RPA Immunity Extends to City Sidewalks Used for Sightseeing in Historic Districts; “Recreational Use” Assessed Objectively

1. Introduction

In THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF SAVANNAH v. McLAMB (Court of Appeals of Georgia, Aug. 15, 2025), Gloria McLamb sued the City of Savannah after tripping on a raised sidewalk paver in Savannah’s National Historic Landmark District. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Georgia Recreational Property Act (“RPA”), OCGA § 51-3-20 et seq., barred the claim.

The trial court denied summary judgment, concluding (i) fact questions existed about whether the sidewalk was “recreational property” and (ii) applying the RPA would violate Georgia’s equal protection clause by treating tourists and local residents differently. The City appealed, challenging both conclusions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that the RPA applied as a matter of law because:

  • Nature of the activity: McLamb’s conduct was objectively “recreational” (sightseeing in a historic district), an activity expressly included in OCGA § 51-3-21 (4) (“viewing or enjoying historical… [and] scenic… sites”).
  • Nature of the property: The City-owned sidewalk in the historic district functioned as recreational-access property for sightseeing, and the existence of nearby businesses (and any indirect economic benefit) did not create a jury issue.

As a result, the City was “entitled to immunity under the RPA,” and the trial court should have granted summary judgment. The appellate court also rejected the trial court’s as-applied constitutional analysis as inconsistent with controlling Supreme Court authority upholding the RPA.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • North Fulton Community Charities v. Goodstein, 367 Ga. App. 576 (887 SE2d 646) (2023)
    Provided the standard of review for summary judgment: de novo review, construing evidence and inferences in favor of the nonmovant. This framing mattered because the court concluded the record still compelled RPA immunity as a matter of law.
  • Carroll v. City of Carrollton, 280 Ga. App. 172 (633 SE2d 591) (2006)
    Quoted for the RPA’s overarching purpose: encouraging owners to open property for public recreation by limiting liability. That purpose supports a broad, function-based understanding of “recreational” access when no charge is imposed.
  • Anderson v. Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games, 273 Ga. 113 (537 SE2d 345) (2000)
    This was the key authority on two points:
    1. Constitutionality: The Supreme Court held the RPA does not violate due process or equal protection because its classification (injuries on recreational property versus other premises) is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.
    2. Mixed-use “balancing” test: For activities involving both commercial and recreational aspects, the court must examine “all social and economic aspects,” including intrinsic nature, what is offered to the public, and purpose/consequence; a user’s subjective view is not controlling.
    Applying Anderson, the Court of Appeals rejected the trial court’s attempt to constitutionalize a tourist/resident distinction and instead treated the proper classification as “recreational” versus “non-recreational” use.
  • Mercer Univ. v. Stofer, 306 Ga. 191 (830 SE2d 169) (2019) (“Stofer I”)
    Supplied the controlling two-part framework for RPA applicability: determine the “true scope and nature” of the invitation by examining (1) the nature of the activity invited and (2) the nature of the property invited for use. It also clarified that an owner’s indirect financial benefit is not a proper consideration in the immunity analysis.
  • Mercer Univ. v. Stofer, 354 Ga. App. 458 (841 SE2d 224) (2020) (“Stofer II”)
    Applied Stofer I to conclude a free concert in a public park was recreational, and that the property remained recreational despite nearby/ancillary commercial availability. The Court of Appeals relied on Stofer II to hold that indirect commercial benefit does not create a factual dispute and to characterize the RPA inquiry as legal where evidence does not materially conflict.
  • Hodges v. Hartford Ca. Ins. Co., 176 Ga. App. 284 (335 SE2d 672) (1985)
    Used to confirm appellate jurisdiction: because the Supreme Court already upheld the RPA’s constitutionality, the Court of Appeals could review the claim that the statute was being applied in an allegedly discriminatory manner.
  • Julian v. City of Rome, 237 Ga. App. 822 (517 SE2d 79) (1999)
    Provided a close analog: a city-owned walkway was recreational under the RPA where intended as park access and no fee was charged, even if downtown commerce benefitted indirectly. This reinforced treating access corridors (walkways/sidewalks) as RPA-covered when they functionally serve recreation.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. RPA’s operative rule. Under OCGA § 51-3-22 and OCGA § 51-3-23, an owner who permits recreational use without charge owes no duty to keep premises safe or warn of dangerous conditions (absent statutory exceptions not addressed in this opinion).
  2. Activity analysis was driven by objective record facts, not litigation characterizations. The trial court relied partly on McLamb’s denial that she was “sightseeing” at the moment of the fall. The Court of Appeals treated that as non-dispositive and emphasized her affirmative testimony: she chose to walk to “see the parks, old buildings, and big trees,” and was “looking up a tree” when she fell. Because OCGA § 51-3-21 (4) expressly includes “viewing or enjoying historical… [and] scenic… sites,” the activity fit squarely within the statute.
  3. Property analysis focused on the nature of the invitation and use. Applying Stofer I/Stofer II, the question was whether people were invited onto the sidewalk to engage in recreation (sightseeing) or to engage in commercial activity. The undisputed facts were that the sidewalk was City-owned, located in the historic district, and no fee was charged to sightsee. Nearby businesses and potential tourism-related economic benefit did not alter the “nature of the property” for RPA purposes.
  4. Constitutional holding was foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. The trial court’s as-applied equal protection concern (tourists vs. residents) conflicted with Anderson, which upheld the RPA’s classification as rationally related to increasing public access to recreation. The Court of Appeals accordingly treated the constitutional objection as not a basis to deny immunity.
  5. Disposition: immunity compelled summary judgment. With both prongs satisfied and no material conflict requiring a jury resolution on the “purpose of the property,” the City was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

3.3. Impact

  • Sidewalks can be “recreational property” when functioning as sightseeing infrastructure. The opinion extends (or at least confirms) that RPA immunity is not limited to parks and trails; it can apply to ordinary municipal sidewalks when they are part of the public’s recreational use of a historic/scenic district.
  • Objective evidence controls the “recreational” characterization. Litigants should expect courts to prioritize admissions and concrete context (what the plaintiff was doing and why) over labels or conclusory denials.
  • Indirect economic benefit is a weak lever against RPA immunity. Following Stofer I, the opinion signals that arguments about tourism revenue, adjacent retail, or general economic uplift will rarely create jury issues.
  • As-applied equal protection challenges face a steep climb. By tying the analysis back to Anderson, the court indicates that reframing the classification (e.g., tourists vs. residents) is unlikely to succeed where the statute’s operative distinction remains “recreational” versus “non-recreational” premises/use.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary judgment
A pretrial ruling where the court decides the case (or an issue) because the key facts are not genuinely disputed and the law requires a particular result.
Recreational Property Act (RPA) immunity
A statutory limitation on landowner liability when the public is allowed to use land for recreational purposes without charge. It reduces the owner’s duty of care.
“Mixed use” and the balancing test
When an area has both recreational and commercial characteristics, courts look at the activity’s intrinsic nature and purpose and the nature of what the public was invited to do, rather than focusing on incidental commerce.
Equal protection (Georgia Constitution)
A constitutional requirement that similarly situated people be treated alike unless there is a sufficient governmental reason for different treatment. Under Anderson, the RPA’s recreational/non-recreational distinction is treated as rational.

5. Conclusion

THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF SAVANNAH v. McLAMB reinforces a practical, objective application of the RPA: when a plaintiff is using municipal property to “view[] or enjoy[] historical… [or] scenic… sites,” and no charge is imposed, RPA immunity can bar premises-liability claims even on ordinary sidewalks in commercially active historic districts. The decision also underscores that indirect commercial benefit does not defeat RPA protection and that constitutional attacks are constrained by Anderson.