Rule 54’s 14-Day Deadline Bars Belated Appellate-Fee Requests, Even After an Appeal Is Affirmed

Case: Merchant v. Merchant (5th Cir. June 22, 2026) (per curiam) (not designated for publication)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
Core holdings: (1) A suit may be “frivolous” under the Mississippi Litigation Accountability Act despite surviving summary judgment where the survival is attributable to parties’ misrepresentations and lack of good-faith litigation conduct; (2) appellate attorney’s fees sought in district court are untimely if not requested within Rule 54(d)’s 14-day window after final judgment, and that window does not restart after an affirmance absent a new judgment.

1. Introduction

In Merchant v. Merchant, Frank Merchant and his wife Dorothy (“Dot”) sued Frank’s twin brother, Billy Merchant, after a property-transfer scheme designed to evade creditors unraveled. Frank and Dot had deeded a Leake County farm (“the Farm”) to Billy and later demanded it back; when Billy sold the Farm to a cousin, George Harkins, Frank and Dot sued to recover it.

The merits phase ended decisively against Frank and Dot: the district court found their “unclean hands” (conveying property to evade creditors) barred recovery and that Harkins was a good-faith purchaser. The Fifth Circuit previously affirmed that merits judgment in Merchant v. Merchant, No. 22-60009, 2022 WL 3134225 (5th Cir. Aug. 5, 2022).

This 2026 decision concerns attorney’s fees on remand. The district court awarded Billy substantial fees under the Mississippi Litigation Accountability Act (“MLAA”), and also awarded a set amount for appellate fees. Frank and Dot appealed the fee award, raising (i) whether their suit was “frivolous” or “without substantial justification,” and (ii) whether the appellate-fee component was procedurally timely.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s fee award under the MLAA insofar as it was based on the plaintiffs’ frivolous, bad-faith litigation conduct—despite the case having survived summary judgment. The court emphasized that survival of a dispositive motion is probative but not dispositive of “substantial justification,” particularly where factual disputes were manufactured or sustained by misrepresentations.

However, the Fifth Circuit vacated the portion awarding appellate attorney’s fees because Billy’s request was untimely: he did not seek appellate fees in the earlier appeal and did not request them in the district court within 14 days after final judgment as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)(i). The court remanded for entry of a revised judgment excluding appellate fees.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Outcome)

Standards of review and appellate posture

  • N. Cypress Med. Cntr. Op. Co. v. Cigna Healthcare, 952 F.3d 708 (5th Cir. 2020): Cited for the abuse-of-discretion standard governing attorney-fee awards. This framing mattered because the Fifth Circuit did not ask whether it would have awarded fees itself, but whether the district court’s decision fell outside the permissible range.
  • Shelton v. La. State, 919 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2019): Supplied the tripartite review structure: factual findings for clear error, legal conclusions de novo, and the ultimate fee award for abuse of discretion. This structure supported affirmance of the MLAA fees where the key determinations (misrepresentations, bad faith) were factual/credibility-driven.
  • Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338 (5th Cir. 1994): Used to find abandonment: because the plaintiffs did not challenge the reasonableness of the fee amount, they forfeited that issue. This narrowed the appeal to entitlement/timeliness rather than line-by-line billing scrutiny.

What “frivolous” means, and whether surviving summary judgment immunizes a claim

  • McBride v. Meridian Pub. Improvement Corp., 730 So. 2d 548 (Miss. 1998): Provided the Mississippi standard that a lawsuit is frivolous when it “objectively” has “no hope of success.” The Fifth Circuit used this as the benchmark for MLAA “without substantial justification.”
  • Nichols v. Munn, 565 So. 2d 1132 (Miss. 1990) and Knights' Piping, Inc. v. Knight, 123 So. 3d 451 (Miss. Ct. App. 2012): Cited for the proposition that survival of a dispositive motion is relevant to “substantial justification,” but not dispositive. The court leaned on these cases to reject the plaintiffs’ categorical argument that surviving summary judgment precludes a finding of frivolity.
  • Foster v. Ross, 804 So. 2d 1018 (Miss. 2002): Supported fee-shifting where a party asserts an interest “without foundation” and continues litigating after it becomes clear the interest is baseless. The Fifth Circuit used this logic to validate a focus on persistence, not just initial filing.

Why credibility and misrepresentation matter (especially post-trial)

  • Davenport v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P., 891 F.3d 162 (5th Cir. 2018): Reinforced that at summary judgment the court cannot make credibility determinations. This supported the Fifth Circuit’s explanation that the case could survive summary judgment even if it was, in reality, hopeless—because credibility issues were unresolved at that stage.
  • Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co., 220 F.3d 370 (5th Cir. 2000): Contrasted with Davenport: at bench trial, the judge can assess credibility. The Fifth Circuit used this to justify the district court’s post-trial conclusion that plaintiffs’ misrepresentations were exposed and demonstrated objective hopelessness.

Procedural law of fee requests for appellate work

  • Roberts v. Brinkerhoff Inspection, Inc., 855 F. App'x 222 (5th Cir. 2021): Central to the appellate-fee vacatur. It stands for the principle that, absent a new judgment, the Rule 54 clock does not restart after an affirmance. The Fifth Circuit applied that rule to hold Billy’s appellate-fee request—made after mandate and nearly a year after judgment—untimely.
  • Zimmerman v. City of Aus., 969 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2020): Clarified the distinction between taxable appellate costs under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39 and attorneys’ fees. This prevented conflation of a costs award with a preserved fee claim.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(A) MLAA fees affirmed: frivolous litigation can exist even if summary judgment is denied

The court’s core move was to separate two ideas the plaintiffs tried to merge: (1) the presence of disputed facts at summary judgment, and (2) whether a claim is “without substantial justification” under the MLAA. While acknowledging that survival of summary judgment is “probative,” the court emphasized that the MLAA directs courts to evaluate additional factors, expressly including whether the party attempted to determine validity and whether the action was prosecuted in bad faith (citing Miss. Code Ann. § 11-55-7(a), (d), (f)).

On this record, the Fifth Circuit credited the district court’s findings that the plaintiffs:

  • made inconsistent and sometimes false representations (including about jurisdictional amount and the basis for the transfer);
  • failed to investigate their claims appropriately (especially striking given Dot’s role as chancery clerk);
  • lied under oath about the motivations for the deed; and
  • did not participate in settlement in good faith.

The court’s explanation for why summary judgment was denied but fees were proper is particularly instructive: the denial reflected that credibility could not yet be tested (Davenport), whereas trial allowed the judge to resolve credibility and find that the disputes had been sustained by misrepresentation (Canal Barge Co.). Put differently, a case can appear triable on paper yet be objectively hopeless in reality; the MLAA allows a post-trial finding that the case never had a legitimate path to success.

(B) Appellate fees vacated: Rule 54’s deadline is strict unless altered by court order

The Fifth Circuit treated appellate fees as a procedural question controlled by the mechanisms for seeking fee awards. It reiterated that a prevailing party has two routes:

  • move in the court of appeals under 5th Cir. Loc. R. 47.8; or
  • move in the district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d), within 14 days of final judgment.

Billy did neither timely for appellate fees. His district-court motion sought only fees “through trial,” and his first request for appellate fees came after mandate—far beyond Rule 54’s 14-day window. Relying on Roberts v. Brinkerhoff Inspection, Inc., the court underscored that affirmance does not restart the fee clock “absent a new judgment.”

Importantly, the court rejected any implicit-extension theory: Rule 54 allows deadline variation only “by court order,” and the district court issued no such order. The panel acknowledged the “odd result” that a party might need to file for appellate fees before an appeal is even noticed, but held that the “plain text controls.”

3.3. Impact

MLAA practice in federal court (and post-trial fee exposure)

Although the opinion is not published, it offers a clear roadmap—highly persuasive in future fee fights—for how MLAA fee exposure can expand after trial. Key implications:

  • No safe harbor from fee liability merely because a claim survived summary judgment. Parties who survive dispositive motions due to credibility disputes may still face post-trial findings that the case was frivolous if those disputes were driven by misrepresentation or bad-faith conduct.
  • Litigation behavior is fee-relevant. The panel endorsed a fee award grounded in the plaintiffs’ process misconduct (inconsistent theories, jurisdictional gamesmanship, false testimony, and bad-faith settlement posture), not simply the underlying wrongful act.
  • Professional role and presumed knowledge matter. The district court’s reliance on Dot’s position as chancery clerk highlights that courts may weigh a party’s sophistication and access to records when assessing “substantial justification.”

Fee-request timing for appellate work: a procedural trap

The appellate-fee vacatur is the decision’s sharpest “rule” takeaway: when seeking appellate fees in the district court, counsel must preserve the request within Rule 54’s 14 days after final judgment—even if an appeal has not yet been filed—unless the district court enters an order extending the deadline. Practically, prevailing parties should:

  • include a prospective request (and fair estimate) for appellate fees in a timely Rule 54 motion; and/or
  • move in the Fifth Circuit under Local Rule 47.8 when the appeal occurs.

Failure to do so risks forfeiture, even where the merits and trial-level fee entitlement are overwhelmingly favorable.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • “Without substantial justification” (MLAA): A claim is sanctionable if it is “frivolous, groundless in fact or in law, or vexatious.” Under McBride v. Meridian Pub. Improvement Corp., “frivolous” means objectively having no hope of success.
  • Why summary judgment doesn’t end the inquiry: Summary judgment is about whether a factfinder could decide for the nonmovant, assuming the nonmovant’s evidence is believed. Courts can’t weigh credibility then (Davenport v. Edward D. Jones & Co., L.P.). After trial—especially a bench trial—courts can weigh credibility and find that the “dispute” was built on falsehoods (Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co.).
  • Rule 54(d) fee motion deadline: If you seek fees in district court, you generally must file within 14 days of final judgment and provide at least a fair estimate. An affirmance on appeal does not restart the clock (Roberts v. Brinkerhoff Inspection, Inc.) unless there is a new judgment.
  • Costs vs. attorneys’ fees on appeal: “Costs” (like printing or filing fees) can be awarded under appellate rules, but they are not attorneys’ fees (Zimmerman v. City of Aus.).

5. Conclusion

Merchant v. Merchant confirms two practical principles. First, under the MLAA, a party may be ordered to pay attorney’s fees for frivolous litigation conduct even if the case earlier survived summary judgment—particularly where the survival is attributable to misrepresentations and credibility disputes that only trial can resolve. Second, appellate attorney’s fees are procedurally unforgiving: if pursued in the district court, Rule 54(d)’s 14-day deadline applies and does not reset after affirmance, absent a court-ordered extension. The decision thus pairs a robust endorsement of trial-court discretion to sanction bad-faith litigation with a strict insistence on fee-motion timeliness for appellate work.