Rogne v. City of Catoosa: Oklahoma’s Savings Statute Does Not Revive a § 1983 Takings Claim After State Inverse-Condemnation Litigation Ends “On the Merits”

Introduction

In Rogne v. City of Catoosa (10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2026), John Rogne sued the City of Catoosa under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a temporary taking without just compensation arising from a 2011 Cease-and-Desist Order (and an alleged temporary fence) that purportedly prevented him from using his vacant lots until the City rescinded the order in 2017. After extensive state-court litigation—where his inverse-condemnation damages theory failed—Rogne filed a federal takings claim in 2024.

The central issue on appeal was narrow: although Rogne conceded the federal suit was filed beyond the ordinary limitations period, could Oklahoma’s savings statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 100, nonetheless permit the late-filed § 1983 action because his earlier state case had been timely? The Tenth Circuit held it could not, because the prior state action ultimately ended on the merits.

Summary of the Opinion

The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), holding:

  • Oklahoma’s two-year personal-injury limitations period applies to § 1983 claims and therefore governed Rogne’s federal takings action.
  • Regardless whether accrual is pegged to the alleged taking (2011) or to Knick v. Township of Scott (2019), the 2024 filing was untimely.
  • Oklahoma’s savings statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 100, did not toll or revive the claim because the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals’ disposition—affirming summary judgment and stating “as a matter of law, there was no taking”—was a failure upon the merits, not “otherwise than upon the merits.”

The court therefore affirmed on limitations grounds and did not reach the district court’s alternative holding of issue preclusion.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Pleading/Procedure, Standard of Review, and Judicial Notice

  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly supplied the governing plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6) review, which framed how the court accepted well-pleaded allegations while still dismissing on a time-bar apparent from the pleadings and judicially noticeable records.
  • Ashaheed v. Currington was cited for taking facts from the well-pleaded complaint at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
  • Johnson v. Spencer supported judicial notice of state-court records to establish what happened procedurally (as “judicial acts”), without accepting disputed factual propositions as true.
  • Cuervo v. Sorenson, Johnson v. City of Cheyenne, and Schwartz v. Booker reinforced de novo review and the obligation to view allegations in the nonmovant’s favor on a motion to dismiss.
  • Allen v. Env't Restoration, LLC supported de novo review of limitations rulings.

2) Takings Doctrine and the Post-Knick Landscape

  • Dolan v. City of Tigard was cited for incorporation of the Takings Clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.
  • Sheetz v. Cnty. of El Dorado (quoting Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid) framed modern takings analysis by emphasizing when compensation is triggered: physical appropriation or interference with the right to exclude.
  • First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cnty. and Knick v. Township of Scott supplied the core “temporary takings require compensation” principle and the rule that repeal/rescission does not erase a completed taking’s compensation obligation.
  • Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City was discussed as the overruled “state-litigation requirement” that had forced takings plaintiffs into state court first, contributing to preclusion risk.
  • San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco was cited (along with Knick’s discussion) to underscore that state-court takings determinations generally carry preclusive effect in later federal litigation—one of the structural pressures that Knick sought to mitigate prospectively, but not by disregarding full faith and credit.
  • Pakdel v. City of San Francisco, North Mill Street, LLC v. City of Aspen, and Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Plan. Agency were used to clarify that, even after Knick eliminated the state-compensation exhaustion requirement, takings claims still must satisfy a finality requirement in many land-use contexts.

3) § 1983 Limitations and Accrual

  • Schell v. Chief Just. and Justs. of Okla. Sup. Ct. and Nance v. Ward grounded the selection of Oklahoma’s two-year personal-injury limitations period for § 1983.
  • Herrera v. City of Espanola supplied the federal accrual rule: a § 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action. The opinion then integrated Knick to explain that, for takings claims, accrual occurs “at the time of the taking.”
  • 2701 Mountain Glen CT, LLC v. City of Woodland Park and Bruce v. Ogden City Corp. were cited as examples of applying state personal-injury limitations periods to § 1983 takings claims (unpublished but illustrative).

4) Oklahoma Inverse Condemnation and Exhaustion/Finality (State Law Context)

  • Snow v. Town of Calumet summarized Oklahoma inverse-condemnation elements and the “substantial interference” concept for de facto takings.
  • Rocket Props., LLC v. City of Tulsa (quoting Mattoon v. City of Norman) framed the substantial-interference standard and also reiterated Oklahoma’s general requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted before inverse-condemnation litigation is ripe.
  • April v. City of Broken Arrow was cited for the proposition that inverse-condemnation actions are not ripe until a final administrative decision is formalized.

5) Oklahoma Savings Statute and “On the Merits”

  • Grider v. USX Corp. described the savings statute’s function: allowing a new action after limitations run if the earlier timely case failed otherwise than upon the merits.
  • Twashakarris, Inc. v. I.N.S. of U.S. provided the Tenth Circuit’s articulation that the “failed action” includes validly filed appeals, and that the one-year refiling window runs from final adjudication.
  • Eastom v. City of Tulsa established that Oklahoma’s savings statute can apply to § 1983 claims.
  • Ciszkowski v. Rector and Chandler v. Denton were used to explain Oklahoma’s transactional approach: a refiling need not be identical if it arises from the same operative events.
  • Pettyjohn v. Plaster (citing Duncan v. Deming Inv. Co. and quoting Crow v. Abraham) supplied the definition of “on the merits”: a disposition declaring parties’ rights and duties based on ultimate facts, not technical or purely procedural grounds; it also noted that dismissal for failure to state a claim is on the merits (therefore outside § 100).
  • Ind. Sch. Dist. #52 of Okla. Cnty. v. Hofmeister and Okla. Pub. Emps. Ass'n v. Okla. Dep't of Central Servs. were cited for the Oklahoma rule that summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits.
  • Brown v. Buhman and Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc., along with Johnson v. Fankell and TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc., were invoked to reject Rogne’s effort to relitigate or second-guess Oklahoma courts’ interpretations and applications of Oklahoma law in federal appellate court.
  • Tran v. Trs. of State Colls. in Colo. supported waiver/abandonment of arguments not raised in the opening brief (re equitable tolling).
  • Sawyers v. Norton, Paycom Payroll, LLC v. Richison, and Tesone v. Empire Mktg. Strategies supported waiver findings as to a late-raised argument about whether § 1983 is necessary to pursue a Fifth Amendment claim.
  • United States v. Clarke was cited (via Knick) for defining inverse condemnation as a cause of action for property “taken in fact.”

Legal Reasoning

  1. Limitations period selection (state personal-injury analogue): The court applied the settled § 1983 rule—state personal-injury limitations control—via Schell v. Chief Just. and Justs. of Okla. Sup. Ct. and Nance v. Ward, yielding Oklahoma’s two-year period.
  2. Accrual was dispositively “too early,” whichever date applied: Under Knick’s framing, a federal takings claim accrues “at the time of the taking.” Rogne proposed 2011 (issuance of the 2011 CDO/fencing). The district court used 2019 (the date of Knick v. Township of Scott). The Tenth Circuit did not need to resolve this disagreement because both dates made a 2024 filing untimely. This is a pragmatic limitations holding: where all plausible accrual theories leave the suit late, accrual precision is unnecessary to affirm.
  3. No rescue via Oklahoma’s savings statute because the state case ended “on the merits”: Oklahoma’s savings statute applies only when the earlier timely case fails “otherwise than upon the merits.” The court focused on the ultimate state disposition, including appeal, consistent with Twashakarris, Inc. v. I.N.S. of U.S.. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed summary judgment, expressly stating there were no material disputed facts and, in a footnote, that “as a matter of law, there was no taking.” Under Oklahoma law, summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits (Ind. Sch. Dist. #52 of Okla. Cnty. v. Hofmeister); thus, the state litigation did not fail “otherwise than upon the merits,” and § 100 could not extend the federal filing time.
  4. Rejection of “it was moot” reframing: Rogne attempted to characterize the state disposition as mootness-based (which could look non-merits). The court parsed the state proceedings: prospective injunctive relief became moot when the CDO was rescinded, but the damages claim for the 2011–2017 period was decided against him on exhaustion/finality and the absence of a taking. Because the OCCA’s holding addressed the damages theory and affirmed summary judgment, the relevant “failure” for savings-statute purposes was merits-based.
  5. Federal appellate restraint regarding alleged Oklahoma legal errors: Rogne argued the Oklahoma courts misapplied Oklahoma inverse-condemnation doctrine (e.g., whether inverse condemnation can be resolved on summary judgment). The Tenth Circuit declined to function as a super-appellate state court, invoking the bedrock principle that state courts are final arbiters of state law (Brown v. Buhman; Johnson v. Fankell; TMJ Implants, Inc. v. Aetna, Inc.).

Impact

  • Hard limit on “second chance” federal filings after adverse state merits outcomes: The decision warns takings plaintiffs that trying inverse condemnation in state court first—then later filing a federal § 1983 takings claim—faces two independent barriers: (i) ordinary statutes of limitation, and (ii) the inability to use Oklahoma’s savings statute where the state case ends in a merits adjudication.
  • Savings statutes are not general equitable safety nets: Even where a plaintiff timely sued in a first forum, § 100 only helps if the first case ended on non-merits grounds (e.g., jurisdictional defects, certain nonsuits), not where the appellate endpoint is summary judgment or another merits declaration.
  • Knick does not retroactively reset deadlines: Although Knick v. Township of Scott changed ripeness doctrine for federal takings claims, this opinion underscores that litigants cannot treat Knick as a fresh start for otherwise stale claims—at least where the claim is brought years after both the alleged taking and Knick itself.
  • Practical litigation planning for land-use takings: Plaintiffs must treat limitations and finality as front-end strategic constraints. Waiting for prolonged local or state proceedings may consume federal filing time, and post hoc reliance on savings statutes may fail if the state case ends with a merits ruling.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Temporary taking
A government action that allegedly takes property rights for a limited time (e.g., prohibiting use for several years). Under First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles Cnty., temporary takings can require compensation just like permanent ones.
Inverse condemnation
A suit brought by the property owner (not the government) seeking compensation for a taking that allegedly occurred without formal eminent-domain proceedings. The opinion, echoing United States v. Clarke via Knick v. Township of Scott, treats it as the traditional “taken in fact” remedy.
Ripeness / finality vs. exhaustion
After Knick v. Township of Scott, a plaintiff need not first seek compensation in state court to file in federal court, but many land-use takings claims still require a “final” governmental decision. The opinion distinguishes this from Oklahoma’s state-law requirement that administrative remedies be pursued before inverse condemnation becomes judicially ripe (e.g., April v. City of Broken Arrow).
Accrual
The date the clock starts for the statute of limitations. Under Knick’s rule, a federal takings claim accrues at the time of the alleged taking. Here, the court held the suit was late even under the most plaintiff-friendly accrual theory.
Oklahoma savings statute (Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 100)
A limited “refiling” rule: if a timely action fails for reasons other than a decision on the merits, the plaintiff may file a new action within one year after that failure. It does not apply when the first action ends in a merits adjudication like summary judgment.
“On the merits”
A decision that resolves the substance of the parties’ rights and liabilities based on ultimate facts, not merely a technical defect. Oklahoma treats summary judgment as “on the merits” (Ind. Sch. Dist. #52 of Okla. Cnty. v. Hofmeister), which was outcome-determinative here.

Conclusion

Rogne v. City of Catoosa clarifies a crucial timing and procedure interaction for Oklahoma-based takings litigation: a plaintiff cannot use Oklahoma’s savings statute to revive a late § 1983 takings claim when the prior, timely state inverse-condemnation case concluded with a merits disposition—particularly summary judgment affirmed on appeal. The opinion reinforces that post-Knick v. Township of Scott access to federal court does not erase statutes of limitation, and that savings-statute relief depends on how the prior case ended, not merely that it was filed on time.