Rumor-Based Cartel Fear and Long-Past Family Harm Do Not Establish Withholding/CAT, and Economic/IEP Concerns Do Not Meet “Exceptional and Extremely Unusual Hardship”

I. Introduction

In Manjel Arturo Valerio Ogaz v. Todd Blanche (4th Cir. June 23, 2026) (unpublished, per curiam), the Fourth Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of an appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of (1) statutory withholding of removal under the INA, (2) protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and (3) cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).

The petitioner, Manjel Arturo Valerio Ogaz, a Mexican national who entered the United States unlawfully in 1999 and remained continuously, based his fear claim on a decades-old killing of his father in Mexico and later “rumors” that cartel members were looking for him. He also sought cancellation of removal on the theory that removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to his two U.S.-citizen children, both of whom had school Individualized Education Plans (“IEPs”).

The central issues were: (a) whether speculative and uncorroborated cartel “rumors,” coupled with a long passage of time and no direct threats, could satisfy the burdens for withholding of removal and CAT protection; and (b) whether claimed financial and emotional harm—along with the children’s special-education needs—rose to the stringent cancellation hardship standard.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Withholding of removal: The court held substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that Ogaz did not suffer past persecution and did not show a “clear probability” of future persecution on a protected ground. The court emphasized the absence of any direct threats, the speculative link to cartel activity, and the substantial time gap since the father’s 1992 killing.
  • CAT: The court held substantial evidence supported the finding that Ogaz did not show it was more likely than not he would be tortured in Mexico, nor that Mexican officials would acquiesce in torture.
  • Cancellation of removal: Applying the mixed question framework, the court agreed the agency did not err in concluding that the hardship to Ogaz’s U.S.-citizen children would not be “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship” expected from removal of a parent, despite the children’s IEPs and asserted economic and emotional impacts.

The petition for review was denied in full. (The asylum claim was not at issue because it was found untimely and Ogaz did not appeal that ruling.)

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Appellate review structure and standards

Joshi v. Garland, 112 F.4th 181, 189 (4th Cir. 2024), supplied the framework where the BIA “adopts and affirms” the IJ while adding its own reasoning: the Fourth Circuit reviews both decisions but limits review to the grounds the BIA relied upon. This mattered because the panel repeatedly anchored its affirmance in the BIA’s stated rationales (passage of time; lack of current likelihood of harm).

8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) and Joshi v. Garland also framed the “highly deferential” substantial-evidence standard: factual findings are conclusive unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise. The opinion’s outcome turns largely on this deference: the record may permit fear, but it did not compel it.

2. Withholding of removal elements, PSG doctrine, nexus, and the higher burden than asylum

Portillo Flores v. Garland, 3 F.4th 615, 626 (4th Cir. 2021), provided the canonical three-part structure: (1) past persecution or well-founded fear; (2) on account of a protected ground; and (3) by actors the government is unable or unwilling to control. The court used this to separate (i) “harm” and (ii) protected-ground causation, concluding Ogaz failed at the threshold (no past persecution; no clear probability of future persecution).

Guardado v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 432, 437 (4th Cir. 2025), set out the requirements for a “particular social group”: immutable characteristic, particularity, and social distinction. The agency accepted the legal cognizability of the family-based PSG here, which narrowed the dispute to proof—especially nexus and likelihood.

Cedillos-Cedillos v. Barr, 962 F.3d 817, 824 (4th Cir. 2020), supplied the nexus standard: a protected ground must be “at least one central reason” for the feared harm, and not merely “incidental, tangential, superficial, or subordinate.” The panel’s reasoning reflects a practical application of this: even if cartel violence exists generally, the record did not establish a targeted, family-based motive against Ogaz in particular.

Yi Ni v. Holder, 613 F.3d 415, 427 (4th Cir. 2010), was cited for the proposition that withholding is narrower than asylum and requires a higher “clear probability” (more-likely-than-not) showing. This higher burden helped make “rumors” and speculative inferences insufficient.

Salgado-Sosa v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 451, 457 (4th Cir. 2018), supported the proposition that a nuclear family can be a cognizable PSG. Importantly, the court’s denial here illustrates a recurring doctrinal point: PSG cognizability does not substitute for proof of persecution likelihood and nexus.

3. CAT standards

Herrera-Martinez v. Garland, 22 F.4th 173, 185 (4th Cir. 2022), supplied CAT’s elements: torture must be intentionally inflicted and occur “by or with the consent or acquiescence” of a public official. The court used this to uphold the agency’s finding that Ogaz did not show a particularized threat of torture or government acquiescence.

4. Cancellation of removal hardship and the court’s limited role

Wilkinson v. Garland, 601 U.S. 209, 225 (2024), and Cortes v. Garland, 105 F.4th 124, 133-34 (4th Cir. 2024), governed jurisdiction and the standard of review for cancellation hardship determinations: courts may review the application of the legal standard to settled facts as a mixed question, but not re-litigate underlying factual disputes.

Cortes v. Garland, 105 F.4th at 134, also provided the substantive hardship formulation: hardship must be “substantially beyond the ordinary hardship” expected when a close family member is removed. The Fourth Circuit applied this benchmark to conclude the children’s circumstances, though sympathetic, did not meet the elevated statutory threshold.

In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319, 323 (BIA 2002), was cited for the longstanding principle that “economic detriment alone” is insufficient to establish even “extreme hardship,” reinforcing the agency’s view that reduced earnings and poorer Mexican economic conditions could not, by themselves, satisfy the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Withholding of removal: “rumors,” time gaps, and lack of individualized targeting

The court affirmed the agency’s core factual assessment: Ogaz did not experience past persecution because he suffered no physical harm, no direct threats, and no direct encounters with alleged persecutors. The “rumors” that unnamed cartel members were looking for him did not transform generalized fear into persecution.

On future persecution, the opinion underscores three evidentiary failings that commonly defeat fear-based claims:

  • Speculative causal chain: The asserted cartel motive for the father’s murder was not corroborated and was arguably contradicted by the contemporaneous news clipping attributing the killing to an intoxication-related bar incident.
  • Passage of time: The father’s killing occurred in 1992; Ogaz left in 1999; the hearing occurred decades later. The BIA emphasized the “passage of time” and “paucity of evidence” of a “current likelihood of harm,” a point the Fourth Circuit accepted as reasonable.
  • Absence of current individualized risk: No evidence showed anyone was presently searching for Ogaz; siblings largely remained unharmed in Mexico; and the sister’s 2010 shooting was found more likely to be random violence rather than targeted retaliation.

The opinion also reflects how substantial-evidence review operates in practice: even if another adjudicator might view the record as suggestive of danger, the court will not disturb the agency unless the evidence compels the opposite conclusion.

2. CAT: particularized risk and official acquiescence

CAT protection demands more than evidence of countrywide violence; it requires a showing that this applicant is more likely than not to be tortured and that torture would involve official consent or acquiescence. The IJ (affirmed by the BIA) found no “particularized threat,” and further found insufficient proof that Mexican officials would turn a blind eye. The Fourth Circuit’s affirmance indicates that generalized cartel power and impunity, without applicant-specific proof, typically will not satisfy CAT’s probability and state-involvement requirements.

3. Cancellation of removal: hardship must exceed the “ordinary” consequences of removal

The court accepted the agency’s view that the claimed harms—reduced earnings, emotional distress from separation, and educational needs managed via IEPs—did not collectively rise to the statutory level.

Three features of the agency’s hardship analysis were decisive and were treated as legally sound:

  • Economic effects were not dispositive: Even assuming reduced earning capacity in Mexico, In re Andazola-Rivas supports the conclusion that economic detriment alone does not meet the heightened standard.
  • Continuity of care and schooling: Because both U.S.-citizen mothers would keep the children in the United States, the IJ found the children would retain access to schooling, IEP services, and stability—undercutting a claim of “exceptional and extremely unusual” disruption.
  • Limited corroboration of psychological harm: The absence of child statements/testimony and the lack of medical or psychological evaluations weakened the claim that separation would cause hardship beyond what is ordinarily expected from removal.

The Fourth Circuit’s reliance on Wilkinson v. Garland and Cortes v. Garland signals an important appellate constraint: once the agency’s fact-finding is settled, the reviewing court’s task is principally to assess whether those facts can legally amount to “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” not to reweigh hardship evidence.

C. Impact

Although the decision is unpublished and “not binding precedent,” it is a useful illustration of how the Fourth Circuit applies established standards to common fact patterns:

  • Evidence quality matters as much as narrative plausibility: Claims grounded in “rumors,” unknown persecutors, and attenuated causal links—especially when contradicted by documentary evidence—struggle to meet withholding’s “clear probability” requirement.
  • Time and intervening safety undermine future-risk showings: Long gaps without threats or harm, and the continued relative safety of similarly situated family members in the home country, are powerful counterweights against a finding of likely persecution or torture.
  • CAT remains applicant-specific: Country conditions evidence of violence is rarely sufficient without a tailored showing of why this particular applicant is more likely than not to be tortured and why officials would acquiesce.
  • Cancellation hardship remains exceptionally demanding: The opinion reinforces that common consequences of removal—emotional distress, financial strain, and educational challenges that can be managed domestically—often do not clear the “substantially beyond ordinary hardship” bar without strong corroboration and proof of severity.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantial-evidence review
A highly deferential standard: the court upholds agency factual findings unless the record forces the opposite conclusion. The court does not reweigh evidence.
Withholding of removal vs. asylum
Withholding has a higher burden: the applicant must show a clear probability (more likely than not) of persecution if removed.
Particular Social Group (PSG)
A protected “group” defined by immutable traits, clear boundaries, and social recognition. A family can qualify, but the applicant must still prove targeting and motive.
Nexus (“on account of”)
The protected trait must be a “central reason” for harm. General crime or generalized cartel violence is not enough unless tied to the protected ground.
CAT “acquiescence”
CAT requires not just danger from criminals, but that officials would consent to or be willfully blind to torture (and fail to intervene).
“Exceptional and extremely unusual hardship”
A very high standard for cancellation of removal: hardship must exceed what normally happens when a parent is removed. Financial and emotional hardship are expected in many cases, so applicants typically need strong proof of unusual severity and limited alternatives.
IEP (Individualized Education Plan)
A school-provided plan for students with disabilities. Here, the agency viewed continued access to U.S. schooling and IEP services (through the custodial parents) as reducing the likelihood of extraordinary hardship.

V. Conclusion

Manjel Arturo Valerio Ogaz v. Todd Blanche applies settled Fourth Circuit and Supreme Court frameworks to deny relief where the applicant’s fear narrative lacked individualized, current, and corroborated evidence of targeting, and where asserted cancellation hardship—though genuine—fell within the range of hardships ordinarily incident to removal. The decision highlights a recurring practical lesson in immigration litigation: success often turns less on the presence of generalized danger or sympathetic family circumstances and more on (1) concrete, applicant-specific proof of risk and motive, and (2) robust, corroborated evidence that hardship truly exceeds ordinary removal consequences.