Second Amendment Challenges to § 922(g)(1) and § 924(c) Fail on Plain-Error Review Absent Abrogating or On-Point Precedent

I. Introduction

In United States v. Christopher Stanton, Jr. (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed Christopher Stanton Jr.’s firearm convictions following a guilty plea: (1) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) and (2) possession of a firearm by a convicted felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

The key appellate issues were constitutional and procedural: Stanton raised, for the first time on appeal, as-applied Second Amendment challenges to both statutes, arguing the district court “plainly erred” by entering judgment and sentencing him under unconstitutional statutes. The government, by operation of existing Eleventh Circuit precedent and the strictures of plain-error review, effectively benefited from two barriers: binding circuit precedent foreclosing the § 922(g)(1) claim and lack of on-point precedent to make any alleged § 924(c) error “plain.”

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed. For § 922(g)(1), the panel held Stanton’s Second Amendment argument was foreclosed by binding Eleventh Circuit precedent—United States v. Rozier and United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) (“Dubois II”)—which the panel concluded remained good law after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi.

For § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), the panel held Stanton could not satisfy the “plainness” prong of plain-error review because he cited no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent holding § 924(c) unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Without such on-point precedent, any error could not be “plain,” so relief was unavailable.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

• Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018)
  Role: Establishes that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from challenging the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal. The panel used Class to clear a threshold issue: Stanton could raise constitutional claims despite pleading guilty.
• United States v. Fleury, 20 F.4th 1353 (11th Cir. 2021)
  Role: Cited for the general proposition that constitutional challenges are ordinarily reviewed de novo. The panel then distinguished that default rule because Stanton failed to raise the issue below.
• United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717 (11th Cir. 2019) and United States v. Wright, 607 F.3d 708 (11th Cir. 2010)
  Role: Confirm that when constitutional challenges are raised for the first time on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit applies plain-error review.
• United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014)
  Role: Provides the four-part plain-error test (error; plain; affects substantial rights; seriously affects integrity/fairness of proceedings). This framing is decisive because the panel resolves both claims at the “plain” prong.
• United States v. Hesser, 800 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2015), Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (2009), and United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077 (11th Cir. 2020)
  Role: Collectively define “plain” error as “clear or obvious” under “clearly established” law at the time of appeal, typically requiring explicit statutory language or controlling precedent directly resolving the issue. This doctrinal requirement is what defeats Stanton’s § 924(c) claim.
• United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010)
  Role: The controlling Eleventh Circuit case upholding § 922(g)(1) against a Second Amendment challenge. The panel reiterated Rozier’s core holding: felon-dispossession laws are a “constitutional avenue” to restrict Second Amendment rights for certain classes, including felons. It also highlighted Rozier’s reliance on Heller’s assurance about “longstanding prohibitions” on felons possessing firearms.
• District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)
  Role: The source of the frequently cited statement that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” The panel treated this as an important anchor for Rozier and, by extension, for continued circuit adherence to § 922(g)(1).
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) and United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)
  Role: Stanton’s primary abrogation theory. He argued these cases’ history-and-tradition methodology undermined Rozier. The panel rejected that argument because Dubois II already held Rozier survived in light of Rahimi’s language.
• United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025) (“Dubois II”)
  Role: The immediate controlling authority confirming Rozier remains binding post-Bruen and post-Rahimi. The panel quoted Dubois II’s reliance on Rahimi’s reassurance that the Court was not suggesting the Second Amendment forbids laws disarming dangerous categories of persons, and that felon prohibitions remain “presumptively lawful.”
• Laguna Rivera v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 130 F.4th 915 (11th Cir. 2025)
  Role: Articulates the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule: earlier panel holdings bind later panels unless overruled en banc or abrogated by the Supreme Court, and that rule applies even if the earlier panel did not hear a particular argument. This doctrinal rule prevents a panel from “revisiting” Rozier/Dubois II based solely on a litigant’s view that they were wrongly decided or insufficiently historical.
• United States v. Moran, 57 F.4th 977 (11th Cir. 2023) and United States v. King, 73 F.3d 1564 (11th Cir. 1996)
  Role: The controlling “no on-point precedent, no plain error” principle. The panel used Moran to hold the absence of Supreme Court/Eleventh Circuit authority striking § 924(c) means Stanton cannot show any error was “plain,” and cited King to stop the analysis at prong two.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Procedural posture determined the standard of review

The panel’s first move was procedural: because Stanton raised the Second Amendment objections for the first time on appeal, the court applied plain-error review. This choice is often outcome-determinative in constitutional attacks, because plain-error doctrine demands not merely a plausible constitutional violation, but a violation that is clear under existing, controlling law.

2. § 922(g)(1): Foreclosed by binding precedent, so no error at all

The panel treated the § 922(g)(1) claim as straightforward. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule, Rozier and Dubois II bind later panels unless and until abrogated by the Supreme Court or overruled en banc. The panel emphasized that Dubois II already addressed the exact argument Stanton raised—i.e., that Bruen and Rahimi displaced earlier circuit authority—and rejected it.

In short, the panel did not re-run a full Bruen/Rahimi historical inquiry into felon dispossession. It held it was not authorized to do so because controlling circuit precedent declared § 922(g)(1) constitutional and not abrogated. That meant Stanton failed to establish even the first prong of plain error (“an error”), let alone a “plain” one.

3. § 924(c): Even if debatable, it was not “plain” without on-point precedent

As to § 924(c)(1)(A)(i), the panel did not purport to decide the full merits of whether the Second Amendment could ever invalidate the statute as applied in some circumstance. Instead, it decided a narrower, procedural question: was any constitutional error plain?

Applying Moran and the Eleventh Circuit’s “explicit, on-point precedent” requirement for plain error, the panel concluded Stanton necessarily lost because he cited no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit decision holding § 924(c) unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. Under this approach, uncertainty, novelty, or open questions in constitutional law do not translate into plain error on direct appeal.

C. Impact

1. Reinforcement of circuit stability post-Bruen/Rahimi.
   The opinion underscores that, in the Eleventh Circuit, § 922(g)(1) challenges remain effectively blocked at the panel level by Rozier and Dubois II unless the Supreme Court provides “clearer instruction” or the Eleventh Circuit sits en banc.
2. Practical insulation of § 924(c) from Second Amendment attacks under plain-error review.
   Even if litigants develop substantial arguments against § 924(c) under the history-and-tradition framework, this decision confirms that defendants who fail to preserve those arguments in the district court will likely lose on appeal absent controlling precedent.
3. Incentive to preserve Second Amendment claims early.
   The case functions as a cautionary precedent: raising constitutional objections only after conviction and sentencing can be fatal because the appellate court will ask whether the law was already clearly established in the defendant’s favor.
4. Continued doctrinal separation between merits and “plainness.”
   The decision illustrates that plain-error review can prevent appellate courts from reaching the underlying constitutional merits—especially in evolving areas like Second Amendment doctrine.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

“As-applied” constitutional challenge

A claim that a statute may be constitutional in general, but unconstitutional when applied to the defendant’s specific facts and circumstances.

Plain-error review

A demanding appellate standard used when a party did not object in the trial court. The defendant must show (1) error, (2) that is “plain” (clear under controlling law), (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

“Plain” (clear or obvious) error

An error is “plain” only when existing law clearly establishes it—typically through explicit statutory text or controlling Supreme Court/Eleventh Circuit precedent directly on point. If reasonable jurists could disagree, it is usually not “plain.”

Prior panel precedent rule

In the Eleventh Circuit, later panels must follow earlier panel decisions unless they are overruled en banc or abrogated by the Supreme Court. A later panel cannot depart from precedent merely because new arguments arise or because it believes the earlier case was wrongly decided.

Bruen/Rahimi “history and tradition” test (general idea)

A Second Amendment methodology focusing on whether modern firearm regulations are consistent with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. In this case, the Eleventh Circuit did not engage in a fresh historical analysis of § 922(g)(1) because binding precedent already governed.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Stanton establishes (and, as an unpublished decision, strongly signals) a practical rule for Eleventh Circuit litigants: when Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) and § 924(c) are raised for the first time on appeal, they will almost certainly fail—§ 922(g)(1) because Rozier and Dubois II foreclose the claim, and § 924(c) because, absent controlling precedent declaring it unconstitutional, any alleged error cannot be “plain.” The decision’s broader significance lies less in developing Second Amendment doctrine on the merits and more in demonstrating how preservation rules and binding-precedent doctrine shape constitutional litigation outcomes in the federal courts of appeals.