Second Circuit Reaffirms: Mere Derecognition Does Not Establish Injury-in-Fact; Student-Association “Legal Status” Conditions Are Viewpoint-Neutral, Reasonable Access Rules in a Limited Public Forum

Introduction

In University at Buffalo Young Americans for Freedom v. University at Buffalo Student Association, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a Western District of New York judgment dismissing First Amendment claims brought by a student group and two officers against the University at Buffalo’s student government and certain university administrators. The controversy began after the student government (the Student Association) adopted, then quickly repealed, a “National Affiliation Ban” that would have derecognized clubs affiliated with outside organizations. It later enforced access to student-activity benefits through an “Acknowledgment Provision” that required club officers to certify compliance with preexisting rules, including a “Legal Status Ban” that prohibits recognized clubs from operating as independent legal entities or contracting or litigating in their own names.

Plaintiffs sought nominal damages for past derecognition and prospective relief against the Legal Status Ban. The district court dismissed the claims and denied a preliminary injunction, finding no standing for nominal damages as to the repealed ban, and no First Amendment violation in the Legal Status Ban and the Acknowledgment Provision. The Second Circuit affirmed in a summary order (nonprecedential), emphasizing two central points: (1) mere derecognition, without pleaded practical effects or objectively substantiated chill, is not an injury-in-fact; and (2) the Legal Status Ban is a viewpoint-neutral and reasonable access condition in a limited public forum, to be analyzed under Christian Legal Society v. Martinez’s framework.

Summary of the Opinion

The panel (Judges Parker, Carney, and Nardini) affirmed dismissal on three fronts:

National Affiliation Ban and standing: Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to seek nominal damages for the brief period of alleged derecognition because they did not allege any concrete, practical effect of nonrecognition (such as denial of facilities or resources), nor any objectively substantiated chill deterring them from attempting to use such benefits.
Legal Status Ban in a limited public forum: The court treated the student-club recognition system as a limited public forum. It held that the Legal Status Ban, enforced through the Acknowledgment Provision, is facially viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the forum’s purposes (including fiscal oversight and liability control consistent with state regulations). The court rejected arguments for strict scrutiny and for an “unbridled discretion” theory.
Derivative and other claims: Because the challenges to the National Affiliation Ban and Legal Status Ban failed, claims against university administrators premised on the Recognition Policy also failed. The request for preliminary injunctive relief necessarily failed as well.

The court also confirmed appellate jurisdiction notwithstanding a missing separate judgment, invoking the 150-day finality rule under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58 and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (504 U.S. 555) and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (578 U.S. 330): These establish the core standing requirements—injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The panel applied them to hold that “derecognition” as a status change, without concrete practical consequences or objectively substantiated chill, is not a cognizable injury-in-fact.
Healy v. James (408 U.S. 169): Healy explains that the primary impediment of nonrecognition is denial of tangible benefits (use of facilities, meeting space). The panel used Healy to underscore that plaintiffs must plead practical negative effects of derecognition; status alone is insufficient.
Bordell v. General Electric Co. (2d Cir. 1991): Articulates the Second Circuit’s “objective chill” requirement: plaintiffs alleging First Amendment chill must provide objective evidence that the policy deterred them. The panel found no such allegations by plaintiffs here.
Christian Legal Society Chapter of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law v. Martinez (561 U.S. 661): Foundational for analyzing student-organization policies in a limited public forum, Martinez teaches that speech and expressive-association claims “merge” for analysis and that neutral access conditions can be constitutionally valid. The panel treated the Legal Status Ban as an “access barrier” akin to Martinez’s “all-comers” policy.
Tyler v. City of Kingston (2d Cir. 2023): Clarifies that in a limited public forum, the government may enforce viewpoint-neutral and reasonable restrictions and may not selectively deny access to speech within the genre the forum has admitted. The panel analogized the Legal Status Ban to an access condition, not a selective exclusion within the admitted genre.
Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 100 v. City of New York Department of Parks & Recreation (2d Cir. 2002): Provides the limited-public-forum test: rules governing speech outside the forum’s scope must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable; but content-based rules on speech already within the forum’s scope can trigger heightened scrutiny. The panel held strict scrutiny inapplicable here because the Legal Status Ban functions as an access condition.
General Media Communications, Inc. v. Cohen (2d Cir. 1997): Defines viewpoint discrimination. The panel found the Legal Status Ban facially viewpoint neutral—it applies to all clubs regardless of ideology.
Amidon v. Student Association of State University of New York at Albany (2d Cir. 2007): Addresses “unbridled discretion.” The panel distinguished Amidon, concluding plaintiffs failed to identify specific policies that, in conjunction with the Legal Status Ban, vested officials with unfettered discretion to engage in covert viewpoint discrimination.
8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 302.14(c)(3)-(4): State regulations requiring oversight and proper accounting of student activity funds. These supported the reasonableness of the Legal Status Ban by tying it to compliance obligations and fiscal stewardship.
Fund Liquidation Holdings LLC v. Bank of America Corp. (2d Cir. 2021) and Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory (2d Cir. 2005): Standards of review—de novo for Rule 12(b)(1)/(6) dismissals and abuse of discretion for preliminary injunction denials. Applied to sustain the district court’s rulings.

Legal Reasoning in Depth

I. Standing for Nominal Damages: “Mere Derecognition” Is Not Enough

Plaintiffs alleged they were automatically derecognized for roughly a month (June 1 to July 3, 2023) under the National Affiliation Ban. The court held that a bare status change—without concrete practical effects—is not an injury-in-fact. Healy identifies the true harm of nonrecognition as denial of facilities and similar resources; plaintiffs neither alleged that they attempted to access such resources and were refused nor offered facts supporting an objectively grounded chill from attempting to do so (Bordell). As a result, even a nominal-damages claim could not proceed because the Article III “injury” element was missing.

II. The Legal Status Ban: A Viewpoint-Neutral, Reasonable Access Rule

The forum: All parties agreed the Student Association recognition system is a limited public forum, governed by Martinez and related Second Circuit authority.

Viewpoint neutrality: The Legal Status Ban forbids any recognized club, regardless of viewpoint, from operating as an independent legal entity (including entering contracts, litigating, and maintaining outside financial accounts). The Acknowledgment Provision requires officers, regardless of viewpoint, to certify compliance with preexisting rules. On their face, neither rule targets a perspective or ideology.

Unbridled discretion: Plaintiffs argued that, by forcing clubs to act only through the Student Association, the Legal Status Ban effectively vested the Association with unbounded discretion to favor or disfavor certain speech. The court rejected this, noting plaintiffs did not identify concrete, operative policies that—together with the Ban—actually confer such discretion. A fleeting reference to a contract-approval policy was insufficiently briefed. Without meaningful argument about specific mechanisms of discretionary application, the “unbridled discretion” theory failed.

Reasonableness: The University designed the forum to support intellectual and social development by coordinating student-club activities. The Student Association advanced two interlocking interests: shielding the Association from legal liability and safeguarding student-activity funds through centralized oversight. The Ban prevents risky external contracting, ensures insurance and fiscal compliance, and accords with state regulations (8 N.Y.C.R.R. § 302.14). Under Tyler’s reasonableness inquiry—assessing the forum’s purpose and the fit between policy and purpose—the Ban was found reasonably related to those aims.

III. Level of Scrutiny and Claim “Merger” Under Martinez

Plaintiffs sought strict scrutiny, urging separate analysis of speech and expressive-association claims and arguing the Ban reaches speech inside the forum’s admitted category. Martinez forecloses the first point where—like here—speech and association claims “merge” in a student-organization forum analysis. On the second point, the court characterized the Legal Status Ban as an “access barrier,” comparable to Martinez’s “all-comers” rule. Access conditions are assessed for viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness; strict scrutiny applies only to restrictions on speech that already lies within the category the forum has opened for expression. Because the Ban governs the threshold conditions for entry into the forum’s benefits, strict scrutiny was inapplicable.

IV. Derivative Claims and Injunctive Relief

Plaintiffs’ claims against university administrators, premised on a Recognition Policy that delegates to a “recognizing agent” such as the Student Association, fell with the failure of the underlying challenges to the National Affiliation Ban and the Legal Status Ban. With no viable First Amendment claim, the request for a preliminary injunction also failed.

Impact and Practical Implications

Standing in campus derecognition cases: This order underscores that plaintiffs must plead concrete, practical harms flowing from derecognition (e.g., denied room reservations, canceled events, lost access to funding or equipment) or supply objective facts showing deterrence. Mere assertions that a club “could not” do things, without alleged attempts or objectively grounded chill, are insufficient.
Nominal damages do not bypass the injury requirement: Even if nominal damages can redress past harms, they cannot substitute for the necessary injury-in-fact. The opinion focuses on the injury prong and finds it lacking.
Access conditions vs. speech restrictions: Treating the Legal Status Ban as an access condition keeps the analysis in the limited-public-forum lane of viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness. Student governments and universities can require centralized financial and legal oversight if applied evenhandedly and tied to forum purposes such as liability management and fund stewardship.
Drafting and enforcing policies: The Student Association’s success here rested on facial neutrality, clear enforcement via officer certification, and articulable administrative and regulatory justifications. Student governments should avoid policies that create open-ended discretion or that tie approvals to imprecise or standardless criteria.
Appellate briefing precision matters: The panel’s observation that plaintiffs did not meaningfully identify or brief “other policies” illustrates the practical importance of specifying the exact provisions challenged and how they operate to permit viewpoint discrimination.
Persuasive, not binding: As a summary order, this ruling is not precedential within the Second Circuit, though parties may cite it under FRAP 32.1 with the “summary order” notation. Its reasoning remains instructive for campus speech litigation strategy and policy design.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Limited public forum: A government-controlled setting opened for certain categories of speakers or subjects (e.g., recognized student organizations). The government may impose reasonable, viewpoint-neutral rules tied to the forum’s purpose. Heightened scrutiny applies only when it regulates speech within the admitted category based on content or viewpoint.
Viewpoint vs. content discrimination: Content regulation concerns the subject matter; viewpoint regulation disfavors a particular perspective on that subject. A rule that applies to all clubs regardless of ideology (e.g., no club may contract in its own name) is viewpoint neutral.
“Access barrier” vs. “restriction on in-forum speech”: An access condition sets threshold terms for receiving recognition and benefits (e.g., compliance certifications). It is assessed for neutrality and reasonableness. A regulation that targets speech already within the forum’s scope based on its content may trigger strict scrutiny.
Unbridled discretion: First Amendment doctrine disfavors policies that grant officials standardless authority to approve or deny expressive activity, because such discretion can mask covert viewpoint discrimination. To prevail, challengers must identify the specific discretionary mechanism and show how it permits viewpoint-based decisions.
Objective chill: To claim injury from self-censorship, plaintiffs must offer facts showing a reasonable person would be deterred from speaking by the challenged policy—conclusory assertions of chill do not suffice.
Nominal damages and injury-in-fact: Nominal damages can remedy a completed violation, but only if there was an actual injury-in-fact—concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent. Absent such injury, Article III standing fails.
FRCP 58 “separate document” rule and finality: When a district court does not enter a separate judgment, the judgment becomes final 150 days after entry of the dispositive order, preserving appellate jurisdiction (FRCP 58(c)(2)(B); FRAP 4(a)(7)(B)).

Conclusion

This summary order delivers two clear messages for campus speech disputes in the Second Circuit. First, standing still starts with injury: a student organization alleging harm from derecognition must plead concrete practical consequences or an objectively substantiated chill. Status change alone is not enough for Article III. Second, where a university’s student-organization system is a limited public forum, neutral, administratively justified access conditions—like a rule prohibiting clubs from acting as separate legal entities—are evaluated for viewpoint neutrality and reasonableness under Martinez and its progeny. Strict scrutiny will not apply unless the policy targets speech already admitted to the forum’s category.

Although nonprecedential, the order offers a roadmap for both plaintiffs and educational institutions. Plaintiffs must develop records that document tangible harms or deterrence; institutions must craft and apply rules with clear, evenhanded criteria tethered to the forum’s purposes and regulatory obligations. In that balance, this decision reinforces familiar First Amendment architecture for student organizations while clarifying the evidentiary and doctrinal thresholds that will decide future campus-speech litigation.