Rule 24(a) Intervention in Restitution-Lien Foreclosure: Post–Summary-Judgment Motions Are Presumptively Untimely Absent a Developed Timeliness Showing

I. Introduction

In United States v. David Jankowski (6th Cir. July 15, 2026), the United States sought to foreclose a federal restitution lien on Michigan real property titled solely in the name of defendant David Jankowski after his criminal conviction and $5.2 million restitution order. David’s spouse, Paula Jankowski, attempted to participate in the foreclosure case by filing a late “Notice of Interested Party” and, after the district court granted summary judgment authorizing sale, a formal motion to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).

The key issue on appeal was narrow but important: whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Paula’s motion to intervene as untimely—particularly where she claimed an equitable/marital interest in the property proceeds and argued she moved before the sale occurred.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Applying the Circuit’s five-factor timeliness framework for Rule 24(a) intervention, the court held the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Paula’s motion untimely because she waited over a year after the foreclosure action began and filed only after discovery closed, dispositive deadlines passed, and summary judgment had already been granted. Because timeliness is a “threshold issue” and Paula failed it, the court declined to address the remaining Rule 24(a) elements (substantial interest, impairment, and adequacy of representation).

The court also rejected Paula’s criticism that the district court did not explicitly discuss each timeliness factor in detail; the burden to develop a timeliness argument rested on Paula, and her filing offered only a minimal, two-sentence rationale.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. The mandatory four-part Rule 24(a) test and timeliness as a gatekeeper

  • Kirsch v. Dean: Provided the governing four-part test for intervention as of right and reinforced that all elements are mandatory. The court relied on Kirsch both for the elements and for evaluating litigation progress (emphasizing what occurred on the “litigation continuum,” not mere elapsed time).
  • Blount-Hill v. Zelman and Grubbs v. Norris: Underscored the strict “any one element fails, intervention fails” principle—supporting the panel’s choice to affirm solely on timeliness.
  • Salem Pointe Cap., LLC v. BEP Rarity Bay, LLC: Confirmed the standard of review (abuse of discretion for timeliness; de novo for the other elements) and described timeliness as a “threshold issue” that must be resolved before anything else.
  • United States v. City of Detroit: Stated the consequence of failing the threshold requirement: “If the motion is untimely, the court must deny intervention.”
  • Nat'l Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. New York: Supplied Supreme Court authority that a finding of untimeliness ends the Rule 24 inquiry—justifying the panel’s decision not to analyze the remaining elements.
  • United States v. Michigan: Reinforced the same point within Sixth Circuit practice: once timeliness fails, courts need not reach the other Rule 24(a)(2) factors.

2. Abuse-of-discretion framing for timeliness determinations

  • United States v. Hunt (quoting Dubay v. Wells): Provided the “definite and firm conviction” formulation for abuse of discretion.
  • Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. (quoting Plain Dealer Pub. Co. v. City of Lakewood): Added that reversal requires a decision that is “arbitrary, unjustifiable[,] or clearly unreasonable.”

3. The five-factor timeliness test and its application to late-stage intervention

  • Creusere v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of Cincinnati: Supported the proposition that timeliness is circumstance-specific and left to district-court discretion; also illustrated that late motions after discovery/dispositive deadlines are routinely deemed untimely.
  • Bailey v. White: Set out the five timeliness factors used in this opinion.
  • Velsicol Chem. Corp. v. Enenco, Inc. and Jordan v. Mich. Conf. of Teamsters Welfare Fund: Allocated the burden to the proposed intervenor to demonstrate timeliness—central to rejecting Paula’s underdeveloped, conclusory timeliness showing.
  • Stupak-Thrall v. Glickman: Emphasized focusing on steps taken in the case; also framed the “purpose” factor as asking whether the lateness is excusable given the purpose (e.g., intervening late purely to preserve an appeal).
  • United States v. BASF-Inmont Corp.: Stated that intervention in the “final stages” is disfavored—used to frame Paula’s post–summary-judgment attempt.
  • Johnson v. City of Memphis, Atlas Noble, LLC v. Krisman Enterprises, and Creusere v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of Cincinnati: Provided close analogs where motions filed after substantial progress (including summary-judgment rulings) were deemed untimely.
  • In re Auto. Parts Antitrust Litig., End-Payor Actions: Explained the Circuit’s “somewhat inconsistent” approaches to the “purpose” factor (legitimacy vs. promptness), allowing the panel to weigh the factor against Paula under either lens.
  • Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept.: Warned against “wait-and-see” intervention strategies, supporting the conclusion that Paula should have moved when she first knew of the action.
  • United States v. Tennessee (quoted in Salem Pointe Cap., LLC v. BEP Rarity Bay, LLC): Supported the “prejudice” concept that late intervention can force collateral litigation beyond the original action.
  • Bradley v. Milliken: Recognized that prejudice is “particularly apparent” when intervention would require a court to revisit prior rulings—here, an already-entered summary judgment authorizing foreclosure and directing proceeds.
  • Cahoo v. SAS Institute, Inc.: Used for the “unusual circumstances” factor, which Paula failed to substantiate.
  • United States v. Johnson: Applied waiver principles to reject constitutional claims “mentioned in passing” without developed argument.

B. Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning is procedural and disciplined: it isolates timeliness as the dispositive “threshold” requirement and then applies the five factors to Paula’s conduct and the posture of the case.

  • (1) Progress of the suit: Paula moved to intervene more than a year after the complaint; discovery had closed; dispositive deadlines had passed; and summary judgment had already been granted. The court treated this as “extensive” and “substantial” progress that weighs heavily against intervention.
  • (2) Purpose of intervention: Paula claimed she only sought to protect proceeds distribution (not oppose foreclosure). The panel held this did not excuse her delay, especially since she moved only after the court already authorized sale and directed proceeds to restitution. The panel also deferred to the district court’s view that the late filing appeared designed to delay collection.
  • (3) Length of time / knowledge: Paula (through counsel) received notice of both the complaint and the government’s summary-judgment motion when filed, and she did not meaningfully dispute that she knew of her purported interest from the start. Her “not relevant” argument (because she purportedly challenged only distribution) was rejected as unsupported.
  • (4) Prejudice: Allowing intervention after summary judgment would delay execution of the sale/collection and likely expand the litigation into collateral disputes about Paula’s property/proceeds interest. It could also require reconsideration of prior rulings (notably the proceeds directive).
  • (5) Unusual circumstances: Paula’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment assertions were conclusory and waived due to lack of developed argument, so they did not support intervention.

Finally, the panel addressed a practical appellate point: although fuller district-court discussion of all five factors is “preferable,” it is not reversible error here because (i) the district court recognized the correct test, (ii) Paula barely argued timeliness, and (iii) the district court’s conclusion was not outside the broad discretion afforded for timeliness.

C. Impact

  • Intervention must be prompt even if a sale has not yet occurred: The decision rejects the idea that “no sale yet” makes a post–summary-judgment motion timely. The litigation stage—not simply whether a transaction is imminent—matters.
  • Interested spouses/third parties must act early in restitution-lien foreclosure actions: Where a restitution lien under 18 U.S.C. § 3613 leads to foreclosure, a spouse claiming equitable or marital interests cannot safely “wait-and-see,” file informal notices, or postpone a Rule 24 motion until after dispositive rulings.
  • Burden of timeliness is real, not rhetorical: The panel’s approval of denial where the movant offered only a skeletal timeliness argument signals that would-be intervenors must address the five factors with facts and explanations.
  • Late intervention risks being characterized as dilatory: The court gave weight to conduct (late filing, failure to appear at a scheduled hearing, and failure to respond) as signaling delay or abandonment—facts that can tip discretionary timeliness decisions.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Restitution lien (18 U.S.C. § 3613): When a federal court orders restitution in a criminal case, the government can enforce it like a civil judgment; the restitution obligation can attach as a lien to the defendant’s property rights.
  • Foreclosure in aid of restitution: The government may bring a civil action to sell (foreclose upon) property subject to the lien to collect money toward the restitution balance.
  • Intervention as of right (Rule 24(a)): A non-party can join an existing case if (among other things) the request is timely and the non-party has a protectable interest that may be impaired if not allowed in.
  • Timeliness (why it matters): Courts protect existing parties and judgments from disruption. Even a person with a genuine interest can be denied entry if they wait too long, especially after discovery and key rulings.
  • Waiver on appeal: If a party mentions constitutional or legal theories only in a cursory way (without developed argument), appellate courts often treat the issue as waived and will not decide it.

V. Conclusion

United States v. David Jankowski crystallizes a practical, procedure-driven rule for the Sixth Circuit: in a restitution-lien foreclosure case, a spouse’s or third party’s attempt to intervene after discovery, after dispositive deadlines, and after summary judgment is strongly disfavored and may be denied as untimely—especially where the intervenor had early notice and offers only a minimal explanation for delay. Because timeliness is a threshold requirement under Rule 24(a), failure to satisfy it ends the analysis, and courts need not reach the merits of the claimed property interest.