Rule 12 Forfeiture Bars Post‑Trial “Prolonged Stop” Suppression Theories; Certified Dog Alerts Supply Probable Cause Despite No Drugs Found

Case: United States v. Deangelo Banks
Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Date: June 30, 2026
Panel: Ripple, Lee, Pryor (Lee, J.)

I. Introduction

United States v. Deangelo Banks arises from a nighttime traffic stop in Decatur, Illinois. Sergeant Rosenbery reported that Banks failed to signal at least 100 feet before a left turn, as required by 625 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/11-804(b). After Banks parked, officers initiated a stop, discovered his insurance card was expired, and Banks exited the vehicle to call for updated insurance information.

Within minutes, another officer arrived with a drug-sniffing dog. The dog alerted on the exterior of the car. Officers searched the interior and located a handgun concealed behind a panel under the center console; no drugs were found. Banks, a felon, was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (as then worded) 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2), which required that he “knowingly” violate § 922(g).

The appeal presented two clusters of issues:

  • Fourth Amendment suppression: (1) whether reasonable suspicion supported the stop; (2) whether officers impermissibly prolonged the stop to allow a dog sniff; (3) whether the dog’s alert established probable cause even though no drugs were found.
  • Merits: whether trial evidence sufficiently proved Banks “knowingly possessed” the handgun (constructive possession).

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed across the board. It held:

  • The district court did not clearly err in crediting Sergeant Rosenbery’s testimony that he observed a turn-signal violation, establishing reasonable suspicion for the stop.
  • Banks forfeited a “prolongation” theory premised on Officer Ganley’s questioning because he did not raise that ground in his suppression motion; in any event, the brief questioning did not delay Banks’s efforts to obtain insurance information.
  • The dog’s alert furnished probable cause to search the car; the absence of drugs did not retroactively negate probable cause, and Banks offered no evidence undermining the dog’s training or reliability.
  • Trial evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find constructive, knowing possession of the firearm.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1. Standards of Review and Deference to the Trial Court

  • United States v. Eymann (962 F.3d 273 (7th Cir. 2020)) supplied the baseline appellate framework: factual findings in suppression rulings are reviewed for clear error, while legal conclusions receive de novo review. That allocation mattered because Banks’s main “reasonable suspicion” attack depended on overturning a credibility call—an area where appellate courts are notably constrained.
  • United States v. Avila (106 F.4th 684 (7th Cir. 2024)) and United States v. Contreras (820 F.3d 255 (7th Cir. 2016)) set a stringent bar for reversing credibility determinations: the credited testimony must be “internally inconsistent, implausible, or contradicted by extrinsic evidence.” The panel used this test to uphold the district judge’s acceptance of Rosenbery’s account despite acknowledged weaknesses (uncertain trailing distance, mistaken block-length estimate, inability to state the number of signal blinks).

2. Reasonable Suspicion for a Traffic Stop

  • United States v. Cole (21 F.4th 421 (7th Cir. 2021) (en banc)) supplied the core proposition that a traffic violation can justify a stop if the officer has reasonable suspicion the violation occurred; without it, the stop is unconstitutional. Banks tried to convert Rosenbery’s uncertainty into a lack of “objective support,” but Cole frames the inquiry as reasonableness, not certainty.
  • United States v. Avila (again) reinforced that the appellate path to reversal runs through demonstrating clear error in the trial court’s credibility assessment—something Banks could not establish on this record.

3. Prolongation and the Dog Sniff During a Traffic Stop

  • Rodriguez v. United States (575 U.S. 348 (2015)) supplied the constitutional dividing line: officers may conduct tasks tied to the “mission” of the stop (addressing the traffic infraction and related safety concerns), but may not add time to conduct a dog sniff absent independent reasonable suspicion.
  • United States v. Gholston (1 F.4th 492 (7th Cir. 2021)) provided the operational question: whether the defendant was “detained longer than necessary” for the dog sniff to occur; and the fact-intensive nature of that determination is reviewed for clear error.
  • United States v. Lewis (920 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 2019)) was used to emphasize a crucial qualifier: a dog sniff of the vehicle’s exterior for illegal drugs during a lawful traffic stop does not itself violate the Fourth Amendment—so long as it does not prolong the stop.
  • United States v. Lopez (907 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2018)) cautioned against treating elapsed minutes as dispositive. The panel followed this guidance by focusing on whether any officer conduct actually extended the stop, not merely that the dog arrived four minutes in.

4. Issue Preservation, Forfeiture, and Plain-Error Review

  • United States v. Kirkland (567 F.3d 316 (7th Cir. 2009)) and United States v. Brodie (507 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2007)) did the doctrinal heavy lifting on forfeiture: a defendant must not only file a suppression motion, but must also specify the grounds; raising a new suppression theory for the first time on appeal (or effectively after trial) is not excused.
  • United States v. Page (123 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc)) supplied the plain-error framework the panel referenced when concluding Banks failed to show that any forfeited suppression argument met the demanding plain-error criteria.

5. Probable Cause from a Dog Alert

  • United States v. Simon (937 F.3d 820 (7th Cir. 2019)) supplied circuit-level confirmation that a dog alert can establish probable cause to search the “entire car,” and that the absence of drugs does not itself undermine probable cause if probable cause existed at the time of the search.
  • Florida v. Harris (568 U.S. 237 (2013)) provided the Supreme Court’s central instruction: probable cause is assessed by the totality of circumstances and “not in hindsight”; certification by a bona fide organization supports a presumption of reliability, subject to rebuttal evidence.

6. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Constructive Possession

  • United States v. Carpenter (162 F.4th 876 (7th Cir. 2025)) governed the standard of review for Banks’s sufficiency claim given his Rule 29 posture. The panel applied de novo review.
  • United States v. Moshiri (858 F.3d 1077 (7th Cir. 2017)) and United States v. Wright (85 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2023)) supplied the familiar, defense-unfriendly sufficiency lens: view evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, do not reweigh credibility, and uphold the verdict if a rational jury could convict—an “nearly insurmountable” hurdle.
  • United States v. Morris (576 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 2009)) defined constructive possession: possession can exist without immediate physical control.
  • United States v. Davis (896 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2018)) supplied the Seventh Circuit’s “nexus” approach: constructive possession may be shown through exclusive control over the property where the gun was found or a substantial connection to the location; proximity alone is insufficient, but proximity plus indicia of connection (including circumstantial evidence) can sustain a conviction.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Reasonable Suspicion: Credibility as the Decisive Fact

The opinion treated the traffic stop as turning on a single factual predicate: whether Rosenbery reasonably suspected Banks violated the Illinois signaling rule. Rosenbery’s testimony was concededly uncertain on details (distance behind the car, the block’s length, the number of blinks), and the district court itself characterized it as “weak.” Yet the district court found Rosenbery “generally credible,” in part because his concessions were viewed as candor rather than fabrication.

Applying United States v. Avila and United States v. Contreras, the Seventh Circuit framed its task narrowly: absent internal inconsistency, implausibility, or contradiction by extrinsic evidence, the appellate court will not re-do credibility. The panel then pointed to the district court’s credited factual anchors—Rosenbery’s familiarity with the area and adequate illumination from streetlights—sufficient to support reasonable suspicion. In short: the stop survived because credibility findings survived.

2. Prolongation: Mission-Related Insurance Inquiry and a Forfeited “Stalling” Theory

The court’s analysis tracks Rodriguez v. United States closely. Insurance verification is a conventional incident of a traffic stop, and here it became the live “mission” issue when the officers discovered the insurance card had expired. Banks chose to exit the car and call someone to obtain updated information; the dog sniff occurred while he was still doing so.

Banks’s most pointed narrative—that Officer Ganley questioned him to “stall” until the dog arrived—collapsed for two independent reasons:

  • Procedural forfeiture: Under United States v. Kirkland and United States v. Brodie, Banks had to identify that ground in his suppression motion. The opinion stresses that he did not, and that trying to repurpose a motion for a new trial after conviction cannot substitute for timely suppression litigation under Rule 12.
  • Merits: Even if considered, the record did not show Ganley’s “momentary exchange” delayed Banks’s insurance-information efforts. Under United States v. Gholston and United States v. Lopez, the key is added detention time attributable to unrelated activity; the panel saw none.

The upshot is a practically significant rule-of-thumb for litigants: a “Rodriguez prolongation” claim is not a free-floating constitutional objection; it is a suppression ground that must be raised with specificity early, or it is likely lost.

3. Probable Cause: Dog Alert Reliability Is Not Rebutted by “No Drugs Found”

On probable cause, the opinion squarely applied Florida v. Harris and circuit reinforcement from United States v. Simon. The panel treated the absence of discovered drugs as legally non-dispositive because probable cause is assessed ex ante, based on what officers reasonably believed at the time.

Critically, the opinion reflects Harris’s evidentiary allocation: a certified dog’s alert creates a presumption (subject to rebuttal) that the alert is reliable enough to establish probable cause. Banks offered no evidence about training deficiencies, handler cueing, certification problems, or error rates; instead, he relied essentially on outcome (“false positive”). The panel held that was insufficient to disturb the probable-cause finding.

4. Knowing Possession: Constructive Possession Proven Through Connection to the Car and the Compartment

On sufficiency, the panel applied the deferential United States v. Moshiri framework (and the “nearly insurmountable” gloss from United States v. Wright) to a constructive-possession theory as articulated in United States v. Morris and United States v. Davis.

The opinion emphasized multiple connecting facts beyond mere proximity:

  • The gun was hidden in Banks’s car near where he kept cell phones and personal documents (including a W-2 and an Illinois State Police warning).
  • Banks was listed as an owner on the registration (with one other person).
  • Banks told officers he was the only driver and that everything inside belonged to him—statements that cut against later claims that others used the car.
  • A purported borrower identified by Banks disclaimed knowing him.
  • Recorded jail calls suggested consciousness that officers “went straight to where the lick was” and that someone may have “tipped” police off.

Although counterpoints existed (notably, DNA on the gun did not match Banks), the panel treated those as classic jury questions. Under the sufficiency standard, the existence of competing inferences did not entitle Banks to acquittal or a new trial.

C. Impact

  • Suppression practice in the Seventh Circuit: The decision underscores that defendants must plead suppression theories with precision and timeliness. A generalized Fourth Amendment motion is not a placeholder for later “Rodriguez” theories developed after testimony emerges at trial. The court’s reliance on United States v. Kirkland and United States v. Brodie signals continued strict enforcement of Rule 12’s structure.
  • Traffic-stop litigation: The opinion reinforces that a dog sniff remains constitutionally permissible if it does not add time to the stop’s mission. Here, the “mission” was actively ongoing due to insurance verification, and the court was unwilling to infer stalling from brief questioning without a record showing added delay.
  • Dog-alert probable cause challenges: The decision is a caution that “no drugs found” is generally not enough. A meaningful challenge will usually require affirmative evidence about the dog’s reliability, training, certification, or handler conduct—precisely the kind of rebuttal contemplated by Florida v. Harris.
  • Firearm possession cases: On constructive possession, the opinion illustrates the evidentiary mix the Seventh Circuit deems sufficient: ownership/registration ties, personal items near the hiding place, inconsistent explanations about access to the vehicle, and inculpatory or consciousness-of-guilt statements—despite a lack of DNA match.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reasonable suspicion: A “commonsense” level of justification—more than a hunch, less than proof. An officer need not be correct; the suspicion must be objectively reasonable.
  • Clear error (appellate review): A highly deferential standard. Even if an appellate court might have decided differently, it will not reverse unless the trial court’s factual finding is plainly wrong.
  • Rodriguez prolongation: Police can do tasks tied to the reason for the stop (license/registration/insurance, warrant checks, safety steps). They generally cannot add time to pursue unrelated investigations (like a dog sniff) unless independent reasonable suspicion justifies it.
  • Forfeiture (Rule 12): If you do not raise a suppression ground at the proper time and with specificity, you usually cannot raise it later—especially not for the first time on appeal.
  • Probable cause: A fair probability that evidence or contraband will be found. It is evaluated based on the facts known at the time—not whether the search later “pans out.”
  • Constructive possession: You can “possess” an item without holding it if the evidence shows a sufficient connection—such as control over where it is kept and circumstances indicating knowledge and access.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Deangelo Banks affirms a firearm conviction and, in doing so, consolidates several practical rules for Fourth Amendment and § 922(g) litigation in the Seventh Circuit. The court (1) deferred to trial-level credibility findings supporting reasonable suspicion; (2) treated “prolongation” as a suppression theory that must be timely and specifically raised or it is forfeited; (3) held that a certified dog’s alert supplies probable cause even when no drugs are recovered, absent concrete evidence undermining reliability; and (4) found ample circumstantial evidence for constructive, knowing possession of a gun hidden in a vehicle tied to the defendant.