Sovereign-Citizen Rhetoric Does Not Trigger Renewed Faretta or Competency Proceedings Absent Concrete Indicators of Incapacity

I. Introduction

In United States v. Lorin Kal Buckner (6th Cir. June 29, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentence of Lorin Kal Buckner, who—facing decades of potential imprisonment—chose to represent himself. Buckner was convicted of two conspiracies: conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and conspiracy to commit bankruptcy fraud, arising from a years-long scheme targeting homeowners facing foreclosure.

The appeal centered on whether Buckner’s later “sovereign-citizen-style” filings and courtroom conduct required the district court to: (1) revisit the validity of his self-representation waiver under Faretta v. California; (2) sua sponte order a competency evaluation under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a); and (3) alter sentencing procedure and guideline calculations. Buckner also attempted to challenge a separate summary criminal-contempt ruling, prompting a threshold appellate-jurisdiction analysis.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Faretta waiver upheld: The initial colloquy was adequate; yes/no “leading” questions are consistent with Sixth Circuit-approved model inquiries. No later “substantial change in circumstances” required a renewed waiver inquiry.
  • No competency evaluation required: Sovereign-citizen rhetoric and idiosyncratic legal theories, without more, do not create “reasonable cause” to doubt competency under § 4241(a).
  • Sentencing challenges rejected on plain-error review: Any Rule 32 verification issue caused no prejudice; guideline enhancements under U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B) and § 3B1.1(c) were properly applied.
  • Contempt challenge dismissed for lack of jurisdiction: The contempt order was not designated in the notice of appeal as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Self-representation and waiver: the Sixth Circuit’s model-colloquy framework

  • Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975): The constitutional anchor for the right to self-representation. The panel relied on Faretta for the proposition that the key condition is that the defendant proceed “with his ‘eyes open’,” not that he demonstrate meaningful legal competence.
  • United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360 (6th Cir. 2004): Provided the controlling Sixth Circuit standard that the district court must use questions “drawn from, or substantially similar to,” the Bench Book’s model inquiry—and that a valid waiver remains effective absent a “substantial change in circumstances.”
  • United States v. McDowell, 814 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1987): The opinion quoted McDowell for the principle that “no degree of legal knowledge is required” to waive counsel, and cited McDowell’s reproduction of the model inquiry to rebut Buckner’s complaint about leading questions.
  • United States v. Miller, 910 F.2d 1321 (6th Cir. 1990): Used to confirm that yes/no questioning covering the relevant points is acceptable and has been approved in prior Sixth Circuit review.
  • United States v. Bankston, 820 F.3d 215 (6th Cir. 2016): Supplied the “core objectives” of a waiver colloquy: familiarity with law, gravity of charges, and dangers of self-representation.
  • United States v. Johnson, 24 F.4th 590 (6th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Sealy, 2025 WL 869511 (6th Cir. Mar. 20, 2025): Addressed standards of review (de novo vs. plain error for changed-circumstance renewal arguments), though the panel deemed the choice non-dispositive.
  • United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2003): Cited for the pragmatic observation that sovereign-citizen tactics can be strategic obstruction rather than evidence of misunderstanding—supporting the Sixth Circuit’s refusal to treat Buckner’s conduct as a trigger for renewed waiver proceedings.
  • United States v. Tucci-Jarraf, 939 F.3d 790 (6th Cir. 2019): Functioned as a close analogue: (i) a defendant may concede relative ignorance while still validly waiving counsel; (ii) fringe legal ideologies do not invalidate waiver; and (iii) post-Indiana v. Edwards, trial courts may—yet need not—impose counsel on some mentally compromised defendants.

2. Competency: “reasonable cause” requires more than bizarre legal theories

  • 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (statutory standard): Requires a competency evaluation when there is “reasonable cause” to believe the defendant cannot understand the nature and consequences of proceedings or assist in his defense.
  • Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960): Supplied the canonical competency test—“rational as well as factual understanding”—which the court found satisfied by Buckner’s history, filings, and trial conduct.
  • United States v. Dubrule, 822 F.3d 866 (6th Cir. 2016) and United States v. Stafford, 782 F.3d 786 (6th Cir. 2015): Dubrule provided relevant factors (irrational behavior, demeanor, medical evidence, counsel concerns) and emphasized that bizarre views alone rarely meet the “high hurdle.” Stafford underscored deference to district courts on competency determinations.
  • United States v. Patterson, 2026 WL 768776 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2026): Noted unresolved Sixth Circuit law on standard of review when competency wasn’t requested, while affirming that the district court’s decision here would survive even abuse-of-discretion review.
  • United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2017): The most factually pointed competency precedent. The panel treated Coleman as controlling because it rejected virtually identical “commercial account” and “no contract/no jurisdiction” claims as evidence of incompetence, absent a “deeper breakdown in cognitive ability.”
  • Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164 (2008): Addressed the “gray area” of defendants competent to stand trial but arguably incompetent to conduct trial proceedings pro se. The panel used Edwards (via Tucci-Jarraf) to stress discretion, not obligation: trial courts may impose counsel, but are not required to “paternalize” defendants.

3. Sentencing procedure and enhancements

  • United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc): Supplied the plain-error framework for unpreserved procedural-reasonableness claims.
  • Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(1)(A): Requires verifying that defendant and attorney read/discussed the PSR. The court assumed arguendo potential error but found no prejudice.
  • United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004); Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189 (2016); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993); United States v. Burleson, 419 F. App’x 649 (6th Cir. 2011): These cases framed the prejudice requirement under plain-error review: the defendant must show a reasonable probability of a different outcome, and the error must have affected the proceedings’ outcome.
  • United States v. Simpson, 796 F.3d 548 (5th Cir. 2015): Cited to support a broad reading of U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B): fraudulent action “during” bankruptcy can include pre-petition conduct whose falsity persists into and through the bankruptcy proceeding.
  • United States v. Clay, 162 F.4th 757 (6th Cir. 2025): Supplied the Sixth Circuit’s “control over at least one participant” standard for applying U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) (organizer/leader/manager/supervisor).

4. Contempt and appellate jurisdiction

  • 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b): The substantive and procedural bases for summary criminal contempt in open court.
  • In re Chandler, 906 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1990) and United States v. Martin, 251 F. App’x 979 (6th Cir. 2007): Addressed the intent requirement for contempt and the deference given to district court use of summary contempt powers.
  • Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(c)(1)(B) and United States v. Dews, 1997 WL 259369 (6th Cir. May 15, 1997): Dews supported treating a criminal-contempt conviction as a “distinct, independent proceeding” that must be separately designated in the notice of appeal; failure to designate deprived the court of jurisdiction to review the contempt issue.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Faretta waiver: adequacy of the colloquy and no duty to redo it

The court rejected Buckner’s critique that the district judge relied on “leading” questions. Under Sixth Circuit law, the inquiry is whether the colloquy is “substantially similar” to the Bench Book model—an approach that commonly uses yes/no prompts to ensure core warnings are actually delivered. The panel emphasized the functional goals: the defendant must appreciate the charges, the risks, and the disadvantages of self-representation. Buckner’s lucid answers and acknowledgment of limited familiarity with procedural/evidentiary rules supported the conclusion that he proceeded with “eyes open.”

On the request for a renewed waiver assessment, the Sixth Circuit relied on the “substantial change in circumstances” limitation. Buckner’s later shift into sovereign-citizen filings did not constitute such a change, because waiver validity does not depend on the defendant later displaying legal competence or choosing a conventional defense. The panel also signaled a policy concern: allowing defendants to manufacture reversible error by adopting disruptive pseudo-legal tactics would create a “heads-I-win, tails-you-lose” dynamic inconsistent with Faretta.

2. Competency: sovereign-citizen tactics are not “reasonable cause” without additional indicators

Applying § 4241(a) and Dusky, the court held that Buckner’s record showed rational and factual understanding: he ran a complex fraud scheme, filed intelligible motions invoking standard criminal procedure, delivered a coherent (if flawed) closing argument focused on “reasonable doubt,” and filed a Rule 29 motion expressly recognizing a “criminal action.” Critically, there was no medical evidence, no mental-health history in the PSR, and no competency concerns raised by appointed counsel. Under Coleman, sovereign-citizen “commercial account” language—standing alone—does not show inability to understand the proceedings.

The opinion also cabin’s defense counsel’s reliance on Indiana v. Edwards: even if a trial judge could have imposed counsel on a borderline defendant, Edwards does not impose a duty to do so.

3. Sentencing: no plain error and no prejudice

Even assuming a technical failure to verify PSR review under Rule 32, Buckner could not show prejudice because his proposed objections to the two enhancements failed on the merits. On U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B), the Sixth Circuit rejected a narrow temporal reading of “during” bankruptcy: the misrepresentation persists after filing because the proceeding continues to operate on the false filing—consistent with United States v. Simpson. On U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), testimony supported Buckner’s supervisory role (company president; hiring; directing office staff; using an “assistant”), satisfying United States v. Clay.

4. Contempt: jurisdictional defect in the notice of appeal

Without reaching whether the contempt finding was substantively supported, the panel dismissed that portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Because the district court entered a separate contempt order, and because contempt is treated as a distinct proceeding, the notice of appeal had to designate that order under FRAP 3(c)(1)(B). Buckner’s notice referenced only the later judgment on the conspiracy convictions; his earlier pro se “NOTICE OF APPEAL” designated no appealable order and predated the contempt finding. Under United States v. Dews, this omission was jurisdictional.

C. Impact

  • Self-representation disputes: The decision reinforces that a valid Faretta waiver is not undermined merely because a defendant later adopts fringe ideologies or self-defeating tactics. District courts are not required to re-colloquize simply because the defendant’s strategy becomes irrational in substance.
  • Competency litigation: The opinion adds to a consistent Sixth Circuit line (Coleman, Tucci-Jarraf, Dubrule) rejecting attempts to convert sovereign-citizen rhetoric into automatic “reasonable cause” for competency proceedings. Competency must be grounded in concrete indicators (medical evidence, profound cognitive disruption, inability to track proceedings), not ideology.
  • Bankruptcy-fraud sentencing: The panel’s reading of § 2B1.1(b)(9)(B) supports applying the enhancement where fraud is embedded in filings that operate through the bankruptcy case, even if preparatory steps occur before formal filing.
  • Appellate practice: The contempt holding is a cautionary procedural point: separate contempt orders must be explicitly designated, or appellate review may be lost entirely regardless of the issue’s merits.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Faretta waiver (waiver of counsel)
A defendant may choose to represent himself, but the judge must warn him about the risks and ensure the choice is knowing and voluntary. The defendant does not have to be good at law; he must understand that self-representation is dangerous.
“Substantial change in circumstances” (renewed waiver inquiry)
After a valid waiver, the court does not repeatedly revisit the decision unless something major changes that calls the original understanding into question (for example, new evidence of inability to understand proceedings). Bad strategy alone is not enough.
Competency under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) and Dusky
Competency asks whether the defendant can understand what is happening in court and can assist in his defense. Odd beliefs or pseudo-legal jargon do not, by themselves, prove incompetency.
Plain-error review
If an issue wasn’t properly raised in the trial court, the appellant must show a clear error that likely changed the outcome. Without prejudice, the appellate court will not reverse.
Guideline enhancements
Sentencing guidelines add “levels” for certain aggravating facts. Here: (1) fraud involving bankruptcy proceedings, and (2) a leadership/supervisory role.
Summary criminal contempt
A judge may immediately punish certain disruptive conduct occurring in court. But to appeal that punishment, the defendant must properly identify (designate) the contempt order in the notice of appeal.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Lorin Kal Buckner fits squarely within the Sixth Circuit’s broader approach to pro se, sovereign-citizen-adjacent litigation: courts must protect the rights of defendants, but they are not required to treat fringe legal rhetoric as proof of incompetency or as a trigger to undo a previously valid self-representation waiver. The decision also underscores a procedural trap with real consequences—criminal contempt is independently appealable, and failure to designate the contempt order can forfeit appellate review.