§ 1446(b)(1)’s 30-Day Removal Deadline Is Not Equitably Tollable; Post-Remand Class-Certification Activity Does Not Restart CAFA Removal Timing

1. Introduction

John Ewalt, Steve Wylie, and Bonnie Navarre (plaintiffs) brought a putative class action against GateHouse Media Ohio Holdings II, Inc., dba The Columbus Dispatch (defendant) in Ohio state court. GateHouse initially removed the action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA). After years of federal litigation, the district court denied class certification and then (incorrectly) remanded the case to state court, reasoning that CAFA jurisdiction no longer existed and declining supplemental jurisdiction.

Back in state court, plaintiffs renewed class-certification efforts. GateHouse then attempted a second removal—well beyond the original 30-day window in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). The district court denied remand by equitably tolling the removal deadline, citing the ambiguity created by its prior remand mistake. The core issue on appeal was whether that equitable tolling could save the otherwise untimely second removal and whether later class-certification proceedings could “restart” the removal clock.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit reversed. Relying on the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan, the court held that § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day removal deadline cannot be equitably tolled. Because the case was removable when filed in 2019 and GateHouse’s second removal in 2025 occurred far outside the statutory deadline—and no statutory exception applied—the removal was untimely and the case had to be remanded to state court.

The court also rejected the argument that a post-remand class-certification motion in state court resets removal timing, and it reiterated that a denial of class certification does not divest CAFA jurisdiction (making the district court’s 2024 remand erroneous, but still not a basis to extend removal time).

On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit declined to remove its remand instruction to allow consideration of GateHouse’s Rule 60(b) motion, holding that GateHouse forfeited that issue by failing to develop it in its appellate briefing.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) The dispositive rule: no equitable tolling of § 1446(b)(1)

Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan is the controlling authority. The Sixth Circuit quotes and applies Enbridge’s holding that § 1446(b)(1)’s time limit, while “not jurisdictional,” is nevertheless “strict” and “mandatory” and not subject to equitable tolling. The Sixth Circuit treats this as foreclosure: regardless of fairness considerations arising from the district court’s earlier erroneous remand, courts may not create “equitable, case-specific exceptions” beyond those Congress included in the statute.

2) CAFA jurisdiction is assessed at commencement; later events do not defeat it

The court grounds its CAFA analysis in the time-of-filing (or commencement) principle from Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc.: once federal jurisdiction attaches, it generally is not divested by subsequent events. It then applies Sixth Circuit CAFA precedent: Metz v. Unizan Bank—holding that denial of class certification does not divest CAFA jurisdiction because CAFA turns on an action being “filed under” the class-action rule, not on later certification.

To reinforce the breadth of consensus, the Sixth Circuit lists a cross-circuit line of cases agreeing that CAFA jurisdiction persists after class certification is denied, including: Kress Stores of P.R., Inc. v. Wal-Mart P.R., Inc., F5 Cap. v. Pappas, Coba v. Ford Motor Co., Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc., Buetow v. ALS Enters., Inc., United Steel, Paper & Forestry, Rubber, Mfg., Energy, Allied Indus. & Serv. Workers Int'l Union v. Shell Oil Co., Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., Louisiana v. Am. Nat'l Prop. & Cas. Co., Dutcher v. Matheson, and Nichols v. 300 M St. Dev. Grp.. The Sixth Circuit also cites Cisneros v. Petland, Inc. to underscore that CAFA jurisdiction can remain even when class-related developments change the posture of the case.

3) Removal timing doctrines: when the clock starts and when § 1446(b)(3) can apply

The Sixth Circuit uses Berera v. Mesa Med. Grp., PLLC (quoting Holston v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp.) for the “solid and unambiguous information” standard: if the initial pleading provides clear removability information, the § 1446(b)(1) clock starts upon receipt of that pleading. Because GateHouse conceded the 2019 complaint was CAFA-removable, the clock started then.

The court explains that § 1446(b)(3)—which allows removal within 30 days of an “other paper” revealing removability—applies only when “the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable.” Here, the case was removable at the start; later class-certification motions are not the first ascertainment of CAFA removability.

4) Standards of review and CAFA appellate mechanics

The panel notes de novo review of the legal question, citing Graiser v. Visionworks of Am., Inc. and Smith v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co.. It also situates appellate jurisdiction through CAFA’s interlocutory review provision, referencing 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1) and the court’s acceptance order in In re John Ewalt, et al..

5) “Use it or lose it” appellate preservation on rehearing

When GateHouse sought to revise the remedy to permit Rule 60(b) consideration, the court held the issue forfeited under a line of Sixth Circuit preservation cases: United States v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. (footnote-only arguments do not preserve issues), Buetenmiller v. Macomb Cnty. Jail (one-sentence treatment can forfeit), United States v. Stewart (perfunctory treatment forfeits), and Dimond Rigging Co. v. BDP Int'l, Inc. (failure to list issues can forfeit). The court also cites Easley v. Reuss for the proposition that rehearing is not a vehicle to raise arguments that should have been developed in the opening brief.

Finally, the panel’s discussion comparing Ruhlen v. Holiday Haven Homeowners, Inc. with Watkins v. Vital Pharms., Inc. serves a practical point: even atypical procedural postures do not justify missing statutory or preservation deadlines; parties must timely pursue available procedural tools.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. The original 2019 complaint started the § 1446(b)(1) clock. GateHouse agreed the complaint was CAFA-removable and contained the information needed to ascertain removability; thus the 30-day window began on service of the initial pleading.
  2. The second removal (2025) was untimely under the statute’s plain timeline. Although GateHouse removed within 30 days of the renewed class-certification motion in state court, that motion could not restart the already-expired statutory clock because removability existed at filing.
  3. § 1446(b)(3) does not apply where the initial pleading was removable. The “other paper” pathway is limited to cases “not removable” at the outset; this case was removable from day one.
  4. The district court’s erroneous remand does not create an extra-statutory timing exception. Even assuming the district court’s 2024 remand “introduced ambiguity,” Enbridge prohibits equitable tolling. Congress set specific statutory exceptions; courts cannot add new ones based on fairness concerns.
  5. GateHouse had procedural options earlier. The panel notes GateHouse could have contested the erroneous remand order or sought interlocutory review, but did not, undercutting the equities it invoked to justify tolling.
  6. Rehearing cannot cure forfeiture. GateHouse’s effort to preserve a Rule 60(b)-related remedy failed because it did not develop the argument in its appellate brief; developing it only on rehearing was too late.

C. Impact

  • Removal timing becomes even more rigid post-Enbridge: defendants cannot rely on equitable tolling to correct procedural unfairness, even where a federal court’s own error contributed to the predicament.
  • No “reset” of removal timing from post-remand class activity: where an initial pleading is CAFA-removable, renewed class-certification efforts later in state court do not create a new 30-day window under § 1446(b)(1) or (b)(3).
  • Reaffirmation that CAFA jurisdiction survives certification denial: district courts in the Sixth Circuit are reminded that they retain CAFA jurisdiction after denying class certification; remanding on the theory that CAFA disappears is legal error.
  • Strategic lesson for litigants: parties must promptly challenge erroneous remand orders and must preserve remedial arguments on appeal with developed briefing; footnotes and passing references risk forfeiture.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

CAFA jurisdiction
A federal jurisdiction statute allowing certain large class actions into federal court if (among other things) the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million, there is minimal diversity, and there are at least 100 class members.
Removal (28 U.S.C. § 1446)
The procedure by which a defendant moves a case filed in state court into federal court. Timing is crucial: normally, the notice must be filed within 30 days after receipt of the initial pleading.
§ 1446(b)(1) vs. § 1446(b)(3)
(b)(1) is the default 30-day clock from the initial pleading. (b)(3) provides a later 30-day window only when the initial pleading was not removable and a later document first reveals removability.
Equitable tolling
A judge-made doctrine that can pause deadlines for fairness reasons. After Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan, it cannot be used to extend § 1446(b)(1)’s removal deadline.
Supplemental jurisdiction
A doctrine allowing federal courts to hear state-law claims linked to federal jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit emphasizes that when CAFA supplies original jurisdiction, a court need not resort to supplemental jurisdiction simply because class certification is denied.
Forfeiture on appeal
Losing the right to have an issue decided because it was not properly presented and argued in the appellate briefs. The Sixth Circuit applied forfeiture principles to GateHouse’s late-developed Rule 60(b) remedy argument.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision operationalizes the Supreme Court’s directive in Enbridge Energy, LP v. Nessel ex rel. Michigan: § 1446(b)(1)’s 30-day removal deadline is strict, mandatory, and not subject to equitable tolling. When a case is removable at filing (as CAFA cases often are), later litigation events—renewed class-certification motions, or even an erroneous federal remand—do not restart or extend removal timing absent a statutory exception.

The opinion also reinforces a settled CAFA principle from Metz v. Unizan Bank and a broad circuit consensus: denial of class certification does not eliminate CAFA jurisdiction. Finally, the rehearing disposition underscores that appellate remedies depend not only on substantive law but on disciplined issue preservation; arguments relegated to footnotes or developed only on rehearing will be treated as forfeited.