Second Circuit Re-Affirms Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) Against Post-Bruen Challenges, Even by “Non-Violent” Felons

Introduction

United States v. Williams, No. 23-6840-cr (2d Cir. July 2, 2025) is a Second Circuit summary order arising from Kejuan Williams’s conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and his 48-month sentence. Although summary orders lack precedential force, Williams is significant because it cements the court’s post-New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen stance that the federal felon-possession ban remains constitutional, including as applied to “non-violent” felons.

Key parties and issues:

  • Defendant-Appellant: Kejuan Williams, who pleaded guilty but challenged the statute and his sentence on appeal.
  • Appellee: United States of America.
  • Main issues on appeal:
    1. Whether § 922(g)(1) violates the Second Amendment after Bruen, especially for non-violent felons.
    2. Whether the District Court committed procedural error in applying a four-level guideline enhancement for use of a firearm in connection with another felony (attempted assault).
    3. Whether the above-Guidelines sentence (48 months versus a range of 30–37 months) was substantively unreasonable.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence. Its principal holdings are:

  1. Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1): The panel cited its recent decision in Zherka v. Bondi (2025) and reaffirmed that § 922(g)(1) survives Bruen, even when applied to non-violent felons.
  2. Procedural Reasonableness: The District Court did not err in finding that Williams’s shooting constituted attempted first-degree assault under Connecticut law, justifying the four-level enhancement. Self-defense was properly rejected.
  3. Substantive Reasonableness: An 11-month upward variance was within the range of permissible decisions under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); the District Court provided a reasoned explanation tied to deterrence and public safety.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013) – earlier affirmation of § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality; the panel noted that Bogle “survives Bruen.”
  • Zherka v. Bondi, No. 22-1108, --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 1618440 (2d Cir. June 9, 2025) – expressly upheld § 922(g)(1) against post-Bruen challenges by non-violent felons; Williams relies on Zherka as dispositive precedent.
  • New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 142 S. Ct. 2111 (2022) – reset the test for Second Amendment challenges. The Second Circuit interpreted Bruen as not undermining the felon-possession ban.
  • United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc) – guiding framework for procedural and substantive reasonableness review of sentences.
  • United States v. Cramer, 777 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 2015) – clear-error standard for factual findings in Guidelines calculations.
  • United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2012) – discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors.
  • Connecticut substantive law (Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53a-19 and assault statutes), governing the self-defense analysis and underlying felony enhancement.

Legal Reasoning

1. Second Amendment Claim
The panel performed a de novo review but found itself bound by its own recent precedents. Zherka had already applied the text-and-history approach demanded by Bruen and concluded historical tradition supports disarming felons, violent or not. Thus, Williams’s constitutional challenge failed regardless of his appeal waiver in the plea agreement.

2. Procedural Reasonableness of Sentencing

  • Guideline Enhancement (§ 2K2.1(b)(6)) – The District Court concluded that firing eight shots toward a retreating assailant constituted attempted first-degree assault, satisfying the “in connection with another felony” prong. The Second Circuit held those factual findings were plausible given surveillance footage and defendant’s own admission.
  • Self-Defense Rebuttal – Connecticut imposes a duty to retreat if safe to do so. Because the assailant was fleeing and a nearby building offered refuge, the district court rationally found lack of imminent threat and thus rejected self-defense.

3. Substantive Reasonableness

Applying the highly deferential standard from Cavera, the panel maintained that:

  • The District Court weighed mitigating factors (difficult childhood, positive steps) but found them outweighed by the seriousness of firing in public, evading arrest with a loaded gun, and Williams’s recidivism.
  • The 48-month sentence—11 months above the top of the Guideline range—was justified as specific deterrence and protection of the public, and fell well below the 10-year statutory maximum.

Potential Impact

  1. Second Amendment Litigation: Williams, together with Zherka, forms a formidable barrier in the Second Circuit to § 922(g)(1) challenges predicated on the “non-violent felon” distinction. Defendants will face an uphill battle unless and until the Supreme Court revisits the issue.
  2. Plea-Agreement Appeal Waivers: The panel’s choice to reach the merits despite an appeal waiver signals that even if waiver validity is disputed, a constitutional challenge will fail on substance in this circuit.
  3. Sentencing Practice: The decision reinforces district courts’ latitude to vary upward modestly from the Guidelines when the facts demonstrate heightened danger, especially misuse of firearms in public. It also illustrates how failure to retreat in Connecticut undermines self-defense claims.
  4. Non-Precedential Caveat: Though the order is “non-precedential” under 2d Cir. R. 32.1.1, the reasoning is publicly citable and will likely be invoked by prosecutors and district courts until contradicted by a precedential opinion or Supreme Court ruling.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): Federal law barring possession of a firearm by anyone convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year (a felony).
  • Bruen Test: Requires the government, when a firearm regulation burdens conduct “presumptively protected” by the Second Amendment, to show the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition.
  • “As-Applied” Challenge: A claim that a statute is unconstitutional for this person in these circumstances, even if facially valid.
  • Guideline Enhancement § 2K2.1(b)(6): Adds 4 offense levels if the defendant used/possessed a firearm “in connection with another felony.”
  • Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness: • Procedural looks at the process: correct Guidelines, factual findings, explanation. • Substantive looks at the ultimate length of the sentence.
  • Clear-Error Review: Appellate court defers unless firmly convinced the lower court made a mistake.

Conclusion

United States v. Williams may be a summary order, but it solidifies the Second Circuit’s post-Bruen position that the felon-in-possession statute remains constitutionally sound, regardless of whether the prior felony was violent. In addition, it underscores the wide berth trial judges have in fact-finding, applying Guideline enhancements, and varying modestly upward when firearm misuse endangers the public. Practitioners should treat Williams, in tandem with Zherka, as a practical (though not technically precedential) block to Second-Amendment challenges by felons and as an instructive map of how the Second Circuit reviews sentencing decisions in firearm cases.