South Carolina’s Offer-or-Attempt Assault Offense Remains a Guidelines Crime of Violence After Clemons

1. Introduction

This decision addresses whether an intervening South Carolina Supreme Court ruling displaced Fourth Circuit precedent classifying a particular form of first-degree assault and battery as a “crime of violence” under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Fourth Circuit held that it did not. Its existing precedent continued to control because the state decision concerned different offenses and did not establish that the specific statutory alternative at issue could be committed recklessly.

Jesse Shane Owens was convicted in 2018 of possessing a firearm and ammunition while subject to a domestic violence restraining order, violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8) and 924(a)(2). He received 76 months’ imprisonment and three years of supervised release, which began in April 2023.

In July 2025, his probation officer alleged five supervised-release violations, four involving new criminal conduct. Two allegations arose from an incident resulting in South Carolina charges for first- and third-degree assault and battery. At the revocation hearing, the victim testified that Owens confined and repeatedly assaulted her for approximately eight hours. Photographs documented extensive bruising, swollen black eyes, and bite wounds.

The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Owens’s conduct violated South Carolina Code § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i). Treating that offense as a crime of violence, it classified the conduct as a Grade A violation. Owens’s appeal challenged that classification, an objection he had not raised below.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the revocation judgment and sentence on two related grounds:

1. Controlling precedent remained applicable. United States v. Mack had already held that the precise statutory alternative involved here qualifies as a Guidelines crime of violence. The subsequent decision in United States v. Clemons did not undermine that holding because it addressed other South Carolina offenses.
2. Owens failed to establish plain error. Having failed to preserve his objection, Owens could not obtain relief merely by suggesting tension between the decisions. The district court followed directly applicable circuit precedent, and Owens did not demonstrate that its foundation had become untenable.

The Grade A classification, combined with Owens’s criminal history category of I, produced an advisory imprisonment range of 12 to 18 months. The district court imposed the statutory maximum of 24 months’ imprisonment and another 12 months of supervised release. It explained that an upward variance was warranted by Owens’s violent history, the brutality of the assault, and his disregard for court-imposed conditions.

The appellate opinion focused on the crime-of-violence classification and preservation of the objection. It did not separately resolve a developed challenge to the substantive reasonableness of the upward variance.

3. The Governing Legal Framework

Grade A violations and crimes of violence

Under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1), a Grade A supervised-release violation includes conduct constituting a state offense punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment that is a crime of violence. Section 4B1.2(a)(1) supplies the relevant definition: an offense having “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”

The disputed South Carolina provision applies when a person “offers or attempts to injure another person with the present ability to do so,” and the act “is accomplished by means likely to produce death or great bodily injury.” The appellate dispute concerned whether that offense necessarily satisfies the federal definition, particularly its required mental state.

The categorical and modified categorical approaches

The categorical approach compares statutory elements with the federal definition. It does not ask simply whether the defendant’s particular conduct was violent. When a statute contains alternative elements defining distinct offenses, the modified categorical approach identifies the applicable alternative before the categorical comparison proceeds.

That distinction matters here. Although the evidence described an exceptionally violent assault, the legal classification depended on the elements of § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i), not merely on the severity of Owens’s conduct.

4. Analysis of the Precedents Cited

United States v. Mack, 56 F.4th 303 (4th Cir. 2022)

United States v. Mack supplied the controlling substantive rule. It held that first-degree assault and battery under § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i) is a Guidelines crime of violence. Its conclusion rested on two determinations: the offense requires sufficiently violent force, and it does not encompass reckless conduct.

On the mental-state issue, United States v. Mack acknowledged the statute’s omission of conventional terms such as “knowingly” or “recklessly.” Nevertheless, it reasoned that it was difficult to conceive of someone recklessly offering or attempting to injure another person. The language describing an offer or attempt therefore supported the conclusion that the offense did not reach mere recklessness.

The decision also established the statute’s divisibility. Consequently, the court in Owens’s case examined the identified statutory alternative rather than every form of first-degree assault and battery. Owens challenged both the mental-state analysis and divisibility, but the panel found no intervening authority sufficient to displace either conclusion.

Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016)

Mathis v. United States provided the Supreme Court framework for distinguishing categorical analysis from modified categorical analysis. Its importance lies in separating alternative elements, which define distinct crimes, from alternative ways of satisfying the same element.

In this case, that framework confined the inquiry to the statutory offense identified by the district court. Even if another branch of South Carolina’s assault statute could encompass reckless conduct, that possibility would not automatically resolve the classification of the offer-or-attempt alternative.

United States v. Clemons, 901 S.E.2d 280 (S.C. 2024)

United States v. Clemons was the intervening state decision on which Owens relied. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature and second-degree assault and battery may be committed recklessly “under some circumstances.” Owens argued that this reasoning undermined the earlier federal interpretation of first-degree assault and battery.

The Fourth Circuit rejected that inference for three reasons. First, the state decision addressed different offenses and did not mention first-degree assault and battery. Second, it did not identify the circumstances in which recklessness would suffice, leaving uncertainty about which statutory language supported its conclusion. Third, it expressly recognized that offenses “dealing with attempt may require specific intent,” a qualification consistent with the reasoning underlying the existing circuit rule.

The panel therefore treated United States v. Clemons as insufficiently specific to alter the classification of § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i). Importantly, the court did not hold that the state decision definitively established the mental state for that provision; it held that the decision did not displace the precedent already governing it.

Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021)

Borden v. United States explains why recklessness was central to the dispute. The opinion cited the Supreme Court’s holding that an offense encompassing reckless conduct does not qualify as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s relevant force-based definition, with a citation to the plurality opinion.

The Fourth Circuit explained that courts draw on decisions interpreting that statute when applying the similarly worded Guidelines crime-of-violence definition. Thus, if the South Carolina offense encompassed reckless conduct, its classification would face a significant obstacle. The panel rejected Owens’s argument because he had not established that the particular offense actually extended that far—not because recklessness was legally irrelevant.

United States v. Simmons, 917 F.3d 312 (4th Cir. 2019)

United States v. Simmons supplied the procedural rule that an unpreserved challenge receives plain-error review. Owens had disputed the strength of the evidence and the victim’s credibility below, but he had not challenged the crime-of-violence classification or resulting violation grade. His evidentiary objections therefore did not preserve the distinct legal issue presented on appeal.

United States v. Ojedokun, 16 F.4th 1091 (4th Cir. 2021)

United States v. Ojedokun supplied the requirements emphasized in the court’s plain-error analysis: Owens needed to show an error, that the error was plain, and that it affected his substantial rights.

The court did not undertake a separate analysis of whether a different violation grade would have changed the sentence. Its reasoning instead centered on the absence of demonstrated plain error where the district court followed directly controlling precedent.

United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2015)

United States v. Williams supplied the institutional rule governing prior panel decisions: one Fourth Circuit panel cannot overrule another unless the earlier decision rests on authority that has become untenable.

This principle reinforced both the merits analysis and the plain-error conclusion. The panel itself remained bound by the existing classification, and the district court’s adherence to that classification did not become plainly erroneous simply because a later state decision concerning other offenses suggested a possible analogy.

5. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A precise statutory inquiry, not an analogy between offense labels

The court’s reasoning turned on statutory specificity. Similar offense names and overlapping subject matter did not establish identical elements or mental states. Because categorical analysis concerns the particular offense’s legal requirements, a decision about second-degree assault and battery could not automatically determine the treatment of a divisible first-degree provision.

The court accordingly distinguished between a decision that merely suggests a possible extension and one that actually establishes the relevant rule of state law. It declined to predict that South Carolina’s highest court would extend its recklessness analysis to the offer-or-attempt provision.

Divisibility limited the reach of Owens’s argument

The statute’s divisibility prevented Owens from defeating the classification simply by suggesting that first-degree assault and battery, considered broadly, might include reckless conduct. The relevant question was narrower: whether the specific alternative covering offers or attempts to injure through means likely to cause death or great bodily injury included such conduct.

The panel did not conduct a fresh, comprehensive divisibility analysis. It relied on the existing circuit holding and observed that the intervening state decision supplied no contrary instruction.

Plain-error review supplied an additional barrier

Even assuming some tension between the federal and state decisions, Owens still faced the consequences of failing to object below. A debatable inference from a decision addressing different statutes did not demonstrate an obvious error in following precedent resolving the same issue.

The opinion therefore joins a substantive conclusion with a procedural one: the prior classification remained controlling, and Owens had not met the demanding standard for relief on an unpreserved claim.

The assault evidence served a different legal function

The victim’s testimony and injury photographs supported the district court’s finding that Owens committed the violation. His conduct and history also informed the decision to impose an above-range sentence. They were not, however, substitutes for the elements-based analysis required to classify an offense as a crime of violence.

This distinction preserves an important boundary: proof of brutal conduct cannot itself make a categorically ineligible offense satisfy the Guidelines definition.

6. Potential Impact and Limits

• Continued application within the Fourth Circuit: The published decision confirms that § 16-3-600(C)(1)(b)(i) remains a Guidelines crime of violence under existing circuit precedent.
• Greater specificity in future challenges: Litigants seeking reconsideration will need authority addressing the relevant elements, rather than relying only on similarities between related offenses.
• Importance of preservation: Defendants should raise classification and divisibility objections in the district court. A preserved objection avoids the additional plain-error hurdle, although it does not eliminate binding precedent.
• No blanket classification: The decision does not establish that every form of South Carolina assault and battery, or every alternative within the first-degree statute, is a crime of violence.
• No substantive revision of state law: The Fourth Circuit applied federal sentencing law; it did not redefine South Carolina’s criminal offenses.

The opinion also leaves room for a materially different future case. It does not suggest that an authoritative state interpretation could never undermine a federal categorical ruling. Its narrower conclusion is that the particular state decision Owens identified did not make the controlling federal precedent untenable.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised release

A period of court-ordered supervision after imprisonment. Violating its conditions can result in revocation and additional imprisonment.

Preponderance of the evidence

The requirement that a fact be more likely true than not. The district court used this standard to find the release violations; a completed state prosecution was not necessary to that finding.

Crime of violence

A defined sentencing category. Here, the relevant definition asks whether the offense necessarily involves using, attempting to use, or threatening physical force against another person.

Mens rea

The mental state required for an offense. Intentional conduct and reckless conduct are not interchangeable for the federal force-based classification at issue.

Divisible statute

A statute containing alternative elements that define separate offenses. Courts identify the applicable alternative before assessing its federal sentencing consequences.

Plain error

A demanding appellate standard for objections not raised below. Showing a possible legal disagreement is not enough.

Upward variance

A sentence above the advisory range. Here, the range was 12 to 18 months, but the district court imposed 24 months after explaining why it considered the range inadequate.

8. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed, rather than newly created, the rule that South Carolina’s specified offer-or-attempt form of first-degree assault and battery qualifies as a Guidelines crime of violence. A later state decision recognizing recklessness for different offenses did not displace that rule.

The decision’s broader significance lies in its insistence on precise statutory comparison, adherence to controlling precedent, and timely preservation of sentencing objections. Its holding remains confined to the statutory alternative actually before the court.