumstances.
• Under § 3664(h), when multiple defendants contribute to a loss, the court may impose liability for the full amount or apportion responsibility.

Precedents governing review and the scope of restitution

• United States v. Utsick, 45 F.4th 1325 (11th Cir. 2022), citing United States v. Jones, 289 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2002), required plain-error review because Jeffrey had not raised his restitution objection below.
• United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2006), cited through United States v. Utsick, supplied the requirements of error, plainness, and an effect on substantial rights, followed by discretionary correction only for an error seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
• United States v. Brown, 665 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2011) described the statutory definition of “victim” as expansive. That breadth allows restitution to account for harm caused throughout a qualifying fraudulent scheme.
• United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627 (11th Cir. 2007), quoting United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264 (11th Cir. 2003), established that restitution is not confined to the particular fraudulent act underlying a charged mailing. The relevant scheme can define a broader compensable injury.
• United States v. Dickerson, 370 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2004) permitted restitution for related conduct not separately resulting in conviction where the offense includes a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. The harm must remain closely related to that scheme.
• United States v. Moss, 34 F.4th 1176 (11th Cir. 2022) required actual-loss measurement. This limitation mattered because the restitution figures reflected determined losses rather than a hypothetical value of every attempted claim.
• United States v. Martin, 803 F.3d 581 (11th Cir. 2015) required proximate causation between the defendant’s conduct and the victim’s loss.
• United States v. Collins, 854 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2017) clarified that the defendant’s conduct need not be the loss’s sole cause. Other participants’ contributions therefore did not necessarily reduce Jeffrey’s responsibility.
• United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2015) recognized the Act’s express authorization of joint and several liability.
• United States v. Grady, 18 F.4th 1275 (11th Cir. 2021) supported full joint and several restitution where the losses resulted from acts within the conspiracy of conviction.

Why personal receipt was not the controlling question

Jeffrey demanded bank tracing, forensic accounting, and proof connecting particular benefit payments to his personal receipt or withdrawal. That argument confused victim compensation with identification of the defendant’s individual gain. Restitution concerns compensable losses caused through the relevant criminal conduct; it does not necessarily equal the amount the defendant personally retained.

The district court found that Jeffrey created the portals, managed other participants, and was a leader. The presentence report supplied actual-loss amounts that he did not contest. Taken together, those findings and figures supported the award without proof that each dollar passed through his hands.

The important qualification: United States v. Barry

United States v. Barry, 163 F.4th 1346 (11th Cir. 2026) was the principal authority on which Jeffrey relied. It cautioned that the scope of a defendant’s jointly undertaken activity is not necessarily identical to the entire conspiracy. Full-loss liability therefore requires reliable and specific evidence connecting the defendant to those losses; conspiracy membership alone is insufficient.

The court did not reject that limitation or announce that leaders are automatically responsible for everything a conspiracy does. It held that the required connection existed here: Jeffrey’s portal creation and management role, together with the uncontested loss evidence, supported attribution. The opinion also stressed that United States v. Barry had not announced a new restitution rule.

The resulting principle is bounded: individualized attribution remains necessary, but it need not take the form of tracing proceeds into the defendant’s pocket. Moreover, this affirmance arose under plain-error review; it does not resolve every question that a timely, specific challenge to loss scope or causation might present.

7. Potential Impact

Digital-fraud prosecutions

The opinion demonstrates how registration records, stored identifying information, shared credentials, communications, and admissions can collectively establish participation in an online fraud conspiracy. Prosecutors need not produce surveillance of withdrawals or an express written agreement when the overall evidence reasonably proves knowing participation.

Restitution proceedings

The decision supports using specific operational findings and reliable, uncontested loss evidence to establish broad restitution responsibility. At the same time, its treatment of United States v. Barry preserves a meaningful defense against attributing unrelated or inadequately connected conspiracy losses to an individual defendant.

Preservation and appellate advocacy

The procedural lessons are substantial: a Rule 33 motion must actually be made; restitution objections should identify disputed amounts, scope, or causation at sentencing; and constitutional arguments must be developed rather than merely mentioned. Appellate arguments must also accurately distinguish testimony heard by jurors from material developed outside their presence.

Because the opinion is unpublished, its principal future value is persuasive and explanatory. It does not displace the published authorities on which it relies.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Circumstantial evidence

Evidence that proves a fact through inference—for example, creating a fraudulent account and retaining its victims’ information. It is not legally inferior to eyewitness testimony.

De novo review

Independent appellate consideration of a legal question. In sufficiency cases, it still requires viewing the evidence favorably to the verdict.

Harmless error

A mistake that does not justify reversal because it did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights.

Plain error

A demanding review standard generally applicable to an objection not raised below. An appellant must establish a clear error affecting substantial rights before discretionary correction becomes available.

Joint and several liability

Responsibility under which each liable defendant may be required to pay the full covered loss, without allowing the victim to recover that loss more than once.

Proximate cause

A sufficiently direct legal connection between criminal conduct and the loss. Personal possession of the stolen money is not the same question.

Restitution versus personal gain

Restitution measures the victim’s compensable injury, which may exceed the share of proceeds retained by a particular participant.

9. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed Jeffrey’s conviction and restitution order because the evidence strongly established knowing participation, the nickname dispute supplied no reversible error, and no new-trial motion had been filed.

The central restitution lesson is that personal-proceeds tracing is not indispensable, but reliable attribution is. Specific findings about Jeffrey’s creation and management of the fraud infrastructure, combined with undisputed actual losses, supported the full award under plain-error review. The opinion applies established conspiracy and restitution principles without making full-loss liability automatic for every conspirator.