Revocation Imprisonment Under § 3583(e)(3) Is Not Capped by the Underlying Offense’s Statutory Maximum; Successive Revocations Do Not Moot an Earlier Revocation Appeal While Supervised Release Remains Modifiable

1. Introduction

United States v. Baldemoro (5th Cir. June 16, 2026) addresses two recurrent supervised-release questions: (1) whether a defendant who already served the statutory maximum prison term for the offense of conviction can nevertheless be reimprisoned upon revocation under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); and (2) whether an appeal challenging an earlier revocation sentence becomes moot after a later revocation issues a new judgment.

The defendant, James Baldemoro, pleaded guilty in 2014 to possession of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(2). He received the statutory maximum ten years’ imprisonment plus ten years’ supervised release. After completing the ten-year custodial term, he twice violated supervised-release conditions and twice received six months’ reimprisonment. Each time, he argued that further imprisonment was unlawful because he had already served the maximum prison term authorized by § 2252A(b)(2), and that revocation imprisonment based on judge-found facts violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit (Wilson, J.) affirmed both revocation sentences and held:

  • Not moot: The first revocation appeal was not moot despite a second revocation judgment, because success on the first could support a motion to modify or terminate the ongoing supervised-release term (a “collateral consequence”).
  • No statutory cap at the offense maximum: § 3583(e)(3) permits revocation imprisonment up to the statutory limits tied to the class of the underlying felony, even if total prison time (original custody + revocation custody) exceeds the underlying statute’s maximum term of imprisonment.
  • No Fifth/Sixth Amendment jury-trial right in § 3583(e)(3) revocations: Revocation proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, and the court’s existing precedent forecloses applying Apprendi/Alleyne to ordinary § 3583(e)(3) revocations; United States v. Haymond does not change that conclusion.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review

  • United States v. Flores, 130 F.4th 465, 468 (5th Cir. 2025): Provided the de novo standard for whether a sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
  • United States v. Branson, 139 F.4th 475, 477 (5th Cir. 2025), cert. denied, 223 L. Ed. 2d 561 (2026): Supplied de novo review for preserved constitutional challenges.

2) Mootness and “collateral consequences” in sentencing appeals

  • United States v. Sosebee, 59 F.4th 151, 154 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987)): Anchored mootness as a jurisdictional (Article III) requirement.
  • Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307 (2012)): Supplied the “any effectual relief whatever” articulation; even a small concrete interest prevents mootness.
  • Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998): Required “some collateral consequence” once the imprisonment term expires.
  • United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 60 (2000): Recognized the statutory ability to seek modification (§ 3583(e)(2)) or termination (§ 3583(e)(1)) of supervised release.
  • Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (5th Cir. 2006): Held an appeal is not moot after release where the district court may modify supervised release in light of “excess prison time.”
  • Herndon v. Upton, 985 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 2021): Reiterated Pettiford’s rule: release from custody does not moot an appeal when supervised release remains ongoing and modifiable.

How they influenced the decision: Baldemoro’s case was “slightly different” because a later revocation had entered a new judgment. The panel extended Pettiford/Herndon’s logic to successive revocations: if a favorable ruling on the earlier revocation could support modification/termination of the current supervised-release term (by showing “excess prison time”), then collateral consequences remain and the appeal is not moot.

3) Statutory structure of supervised release and revocation imprisonment

  • Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000): Recognized postrevocation penalties are “part of the penalty for the initial offense,” but also noted that “the gravity of the initial offense determines the maximum term of reimprisonment” (by reference to the supervised-release framework, not the underlying offense’s prison maximum).
  • United States v. Hampton, 633 F.3d 334, 341 (5th Cir. 2011): Squarely stated that revocation imprisonment may cause total prison time to exceed the underlying offense’s statutory maximum.
  • United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114, 116 n.7 (5th Cir. 2005): Collected authority explaining that initial imprisonment plus revocation imprisonment may exceed the statutory maximum for the offense.

How they influenced the decision: Baldemoro attempted to use Johnson v. United States to import a cap tied to § 2252A(b)(2)’s “not more than 10 years.” The panel rejected that move as inconsistent with the text of § 3583(e)(3) and with binding Fifth Circuit precedent (Hampton, Hinson), which treats revocation imprisonment as governed by § 3583(e)(3)’s limits (here, keyed to the underlying offense’s felony class), not by the underlying offense’s prison-maximum clause.

4) Nationwide consensus rejecting the “offense maximum caps revocation” theory

The panel cited decisions from every circuit to consider the argument and reject it, including: United States v. Pettus; United States v. Cook; United States v. McMillan; United States v. Wright; United States v. Colt; United States v. Childs; United States v. Henderson; United States v. Salazar; United States v. Moore.

How they influenced the decision: Although Fifth Circuit law already foreclosed Baldemoro’s statutory theory, the court’s “every circuit” observation fortified the conclusion that § 3583(e)(3) is uniformly understood as an independent postconviction sanctioning mechanism, not one limited by the underlying offense’s prison maximum.

5) Constitutional limits: revocation as non-prosecution; Apprendi/Alleyne; and Haymond

  • Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972): Established that revocation proceedings are not part of a criminal prosecution and do not trigger the “full panoply” of trial rights.
  • United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114, 118 (5th Cir. 2005): Applied Morrissey to supervised-release revocations, rejecting full Fifth/Sixth Amendment trial-rights in revocation.
  • Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000): Jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt facts increasing penalty beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.
  • Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 108 (2013): Extended Apprendi to facts raising mandatory minimums.
  • United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634 (2019): Fractured Court invalidated § 3583(k) as applied; plurality raised concerns about § 3583(e)(3) in a “rare” case but declined to decide it.
  • United States v. Garner, 969 F.3d 550, 552 (5th Cir. 2020), as revised (Aug. 14, 2020) (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)): Identified Justice Breyer’s concurrence as controlling under Marks.
  • United States v. Peguero, 34 F.4th 143, 159 (2d Cir. 2022): Noted every circuit agrees Haymond did not undermine the validity of § 3583(e).

The court also cited post-Haymond circuit decisions rejecting similar constitutional attacks on § 3583(e)(3), including: United States v. Seighman; United States v. Doka; United States v. Ka; United States v. Carpenter, cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1188 (2025); plus the already-mentioned Moore, Childs, Henderson, and Salazar.

How they influenced the decision: Baldemoro’s constitutional theory depended on treating revocation imprisonment as either (i) punishment for “new conduct,” or (ii) an “enhancement” beyond the underlying statutory maximum, thus invoking Apprendi/Alleyne jury safeguards. The panel rejected this via two steps:

  1. Binding baseline rule: Under Morrissey v. Brewer and United States v. Hinson, revocation is not a criminal prosecution, and the full set of trial rights Baldemoro invoked does not apply.
  2. Haymond does not generalize: Under United States v. Garner (Marks), Justice Breyer’s controlling concurrence in United States v. Haymond refused to “transplant the Apprendi line” to supervised release generally and invalidated § 3583(k) based on three combined features (limited offense set, removal of judicial discretion, and a five-year mandatory minimum). Those features are absent from § 3583(e)(3), which applies broadly, preserves discretion, and contains no mandatory minimum.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Mootness: successive revocations do not erase collateral consequences

The Government argued the second revocation “superseded” the first, eliminating any possible relief. The court disagreed because Baldemoro remained subject to a lengthy supervised-release term, and the sentencing court retained statutory authority under § 3583(e)(1) and § 3583(e)(2) to terminate or modify supervision.

Critically, the panel treated the potential to argue “excess prison time” (if the first revocation were unlawful) as a live collateral consequence, even though the supervised-release term Baldemoro was serving flowed from a later revocation judgment. That bridge—earlier unlawful custody as a basis to seek later supervision relief—is the doctrinal move that keeps the first appeal alive.

2) Statutory merits: § 3583(e)(3) is an independent imprisonment authorization with its own cap

Baldemoro’s statutory argument sought to make the underlying statute’s prison maximum (here, ten years under § 2252A(b)(2)) a ceiling on all custody, including revocation custody. The panel found the statutory text foreclosed that reading:

  • § 2252A(b)(2) caps initial imprisonment for the conviction at “not more than 10 years.”
  • § 3583(e)(3) separately authorizes revocation imprisonment up to specified limits keyed to the felony class (here, a Class C felony cap of two years “on any such revocation”).

The opinion emphasized what § 3583(e)(3) does not say: it does not subtract prior imprisonment for the offense of conviction from the revocation-imprisonment cap. In other words, Congress built a supervised-release sanctioning scheme where revocation custody is constrained by § 3583(e)(3)’s limits (and the “on any such revocation” phrasing), not by the underlying offense’s maximum term of imprisonment.

3) Constitutional merits: ordinary § 3583(e)(3) revocation remains outside Apprendi/Alleyne

The panel treated Baldemoro’s Apprendi/Alleyne submission as incompatible with controlling revocation doctrine: revocation is adjudicated by a judge under a preponderance standard, and the resulting custody is a component of the original sentence’s supervised-release framework. Under the Fifth Circuit’s reading of United States v. Haymond (via United States v. Garner and Marks v. United States), only § 3583(k)’s unusual combination of constraints triggered constitutional invalidity; § 3583(e)(3) does not share those features.

C. Impact

  • Revocation custody can exceed the underlying offense’s prison maximum: The decision reaffirms and applies Fifth Circuit law that § 3583(e)(3) authorizes revocation imprisonment even where the defendant already served the maximum prison term stated in the statute of conviction—so long as the revocation term fits within § 3583(e)(3)’s felony-class limits.
  • Successive revocations do not automatically moot earlier revocation appeals: The opinion extends the “modifiable supervised release” collateral-consequence rationale into the successive-judgment context, preserving appellate review where a victory could later support modification/termination of the ongoing supervision.
  • Haymond remains cabined: The Fifth Circuit continues to treat Haymond as a narrow § 3583(k) decision, leaving § 3583(e)(3) largely insulated from Apprendi/Alleyne challenges.
  • Practical litigation consequence: Defendants challenging revocation custody after release from custody will focus on concrete downstream supervision consequences (modification/termination) to defeat mootness, particularly when multiple revocations occur.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised release: A post-prison monitoring term imposed at sentencing. Violations can result in revocation and additional prison time under § 3583(e)(3).
  • Revocation imprisonment cap (“Class C or D felony”): § 3583(e)(3) sets maximum revocation prison time by the felony class of the underlying conviction. For Class C/D felonies, the cap is “more than 2 years in prison” per revocation.
  • Mootness: An appeal is moot only if the court cannot grant any effective relief. In sentencing, completed custody can still leave a live case if ongoing supervised release could be reduced based on the appellate outcome.
  • Collateral consequence: A continuing legal effect of a sentence (here, the ongoing supervised-release term that might be modified/terminated) that keeps the dispute “live.”
  • Apprendi/Alleyne: Jury-trial doctrines requiring jury findings (beyond a reasonable doubt) for facts that increase statutory maximums (Apprendi) or mandatory minimums (Alleyne) in criminal prosecutions. The Fifth Circuit reiterated that ordinary supervised-release revocation under § 3583(e)(3) is not treated as such a prosecution.
  • Marks rule: When the Supreme Court issues a fractured decision, the controlling holding is the position taken on the “narrowest grounds.” The Fifth Circuit applied this through United States v. Garner to treat Justice Breyer’s concurrence in United States v. Haymond as controlling.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Baldemoro reinforces two key propositions in Fifth Circuit supervised-release jurisprudence. First, § 3583(e)(3) authorizes revocation imprisonment according to its own felony-class limits, even when the defendant already served the underlying offense’s statutory maximum prison term. Second, an earlier revocation appeal is not moot merely because a later revocation judgment issued, so long as a favorable ruling could support modification or termination of an ongoing supervised-release term. On the constitutional front, the court held that Haymond does not generalize Apprendi/Alleyne into ordinary § 3583(e)(3) revocations, leaving the prevailing revocation framework intact.