Rule 41(b) Dismissals for Violating Filing Injunctions Must Be Without Prejudice When Defendants Are Unserved

1. Introduction

In Waseem Daker v. Gregory Dozier (11th Cir. Sept. 3, 2026) (unpublished), pro se prisoner-litigant Waseem Daker appealed the Southern District of Georgia’s dismissal of his civil-rights complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RLUIPA. The dismissal was based not on the merits, but on Daker’s failure to comply with a filing injunction previously entered against him by the Northern District of Georgia (the “Order”).

The appeal raised six issues, including whether the Northern District’s filing injunction functioned as an impermissible “universal” (nationwide) injunction under Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025), whether Daker’s amended pleading cured noncompliance, whether factual allegations of impediments to compliance had to be accepted as true, whether Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025) required a jury, and whether dismissal “with prejudice” was permissible when defendants had not been served.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit largely rejected Daker’s challenges to the district court’s authority to enforce the Northern District’s filing injunction and to dismiss for noncompliance. It held:

  • The filing injunction was not a prohibited “universal injunction” under Trump v. CASA, Inc. because it restrained only Daker, not the government’s enforcement of law against “anyone, anywhere.”
  • Daker had adequate warning that the injunction applied beyond the Northern District (relying on the court’s prior unpublished decision Daker v. Hays SP Warden (Daker II)).
  • Daker’s amended complaint still failed to comply with the filing injunction, and Rule 15(a)(1) did not rescue the amendment on the timeline presented.
  • The district court did not have to accept Daker’s “good cause” allegations as true because the dismissal was for failure to comply with a court order, not for failure to state a claim.
  • Perttu did not apply because the case was not dismissed on PLRA exhaustion grounds.

However, the court agreed with Daker on one procedural point: because the defendants were never served, the dismissal should have been without prejudice. The Eleventh Circuit therefore vacated the “with prejudice” judgment and remanded with instructions to dismiss without prejudice.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Foudy v. Indian River Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 845 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2017)

Foudy supplied the standard of review: dismissal for failure to comply with a court order is reviewed for abuse of discretion. This deferential lens mattered because Daker’s appellate arguments largely attacked the district court’s case-management judgment rather than a pure merits ruling.

Kentner v. City of Sanibel, 750 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2014)

Kentner provided that questions of constitutional law are reviewed de novo. The panel used that framework when addressing Daker’s claim that the filing injunction was unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s universal-injunction decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc.

Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831 (2025)

CASA was the centerpiece of Daker’s “universal injunction” attack. The Eleventh Circuit read CASA as prohibiting injunctions that protect nonparties by forbidding government enforcement “against anyone, anywhere,” but emphasized CASA’s own clarification that even “traditional” injunctions can have effects beyond a court’s geographic jurisdiction. Applying that distinction, the panel held the Northern District’s Order was permissible because it targeted one litigant (Daker)—a party subject to the issuing court’s authority—rather than granting relief to the public at large.

Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc)

Procup anchored the Eleventh Circuit’s longstanding doctrine that federal courts have inherent power and a constitutional obligation to protect their Article III function from abusive litigation practices. The panel cited Procup for the proposition that courts may use injunctive tools to prevent a single litigant from consuming disproportionate judicial resources. This precedent supports the legitimacy of litigant-specific filing restrictions when tailored to abusive conduct.

Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2008)

Miller reinforced that authority by linking it to the All Writs Act, which empowers federal courts to issue orders necessary in aid of their jurisdictions. Citing Miller, the panel treated the challenged injunction as an accepted mechanism for restricting “vexatious and abusive litigants,” not as a public-law decree barred by CASA.

Daker v. Hays SP Warden (Daker II), No. 23 12852 (11th Cir. Feb. 20, 2026) (unpublished)

The panel relied on Daker II to reject Daker’s notice argument, stating that the Order “clearly” applied outside the Northern District. While unpublished and nonbinding, Daker II functioned as an intra-circuit consistency point: the court was not inclined to relitigate the Order’s scope where it had already addressed the same contention from the same litigant.

Dorman v. Chaplains Off. BSO, 36 F.4th 1306 (11th Cir. 2022)

Daker invoked pleading-stage principles, but the panel used Dorman to draw a boundary: the “accept allegations as true” rule applies to Rule 12(b)(6)-type dismissals for failure to state a claim, not to dismissals based on failure to comply with court orders. This distinction insulated the district court’s enforcement decision from merits-based pleading constraints.

Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460 (2025)

Daker argued Perttu required a jury determination because his “court access” allegations were intertwined with whether he had good cause to violate the filing injunction. The panel rejected the analogy: Perttu concerns the Seventh Amendment right to a jury where PLRA exhaustion is intertwined with the merits. Because the dismissal here was for noncompliance with a court order (not exhaustion), Perttu did not constrain the district court’s ability to dismiss.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Filing injunctions after CASA: litigant-specific orders are not “universal injunctions”

The opinion’s first major move is definitional. It reads CASA as condemning injunctions that protect nonparties—orders that restrain government conduct vis-à-vis everyone. The Northern District’s Order, by contrast, operated as a constraint on Daker’s ability to initiate litigation without satisfying specified conditions (e.g., attaching the Order). Because it regulated the conduct of a single litigant rather than granting global protection, it fell outside CASA’s prohibition.

(b) Enforcement across districts

Daker attempted to cabin the Order’s warning to the Northern District. The panel—citing Daker II—treated the Order’s text as reaching beyond that district. Practically, this reflects a view that a litigant-specific filing injunction can be operationally meaningful only if it is not defeated by forum-shopping to other districts.

(c) Amendment under Rule 15(a)(1) does not cure noncompliance with a filing injunction

The court rejected the idea that an amended complaint mooted the initial noncompliance. Two rationales appear: (i) the amended complaint itself still violated the Order (it omitted a copy of it), and (ii) the panel signaled Rule 15(a)(1) did not provide a right to amend on the timeline Daker used, because he did not amend within 21 days of filing and there had been no responsive pleading or qualifying motion.

(d) Noncompliance dismissals are not merits dismissals

By distinguishing dismissal for failure to comply from dismissal for failure to state a claim, the panel preserved the district court’s discretion to manage its docket and enforce procedural injunctions without being forced into a merits-style evaluation of factual allegations of “good cause” at the pleading stage.

(e) The key holding: with-prejudice dismissal is improper when defendants are unserved

The dispositive reversal was narrow but important: because defendants were never served, the district court should not have dismissed “with prejudice.” The panel vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss “without prejudice.” Although the opinion frames this in service terms, the underlying principle is that a judgment carrying claim-preclusive effect is generally inappropriate where the case has not progressed to the point of establishing the court’s power over the parties and adjudicating in a posture warranting finality.

3.3. Impact

  • Post-CASA clarification: The opinion signals that CASA does not endanger traditional vexatious-litigant filing injunctions. Courts may continue to police abusive serial litigation with litigant-specific restrictions without fear that such orders will be characterized as forbidden “universal injunctions.”
  • Cross-district enforceability: By accepting that the Order’s warning applied outside the issuing district, the panel reduces incentives for litigants subject to filing injunctions to evade them through venue selection.
  • Procedural finality check: The vacatur underscores that dismissal sanctions must be calibrated to the procedural posture. Even where dismissal is warranted for noncompliance, courts must take care before imposing “with prejudice” consequences when defendants are unserved.
  • Limiting Perttu: The opinion narrows attempts to extend Perttu beyond PLRA exhaustion into other procedural gatekeeping contexts (like filing-injunction enforcement).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Universal (nationwide) injunction: An order that prevents the government from enforcing a law against anyone, not just the parties before the court. CASA held such injunctions exceed federal courts’ authority.
  • Filing injunction (vexatious-litigant order): A court order restricting a particular litigant’s ability to file new cases unless specific conditions are met (e.g., attaching the injunction, obtaining leave, certifying claims). It is aimed at abusive litigation conduct, not at deciding the merits of any one claim.
  • Abuse of discretion vs. de novo review: “Abuse of discretion” is deferential (the appellate court intervenes only if the decision was unreasonable). “De novo” is nondeferential (the appellate court decides the legal question anew).
  • Dismissal with prejudice vs. without prejudice: “With prejudice” usually means the claim is over for good (it can bar refiling). “Without prejudice” means the plaintiff may be able to refile, subject to other rules (limitations periods, injunction conditions, etc.).
  • Service of process: Formal delivery of the lawsuit to defendants. If defendants are not served, the case has not reached a typical adversarial posture, which can affect what sanctions and final judgments are appropriate.

5. Conclusion

Waseem Daker v. Gregory Dozier reinforces that litigant-specific filing injunctions remain valid tools of federal docket management even after Trump v. CASA, Inc., and that attempts to convert noncompliance dismissals into merits-like proceedings (through pleading-truth rules or Perttu-style jury demands) will generally fail.

The opinion’s central practical takeaway is procedural: when dismissal is imposed for violating a filing injunction, courts must still tailor the sanction to the case posture—here, requiring dismissal without prejudice where defendants were unserved. That limitation preserves judicial authority to curb abusive filings while avoiding premature, claim-preclusive finality.