Scope of Due Process under Rule 60(b)(4): Notice and Opportunity to Respond

Introduction

United States v. Teague, decided April 11, 2025 by the Tenth Circuit, addresses the narrow circumstances in which a civil judgment may be deemed “void” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) for lack of procedural due process. Anthony David Teague, a pro se federal prisoner, sought relief from the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion via Rule 60(b)(4). He argued that the magistrate judge had treated the government’s response and attached affidavit as a motion for summary judgment without expressly notifying him of that conversion or of his right to file a reply. After the district court rejected his arguments, Teague filed multiple motions seeking certificate of appealability (COA). The Tenth Circuit consolidated his appeals, denied the COA, and clarified the limits of Rule 60(b)(4) relief when a litigant has otherwise received notice and an opportunity to be heard.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit held that:

Teague must secure a COA to appeal the denial of Rule 60(b) motions. He failed to make the requisite “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
Rule 60(b)(4) authorizes relief only where a judgment is “void” due to jurisdictional defect or a violation of due process that deprives a party of notice or the opportunity to be heard.
Although Teague contended he lacked an express invitation to file a reply, the court found that:
- Local rules had long permitted a reply to the government’s response.
- All filings were mailed to his correct address.
- He was not prejudiced by any failure to advise him specifically of his reply rights.
Even assuming the Rule 12(b)(6)–to–summary‐judgment conversion principle (from Gee v. Pacheco) applied, Teague’s argument did not demonstrate a fundamental due process violation.
No reasonable jurist would debate that Teague received constitutionally adequate notice and an opportunity to respond, so COA was denied and the appeals were dismissed.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010): Established that Rule 60(b)(4) applies only when a judgment is premised on a certain jurisdictional error or a due process violation depriving a party of notice/opportunity to be heard.
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000): Defined the COA standard—“reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment ... debatable or wrong.”
Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2006): Confirmed that COA is required to appeal Rule 60(b) decisions in habeas proceedings.
Bartch v. Barch, 111 F.4th 1043, 1054 (10th Cir. 2024): Emphasized that Rule 60(b)(4) has no fixed time limit for filing but is available only in “rare instances.”
Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2010): Articulated the requirement that when a court considers materials outside a complaint in a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, it must convert to summary judgment with proper notice.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning unfolded in three key steps:

COA Requirement and Standard: Because Teague attacked a prior habeas ruling via Rule 60(b), § 2253(c) required him to obtain a COA. Under Slack, he needed to show that reasonable jurists could debate the district court’s disposition of his constitutional claims.
Scope of Rule 60(b)(4): Relying on Espinosa, the court reiterated that relief for a “void” judgment is limited to jurisdictional defects or due process breaches that leave a party without notice or chance to be heard. A mere procedural misstep—like failing to “expressly invite” a reply—does not alone render a judgment void if the litigant otherwise had notice under the rules and an opportunity to respond.
Application to Teague: The Tenth Circuit found that Teague had actual and constructive notice of his right to reply under the local rules and received mailings at his correct address. His hypothetical speculation that he might have amended his § 2255 motion more effectively did not transform a nonprejudicial procedural omission into a constitutional violation.

3. Impact

This decision reinforces the following principles:

Rule 60(b)(4) relief remains a narrow exception reserved for true jurisdictional or fundamental due process defects—not every procedural miscue.
Local rules permitting replies or amendments, combined with actual mailing of orders, ordinarily satisfy due process notice requirements.
Prisoners proceeding pro se must still make a “substantial showing” to obtain a COA when challenging habeas‐related determinations under Rule 60(b).

Future litigants and courts in the Tenth Circuit will look to Teague for guidance on distinguishing harmless procedural irregularities from void judgments requiring vacatur.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Certificate of Appealability (COA): A document a habeas petitioner must obtain before appealing the denial of habeas or Rule 60(b) motions. It requires showing that reasonable jurists could debate the court’s decision.
Rule 60(b)(4): Federal Rule of Civil Procedure allowing relief from a judgment only when it is genuinely “void,” typically for lack of jurisdiction or a due process breach depriving notice/opportunity to be heard.
Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition (PFRD): A magistrate judge’s report recommending how a district court should rule on a motion, subject to objections by the parties.
Conversion to Summary Judgment: Under Rule 12(b)(6), if a court considers evidence outside the pleadings (e.g., affidavits), it must convert the motion to one for summary judgment and notify the parties so they can respond with evidence.

Conclusion

United States v. Teague clarifies that the Due Process Clause is not offended by every procedural lapse. When litigants have constructive or actual notice of their rights under the court’s rules and receive filings at their correct addresses, they are deemed to have had a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Rule 60(b)(4) remains a narrowly tailored remedy for “fundamental infirmities,” not for nonprejudicial oversights. This decision thus fortifies the procedural rigor of habeas and post‐conviction practice, underscoring that relief for void judgments is reserved for truly extraordinary circumstances.