Sines v. Spencer: Fourth Circuit Reaffirms Strict Rule 50 Renewal Requirement and Limits on Unpreserved Civil Arguments on Appeal

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Unpublished, per curiam)
Date: March 27, 2025
Panel: Circuit Judges Wynn and Harris; Senior Circuit Judge Floyd
Docket No.: 23-1112
Disposition: Affirmed

Introduction

In this appeal arising from the long-running civil litigation over the Charlottesville “Unite the Right” events, defendant-appellant Richard Spencer challenged several district court rulings following a jury verdict against him. The plaintiffs—Elizabeth Sines and others—had sued Spencer and numerous co-defendants under federal and Virginia law, including claims for conspiracy to commit racially motivated violence, failure to prevent such conspiracy, state civil conspiracy, and a Virginia statutory tort for racial, religious, or ethnic harassment (Va. Code § 8.01-42.1).

On appeal, Spencer (pro se) argued that the district court erred in: (1) denying his motion to transfer the case from the Charlottesville Division to the Lynchburg Division under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and (b); (2) upholding a magistrate judge’s order striking his summary judgment motion as untimely; (3) allowing claims to proceed that were allegedly insufficiently pleaded in the second amended complaint; and (4) entering judgment on the jury’s verdict for Virginia Code § 8.01-42.1 (Count IV), which he argued lacked sufficient evidentiary support.

The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Although unpublished and thus nonbinding in the circuit, the opinion is a cautionary, practice-focused decision emphasizing four preservation and appellate review pillars: (i) waiver by failing to brief a ground on appeal; (ii) broad discretion for district courts in docket management and striking untimely filings; (iii) a stringent “fundamental error” safety valve for civil arguments raised for the first time on appeal; and (iv) strict compliance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50’s renewal requirement for sufficiency challenges to survive on appeal.

Summary of the Opinion

Venue Transfer (28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), (b)): Spencer waived appellate review of the district court’s conclusion that §§ 1404(a) and (b) did not authorize the divisional transfer he sought because he did not present any argument challenging those determinations in his appellate briefing. The court declined to reach the district court’s alternative balancing analysis under § 1404(a).
Striking Untimely Summary Judgment: Affirmed under abuse-of-discretion review. District courts have wide latitude in managing their dockets, including enforcing scheduling orders and striking late filings.
Pleading Sufficiency (Raised First Time on Appeal): The court reviewed for “fundamental error” (a standard at least as demanding as criminal plain error) and found none. Thus, the pleading challenges failed.
Sufficiency of the Evidence (Count IV – Va. Code § 8.01-42.1): Spencer forfeited this argument. Although he filed a pre-verdict Rule 50(a) motion, his specific post-verdict Rule 50(b) theory—that there was no evidence he “directly harmed” plaintiffs or “expressly ordered” harm—was not raised in his Rule 50(a) motion. Because Rule 50(b) is a renewal mechanism, not an opportunity to introduce new grounds, the appellate sufficiency challenge was barred.

Analysis

1) Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Decision

Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown, 123 F.4th 652, 660 n.4 (4th Cir. 2024); Grayson O Co. v. Agadir Int’l LLC, 856 F.3d 307, 316 (4th Cir. 2017): These decisions underscore a basic appellate principle: issues or grounds not argued in the appellant’s brief are deemed waived. The Fourth Circuit applied this rule to hold that Spencer waived review of the district court’s statutory conclusion that §§ 1404(a) and (b) did not authorize the transfer he sought because he did not challenge that legal determination on appeal.
United States v. Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 899 F.3d 295, 324 (4th Cir. 2018); Turner v. United States, 736 F.3d 274, 283 (4th Cir. 2013): Both cases confirm the broad discretion district courts enjoy in managing their dockets and in striking filings that violate scheduling orders. The panel relied on these authorities to affirm striking Spencer’s late summary judgment motion.
Milla v. Brown, 109 F.4th 222, 234 (4th Cir. 2024); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993): Together, these cases articulate the Fourth Circuit’s approach to unpreserved civil issues on appeal: “fundamental error” review—at least as stringent as criminal plain error. Under Olano, an appellant must show an error that is plain, affects substantial rights, and seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. The court found no such error in the pleadings challenges Spencer raised for the first time on appeal.
Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., U.S., 679 F.3d 146 (4th Cir. 2012); Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008): These decisions comprise the core architecture of Rule 50 preservation. Belk and Unitherm require a two-step process: (a) a sufficiently specific Rule 50(a) motion before submission to the jury, and (b) a renewed Rule 50(b) motion after verdict. Exxon Shipping makes explicit that Rule 50(b) is a renewal mechanism; it does not permit new grounds that were not raised under Rule 50(a). Applying these cases, the Fourth Circuit held Spencer forfeited his sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge to Count IV.

2) Legal Reasoning

a) Waiver of Venue-Transfer Grounds. The district court held that neither § 1404(a) nor § 1404(b) authorized the intradistrict transfer Spencer sought. On appeal, Spencer did not challenge this statutory holding, thereby waiving review. The panel therefore had no occasion to address the district court’s alternative analysis weighing the convenience factors under § 1404(a). This reinforces that appellants must confront each dispositive ground below; ignoring a key pillar of the ruling can be outcome-determinative on appeal.

b) Docket Management and Untimely Summary Judgment. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the panel affirmed the order striking Spencer’s late summary judgment motion. The cases cited emphasize that district courts are on the front line of case management; enforcing deadlines and striking noncompliant filings are well within their remit. Nothing in the record rose to the level of a clear error in judgment.

c) New Pleading Attacks on Appeal: “Fundamental Error” Review. Spencer challenged the sufficiency of the second amended complaint for the first time on appeal, targeting the federal conspiracy claim (§ 1985(3)), Virginia civil conspiracy, and the Virginia harassment statute (§ 8.01-42.1). The Fourth Circuit’s civil “fundamental error” review—drawn from Milla and anchored in the Olano framework—is intentionally narrow. It protects the integrity of proceedings while discouraging sandbagging. The court concluded that Spencer failed to show a plain, outcome-altering error that seriously impugned the fairness or integrity of the proceedings, and it therefore declined to reach the merits of these late-stage pleading attacks.

d) Rule 50’s Two-Stage Specificity and Renewal Requirement. The most consequential part of the opinion centers on the strict application of Rule 50. The rule provides: - Rule 50(a): Before the case goes to the jury, a party may move for judgment as a matter of law, but must “specify the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment.” - Rule 50(b): After the verdict, a party may file a “renewed” Rule 50 motion, but only on grounds advanced in the Rule 50(a) motion.

Spencer’s Rule 50(a) motion contended (in substance) that the evidence did not prove he entered a conspiracy or intended harm and that his statements were protected by the First Amendment. After the verdict, however, his Rule 50(b) motion pressed a different sufficiency theory as to Count IV: that there was no evidence he directly harmed plaintiffs or expressly ordered someone else to do so. Because that ground was not raised in the Rule 50(a) motion, it was not a “renewal” under Rule 50(b). Citing Exxon Shipping, the court characterized this as an impermissible, new post-verdict theory—thereby forfeiting appellate review of evidentiary sufficiency for Count IV under Belk and Unitherm.

3) Likely Impact

Preservation Discipline: Litigants in the Fourth Circuit should expect strict enforcement of procedural preservation rules. This opinion amplifies that an imprecise Rule 50(a) motion jeopardizes later sufficiency challenges, and a Rule 50(b) motion that shifts theories is a nonstarter on appeal.
Appellate Briefing Strategy: The waiver holding on venue highlights the importance of addressing each ground underpinning a district court ruling. Failure to brief a dispositive ground is fatal, even for pro se appellants.
Trial Management and Scheduling Orders: District judges can confidently enforce deadlines, including striking summary judgment motions filed outside established schedules. Parties should treat scheduling orders as binding commitments.
New Arguments on Appeal in Civil Cases: The “fundamental error” framework will remain a very narrow gateway. Parties should not expect the Fourth Circuit to rescue late-raised issues absent clear, outcome-altering, systemic error.
Charlottesville Litigation Posture: Although unpublished and procedural in nature, the affirmance leaves the jury’s verdict intact against Spencer, with no appellate inroad on Count IV’s evidentiary sufficiency or on the viability of the pleaded theories.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Waiver vs. Forfeiture: - Waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. In appellate practice, courts often use “waiver” to describe an appellant’s failure to brief an issue—treating it as abandoned.
- Forfeiture is the failure to make a timely assertion (e.g., not raising a ground in a Rule 50(a) motion). Forfeited arguments are generally reviewed, if at all, under a very demanding standard.
“Fundamental Error” Review in Civil Appeals: In the Fourth Circuit, when a civil party raises an issue for the first time on appeal, the court may consider it only to correct “fundamental” error—an inquiry at least as searching as criminal plain error under Olano. To succeed, an appellant must show an obvious error that affected substantial rights and seriously undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.
Rule 50(a) and Rule 50(b): Rule 50(a) requires a specific, element-focused motion before the case goes to the jury. Rule 50(b) is not a second bite at the apple; it is a renewal of the same grounds after the verdict. New theories in a Rule 50(b) motion are barred and cannot be raised on appeal.
Sufficiency of the Allegations vs. Sufficiency of the Evidence: - Pleading sufficiency asks whether the complaint plausibly states a claim (a Rule 12(b)(6) question focused on allegations and reasonable inferences).
- Evidentiary sufficiency asks whether the trial record contains enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find for the nonmovant on each essential element—policed by Rule 50’s procedural requirements.
28 U.S.C. § 1404 Transfers: Section 1404(a) governs transfers for convenience “to any other district or division where [the action] might have been brought” or to which all parties consent. Section 1404(b) addresses intradistrict (divisional) transfers. The appellate court here did not decide whether either subsection authorized the specific divisional transfer requested; it held only that Spencer waived review by not challenging the district court’s statutory analysis.
Virginia Code § 8.01-42.1 (Racial, Religious, or Ethnic Harassment): This Virginia statute provides a civil cause of action for injuries resulting from acts motivated by racial, religious, or ethnic animus. The Fourth Circuit did not reach the substantive elements; it resolved Spencer’s Count IV challenge solely on Rule 50 preservation grounds.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986: - Section 1985(3) creates a cause of action for conspiracies to deprive persons or classes of equal protection or equal privileges and immunities.
- Section 1986 imposes liability on those who know of a § 1985 conspiracy and have the power to prevent it but fail to do so. The appellate court declined to revisit the pleadings on these claims because the challenges were raised too late.

Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s unpublished decision in Sines v. Spencer is less a merits ruling than a procedural roadmap. Its core lessons are unmistakable:

Appellants must challenge each dispositive ground of a district court’s ruling; silence equals waiver.
District courts have wide berth to enforce schedules, including striking late-filed motions.
New civil issues raised for the first time on appeal face the stiff headwind of “fundamental error” review and almost never succeed.
Most importantly, sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges are strictly policed under Rule 50: specify concrete grounds in Rule 50(a), and renew those same grounds in Rule 50(b). Deviations—for example, adding a new element-focused theory post-verdict—forfeit appellate review under Belk, Unitherm, and Exxon Shipping.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion reinforces a set of practical imperatives that govern trial and appellate practice in the Fourth Circuit. For litigants—especially those proceeding without counsel—the decision is a pointed reminder that procedural precision is not optional; it is often outcome determinative.

Key Takeaways for Practitioners

When seeking transfer, brief every statutory basis the district court relied upon; otherwise, the issue is waived.
Treat scheduling orders as hard deadlines; late dispositive motions may be struck, and appellate courts will defer to the district judge’s management decisions.
Do not bank on appellate rescue for arguments not raised below; “fundamental error” is a very narrow aperture.
For Rule 50: - Before the jury retires, move under Rule 50(a) on each discrete element you intend to challenge later, stating the specific law-and-fact basis. - After the verdict, renew under Rule 50(b) on the same grounds—no new theories. - Without a proper Rule 50(b) renewal, sufficiency arguments are lost on appeal.

Note: The Fourth Circuit marked this opinion “Unpublished.” Under circuit rules, unpublished opinions are not binding precedent, though they often provide persuasive guidance.