Rule 60(b)(4) Void-Judgment Motions Must Be Filed Within a Reasonable Time—Unjustified Delay Bars Jurisdictional Attacks on Default Judgments

Introduction

In Flaherty v. Amigos Del Mar LTD. (1st Cir. July 8, 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit addressed whether a foreign defendant may wait years after a federal default judgment—and many months after attempted foreign enforcement—to appear and seek vacatur under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) on the ground that the judgment is “void” for lack of jurisdiction.

The underlying dispute arose from a May 2019 scuba-diving incident in Belize. Plaintiff-Appellee Susan Flaherty alleged that an Amigos employee (not a certified divemaster) pushed her off Amigos’s vessel while the propellers were engaged, pulling her under the boat and causing catastrophic injuries to her lower body. Flaherty sued in the District of Massachusetts in August 2020, invoking admiralty jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Defendant-Appellant Amigos Del Mar Unlimited, Ltd. (a Belizean company) was served via the Hague Service Convention and did not appear. The district court entered default judgment (June 2021) and later an amended judgment exceeding $6 million (February 2022). Flaherty pursued enforcement in Belize starting July 2022. Amigos first appeared in the U.S. action in February 2024—about two years after the amended judgment and nineteen months after Belizean enforcement began—seeking to vacate as void under Rule 60(b)(4).

The central appellate issue was procedural: whether the Rule 60(b)(4) motion was timely under Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” requirement, particularly in light of intervening Supreme Court authority.

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit affirmed the denial of Amigos’s Rule 60(b)(4) motion without reaching the merits of Amigos’s subject-matter or personal-jurisdiction arguments. Relying on the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607 U.S. 155 (2026), the court held that Rule 60(b)(4) motions are subject to Rule 60(c)(1) and must be filed “within a reasonable time.”

Applying a fact-intensive reasonableness analysis, the court agreed with the district court’s alternative finding that the delay here—two years after the amended judgment and nineteen months after attempted Belizean enforcement—was unreasonable, particularly because Amigos offered no meaningful justification beyond claimed legal advice to ignore the U.S. proceedings. The First Circuit emphasized that “Disagreement with a federal court’s finding is no justification to ignore it,” quoting United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 275 (2010).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607 U.S. 155 (2026)
    This intervening Supreme Court decision supplied the key rule of decision: “Litigants seeking relief under Rule 60(b)(4) must comply with Rule 60(c)(1) and file a motion within a reasonable time.” The First Circuit treated it as dispositive on the threshold timeliness question, displacing older circuit doctrine that allowed Rule 60(b)(4) motions “at any time.”
  • Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Ceramica Europa II, Inc., 160 F.3d 849 (1st Cir. 1998); Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657 (1st Cir. 1990)
    These cases represented the First Circuit’s former approach exempting Rule 60(b)(4) motions from the “reasonable time” limit. The opinion explicitly declares that line of authority “is no longer good law” after Coney Island Auto Parts.
  • Farm Credit Bank of Balt. v. Ferrera-Goitia, 316 F.3d 62 (1st Cir. 2003)
    Used for the general framework governing Rule 60(b): balancing finality against merits-based resolution, and for the abuse-of-discretion standard typically applied to Rule 60(b) determinations. It also supplied the multi-factor “reasonable time” considerations: length of delay, justification, and prejudice.
  • Paul Revere Variable Annuity Ins. Co. v. Zang, 248 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. One Urban Lot, 882 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1989)
    Cited to emphasize that Rule 60(b) relief is “extraordinary,” reinforcing why timeliness and finality concerns are central.
  • Thomas v. Rhode Island, 542 F.3d 944 (1st Cir. 2008)
    Referenced for the then-existing circuit understanding about preserving arguments and timely raising them in the trial court—contextualizing the doctrinal landscape before Coney Island Auto Parts.
  • Carrozza v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., 992 F.3d 44 (1st Cir. 2021)
    Cited to reject Amigos’s attempt to introduce on appeal a new Rule 60(b)(6) theory (Covid-related inability to defend), reinforcing issue-preservation limits on appellate review.
  • Bouret-Echevarría v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 784 F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 2015)
    Provided the principle that “reasonable time” is circumstance-specific and illustrated what counts as a justified delay: diligent efforts amid obstacles (attorney admission efforts, need for local counsel, communication roadblocks). The court contrasted that diligence with Amigos’s inactivity.
  • Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274 (1st Cir. 1993)
    Offered a strong benchmark: sixteen months is “overlong in virtually any event,” supporting the conclusion that nineteen months (even measured from enforcement notice) is difficult to justify.
  • United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260 (2010)
    Quoted for the proposition that Rule 60(b)(4) does not license litigants to “sleep on their rights,” rebutting Amigos’s theory that it could ignore the judgment because it believed jurisdiction was lacking.
  • Ungar v. Pal. Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010) (and the opinion’s discussion of intra-circuit tension)
    Noted in a footnote as part of an acknowledged inconsistency about when the “reasonable time” clock begins for some Rule 60(b) grounds (entry of judgment versus later discovery of the basis).
  • In re Vista-Pro Auto., LLC, 109 F.4th 438 (6th Cir. 2024), aff’d sub nom., Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton, 607 U.S. 155 (2026)
    Used to frame possible “clock start” approaches for Rule 60(b)(4)–(6): when the movant knew/should have known the factual basis, and possibly (in default contexts) when enforcement is first attempted.
  • A & F Bahamas LLC v. World Venture Grp., Inc., 796 F. App’x 657 (11th Cir. 2020)
    Cited as persuasive authority that even an eleven-month delay after awareness of the judgment can reflect “sat on his rights,” reinforcing the First Circuit’s skepticism of lengthy post-notice inaction.
  • United States v. Baus, 834 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1987)
    Distinguished to show what “extenuating circumstances” might justify long delay (government lulling, delayed demand, breach of settlement). The court found nothing comparable for Amigos.
  • United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657 (1st Cir. 1990) (again, for the multi-factor test)
    Quoted for the point that prejudice is relevant but not the “lodestar”; justification for delay remains critical.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Threshold gatekeeping under Rule 60(c)(1)
    The court treated Rule 60(c)(1) as the procedural gateway: regardless of a motion’s substantive theory (including “voidness” under Rule 60(b)(4)), the movant must file within a “reasonable time.”
  2. Doctrinal shift: Rule 60(b)(4) is not timeless
    The First Circuit acknowledged that, when Amigos litigated below, circuit precedent allowed Rule 60(b)(4) motions “at any time.” But Coney Island Auto Parts overruled that understanding. The panel therefore evaluated timeliness under the “reasonable time” standard as controlling law.
  3. Standard of review: deference to the district court’s timeliness call
    The court reiterated that Rule 60(b) rulings are generally reviewed for abuse of discretion, citing Farm Credit Bank of Balt. v. Ferrera-Goitia. Here, the district court had expressly made an alternative finding: if the reasonable-time requirement applied, the motion was untimely. The First Circuit held that conclusion was not legally erroneous and not plainly wrong.
  4. Reasonableness factors: length, justification, prejudice
    Applying the Ferrera-Goitia factors, the court emphasized:
    • Length: even under the more defendant-friendly clock (measuring from enforcement notice), the delay was nineteen months, which the court viewed as difficult to reconcile with reasonableness given Cotto v. United States.
    • Justification: Amigos’s explanation—advice from Belizean counsel that U.S. courts lacked jurisdiction—was deemed inadequate. Once the district court entered default and gave notice (including notice of the damages hearing), Amigos had reason and opportunity to appear and contest jurisdiction. The court treated Amigos’s inaction as a choice, not an unavoidable impediment.
    • Prejudice: the parties disputed prejudice (missing incident file versus ongoing Belize litigation). The court held it need not resolve prejudice because lack of justification alone supported the untimeliness finding, and prejudice is only one factor, not the controlling one.
  5. Merits deliberately avoided
    Because the motion failed at the timeliness gate, the court did not decide whether the Massachusetts federal court had admiralty subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1333 or personal jurisdiction over Amigos.

Impact

The decision’s practical and precedential significance lies in how it operationalizes Coney Island Auto Parts within First Circuit practice:

  • Finality strengthened in default-judgment settings: Even “void judgment” arguments (jurisdictional defects) can be forfeited through unreasonable delay. Defendants cannot treat voidness as an evergreen escape hatch.
  • Strategic nonappearance becomes riskier: The opinion signals that a defendant’s conscious decision to ignore U.S. proceedings—based on unilateral jurisdictional views or foreign legal advice—will rarely qualify as a sound justification under Rule 60(c)(1).
  • Enforcement activity can be a decisive trigger: While the First Circuit did not resolve when the “clock” begins, it indicated that even using an enforcement-based start date (often more favorable to defaulting defendants) does not rescue long delays. Litigants should assume the clock may start at least by notice of enforcement efforts.
  • Appellate issue preservation remains strict: The rejection of the belated Covid-based Rule 60(b)(6) theory (under Carrozza v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc.) underscores that parties must develop their grounds for relief in the district court, not on appeal.
  • Cross-border judgment enforcement context: The case highlights an increasingly common litigation pattern: U.S. judgments pursued abroad, followed by a late U.S. collateral attack. The First Circuit’s approach discourages waiting to see whether enforcement becomes painful before engaging with the issuing court.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Default judgment: A binding judgment entered when a defendant, despite proper service and notice, fails to appear or defend.
  • Rule 60(b)(4) “void” judgment: A narrow category of judgments treated as legally null (commonly alleged when a court lacked jurisdiction). This case emphasizes that even a “voidness” claim must be raised promptly.
  • Rule 60(c)(1) “reasonable time”: A flexible timeliness standard. Courts look to (i) how long the movant waited, (ii) why it waited, and (iii) what prejudice reopening would cause. No single factor is automatically decisive.
  • Subject matter jurisdiction vs. personal jurisdiction: Subject matter jurisdiction concerns the court’s power over the type of case (here, admiralty under 28 U.S.C. § 1333). Personal jurisdiction concerns the court’s authority over the defendant. Amigos asserted defects in both but lost on timeliness before either was addressed.
  • Hague Service Convention: A treaty-based method of serving foreign defendants. Here, service was made under the Convention, and Amigos’s principal signed proof of service as voluntarily received.
  • Abuse of discretion review: A deferential appellate standard. The court asks whether the district court made a legal error or reached a plainly unreasonable result, not whether the appellate court would have decided differently in the first instance.

Conclusion

Flaherty v. Amigos Del Mar LTD. applies the Supreme Court’s rule from Coney Island Auto Parts Unlimited, Inc. v. Burton to hold that Rule 60(b)(4) motions are constrained by Rule 60(c)(1)’s “reasonable time” requirement. The First Circuit affirmed denial of vacatur where the defendant waited roughly two years after the amended judgment (and nineteen months after learning of foreign enforcement) with no persuasive justification. The case underscores a clear takeaway: even jurisdictional challenges framed as “voidness” must be raised promptly, and deliberate nonparticipation is unlikely to be excused.