Rule 56(e)(2) Admissions and Personal-Involvement Limits in § 1983: Summary Judgment Affirmed When a Pro Se Plaintiff Does Not Properly Oppose

1. Introduction

James Glover v. Barry Jacobs (3d Cir. Mar. 24, 2026) is a nonprecedential decision affirming a series of district-court rulings that culminated in summary judgment for Philadelphia-related defendants in a pro se civil-rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The appellant, James L. Glover—describing himself as a community activist and “independent press”—regularly sought police-related records through Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know Law (“RTKL”) and Act 22 (relating to audio/video requests). After the Philadelphia Police Department allegedly restricted his in-person access at a police facility and posted his photograph at the security desk, a security guard later reported that Glover tapped the window with a long rifle and pointed it at her. Glover was arrested, jailed for 36 days, and charged with serious offenses; the charges were later nolle prossed and his record expunged. Glover asserted that, during the pendency of the criminal matter, he stopped filing records requests and stopped posting YouTube videos.

In federal court, Glover sued two officers involved in responding to RTKL/Act 22 requests, three attorneys advising the police department on those requests, and other unknown city employees. His theory tied the posting of his photo and alleged request delays to a chain of events leading to “wrongful identification,” arrest/incarceration, and the suppression of his information-gathering activities—raising First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment claims and state-law claims (some of which were dismissed).

The appeal presented recurring federal-civil-procedure issues: (1) the consequences of failing to respond to a summary-judgment motion and statement of facts; (2) standards for sanctions and motions to strike; (3) discretionary management of extensions of time; and (4) when a default should be set aside so that a case can be resolved on the merits.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed all challenged orders. The panel held that the district court properly:

  • treated defendants’ statement of material facts as admitted after Glover failed to file a timely opposition (invoking Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2));
  • entered summary judgment because, on the admitted record, defendants neither violated Glover’s First Amendment rights nor were personally involved in his arrest;
  • rejected a “prior restraint” theory because no administrative or judicial order forbade speech in advance (citing Alexander v. United States);
  • denied motions to strike and for sanctions where Rule 11’s “exceptional case” threshold was not met and where Rule 12(f) standards were not satisfied;
  • denied additional extension requests after multiple extensions had already been granted; and
  • set aside the default judgment consistent with the preference for merits-based adjudication and the three-factor test for vacating default.

The court also declined to consider a retaliation theory not raised below and denied post-judgment efforts to supplement the appellate record with video evidence and to stay the appeal.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Appellate standards of review

  • Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014): Cited for plenary (de novo) review of summary judgment. Its relevance here is procedural: the Third Circuit independently evaluates whether, given the proper record, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
  • Moeck v. Pleasant Valley Sch. Dist., 844 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2016): Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of sanctions decisions, reinforcing that appellate courts generally defer to district courts on whether conduct warrants sanctions.
  • In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 751 F.2d 603 (3d Cir. 1984): Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of orders denying motions to strike, framing the high deference given to trial courts managing the record.
  • Jorden v. Nat'l Guard Bureau, 877 F.2d 245 (3d Cir. 1989): Cited for abuse-of-discretion review of an order setting aside default judgment, again emphasizing deference in docket-management and equitable determinations.

2) § 1983 personal involvement requirement

  • Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195 (3d Cir. 1988): The cornerstone citation for the proposition that § 1983 liability requires “personal involvement.” The panel used Rode to reject claims premised on generalized responsibility or institutional association—particularly important where the defendants were records-response personnel and advising attorneys, not arresting officers.

3) Prior restraint doctrine

  • Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993): Quoted for the definition of prior restraint as “administrative and judicial orders forbidding certain communications” before they occur. The panel used this definition to conclude that, whatever the alleged chill, there was no qualifying advance prohibition order.

4) Preservation/waiver on appeal

  • Webb v. City of Phila., 562 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2009): Cited for the rule that an argument not raised in the district court will not be addressed on appeal. This controlled the panel’s refusal to reach the First Amendment retaliation theory.

5) Rule 11 sanctions and the “exceptional case” framing

  • Lieb v. Topstone Indus. Inc., 788 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1986): Used to describe Rule 11’s purpose: deterring filings that are frivolous, legally unreasonable, or without factual foundation.
  • Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191 (3d Cir. 1988): Cited for the principle that Rule 11 sanctions are reserved for “exceptional cases,” supporting the district court’s refusal to sanction based on allegations of falsehoods where the plaintiff did not substantiate the lack of factual foundation.

6) Motions to strike (Rule 12(f))

  • C.S. v. McCrumb, 135 F.4th 1056 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited (with a pinpoint footnote) as persuasive authority discussing the standard for granting motions to strike. The Third Circuit used it alongside Rule 12(f)’s text to underscore that striking material is limited to “redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter,” which Glover did not identify.

7) Vacating default; preference for merits-based resolution

  • Hritz v. Woma, 732 F.2d 1178 (3d Cir. 1984): Quoted for the policy that default judgments are disfavored and cases should be decided on the merits when practicable.
  • Gross v. Stereo Component Sys., Inc., 700 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1983): Cited for the three-factor framework for setting aside default judgment: prejudice to the plaintiff, existence of a meritorious defense, and whether culpable conduct led to default. The panel applied this framework and found no error where the delay was attributed to attorney negligence rather than culpable conduct.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The Rule 56(e)(2) path to summary judgment when facts go unopposed

The central procedural move was the district court’s application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2): when a party “fails to properly address another party’s assertion of fact,” the court may consider the fact undisputed. The Third Circuit approved the district court’s decision to deem defendants’ material facts admitted because Glover, despite an extension, did not file a timely opposition.

Critically, the panel’s reasoning reflects a two-step discipline common in summary-judgment practice:

  1. Record management: A nonmovant must respond in the manner and time required; otherwise, factual assertions may be treated as undisputed.
  2. Legal sufficiency: Even with facts deemed admitted, the court must still decide whether those facts entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law—which the panel concluded they did.

2) Personal involvement as a gating requirement for § 1983 liability

On the admitted record, the panel agreed that the defendants (records-response officers and advising attorneys) lacked the “personal involvement” necessary under Rode v. Dellarciprete to be liable for the alleged arrest-related harms and the claimed chilling of RTKL/Act 22 activity. The opinion thereby reinforces a practical pleading-and-proof boundary: even when a plaintiff alleges a broad narrative of institutional mistreatment, each § 1983 defendant must be tied to the constitutional violation through their own acts or omissions.

3) Prior restraint confined to advance prohibitions on speech

The panel rejected the prior restraint theory by applying Alexander v. United States and emphasizing that prior restraints involve orders forbidding communication before it occurs. The facts described (photo placement, access restrictions, alleged delays) did not constitute an administrative or judicial order enjoining speech or publication in advance, so the doctrine did not fit.

4) Sanctions and striking evidence: high thresholds and focused showings

The panel affirmed denial of sanctions under Rule 11 (and referenced Glover’s invocation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927) by reiterating Rule 11’s deterrent purpose (Lieb v. Topstone Indus. Inc.) and the “exceptional case” threshold (Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders). Allegations that affidavits contained false statements did not suffice without a developed showing that they lacked factual foundation.

The panel also held that Glover failed to identify material meeting Rule 12(f)’s narrow categories—“redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous”—and thus the denial of the motion to strike was within the district court’s discretion (reinforced by C.S. v. McCrumb as persuasive discussion).

5) Extensions of time: discretion shaped by repeated accommodations

The Third Circuit treated the extension rulings as discretionary docket management, emphasizing that the district court granted four extensions and was “within its discretion” to deny a fifth. The underlying message is that pro se status does not eliminate compliance obligations, particularly after repeated leniency.

6) Setting aside default: applying the Gross factors and the Hritz preference

The panel reaffirmed the Third Circuit’s longstanding hostility to default judgments (Hritz v. Woma) and endorsed the district court’s application of the Gross v. Stereo Component Sys., Inc. factors. It found: (i) no prejudice from the delay; (ii) viable defenses; and (iii) no culpable conduct because the default resulted from attorney negligence—supporting vacatur so the case could be decided on the merits.

C. Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the decision is instructive in several practical respects:

  • Summary judgment practice: It underscores that failure to timely oppose can functionally decide a case via Rule 56(e)(2) admissions—especially when a statement of undisputed facts is properly supported.
  • Defendant-specific proof in § 1983: It highlights how personal-involvement doctrine can defeat claims aimed at peripheral officials (e.g., records staff or advising attorneys) absent evidence connecting them to the alleged constitutional injury.
  • Conceptual fit matters: The prior restraint doctrine will not be extended to every claim of “chill”; courts will look for an actual pre-publication prohibition order.
  • Sanctions discipline: Courts require concrete, targeted showings for Rule 11/§ 1927 relief; generalized accusations of falsity are unlikely to succeed.
  • Defaults are fragile: The case reiterates the Third Circuit’s preference for merits adjudication and provides a roadmap for vacating default where the plaintiff cannot show prejudice and the defendant can articulate defenses.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2): If one side files a summary-judgment motion with factual assertions and the other side does not properly respond, the court may treat those facts as undisputed.
  • Summary judgment: A decision without trial when, based on the record, there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to win as a matter of law.
  • “Personal involvement” in § 1983: A defendant is not liable simply because they work for the government; the plaintiff must show the defendant’s own actions (or deliberate failures to act) caused the constitutional violation.
  • Prior restraint: A government action that forbids speech before it happens—typically an order or injunction stopping publication or speech in advance.
  • Rule 11 sanctions: Penalties for filings that are frivolous or lack factual foundation; courts reserve them for exceptional situations.
  • Rule 12(f) motion to strike: A request to remove specific improper material (e.g., irrelevant or scandalous matter) from pleadings; it is not a general tool to dispute evidence.
  • Default judgment / setting aside default: A win entered because the other side failed to respond; courts often vacate it if the plaintiff is not prejudiced, the defendant has plausible defenses, and the default was not culpable.
  • Nolle prossed / expunged: “Nolle prossed” means the prosecution chose not to proceed; “expunged” means the record is removed or sealed under applicable law.
  • RTKL / Act 22 (as referenced in the opinion): Pennsylvania statutory mechanisms for requesting public records (RTKL) and for requesting certain law-enforcement audio/video recordings (Act 22).

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision affirms a procedural-and-substantive baseline: when a plaintiff does not properly oppose summary judgment, Rule 56(e)(2) can render the movant’s factual narrative effectively controlling, and the court may enter judgment if those facts negate essential elements of the claims. Substantively, the opinion reiterates that § 1983 requires defendant-specific personal involvement (Rode v. Dellarciprete), and doctrinally, it confines “prior restraint” to true advance prohibitions on speech (Alexander v. United States). Finally, it reinforces the circuit’s preference to resolve cases on the merits by readily setting aside defaults when the Gross v. Stereo Component Sys., Inc. factors favor vacatur.