Second Circuit Requires Enhanced Anders Scrutiny When Electronic-Device Search Conditions Present Potentially Non-Frivolous Appellate Issues

Introduction

In United States v. Samuels (2d Cir. May 26, 2026), the Court of Appeals confronted an appeal in a common procedural posture: defense counsel moved to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there were no non-frivolous issues, while the Government sought dismissal in part based on an appeal waiver (or, alternatively, summary affirmance).

The central issue became whether counsel’s Anders submission adequately addressed a potential challenge to a supervised release condition: Special Condition 1, authorizing searches—upon reasonable suspicion—of Mr. Samuels’s “computer, other electronic communication, data storage devices, [and] cloud storage or media.”

The panel (per curiam) did not decide the legality of the condition. Instead, it addressed the Anders process: when the appellate record does not clearly foreclose a challenge to a significant liberty-restricting supervised release condition—and where the legal landscape is actively developing— the court will not treat a cursory Anders discussion as harmless.

Summary of the Opinion

The court deferred decision on (i) counsel’s motion to withdraw under Anders and (ii) the Government’s motion to dismiss in part or summarily affirm. After an independent review, the panel identified a potentially non-frivolous issue concerning Special Condition 1’s electronic-device search authority.

The panel ordered counsel, within 30 days, to either:

1. file supplemental briefing demonstrating there are no non-frivolous issues as to Special Condition 1 (or represent, after consultation, that Mr. Samuels authorizes not pursuing any such issue), or
2. notify the court that counsel will file a merits brief (to be decided by a new panel in the ordinary course).

Judge Menashi dissented, concluding that any challenge to Special Condition 1 would be futile under existing Second Circuit precedent and the record.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) The Anders framework and adequacy review

• Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): The foundational rule permitting appointed counsel to withdraw only after identifying anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal, and after the court independently reviews the record. The per curiam opinion invokes Anders to emphasize the court’s institutional role: to “spot issues that may have merit even though they may ultimately not prevail.”
• United States v. Reyes-Arzate, 91 F.4th 616 (2d Cir. 2024): Supplies the standard for granting Anders withdrawal—courts must be satisfied counsel “diligently searched” the record and the appeal is “legally” frivolous. The Samuels panel uses Reyes-Arzate to justify close scrutiny of counsel’s handling of Special Condition 1.
• United States v. Arguedas, 134 F.4th 54 (2d Cir. 2025): Addresses when a deficient Anders brief may be deemed harmless—either because the record shows no non-frivolous issues exist, or because the deficiency can be cured by counsel’s representation that counsel discussed the risks/benefits of challenging the potentially non-frivolous issues and the defendant authorized not pursuing them. Samuels operationalizes Arguedas by ordering supplementation (or a merits brief) rather than accepting a “cursory” discussion where the record and law are not settled enough to declare harmlessness.

2) Supervised release search conditions (dissent’s authorities)

Although the per curiam order does not adjudicate Special Condition 1’s validity, Judge Menashi’s dissent argues that established doctrine makes the issue frivolous and therefore unsuitable as a basis to deny an Anders motion.

• United States v. Robinson, 134 F.4th 104 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited for the proposition that electronic and non-electronic search conditions are often crucial for supervision, and that the Second Circuit has never limited electronic search conditions to cases involving sex offenses or explicit electronics-based crimes. The dissent also quotes Robinson for the “self-evident” need for such conditions given recidivism and dishonesty.
• United States v. Lawrence, 139 F.4th 115 (2d Cir. 2025): Provides the doctrinal test (tracking U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)) allowing conditions not directly related to the offense if reasonably related to the defendant’s history/characteristics and sentencing goals, and involving no greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. The dissent uses Lawrence to argue that even if Samuels used only a cellphone, a condition authorizing searches of computers could still be permissible.
• United States v. Jimenez, No. 26-1661, 2026 WL 1338242 (2d Cir. Feb. 25, 2026): Invoked for the statement that when electronic devices were “instrumentalized” in offense conduct, the court has “regularly held” electronic search conditions permissible.
• United States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69 (2d Cir. 2025) and United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018): Cited for the principle that conditions may be upheld where the district court’s reasoning is “self-evident in the record.”
• United States v. Maiorana, 153 F.4th 306 (2d Cir. 2025): Cited in dissent to criticize the majority’s approach as adding “burdensome ritual” to supervised release practice.

Legal Reasoning

The per curiam panel’s reasoning is procedural and institutional rather than merits-based:

• Independent review identified a plausible appellate issue: The court itself identified a potentially non-frivolous challenge to Special Condition 1. That alone triggers heightened caution before approving counsel’s withdrawal.
• The condition’s legality is unsettled in practice: The majority notes that “the legality of this particular condition or analogous conditions is currently the subject of review by multiple panels of this Court.” That observation matters for Anders: if the doctrine is in flux, labeling an issue “frivolous” requires a stronger showing.
• Factual ambiguity undermines a “frivolousness” conclusion: The majority disputes the dissent’s confidence that the record establishes Samuels used electronic devices to carry out the offense conduct, stating “we do not know if Samuels used a cellphone or other electronic devices to carry out the offense conduct.” Because supervised-release conditions are typically justified by offense characteristics and defendant history, record uncertainty makes a merits challenge less readily dismissible.
• Application of the Arguedas harmlessness/cure framework: The court cannot conclude counsel’s “cursory” treatment is harmless, so it orders either supplemental briefing (to demonstrate no non-frivolous issue exists or to confirm an informed client choice not to pursue it) or a merits brief.

The dissent’s legal reasoning is the converse: under United States v. Robinson and United States v. Lawrence, electronic-device search conditions need not be tightly tethered to the offense, and the record contains references to phone use sufficient to make the district court’s rationale “self-evident,” rendering any appellate challenge futile and therefore frivolous in the Anders sense.

Impact

1) Practical tightening of Anders review for supervised-release conditions.
Samuels signals that even where conviction issues appear foreclosed (especially by plea and waiver), supervised release conditions—particularly those affecting digital privacy—can independently create non-frivolous appellate questions. Counsel should expect that a thin, boilerplate Anders discussion of such conditions may prompt supplemental orders.

2) Greater record sensitivity.
The per curiam opinion emphasizes factual uncertainty (what the record actually shows about device use). That orientation encourages fuller record development and careful citation in Anders submissions and sentencing explanations.

3) Foreshadowing continued doctrinal refinement on electronic search conditions.
By noting multiple pending panel reviews, the court indicates that standards governing electronic-device and cloud-storage search conditions are actively evolving. Even if many such conditions are ultimately upheld, Samuels suggests the Second Circuit is not prepared to treat challenges as categorically frivolous at the Anders stage.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anders brief / motion to withdraw: When appointed counsel believes an appeal has no non-frivolous issues, counsel may ask to withdraw—but must first identify potential issues and explain why they lack merit. The court must independently review the record before allowing withdrawal.
• “Non-frivolous” issue: Not a guaranteed winner—just an argument with a plausible legal or factual basis that a reasonable advocate could pursue.
• Special conditions of supervised release: Additional, tailored rules imposed after imprisonment. They can restrict liberty (e.g., searches of devices) and must be justified under sentencing standards (reasonable relation to statutory goals; no greater liberty deprivation than necessary).
• “Reasonable suspicion” search condition: A search may occur when supervision officers have specific, articulable reasons to suspect wrongdoing or a supervision violation—less than probable cause, but more than a hunch.
• Appeal waiver: A plea-agreement clause limiting what a defendant may appeal. Even with a waiver, certain issues (often including some sentencing issues) may still be litigated depending on the waiver’s scope and enforceability.

Conclusion

United States v. Samuels establishes a clear procedural takeaway: when the court’s independent review identifies a potentially non-frivolous challenge to a supervised release condition—especially a digital-device search condition amid evolving circuit scrutiny—the Second Circuit will not rubber-stamp Anders withdrawal on a cursory discussion. Instead, counsel must either substantively brief why the issue is frivolous (or confirm an informed client decision not to pursue it) or proceed with a merits brief. The dissent underscores an opposing view that existing precedent already makes such challenges futile, setting the stage for continued refinement of how privacy-intrusive supervision tools are justified and reviewed on appeal.