Sixth Circuit Confirms U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 Obstruction Enhancement Covers Pre‑Investigation Conduct After the 2006 Amendment

I. Introduction

In United States v. Andrew Golobic (6th Cir. Mar. 19, 2026), the Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions and 144-month sentence of Andrew Golobic, an ICE Alternatives-to-Detention agent who used his supervisory authority over noncitizen supervisees to coerce sexual conduct and then attempted to conceal that misconduct.

The appeal raised three clusters of issues:

  • Trial procedure: whether the district court had “good cause” under Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)(3) to excuse a sick juror during deliberations and proceed with 11 jurors.
  • Charging: whether the indictment was multiplicitous in violation of double jeopardy principles (raised for the first time on appeal).
  • Sentencing: whether several guideline enhancements and collateral consequences (including sex-offender registration) were lawful—most notably whether the obstruction enhancement may apply to conduct occurring before a formal investigation begins.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit (Sutton, C.J.) affirmed across the board:

  • Juror excusal: The district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing a juror who became ill, went to the emergency room, had abnormal lab results requiring further testing, and was admitted to the hospital.
  • Multiplicity: No plain error occurred because the defendant cited no supporting precedent and, in any event, each challenged count required proof of distinct elements and (as charged) distinct conduct.
  • Sentencing:
    • The obstruction enhancement could apply to pre-investigation conduct given the 2006 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
    • The abduction enhancement was not based on “acquitted conduct” because the jury did not acquit Golobic of kidnapping/abduction; a “no” response to a special interrogatory (in the posture presented) did not equal an acquittal.
    • No impermissible double counting occurred because the enhancements targeted distinct aspects of the offense.
    • The guidelines did not override statutory maximums; U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 constrained the sentence on the 12-month-max count.
    • Sex-offender registration was mandatory because the statute expressly includes convictions “under [18 U.S.C. §] 1591,” and Golobic was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d).

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Excusing a juror during deliberations (Rule 23(b)(3))

  • United States v. De Oleo, 697 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2012): Set the governing abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing juror excusal decisions. The court applied De Oleo’s deferential posture to uphold the district judge’s real-time assessment of the juror’s illness.
  • United States v. Ramos, 861 F.2d 461 (6th Cir. 1988): Explained that “good cause” encompasses temporary problems arising during deliberations and calls for “sound discretion” at a sensitive stage. Ramos supplied the doctrinal frame that “good cause” is not rigid and is fact-dependent.
  • United States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Casey, 2000 WL 1721055 (6th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Simpson, 1999 WL 777348 (6th Cir. 1999): Cited for the straightforward proposition that juror illness is a paradigmatic example of good cause.
  • Out-of-circuit comparisons used to reject Golobic’s argument: United States v. Spence, 163 F.3d 1280 (11th Cir. 1998) (juror expected back the next morning); United States v. Patterson, 26 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (insufficient inquiry into absence); United States v. Araujo, 62 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 1995) (car trouble). The Sixth Circuit distinguished each on its facts to reinforce that the district court here gathered information and faced a medically uncertain timeline.

2. Multiplicity / Double Jeopardy

  • United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835 (6th Cir. 1996): Established that an unpreserved multiplicity claim is reviewed for plain error.
  • United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 2008): Defined multiplicity as charging a single offense in more than one count and linked it to double jeopardy concerns.
  • Gavieres v. United States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911), and Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932): Provided the core test—no double jeopardy problem if each statute requires proof of an element the other does not.
  • United States v. DeCarlo, 434 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2006): Clarified that overlap in evidence does not establish multiplicity where discrete statutory elements differ.
  • United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784 (6th Cir. 2015): Used to dispose of the plain-error claim because Golobic failed to identify precedent supporting the alleged multiplicity. Al-Maliki functioned as a gatekeeping rule: without on-point authority, “plainness” is difficult or impossible to establish.
  • United States v. Ehle, 640 F.3d 689 (6th Cir. 2011), and Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985): Ehle illustrated when multiplicity can be “plain” (where Supreme Court precedent directly resolves the issue). The court distinguished Ehle because there was no analogous Supreme Court or Sixth Circuit decision holding these statutes multiplicitous.

3. Sentencing: obstruction, acquitted conduct, double counting, statutory maximums

  • United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946 (6th Cir. 1998), and United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2000): Cited for the requirement under plain-error review that an error must affect substantial rights—an omission the court found fatal to Golobic’s obstruction-enhancement challenge.
  • Pre-2006 Sixth Circuit obstruction cases: United States v. Baggett, 342 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Boyd, 312 F.3d 213 (6th Cir. 2002): These reflected the earlier guideline wording (“during the course of the investigation”). The panel treated their limitation as superseded by the 2006 guideline amendment.
  • Post-2006 Sixth Circuit recognition of the amendment: United States v. Vysniauskas, 593 F. App’x 518 (6th Cir. 2015); United States v. Fisher, 824 F. App’x 347 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Elliott, 521 F. App’x 513 (6th Cir. 2013): These supported the court’s key doctrinal point: obstruction “with respect to” an investigation can occur before the formal investigation begins.
  • Cases explained as not contradicting that rule: United States v. Bazazpour, 690 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Walker, 399 F. App’x 75 (6th Cir. 2010) (pre-2006 conduct); United States v. Wallace, 600 F. App’x 322 (6th Cir. 2015), and United States v. Rudra, No. 25-3040, 2026 WL 75323 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (no argument about the 2006 amendment).
  • Other circuits in accord post-amendment: United States v. Diaz, 90 F.4th 335 (5th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Montanari, 863 F.3d 775 (8th Cir. 2017). Their inclusion strengthened the panel’s view that the 2006 amendment marked a broadening change rather than a circuit-specific reading.
  • United States v. Bailey, 973 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 2020): Provided the standard of review (clear error for facts; de novo for legal conclusions) for the abduction enhancement challenge.
  • Evans v. Michigan, 568 U.S. 313 (2013): Defined “acquittal” as a ruling that the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to establish criminal liability. The panel used Evans to explain why a special-interrogatory “no” (given the unanimity instruction requiring “no” absent unanimity for “yes”) is not necessarily an acquittal.
  • Double-counting doctrine: United States v. Clark, 11 F.4th 491 (6th Cir. 2021) (standard of review); United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348 (6th Cir. 2010) (definition of impermissible double counting); United States v. Volkman, 797 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2015) (distinct aspects of conduct can justify multiple enhancements); United States v. McCoy, 480 F. App’x 366 (6th Cir. 2012) (supporting the idea that “color of law,” supervisory control, and vulnerability enhancements punish different wrongs).
  • United States v. Barnes, 822 F.3d 914 (6th Cir. 2016): Plain-error framework applied to the statutory-maximum/guidelines argument.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 23(b)(3): “Good cause” to excuse a deliberating juror can rest on medically uncertain illness

The court treated the “good cause” inquiry as practical and contextual: the juror’s emergency-room visit, abnormal test results, expectation of further testing and possible admission (which occurred), and the jury’s already lengthy deliberations (nearly five days) justified proceeding with 11 jurors rather than delaying deliberations for an unknown period. The decision’s throughline is that district judges may make a reasoned call based on evolving medical information without waiting for absolute diagnostic certainty.

2. Multiplicity: plain-error review is a high bar—especially without on-point precedent—and distinct elements (and charged timeframes) defeat the claim

The panel’s multiplicity analysis had two reinforcing steps:

  1. “Plainness” failure: Under United States v. Al-Maliki, Golobic’s failure to identify supporting precedent undercut any claim of “plain error.”
  2. Merits failure under Blockburger: Even if reached, the counts were distinct. The court emphasized (i) different statutory elements and (ii) as charged, different conduct separated in time: Count 5 (18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(3)) concerned lowering Evelin’s reporting status on Feb. 5, 2020; Count 2 (18 U.S.C. § 1591(d)) involved interference with enforcement of § 1591 from June 24, 2020 through July 27, 2022; and Count 6 (18 U.S.C. § 1519) involved destroying a record on June 24, 2020.

3. Obstruction enhancement: the 2006 amendment to § 3C1.1 broadens coverage to pre-investigation conduct

The opinion’s most explicit “rule clarification” is its treatment of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The Sixth Circuit contrasted the pre-2006 text (“during the course of the investigation”) with the post-2006 text (“with respect to the investigation”), plus the application note stating the enhancement may cover conduct “prior to the start of the investigation of the instant offense.”

Against that backdrop, earlier Sixth Circuit decisions (United States v. Baggett; United States v. Boyd) limiting the enhancement to post-investigation conduct were treated as products of superseded guideline language. Because Golobic did not rebut the government’s reliance on the amendment, and because the facts showed he reduced Evelin’s supervision to prevent reporting (i.e., to thwart detection and investigative follow-up), the enhancement was affirmed.

4. “Acquitted conduct” limits (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)) did not apply because there was no acquittal—and the “no” interrogatory was not one

Golobic invoked U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) (effective November 1, 2024), which provides that “relevant conduct” does not include conduct “for which the defendant was criminally charged and acquitted in federal court.” The court’s answer was categorical: Golobic was not charged with kidnapping or abduction, so the jury did not acquit him of those offenses.

Critically, the verdict form’s “kidnapping” interrogatory did not function as an acquittal because the jury was instructed to answer “no” unless it unanimously agreed to “yes.” A “no,” therefore, could merely signify a lack of unanimity, not a unanimous conclusion that the government’s proof was insufficient under Evans v. Michigan. The court also noted two additional backstops: (i) removing the enhancement would not have changed the guideline range (still 360 months to life), and (ii) “kidnapping” (as instructed) is distinct from “abduction” (as defined for the enhancement).

5. Double counting: multiple enhancements are permissible when they punish different aspects of the wrong

Applying United States v. Battaglia and United States v. Volkman, the panel upheld enhancements for (1) acting under color of law (U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(b)(1)), (2) supervisory control (U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(3)), and (3) vulnerable victim (U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1)). Even if related factually (federal authority enabling supervision; supervision interacting with immigration vulnerability), the enhancements were treated as addressing distinct sentencing concerns: abuse of governmental power, coercive dynamics of custodial/supervisory control, and exploitation of special vulnerability.

6. Statutory maximums: guideline grouping does not authorize exceeding a count’s maximum, and § 5G1.2 constrains the sentence

The court rejected the claim that a 12-month statutory maximum count “drove” a life-range guideline calculation. It emphasized that U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b) and its commentary cap the sentence on any count at that count’s statutory maximum, and that the overall guideline range resulted from grouping multiple counts. The imposed sentence respected each count’s statutory ceiling.

7. Sex-offender registration: obstruction “under § 1591” triggers SORNA registration

The court applied the statute’s text: under 34 U.S.C. § 20911(1), (5)(A)(iii), a “sex offender” includes one convicted of a federal offense “under [18 U.S.C. §] 1591.” Because Golobic was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d) (obstruction of enforcement), the court held that registration under 34 U.S.C. § 20913(a) followed—even if the conviction was for obstruction rather than a completed sex act.

C. Impact

  • Sentencing—obstruction enhancement: The opinion fortifies a post-2006 interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 in the Sixth Circuit: defendants can receive the obstruction enhancement for pre-investigation conduct aimed at preventing reporting, detection, or eventual investigative steps. Litigants relying on United States v. Baggett or United States v. Boyd must grapple with the guideline amendment and commentary.
  • Sentencing—acquittal characterization: The decision signals caution in treating special-verdict interrogatories as “acquittals,” especially where instructions convert “no” into a default outcome absent unanimity. This reasoning narrows the reach of arguments under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) when no charged acquittal exists.
  • Procedure—11-person verdicts: The ruling underscores that serious, uncertain juror illness—combined with meaningful inquiry and context like prolonged deliberations—will typically satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) “good cause,” reducing the likelihood of reversals absent clear arbitrariness.
  • SORNA collateral consequences: By reading “under § 1591” to include § 1591(d), the opinion reinforces that trafficking-statute obstruction convictions can carry mandatory sex-offender registration, even without a conviction for a hands-on sex offense.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 23(b)(3) “good cause”
Federal criminal juries are usually 12 people, but the judge may allow 11 to return a verdict if there is “good cause” to excuse a juror. Serious illness during deliberations is a common example, especially where the return date is uncertain.
Multiplicity
An indictment is “multiplicitous” if it charges the same offense in multiple counts, risking multiple punishments for one crime. Courts use the Blockburger v. United States test: if each statute requires proof of an element the other does not, the counts are generally not the same offense.
Plain-error review
When a defendant did not object in the district court, the court of appeals will reverse only for a clear, obvious error that likely affected the outcome. Without precedent clearly establishing the error, it is hard to show the error was “plain.”
Guideline amendments (2006 change to § 3C1.1)
Before 2006, obstruction enhancement language suggested the investigation had to be underway. After 2006, the wording (“with respect to the investigation”) and commentary allow coverage of conduct designed to obstruct an investigation even before it formally begins.
“Acquitted conduct” and special interrogatories
“Acquitted conduct” refers to conduct the jury has found the government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt for a charged offense. Here, the jury did not acquit Golobic of kidnapping/abduction because those were not charged offenses, and the interrogatory “no” did not necessarily reflect unanimous rejection.
Double counting (sentencing)
“Double counting” is forbidden only when the same feature of conduct is penalized twice in the same way. Multiple enhancements are allowed when each addresses a different sentencing concern (e.g., abuse of official power vs. victim vulnerability).
Statutory maximums vs. guideline ranges
Guidelines can recommend a range, but the sentence on each count cannot exceed that count’s statutory maximum. When multiple counts are involved, the court can structure concurrent/consecutive terms to reach an overall sentence consistent with both the guidelines and statutory caps.
SORNA registration trigger
Federal law requires registration for certain convictions. If the statute defines “sex offender” to include convictions “under” a specific trafficking statute, that can include obstruction provisions within that statute.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Andrew Golobic is a wide-ranging affirmance with several practice-significant holdings. Most notably, it crystallizes that, in the Sixth Circuit, the 2006 amendment to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 authorizes obstruction enhancements for conduct occurring before a formal investigation begins, so long as the conduct is aimed at obstructing justice “with respect to” the investigation. The decision also reinforces (i) the broad discretion trial courts possess to excuse ill jurors under Rule 23(b)(3), (ii) the demanding nature of plain-error review for multiplicity and sentencing challenges, (iii) a careful, functional understanding of what constitutes an “acquittal,” and (iv) the textual reach of SORNA registration when a defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(d).