Scope of Primary Assumption of Risk in Sports: Limits on Unreasonably Enhanced Risks and Non-Participant Injuries

Introduction

In Katleski v. Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc. (2025 NYSlipOp 02178), the New York Court of Appeals addressed two companion appeals arising from separate golf-related injuries on the same June day in 2020. Plaintiff David Katleski, an experienced golfer, was struck by an errant ball while competing in a tournament at Cazenovia Golf Club. Plaintiff Mary E. Galante was injured moments after arriving at a golf course when her rented cart collided with a car in the parking lot. The core legal question in both appeals concerned the scope of New York’s primary assumption of risk doctrine, a narrow vestige of the old contributory-negligence defense, as preserved under the comparative-fault regime of CPLR 1411. This commentary examines the background, issues, and parties in each appeal, summarizes the Court’s holdings, analyzes the precedents and reasoning underpinning those holdings, and assesses their likely impact on future sports-injury and premises-liability litigation.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for Cazenovia Golf Club in Katleski’s negligence suit. It held that being struck by a mishit golf ball is an inherent risk of the sport and that the layout of the course—though challenging—did not unreasonably enhance that risk beyond what golfers commonly face. By contrast, the Court reversed summary dismissal of Galante’s claim against Erie County, ruling that primary assumption of risk applies only to participants in protected athletic or recreational activities; a non-participant injured in a parking lot is not barred by the doctrine.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Grady v. Chenango Val. Cent. Sch. Dist. (40 NY3d 89 [2023]): reaffirmed that primary assumption of risk must not encroach on comparative fault; recognized limited application to athletics and recreation.
Custodi v. Town of Amherst (20 NY3d 83 [2012]): defined the doctrine’s narrow scope to “sporting events, sponsored athletic and recreative activities, or athletic and recreational pursuits at designated venues.”
Trupia v. Lake George Cent. School Dist. (14 NY3d 392 [2010]): emphasized that assumption of risk as absolute defense was abolished by CPLR 1411 except in limited sports context.
Morgan v. State of New York (90 NY2d 471 [1997]): explained that only risks inherent in the sport—rather than reckless or intentional conduct—are assumed.
Benitez v. New York City Bd. of Educ. (73 NY2d 650 [1989]): long‐standing rule that risks “concealed or unreasonably enhanced” are not assumed.
Cole v. New York Racing Assn. (24 AD2d 993 [2d Dept 1965], aff’d 17 NY2d 761 [1966]): venue-design that exceeds common practice can unreasonably enhance risk.
Bukowski v. Clarkson University (19 NY3d 353 [2012]): held that commonplace facility conditions do not constitute unreasonable enhancement.
Turcotte v. Fell (68 NY2d 432 [1986]): seminal decision explaining the competitive-purpose test and the “unreasonably enhanced” exception.
Rinaldo v. McGovern (78 NY2d 729 [1991]): held that stray balls are an inherent golf risk.
Anand v. Kapoor (15 NY3d 946 [2010]): reiterated that inherency, not precise foreseeability, is the doctrine’s sine qua non.

Legal Reasoning

The Court began by reaffirming the primacy of CPLR 1411’s comparative-fault scheme and the narrow vestige of primary assumption of risk preserved for athletic participants. It stressed that a plaintiff consents only to risks “inherent in and arising from the nature of the sport generally,” and does not assume obligations beyond customary hazards (Anand; Morgan). Two important limitations apply: (1) risks that are “concealed or unreasonably enhanced” by reckless conduct or atypical design are not assumed; and (2) the doctrine applies exclusively in the sports/recreation context (Custodi; Trupia).

In Katleski’s case, the club showed that the risk of a mishit ball is inherent to golf (Rinaldo) and that close-parallel fairways without barriers are common worldwide. Katleski’s expert merely opined that the third-hole tee box “drastically” increased risk, but failed to compare it to customary layouts or cite binding industry standards. The Court likened the situation to Bukowski, where facility features, though arguably less safe than ideal, were standard. It distinguished Grady and Cole, where drills or track designs uncommonly heightened danger.

In Galante’s case, the Court observed that primary assumption of risk shields only those “engaged in” or “observing” athletic pursuits at designated venues. A person driving a cart in a parking lot was neither playing golf nor exposed to an inherent sport-risk at the moment of injury. Applying the doctrine beyond that narrow sphere would swallow comparative fault and undermine landowners’ general duty to maintain safe premises.

Impact

This decision clarifies two critical boundaries of New York’s primary-risk doctrine:

Venue design or sports operation must exceed ordinary, customary risks to invoke the “unreasonably enhanced” exception. Expert opinions alone, absent evidence of deviation from common practice or industry standards, cannot raise triable issues.
Non-participants injured on the periphery of sports facilities are not barred by the doctrine; they retain traditional negligence and premises-liability rights under comparative fault.

Going forward, sports venues and sponsors will find firmer footing for summary judgment where risks mirror widespread practice. Plaintiffs will need concrete evidence of atypical hazard creation to overcome summary dismissal based on primary assumption of risk. Premises owners should remain vigilant that coverage of primary assumption of risk does not extend to visitors unconnected to the athletic activity itself.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Comparative Fault (CPLR 1411): A system where plaintiffs’ recoveries are reduced proportionally to their own negligence; it abolished absolute defenses like contributory negligence and broad assumption of risk.
Primary Assumption of Risk: A limited doctrine shielding defendants from liability for risks inherent in sports and recreation that participants knowingly accept.
Inherent Risks: Dangers that flow naturally from the sport—e.g., stray balls in golf or baseball.
Unreasonably Enhanced Risks: Hazards made significantly greater than customary by negligent design, operation, or reckless conduct.
Designated Recreational Venue: A site set aside for sports or similar activities, to which the doctrine’s protection is confined.

Conclusion

Katleski v. Cazenovia Golf Club, Inc. sharpens the contours of New York’s primary assumption of risk doctrine by reaffirming that only inherent, customary sports risks are assumed and that the defense applies solely to active participants or observers in organized athletic or recreational contexts. Course designs or practice drills that mirror common industry practice will not give rise to an “unreasonably enhanced” risk. Conversely, non-participants injured on the outskirts of sport venues maintain their full rights under comparative negligence. The decision thus preserves both the social value of vigorous athletic participation and the integrity of New York’s modern negligence framework.