Section 5101’s “Preserve the Family” Purpose Does Not Displace the § 5114 Best-Interests Test; “Safety and Timely Permanency” Remains Paramount in TPR

1. Introduction

Case: In re H.R. and A.R., Jr., Juveniles (A.R., Father*) (Vt. May 8, 2026) (entry order).
Parties: The Department for Children and Families (DCF) sought termination of parental rights; father appealed the termination of his residual parental rights in H.R. (born 2008) and A.R. (born 2010). Mother did not appear at the termination hearing and did not appeal.

Background: The children lived with both parents in Texas until 2019, when father was hospitalized for mental health reasons. Mother and the children later moved to Vermont, where DCF took emergency custody in May 2022 after a severe incident involving a house fire and physical altercation. The children were adjudicated CHINS about five months later. Father remained in Texas and had not seen the children since 2019.

Core issues on appeal: Whether the family division erred in applying Vermont’s statutory best-interests factors for termination—particularly where (i) the children were safe and thriving in foster care, and (ii) the children were close to the age of majority. Father argued that 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(3) required a construction favoring family preservation absent serious harm or public-safety concerns.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the termination of father’s residual parental rights. The Court held that the family division applied the proper legal standard and did not abuse its discretion in concluding that termination served the children’s best interests under 33 V.S.A. § 5114. The Court rejected father’s reliance on 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(3) as altering the governing termination framework, emphasizing that “safety and timely permanency for children” is the “paramount concern[]” under 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(4).

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

  • In re B.W., 162 Vt. 287, 291 (1994)
    Cited for the two-step requirement when modifying an existing disposition order to terminate parental rights: (1) a “substantial change in material circumstances,” and (2) termination in the child’s best interests. The Court used In re B.W. as the foundational procedural/legal threshold framing the termination analysis.
  • In re B.M., 165 Vt. 331, 336 (1996)
    Quoted for the “critical factor” in the best-interests inquiry: whether the parent can resume parental duties within a reasonable time. Later, the Court also invoked In re B.M. (at 342) to reject any categorical rule that a parent-child bond must be maintained “regardless of the cost to the child,” reinforcing that permanency and welfare can outweigh relational continuity.
  • In re B.S., 166 Vt. 345, 353 (1997)
    Used to sharpen the “reasonable time” concept by insisting it must be evaluated “from the perspective of the needs of the child,” not the parent’s preferred timeline—an important rebuttal to father’s argument that the children’s age and current foster stability should forestall termination.
  • In re G.S., 153 Vt. 651, 652 (1990) (mem.)
    Cited for appellate review principles: findings stand unless “clearly erroneous,” and conclusions are affirmed if supported by findings, so long as the proper standard was applied.
  • In re S.B., 174 Vt. 427, 429 (2002) (mem.)
    Reinforced the Supreme Court’s limited role: it will not reweigh evidence or second-guess the family court, but asks whether there was an abuse of discretion in terminating parental rights.
  • Meyncke v. Meyncke, 2009 VT 84, ¶ 15, 186 Vt. 571 (mem.)
    Cited to dispose of arguments amounting to mere disagreement with the trial court’s reasoning; such disagreement does not establish abuse of discretion.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Section 5101 is a construction/purpose provision; it does not replace the termination test.
    Father relied on 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(3) (“preserve the family”) to argue termination was unnecessary because the children were safe in foster care and nearing adulthood. The Court responded that § 5101 lists purposes guiding construction of the juvenile proceedings statutes, but it “does not provide a different standard” for termination. The operative best-interests analysis remains under 33 V.S.A. § 5114.
  2. “Safety and timely permanency” is expressly paramount.
    The Court emphasized 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(4), which makes “safety and timely permanency for children” the “paramount concern[]” in these proceedings. This directly undercut father’s suggestion that continued legal parenthood should be maintained because the children were currently safe in foster care.
  3. The “reasonable time” to resume parenting is measured from the children’s perspective.
    Applying In re B.M. and In re B.S., the Court focused on whether father could resume parental duties within a reasonable period of time as experienced by H.R. and A.R. By the time of the hearing, they had been in DCF custody for three-and-a-half years, were thriving, and further delay would be harmful.
  4. The record supported inability to parent now or in the foreseeable future.
    The family division’s oral findings—accepted on appeal under the “clearly erroneous/abuse of discretion” standard—included:
    • Father had not seen the children since 2019.
    • Credited testimony described father’s violence/aggression and disturbing discipline practices (including handcuffing).
    • Father minimally engaged with DCF, did not complete case-plan steps (domestic violence programming, substance-use assessment/recommendations, releases), and there was no objective proof of sobriety.
    • Father requested an ICPC home study but did not complete required steps (a background check), leading to denial.
    • Both children affirmatively opposed reunification and requested termination.
    Against that backdrop, the Court found no abuse of discretion in concluding father could not play a constructive parental role.
  5. Foster-care success and proximity to majority are not categorical bars to termination.
    The Court rejected the notion that because the children were safe and near adulthood termination was unnecessary. Instead, the children’s stability and improvement in the foster home supported the permanency goal, and the statutory inquiry remained whether father could safely parent within a reasonable time.
  6. A parent-child bond, even if present, is not dispositive.
    The Court noted the trial court did not find the bond father asserted; but even if it had, In re B.M. forecloses any rule maintaining the bond “regardless of the cost to the child.”

C. Impact

Although the document is an entry order (and the cover note cautions that decisions of a three-justice panel are not precedent), its reasoning is instructive in several recurring termination contexts:

  • Clarifying the role of 33 V.S.A. § 5101 in termination litigation: Parties may cite “family preservation” language, but this decision emphasizes that § 5101 does not alter the controlling best-interests framework of § 5114 and that § 5101(a)(4)’s permanency/safety priority is central.
  • Rejecting “no need to terminate because the child is safe” arguments: The opinion frames foster stability not as a reason to avoid termination, but as relevant to permanency and to the comparative welfare analysis under § 5114.
  • Reinforcing child-centered timelines: It reiterates that the “reasonable time” inquiry is measured from the child’s perspective—particularly salient when children have spent years in care.
  • Interstate/noncustodial parent cases: The decision highlights how failure to engage with case-plan requirements and to complete ICPC-related steps can support findings of stagnation and inability to assume parenting within a reasonable time.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Residual parental rights
The remaining legal rights and responsibilities of a parent after state intervention (e.g., rights to visitation, decision-making, and the legal parent-child relationship). Termination ends those rights entirely.
CHINS (Child in Need of Care or Supervision)
A legal status allowing court supervision and services when a child lacks proper parental care or is at risk.
ICPC (Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children)
A process required for many out-of-state placements to ensure the receiving state evaluates safety and suitability (commonly via a “home study”). Noncompletion can prevent an interstate placement from being approved.
Disposition case plan / action steps
A court-adopted service plan describing what parents must do to address the issues leading to state custody (e.g., treatment, assessments, releases, programming).
Stagnation
In termination cases, a finding that a parent has not made meaningful progress on the issues preventing safe parenting, despite having time and opportunity to do so.
Best-interests factors (33 V.S.A. § 5114)
Statutory considerations the court must weigh to decide whether termination is in the child’s best interests; the “critical factor” emphasized here is the parent’s ability to resume parenting within a reasonable time.
Abuse of discretion / clearly erroneous
Deferential appellate standards. The Supreme Court will not reweigh evidence; it asks whether the trial court applied the right legal standard and whether its findings and conclusions are supported by the record.

5. Conclusion

In re H.R. and A.R., Jr., Juveniles affirms that termination turns on the statutory best-interests analysis under 33 V.S.A. § 5114, with the key question being whether a parent can resume parental duties within a reasonable time from the child’s perspective. The Court rejected the argument that 33 V.S.A. § 5101’s family-preservation purpose blocks termination when children are safe in foster care or nearing adulthood, emphasizing instead that “safety and timely permanency for children” is the “paramount concern[]” under 33 V.S.A. § 5101(a)(4). On the record—minimal contact since 2019, failure to engage in services and ICPC requirements, and the children’s credible opposition to reunification—the Court found no abuse of discretion in ordering termination to secure permanency.