RIF Disparate-Impact Claims Require a Less-Discriminatory Alternative, and Retaliation Requires Employer Knowledge of Protected Activity

Case: Robyn Bomar v. Board of Education of Harford County, No. 25-1065 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 2026) (unpublished)

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Disposition: Summary judgment for defendants affirmed

Precedential status: The court expressly notes the decision is unpublished and “not binding precedent in this circuit.” Even so, it is instructive in how the Fourth Circuit applies established Title VII/McDonnell Douglas, disparate-impact, and retaliation standards to a county-wide reduction-in-force (“RIF”) reassignment process.

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from Harford County Public Schools’ 2019 county-wide administrative reduction in force. Superintendent Dr. Sean Bulson, responding to a budget deficit, implemented a “2019 Reassignment Plan” requiring assistant principals to reapply for their positions through standardized interview materials, supervisor references, and principal rankings. Plaintiffs-Appellants Robyn Bomar, Letina Hall, Jonise Stallings, and Shakera Adkins—Black women over forty—were not selected and were reassigned.

They sued the Board of Education of Harford County (the “School Board”) and Superintendent Bulson, alleging:

  • Disparate treatment discrimination based on race, sex, and age (Title VII, MFEPA, ADEA);
  • Disparate impact discrimination (Title VII/MFEPA theory) based on the claim the RIF process disproportionately affected Black women;
  • Retaliation for complaining about discrimination (Title VII and MFEPA);
  • FMLA retaliation (Hall and Adkins) tied to protected medical leave; and
  • Section 1983 constitutional claims against Superintendent Bulson premised on employment discrimination.

The key appellate issue was whether, at summary judgment, plaintiffs produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that defendants’ stated reasons were pretext, and—on disparate impact—whether plaintiffs identified an available, less discriminatory alternative that would still satisfy legitimate business necessities.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the School Board and Superintendent Bulson on all claims.

Core holdings:

  • Disparate treatment: Assuming plaintiffs established prima facie cases, the School Board produced legitimate non-discriminatory reasons (lower interview scores, weaker references, lack of top-five principal rankings). Plaintiffs failed at the pretext stage.
  • Disparate impact: Even assuming a prima facie disparate impact on Black women, plaintiffs failed to identify an available alternative practice that would reduce impact while serving the School Board’s legitimate needs (including giving principals meaningful input).
  • Title VII/MFEPA retaliation: Plaintiffs failed to show evidence that the School Board was aware of protected activity before the alleged adverse actions, defeating the causation element of the prima facie case.
  • FMLA retaliation: Hall and Adkins made a prima facie showing as to the 2019 non-selection based on temporal proximity, but failed to show pretext. Their later “pool exclusion” claims failed because the lapse of over a year was too long to infer causation from timing alone.
  • Section 1983: The same analytical framework applied; the failure of the Title VII discrimination proof doomed the constitutional employment-discrimination claims.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Result)

A. Standards of review and summary judgment posture

  • Haynes v. Waste Connections, Inc., 922 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 2019): Cited for the rule that, on summary judgment, facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. This framing benefited plaintiffs procedurally, but did not substitute for evidence of pretext or causation.
  • Wannamaker-Amos v. Purem Novi, Inc., 126 F.4th 244 (4th Cir. 2025): Used for de novo review and a clear articulation of the McDonnell Douglas structure, especially the plaintiff’s pretext burden at step three.
  • Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121 (4th Cir. 2023): Reinforces that summary judgment is improper if genuine disputes of material fact exist—an admonition the court ultimately found not triggered because plaintiffs’ proof did not create triable disputes.
  • DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2015): Cited for evaluating employment disputes in context rather than isolating discrete incidents. The court acknowledged this holistic lens, but found plaintiffs’ record still insufficient.

B. Statutory/claim-translation across Title VII, MFEPA, ADEA, FMLA, and Section 1983

  • Gaines v. Balt. Police Dep't, 657 F. Supp. 3d 708 (D. Md. 2023): Supports treating MFEPA as a Maryland analogue to federal discrimination law. This allowed the court to apply Title VII doctrine uniformly to state claims.
  • Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1993): Authority for applying the Title VII/McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA claims—critical because plaintiffs asserted age discrimination alongside Title VII categories.
  • Yashenko v. Harrah's NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d 541 (4th Cir. 2006): Establishes FMLA retaliation claims’ similarity to Title VII, justifying McDonnell Douglas analysis.
  • Love-Lane v. Martin, 355 F.3d 766 (4th Cir. 2004): Provides that Section 1983 employment-discrimination claims track Title VII’s elements; thus, plaintiffs’ inability to prove discrimination similarly disposed of their constitutional claims.

C. Substantive discrimination concepts: disparate treatment and disparate impact

  • Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977): Defines disparate treatment (intentional differential treatment) and disparate impact (facially neutral practices with disproportionate effects). The court relied on these baseline definitions to separate plaintiffs’ theories.
  • Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993): Cited for disparate treatment as treating some less favorably because of a protected trait; it anchored the intent-focused character of plaintiffs’ race/sex/age theories.
  • Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009): Central to the disparate-impact discussion. The opinion uses Ricci to lay out the statutory defense of business necessity and the plaintiff’s rebuttal obligation: identify an available alternative practice that serves legitimate needs with less disparate impact. This requirement was decisive—plaintiffs did not propose such an alternative.

D. McDonnell Douglas burden shifting and “pretext” mechanics

  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): The governing framework for circumstantial proof of discrimination/retaliation.
  • Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981): Reinforces that once the employer articulates a legitimate reason, plaintiffs must show it was a pretext for discrimination.
  • St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993): Cited to clarify step two’s limited function—employer must produce admissible evidence of a non-discriminatory reason that, if believed, would support a finding of no discrimination.
  • Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000): Used twice: (i) to emphasize step two is “production, not persuasion,” and (ii) to frame pretext evidence as showing the reason is “unworthy of credence” or that other circumstantial evidence supports discrimination.

E. Retaliation causation (knowledge and temporal proximity)

  • Roberts v. Gestamp W. Va., LLC, 45 F.4th 726 (4th Cir. 2022): Applied McDonnell Douglas to FMLA retaliation.
  • Barreto v. SGT, Inc., 826 F. App'x 267 (4th Cir. 2020): Confirms McDonnell Douglas applies to MFEPA retaliation claims.
  • Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54 F.4th 201 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Smith v. CSRA, 12 F.4th 396 (4th Cir. 2021)): Articulates ways to show causation—temporal proximity, other facts suggesting retaliatory motive, or both.
  • Foster v. Univ. of Md. E. Shore, 787 F.3d 243 (4th Cir. 2015): Provides the employer’s burden to articulate a legitimate non-retaliatory reason once prima facie retaliation is shown.
  • Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001): Sets the rule that, if relying only on temporal proximity, the timing must be very close.
  • Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc., 998 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting King v. Pulaski Cnty. Sch. Bd., 195 F. Supp. 3d 873 (W.D. Va. 2016)): Rejects retaliation inferences based on timing alone where months have passed, and notes there is no bright-line rule but longer lapses generally require additional evidence.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Disparate treatment: why the case turned on pretext

The court assumed (without deciding) that plaintiffs established prima facie discrimination. That assumption made the appeal turn on steps two and three of McDonnell Douglas.

Step two (employer production) was satisfied by evidence that selection outcomes correlated with performance measures embedded in the plan: interview scoring totals, standardized supervisor references, and principal preference lists. The court emphasized—via St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.—that step two is not a mini-trial on whether the process was “good,” “fair,” or “well safeguarded.” It is a threshold production inquiry.

Step three (plaintiff proof of pretext) failed because, even with all inferences drawn in plaintiffs’ favor, the record did not contain evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer the stated reasons were false and discrimination was the real motive. In practical terms, plaintiffs’ criticism of the process’s structure did not substitute for evidence that defendants manipulated scoring, applied criteria inconsistently along protected-class lines, ignored comparable white/younger candidates with similar application profiles, or otherwise acted with discriminatory intent.

B. Disparate impact: the decisive “available alternative practice” requirement

The court again assumed a prima facie showing (notably, plaintiffs highlighted that four of the five Black women applicants were not selected). The opinion then moved to the statutory defense/rebuttal structure described in Ricci v. DeStefano:

  • The School Board justified the plan as consistent with business necessity—especially the goal of giving principals meaningful input into assistant principal placement and improving evaluation quality during a budget-driven staffing reduction.
  • Plaintiffs were required to rebut this justification by identifying an available alternative employment practice that would have less disparate impact and still serve those legitimate needs.

Because plaintiffs did not propose a workable alternative mechanism (e.g., a modified scoring model, different weighting, validated selection instruments, structured calibration, anonymized review, or other concrete design that still preserved principal input and addressed the budget constraints), their disparate-impact theory failed as a matter of law.

C. Title VII/MFEPA retaliation: knowledge as a gating causation fact

For retaliation, the court affirmed on a straightforward prima facie defect: plaintiffs did not produce evidence that decisionmakers were aware of the protected activity before the adverse actions. Without knowledge, a causal relationship cannot be inferred, even if the employee engaged in protected activity.

This is a recurring litigation pitfall: plaintiffs may show they complained (protected activity) and were later harmed (adverse action), but unless they connect the complaint to the actors and timing relevant to the decision, causation remains speculative.

D. FMLA retaliation: temporal proximity can start the case, but cannot finish it

Hall and Adkins cleared the prima facie bar for the initial 2019 non-selection because the reassignment decision followed relatively soon after their leave—sufficient under Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden for a timing-based inference at step one.

But they still lost because:

  • The School Board offered non-retaliatory reasons (other applicants performed better); and
  • Plaintiffs did not produce evidence of pretext.

As to later alleged retaliation (exclusion from the three-year pool for 2020/2021 openings), the court held that a gap of more than a year was too long to infer causation from timing alone under Roberts v. Glenn Indus. Grp., Inc.. Without additional evidence (statements, inconsistent explanations, departures from policy, or comparator evidence), the prima facie case failed.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished, the decision is likely to influence how litigants in the Fourth Circuit develop (or defend against) challenges to RIF-related reassignment systems:

  • Process critique vs. evidentiary proof: Allegations that a selection system lacks “safeguards” are unlikely to defeat summary judgment absent concrete evidence tying flaws to discriminatory manipulation or disparate application.
  • Disparate-impact pleading and proof discipline: Plaintiffs must be prepared—early—to articulate a specific, feasible, less-discriminatory alternative practice. Courts will treat this as an essential element once business necessity is shown.
  • Retaliation hinges on knowledge: Plaintiffs should preserve evidence of who knew what, and when, including evidence linking complaints to the decisionmakers involved in the adverse employment action.
  • Temporal proximity is time-sensitive: Close timing may establish prima facie causation, but longer gaps typically require additional indicia of retaliation (pattern evidence, inconsistent explanations, or documented deviations from policy).
  • Section 1983 piggybacks on Title VII proof: In employment-discrimination cases, plaintiffs should expect Title VII evidentiary weaknesses to carry over to constitutional claims when the elements align.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling where the court decides there is no genuine dispute of material fact for a jury to resolve, so the moving party wins as a matter of law.
  • Disparate treatment vs. disparate impact: Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination (motive matters). Disparate impact focuses on outcomes of a neutral policy that disproportionately harms a protected group even without proof of intent, unless justified by business necessity and not avoidable by a workable alternative.
  • McDonnell Douglas framework: A three-step method to prove discrimination/retaliation with circumstantial evidence: (1) plaintiff’s prima facie case; (2) employer’s legitimate reason; (3) plaintiff proves that reason is pretext.
  • Legitimate, non-discriminatory reason (step two): The employer’s burden is to produce evidence of a lawful reason—this is not a requirement to prove the reason is correct or optimal.
  • Pretext (step three): Proof that the employer’s stated reason is not the real reason—often shown by inconsistencies, shifting explanations, comparator evidence, procedural irregularities tied to bias, or other facts indicating discrimination/retaliation.
  • Business necessity (disparate impact): A defense that the challenged practice is job-related and consistent with legitimate operational needs.
  • Available alternative practice: A different, practical method that would meet the employer’s legitimate needs with less disparate impact. Without proposing one, plaintiffs commonly cannot overcome a business-necessity defense.
  • Protected activity and knowledge (retaliation): Complaints and charges are protected, but retaliation requires the employer (typically the decisionmaker) to know about the protected activity at the time of the adverse decision.
  • Temporal proximity: Using closeness in time between protected activity and adverse action to infer causation; the inference weakens rapidly as time passes unless supported by other evidence.

5. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit’s decision affirms a familiar but often outcome-determinative set of evidentiary rules in employment cases challenging RIF-related selection systems:

  • Disparate treatment claims commonly rise or fall on whether plaintiffs can produce concrete evidence of pretext, not merely criticism of process design.
  • Disparate impact claims require plaintiffs to do more than show disparity; they must identify a workable, less-discriminatory alternative that still satisfies legitimate business needs.
  • Retaliation claims require evidence the employer knew of the protected activity, and timing alone—especially after substantial delay—rarely suffices.

Even as a nonprecedential decision, the opinion is a clear roadmap for the proof courts expect at summary judgment when plaintiffs challenge a structured reassignment plan implemented in response to budget-driven administrative reductions.