Sovereign-Citizen-Style Filings Do Not Trigger Renewed Faretta or Competency Proceedings Absent a “Deeper Breakdown in Cognitive Ability”

Introduction

In United States v. Lorin Kal Buckner (6th Cir. June 29, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed Buckner’s convictions for (1) conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and (2) conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud arising from a multi-year foreclosure-rescue scheme. Buckner elected to represent himself, then increasingly disrupted proceedings with “sovereign citizen” rhetoric—insisting the court lacked jurisdiction absent a “contract,” “returning” the indictment for “settlement,” and declining to cross-examine witnesses except by repeating formulaic phrases.

On appeal (now with counsel), Buckner argued that: (i) his waiver of counsel was not knowing and voluntary and required renewed assessment; (ii) his conduct required a competency evaluation; (iii) his sentence was procedurally unreasonable (including alleged Rule 32 defects and guideline enhancements); and (iv) the district court’s summary criminal contempt finding was unsupported. The Sixth Circuit rejected all preserved issues and held it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the contempt issue due to an inadequate notice of appeal designation.

Summary of the Opinion

  • Self-representation: The district court’s initial Faretta colloquy was valid; leading yes/no questions are consistent with Sixth Circuit model inquiry practice, and no “substantial change in circumstances” required a renewed waiver inquiry.
  • Competency: Sovereign-citizen-style filings and rhetoric, without evidence of a “deeper breakdown in cognitive ability,” did not provide “reasonable cause” for a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
  • Sentencing: Any unpreserved Rule 32 verification defect was not prejudicial under plain-error review; the guideline enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B) and U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) were properly applied.
  • Contempt appeal: The Sixth Circuit lacked jurisdiction because Buckner’s notice of appeal did not designate the separate contempt order as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) The right to self-representation and valid waiver

The court grounded its waiver analysis in Faretta v. California, recognizing that defendants may represent themselves if the waiver of counsel is knowing and voluntary. To evaluate adequacy of the colloquy, the panel relied on Sixth Circuit waiver-standards cases:

  • United States v. McBride: Establishes that district courts should use a “series of questions” substantially similar to the model inquiry (Bench Book), and that a waiver remains effective absent a “substantial change in circumstances” requiring a new inquiry. The Buckner panel used McBride both to validate the original colloquy and to frame the “renewed waiver” question.
  • United States v. McDowell: Emphasizes that “no degree of legal knowledge” is required to waive counsel; the right is conditioned only on the defendant asserting it with “eyes open.” Buckner’s later pseudo-legal strategy did not negate an earlier “eyes open” waiver.
  • United States v. Miller: Supports the proposition that yes/no (arguably “leading”) questions are acceptable when the colloquy covers the core warnings. The court used this to reject Buckner’s complaint about the colloquy’s format.
  • United States v. Bankston: Clarifies that “substantially similar” requires meeting the model inquiry’s “objectives” and “relevant considerations” (familiarity with law, gravity of charges, dangers of self-representation). The panel concluded those considerations were addressed “in some depth.”
  • United States v. Johnson and United States v. Sealy: Provided the review framework (de novo for waiver validity generally; possible plain-error overlay for claims that a new waiver assessment was required after changed circumstances). The panel avoided choosing because the claim failed under either standard.
  • United States v. Tucci-Jarraf: Applied to show that acknowledging limited familiarity with procedural/evidentiary rules can demonstrate the defendant understood his own legal limitations—supporting “eyes open” waiver even if later filings are fringe or incoherent.
  • United States v. James: Quoted (Seventh Circuit) to contextualize sovereign-citizen tactics as strategic obstruction rather than evidence undermining waiver.

2) Competency to proceed and when a hearing is required

The panel applied statutory and constitutional competency standards:

  • 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a): Requires a competency evaluation when there is “reasonable cause” to doubt the defendant’s capacity to understand proceedings or assist in defense.
  • Dusky v. United States: Supplies the baseline test—“rational as well as factual understanding” of proceedings. The court used Dusky to conclude Buckner’s record showed comprehension despite his rhetoric.
  • United States v. Dubrule: Lists factors relevant to “reasonable cause” and stresses that “even bizarre” legal views do not themselves establish incompetency. Buckner’s sovereign-citizen filings were treated as insufficient under this “high hurdle.”
  • United States v. Stafford: Reinforces deference to the district court’s decision not to order a competency hearing.
  • United States v. Patterson: Noted the Sixth Circuit has not resolved whether abuse-of-discretion or plain-error applies when no competency hearing was requested, but held Buckner failed even under the more demanding standard for the government (no abuse, much less plain error).
  • United States v. Coleman: The key analog. Like Buckner, Coleman claimed he could “settle and close” the case, appeared “on special appearance,” and denied jurisdiction absent a contract. The Sixth Circuit previously rejected the argument that such statements show inability to comprehend a criminal proceeding; it required evidence of a “deeper breakdown in cognitive ability.” The Buckner panel treated Coleman as effectively controlling.
  • Indiana v. Edwards: Buckner invoked it to argue the court should have intervened given his self-representation. The panel emphasized Edwards is permissive—judges “may” impose counsel on certain mentally compromised defendants, but are not required to paternalize. This undercut Buckner’s attempt to turn discretionary authority into reversible error.

3) Sentencing procedure, plain error, and guideline application

  • United States v. Vonner and United States v. Olano: Established the plain-error framework for unpreserved sentencing challenges and the requirement of prejudice.
  • United States v. Dominguez Benitez and Molina-Martinez v. United States: Used for the prejudice inquiry—whether there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome. The panel held Buckner could not show prejudice from any Rule 32 verification lapse because his enhancement challenges failed on the merits.
  • United States v. Burleson: Applied Olano’s prejudice requirement specifically to Rule 32(i)(1)(A) challenges.
  • United States v. Simpson: Persuasive authority supporting a broad reading of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B), encompassing conduct that precedes filing but operates “during” bankruptcy proceedings because the misrepresentation persists and affects the proceeding.
  • United States v. Clay: Provided the Sixth Circuit standard for U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c)—control over at least one participant. Testimony about Buckner’s role as “president,” hiring, and directing employees supported the enhancement.

4) Criminal contempt and appellate jurisdiction

  • In re Chandler and United States v. Martin: Addressed the intent requirement and deferential review standard for summary contempt. The panel did not reach the merits because jurisdiction was lacking.
  • Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B): Required designation of the order being appealed. Buckner designated only the criminal judgment, not the separate contempt order.
  • United States v. Dews: Treated a criminal-contempt conviction as a “distinct, independent proceeding” requiring separate designation in the notice of appeal. This case supplied the dispositive jurisdictional rule.

Legal Reasoning

1) No renewed Faretta colloquy merely because the pro se strategy is irrational

The panel drew a firm line between (a) the defendant’s understanding of the right being waived and the risks assumed, and (b) the quality or rationality of the defense ultimately pursued. Under United States v. McDowell and Faretta v. California, a defendant need not be legally competent in the colloquial sense—only aware that proceeding without counsel is dangerous. Buckner was warned about governing law, the inability of the court to give legal advice, and the prospect of decades in prison; he affirmed understanding.

The “substantial change in circumstances” doctrine from United States v. McBride did not help Buckner because his later sovereign-citizen filings showed, at most, poor legal strategy or deliberate obstruction—not a new incapacity undermining the original waiver. The court explicitly rejected a “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose” approach whereby a defendant engineers chaos pro se and later seeks reversal based on that chaos.

2) Sovereign-citizen rhetoric is not “reasonable cause” for incompetency absent additional indicators

Applying 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) and Dusky v. United States, the panel emphasized that the question is functional: can the defendant understand proceedings and assist in defense? The court catalogued record evidence indicating competence: Buckner coordinated a complex fraud operation, denied mental-health issues, presented no medical evidence, had normal demeanor, and had no attorney raise competency concerns.

Critically, the panel treated Buckner’s sovereign-citizen submissions as falling within a familiar category already addressed by Sixth Circuit precedent—especially United States v. Coleman and United States v. Tucci-Jarraf. Those cases prevent converting fringe ideologies into presumptive incompetence. Buckner’s coherent criminal-law motions (including citations to Rule 14 and Barker v. Wingo) and his lucid closing argument reinforced that he knew it was a criminal case.

Buckner’s reliance on Indiana v. Edwards failed because Edwards authorizes discretion to appoint counsel for some marginal defendants; it does not create a constitutional duty to override self-representation whenever a pro se defendant is self-sabotaging.

3) Sentencing: no plain error without prejudice; enhancements sustained

On the alleged Rule 32 verification problem, the panel treated prejudice as the key obstacle under United States v. Vonner, United States v. Olano, and United States v. Dominguez Benitez. Buckner claimed he might have objected to enhancements—yet the panel held both enhancements were substantively correct, eliminating any “reasonable probability” of a different outcome.

On U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B), the court rejected Buckner’s textual “during” argument as “temporal hair-splitting”: the fraudulent statement’s operative effect continues through the bankruptcy case. On U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), trial testimony supported that Buckner exercised control over at least one participant, satisfying United States v. Clay.

4) Contempt: strict notice-of-appeal designation rules can be outcome-determinative

Even though the panel recited standards for summary contempt, it held it could not reach sufficiency because of jurisdiction. Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) and United States v. Dews, a contempt order is separately appealable and must be separately designated. Buckner’s notice referenced only the later judgment of conviction, not the earlier separate contempt order; a pro se “NOTICE OF APPEAL” filed before the contempt finding did not cure that defect.

Impact

  • Stabilizing trial management in sovereign-citizen cases: The opinion reinforces that courts need not repeatedly re-litigate waiver or competency whenever a pro se defendant adopts sovereign-citizen tactics. Absent concrete indicators of cognitive breakdown, such conduct is treated as obstruction or misguided ideology, not incapacity.
  • Guardrails around competency doctrine: By anchoring analysis in United States v. Coleman and Dusky v. United States, the Sixth Circuit discourages “ideology equals incompetence” arguments and emphasizes objective record markers (medical evidence, demeanor, counsel concerns, coherent filings).
  • Appellate practice warning: The dismissal of the contempt challenge underscores that notices of appeal must precisely designate independently appealable orders—especially contempt orders—consistent with United States v. Dews.
  • Guideline interpretation: The decision supports a practical reading of “during” bankruptcy proceedings under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B), treating pre-filing misrepresentations as part of the bankruptcy fraud mechanism when their effects persist in the proceeding.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Faretta waiver
A defendant may choose to represent himself, but the judge must ensure he understands what he is giving up (a trained lawyer) and the risks of going alone. The judge does not have to prove the defendant will do a good job—only that the choice is informed.
“Substantial change in circumstances” (renewed waiver inquiry)
Once a valid waiver is taken, the court typically does not repeat the full inquiry unless something significant changes that calls the original waiver’s validity into question (for example, a genuine new mental impairment). A bad defense strategy is not, by itself, such a change.
Competency vs. unconventional beliefs
Competency is about capacity to understand and participate—not whether a defendant holds strange legal views. Sovereign-citizen rhetoric is often treated as deliberate refusal to accept legitimacy, not proof of mental inability.
Plain-error review
If an objection was not made in the trial court, the appellate court will reverse only for clear error that likely changed the outcome. Even if a procedural misstep occurred, the appellant must show it mattered.
Summary criminal contempt
A judge may immediately punish disruptive conduct in court to maintain order. But a contempt conviction is separately appealable, and it must be properly identified in the notice of appeal.

Conclusion

United States v. Lorin Kal Buckner consolidates a consistent Sixth Circuit theme: sovereign-citizen-style filings and courtroom disruption do not, standing alone, undermine a prior valid waiver of counsel or compel a competency evaluation. The court reaffirmed that self-representation protects autonomy, not effectiveness, and that competency doctrine is triggered by functional incapacity, not fringe ideology. Finally, the case highlights a consequential appellate practice point—contempt orders are “distinct” and must be separately designated for appeal—making procedural precision essential even when substantive issues seem strong.