Six-to-Seven-Year Age Gap Falls in the “Zone of Discretion” and Requires Other Evidence to Show a “Significantly Younger” Replacement

Case: Mark Yacko v. General Motors Co. (6th Cir. Feb. 12, 2026) (unpublished)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Claim at Issue on Appeal: Age discrimination under Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A), analyzed under ADEA standards

1. Introduction

Mark Yacko worked at General Motors’ Parma, Ohio plant from 1999 until his termination in 2023. By the end of his employment, he was a Maintenance Group Leader. In 2022, he began reporting to a new supervisor, Frank Jewett, and received a middling-to-low mid-year rating under GM’s former “nine-box” system. Later in 2022 GM shifted to a simplified three-tier system—plus, minus, or par.

Following a calibration meeting of HR leadership (the “HRM team”), Yacko received a “teamGM minus” year-end rating. A human resources director, Tammy DeWildt, subsequently ran a report identifying managers with “minus” ratings and terminated two managers returned by the report: Yacko and Craig Conrad (who was fifteen years younger than Yacko). After Yacko’s termination, GM reassigned Roger East (a manager a little over six years younger than Yacko) to cover Yacko’s third-shift role.

Yacko sued alleging age discrimination (plus other claims not pursued on appeal). The key appellate issue was whether Yacko had enough circumstantial evidence to survive summary judgment under the burden-shifting framework, specifically whether he established the fourth element of a prima facie case: replacement by a “significantly younger” person or more favorable treatment of similarly situated, significantly younger comparators.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for GM. Although Yacko satisfied the first three prima facie elements (age over 40, adverse action, and qualifications), he failed the fourth element.

Holding (practical): Where the alleged replacement (or comparator) is only a little over six years younger—placing the case in the Sixth Circuit’s “zone of discretion”—a plaintiff must point to other evidence suggesting age factored into the decision. Absent such evidence, the age gap is treated as insignificant and the prima facie case fails.

The court also rejected Yacko’s comparator theory: East and Spells were not “significantly younger” given the lack of other age-related evidence, and Conrad was not “similarly situated” in relevant respects when Yacko sought to compare differential treatment tied to a 2019 performance event.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

The opinion is built almost entirely from established Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court frameworks; its contribution is the way it applies those frameworks to a narrow age-gap record and a calibration-driven termination process.

  • Willard v. Huntington Ford, Inc. — Used for the summary-judgment lens (viewing evidence in the nonmovant’s favor) and for applying McDonnell Douglas to circumstantial-evidence discrimination claims. The court invoked Willard both for the standard of review and as the immediate authority for using the burden-shifting framework in an ADEA/Ohio analog case.
  • Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. — Quoted (via Willard) for the governing question at summary judgment: whether a reasonable jury could find for the nonmoving party by a preponderance of the evidence. This framed the court’s focus on whether the record could support the prima facie elements, not whether Yacko’s theory was merely plausible.
  • Angel v. Kentucky — Cited for the appellate court’s freedom to affirm on any record-supported ground, particularly where facts are undisputed. This enabled the Sixth Circuit to resolve the appeal at step one of McDonnell Douglas (prima facie case) rather than step three (pretext), even though the district court had focused on pretext.
  • Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll. — Provides two key propositions: (1) Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A) age-discrimination claims are analyzed under the same standards as the ADEA, and (2) elaboration of Grosjean’s “zone of discretion” for age differences between six and ten years. Blizzard is the linchpin for the court’s treatment of Yacko’s roughly six-to-seven-year age gap.
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green — The foundational burden-shifting structure: prima facie case → employer’s legitimate reason → pretext. The panel emphasized that Yacko’s case fails before reaching pretext because the fourth prima facie element was not met.
  • Provenzano v. LCI Holdings, Inc. — Cited to underscore that the prima facie burden “is not intended to be onerous,” yet it still requires proof of each element. This helped the court justify ending the case at step one without demanding extensive evidence—just enough to satisfy the elements.
  • Pelcha v. MW Bancorp., Inc. — Supplies the four elements of a prima facie ADEA-style age-discrimination claim, including the fourth element (replacement outside the protected class or less favorable treatment than similarly situated, non-protected employees).
  • Grosjean v. First Energy Corp. — Establishes the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line point that an age difference of six years or less is insignificant, and anchors the discussion of what counts as “significantly younger.”
  • Diebel v. L & H Res., LLC — Cited for the comparator route to satisfying the fourth element and for the “more than six years younger” framing when comparing treatment of similarly situated employees.
  • Scola v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. — Used as an example of how, within the “zone of discretion,” courts look for additional evidence of age discrimination to support an inference that age mattered despite a modest age gap.
  • Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co. — Provides the “similarly situated in all relevant respects” standard (quoting Ercegovich), central to rejecting Conrad as a comparator.
  • Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. — Supplies two important comparator principles: the “all relevant respects” standard and the caution that comparability is case-specific and requires independent judicial assessment of what differences matter.
  • Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp. — Offers the frequently cited comparator factors: same supervisor, same standards, and similar conduct without differentiating circumstances. The panel used these factors to explain why Conrad’s circumstances did not align with Yacko’s.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The court resolves the case at step one, not pretext

Although the district court had ruled that Yacko failed at step three (pretext), the Sixth Circuit invoked Angel v. Kentucky to affirm on a different ground: Yacko could not make a prima facie showing under Pelcha v. MW Bancorp., Inc.. This move matters because it narrows what a plaintiff must show to survive summary judgment—before the employer’s justification and pretext analysis even begin.

B. “Significantly younger” replacement: applying Grosjean and the “zone of discretion” from Blizzard

Yacko’s replacement, East, was “a little over six years younger.” Under Grosjean v. First Energy Corp., an age gap of six years or less is insignificant; gaps between six and ten years fall into the Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll. “zone of discretion.”

In that zone, the panel looked for “other evidence of age discrimination” (as illustrated by Scola v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc.) to support the inference that age played a role. The court found none:

  • Yacko admitted he did not know whether age “came into their mind or not.”
  • GM witnesses testified they were not aware of Yacko’s age or East’s age at the relevant times.

With no age-related remarks, no statistical pattern, no process irregularities tied to age, and no evidence that decisionmakers considered ages, the panel treated the modest age difference as insufficient to support the fourth element.

C. Comparator theory: rejecting East, Spells, and Conrad

The panel then assessed whether Yacko could show more favorable treatment of a similarly situated, significantly younger employee.

  • East and Spells: Both were between six and seven years younger, placing them in the same “zone of discretion” analysis. Because Yacko offered no independent evidence that age influenced retention/assignment decisions, they could not serve as “significantly younger” comparators on this record.
  • Conrad: Conrad was fifteen years younger (clearly “significantly younger”), but the panel held he was not “similarly situated in all relevant respects” under Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co. (quoting Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.) and the factors in Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp.. Yacko’s comparison relied on Conrad receiving a PIP after a poor review in 2019; yet Conrad’s job, supervisor, review system (nine-box), and the record of deficiencies were materially different. The one strong similarity—both receiving “minus” ratings in 2022—cut against Yacko because both were terminated.

3.3. Impact

Although unpublished, the decision provides a clear, practice-oriented application of existing Sixth Circuit doctrine:

  • Zone-of-discretion cases need something more than the raw age gap: When the replacement/comparator is about 6–7 years younger, plaintiffs should expect courts to ask for additional age-linked evidence (remarks, patterns, suspicious deviations, statistical disparities, or evidence that ages were known and weighed).
  • Comparator evidence must match the relevant decision context: Comparing discipline/performance management across different supervisors, roles, and evaluation systems is unlikely to establish “similarly situated” status, especially where the employer’s process changed (here, nine-box to three-box) and where the comparator ultimately received the same adverse outcome in the relevant period.
  • Step-one failures can end cases early: By affirming on prima facie grounds, the opinion signals that plaintiffs cannot rely on a court reaching pretext if they cannot satisfy the fourth element with competent evidence.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment

A case can be decided without trial if, even viewing the evidence in the plaintiff’s favor, no reasonable jury could legally find for the plaintiff.

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting

  1. Prima facie case: The plaintiff must show basic facts that permit an inference of discrimination.
  2. Legitimate reason: The employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason for the action.
  3. Pretext: The plaintiff shows the stated reason is a cover for discrimination.

“Significantly younger” and the “zone of discretion”

In the Sixth Circuit, an age gap of six years or less is generally too small to imply discrimination by itself (Grosjean). If the gap is roughly six to ten years, courts may look at the whole record for additional evidence that age mattered (Blizzard).

“Similarly situated” comparators

A comparator is another employee used as a benchmark. Courts typically look for comparable supervisors, standards, and conduct, and avoid comparisons where key circumstances differ (Mitchell, Ercegovich).

Performance Improvement Plan (PIP)

A structured corrective process used by employers to document performance issues and set goals before further discipline. Whether a PIP must be offered depends on policy, practice, and context—differences in timing, systems, and supervisors often undermine PIP-based comparators.

5. Conclusion

Mark Yacko v. General Motors Co. reinforces a practical evidentiary point in Sixth Circuit age-discrimination litigation: when the age difference between a terminated employee and the replacement (or proposed comparator) is just over six years—within the “zone of discretion”—the plaintiff must produce additional evidence that age was actually considered. Without that, the age gap will not carry the fourth element of the prima facie case, and the claim can fail at step one of McDonnell Douglas—before any pretext inquiry begins.