Sixth Circuit Adopts Probable-Cause Standard for the “Serious Reasons for Believing” Serious-Nonpolitical-Crime Bar

I. Introduction

In Leandro Spindola v. Todd Blanche (6th Cir. Aug. 7, 2026), the Sixth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (CAT) relief. Petitioner Leandro Edimar Spindola, a Brazilian citizen, conceded removability but sought protection based on a years-long family dispute in Brazil that included threats and violence against his family. The decisive event occurred on August 25, 2022, when Spindola shot repeatedly at a vehicle driven by his nephew Rafael, pursued him for roughly two kilometers, and ultimately injured him. Brazilian authorities later charged Spindola with attempted murder.

The central legal issues were: (1) the meaning of “serious reasons for believing” in the “serious nonpolitical crime” bar to asylum and withholding under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) and 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii), and (2) whether substantial evidence supported the agency’s denial of CAT relief, particularly regarding “consent or acquiescence” by Brazilian officials.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held, as a matter of first impression in the Sixth Circuit, that “serious reasons for believing” in the serious-nonpolitical-crime bar requires no more than probable cause. Applying that standard, the court found substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that there were serious reasons to believe Spindola committed a serious nonpolitical crime (attempted murder) before entering the United States. The court further held Spindola’s arguments—lack of intent and defense of others—did not defeat application of the bar, particularly because the agency reasonably discounted those factual claims and because the burden-shifting framework placed the refutation burden on Spindola.

As to CAT, the court held substantial evidence supported the conclusion that Spindola did not show a likelihood of torture with the “consent or acquiescence” of Brazilian officials, and that his fear of torture by PCC members in prison was too speculative given the limited evidence of Rafael’s ongoing PCC connections.

III. Analysis

A. New Precedent / Rule Announced

The Sixth Circuit expressly adopted the rule that the serious-nonpolitical-crime bar’s “serious reasons for believing” standard is equivalent to probable cause. This aligns the circuit with the BIA and the majority of circuits and clarifies the evidentiary threshold the government must meet before the burden shifts to the noncitizen to disprove the bar’s application.

B. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1. Standards of Review and Post-Chevron Statutory Interpretation

  • Seldon v. Garland, 120 F.4th 527 (6th Cir. 2024): Provided the framework that where the BIA issues a separate opinion, the court reviews the BIA as the final agency determination; factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence and legal questions de novo.
  • Castillo v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 777 (6th Cir. 2025), citing Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024): Anchored the court’s interpretive method—give the statute its “best reading” without deferring to the BIA. This was crucial because the court adopted the probable-cause reading as its own textual conclusion, not as an act of deference.
  • Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled by Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo: Cited to explain that earlier circuit decisions may have been influenced by deference doctrines now rejected, while emphasizing that the probable-cause approach also rests on older, independent foundations.

2. Defining “Serious Reasons for Believing” as Probable Cause

  • Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003): Supplied the court’s operative definition of probable cause as a “reasonable ground for belief of guilt,” emphasizing its “fluid concept” and “totality of the circumstances” approach.
  • Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013): Reinforced that probable cause is a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry producing a “fair probability” of guilt—language the court used to evaluate whether intent could be inferred from Spindola’s conduct.
  • Matter of E-A-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 2012): Reflected the agency’s view equating “serious reasons for believing” with probable cause; while no longer entitled to automatic deference post-Loper Bright, it supported the court’s conclusion that this reading is long-standing and mainstream.

3. Circuit Consensus Supporting Probable Cause

  • Acosta v. Blanche, 176 F.4th 58 (1st Cir. 2026): A post-Loper Bright example confirming probable cause as the standard.
  • Khouzam v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2004), as amended (Apr. 12, 2004): A leading early adoption; the Sixth Circuit highlighted its historical grounding.
  • Herrera-Elias v. Garland, 96 F.4th 1040 (8th Cir. 2024): Another published circuit endorsement.
  • Go v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011): The Ninth Circuit’s published adoption of the standard.
  • Unpublished but persuasive alignment: Marroquin-Retana v. Att'y Gen. U.S., 675 F. App'x 216 (3d Cir. 2017); Whyte v. Garland, No. 22-1032, 2023 WL 3092977 (4th Cir. Apr. 26, 2023); Turcios-Ortiz v. Blanche, No. 25-9536, 2026 WL 1397090 (10th Cir. May 19, 2026).
  • Santana v. Blanche, No. 25-643, 2026 WL 1068089 (9th Cir. Apr. 20, 2026): Confirmed the Ninth Circuit’s continued adherence post-Loper Bright.
  • Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167 (2d Cir. 1980): Used (via Khouzam) to show the probable-cause equation predates modern deference regimes.

4. Burden Shifting for Mandatory Bars

  • Mukeshimana v. Holder, 507 F. App'x 524 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam): Cited for the proposition that once the government shows a bar “may apply,” the burden shifts to the applicant to prove it does not apply, consistent with 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(d)(2)(i), 1240.8(d).
  • Diaz-Zanatta v. Holder, 558 F.3d 450 (6th Cir. 2009): Provided the Sixth Circuit’s prior description of similar burden shifting in the context of the persecution bar, supporting the court’s rejection of Spindola’s attempt to import criminal-trial burden dynamics into removal proceedings.
  • Berhane v. Holder, 606 F.3d 819 (6th Cir. 2010): Cited to treat the asylum and withholding serious-nonpolitical-crime bars as substantively synonymous for purposes of analysis.

5. Rejecting “Exculpatory Evidence” Demands at the Probable-Cause Stage

  • United States v. Angel, 355 F.3d 462 (6th Cir. 2004), citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992): Used by analogy to explain why the IJ/BIA need not credit or fully litigate Spindola’s asserted lack of intent at the government’s probable-cause stage. The court treated intent as inferable from conduct and left rebuttal to the applicant’s burden.

6. CAT “Acquiescence,” Adequate Explanation, and Substantial Evidence

  • Vasquez-Rivera v. Garland, 96 F.4th 903 (6th Cir. 2024): Provided the CAT definition framework and recognized that where the BIA adopts IJ reasoning, the court reviews the IJ’s decision to that extent.
  • Denko v. I.N.S., 351 F.3d 717 (6th Cir. 2003): Supported the proposition that the BIA may summarily affirm without extensive commentary.
  • Turcios-Flores v. Garland, 67 F.4th 347 (6th Cir. 2023): Used to show that even imperfect or unsuccessful government efforts to prevent harm can defeat a claim of official acquiescence.
  • Patel v. Bondi, 131 F.4th 377 (6th Cir. 2025): Provided the “willfully blind eye” framing for acquiescence; the court found Brazil did not turn such an eye given police response and prosecutions.
  • Garland v. Ming Dai, 593 U.S. 357 (2021): Supported upholding agency decisions even if “less than ideal clarity,” so long as the agency’s path is reasonably discernible—used to reject the argument that the BIA had to spell out every inference about PCC risk in prison.

C. Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Interpretation: “Serious Reasons for Believing”

The court began with statutory text and ordinary meaning: “serious reasons for believing” closely tracks the language traditionally used to describe probable cause (“reasonable ground for belief of guilt”). The court emphasized probable cause’s flexibility and totality-of-the-circumstances character, finding it a comfortable match for the INA’s unelaborated phrase.

2. Application to the Record: Probable Cause of a Serious Nonpolitical Crime

Substantial evidence supported probable cause because Spindola admitted the core conduct underlying the Brazilian attempted-murder charge: arming himself, firing multiple rounds at Rafael’s vehicle after realizing his son was not with Rafael, re-engaging and chasing Rafael for about two kilometers, and ultimately shooting and seriously injuring him. The court held that intent to kill could be reasonably inferred from these circumstances, especially given the prior violent feud.

3. Intent and Justification Treated as Rebuttal, Not as a Bar to Probable Cause

A key structural move was the court’s insistence on procedural sequencing. The government’s job is to establish probable cause that the bar applies; once it does, the applicant bears the burden to prove the bar does not apply. Within that framework, Spindola’s “I intended only to disable the car” narrative and his defense-of-others theory were treated as rebuttal evidence—not as reasons the agency must withhold a probable-cause finding in the first place.

4. Defense of Others / Self-Defense: Substantial Evidence Supports Rejection

The IJ and BIA found Spindola’s conduct inconsistent with a reasonable necessity claim: he admitted knowing his son was not in Rafael’s car when he began shooting, and his pursuit and use of deadly force amounted to “taking the law into his own hands” rather than responding to an imminent threat requiring that level of force. The Sixth Circuit deferred under substantial-evidence review.

5. CAT: No Showing of Likely Torture with Official Consent or Acquiescence

The court agreed that Brazil’s police response and prosecution of Rafael and others undermined any claim of official acquiescence. The court further held the feared PCC-in-prison scenario was speculative: evidence of Rafael’s PCC ties was limited to a vague voicemail allegation and the historical fact that an accomplice in a past attack was PCC-affiliated—insufficient to compel a finding that torture was more likely than not with official acquiescence.

D. Impact

  • Clarifies the evidentiary threshold in the Sixth Circuit: DHS can trigger the serious-nonpolitical-crime bar by showing probable cause—lower than “preponderance” and far below “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Reinforces burden allocation and sequencing: Applicants should expect that claims like lack of intent, justification, or mitigation will be evaluated mainly at the rebuttal stage; they must be supported with persuasive evidence sufficient to meet the applicant’s burden.
  • Aligns Sixth Circuit with national consensus post-Loper Bright: By adopting probable cause as the “best reading,” the decision stabilizes the interpretation independent of agency deference.
  • CAT claims face a demanding acquiescence showing: Evidence of some police failures or dissatisfaction with sentencing outcomes will often be insufficient when the record shows meaningful governmental response and prosecution.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Serious reasons for believing” = probable cause: Not a full trial on guilt; it means there is a reasonable basis—looking at all circumstances—to think the person committed the crime.
  • “Serious nonpolitical crime” bar: Even if someone fears harm, asylum/withholding can be denied if there is probable cause they committed a serious crime abroad that is not political in nature.
  • Burden shifting: DHS first shows the bar may apply (now clarified as probable cause). Then the applicant must prove the bar does not apply.
  • Substantial evidence review: The court does not decide facts anew; it upholds the agency unless the record compels the opposite conclusion.
  • CAT “acquiescence”: It is not enough that a private actor may harm the applicant; the applicant must show officials would knowingly allow it (including “willful blindness”) and fail to intervene.

V. Conclusion

Spindola v. Blanche establishes a clear Sixth Circuit rule: the INA’s “serious reasons for believing” standard in the serious-nonpolitical-crime bar is satisfied by probable cause. The decision also underscores that intent and self-defense-style justifications generally function as rebuttal matters for the applicant to prove, not as hurdles the government must negate to establish probable cause. Finally, the opinion reflects the Sixth Circuit’s continued insistence that CAT protection requires a concrete, non-speculative showing not only of likely severe harm, but of likely official consent or acquiescence.