Repeated Supervised-Release Breaches and Similar Recidivism Can Justify an Above-Guidelines Revocation Sentence Outside the “Mine-Run”

Commentary on United States v. Dedrick Anthony Taylor (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2025) (unpublished)

I. Introduction

United States v. Dedrick Anthony Taylor addresses when a district court may impose an upward variance after revoking supervised release and how appellate courts assess substantive reasonableness in that setting. The defendant, Dedrick Anthony Taylor, had originally been convicted in 2005 of two counts of armed bank robbery and two counts of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, receiving 240 months’ imprisonment followed by five years of supervised release. After release in 2021, he violated supervision in 2022 (embezzlement from an employer and restitution nonpayment), and the district court attempted a lenient approach—time served with supervision continuing to the original expiration date.

In 2024, Taylor again faced revocation allegations: (1) committing another crime—attempted aggravated robbery—and (2) failing to make monthly restitution payments. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Taylor attempted aggravated robbery (the government presented witnesses and exhibits indicating an attempted bank robbery with a BB gun) and that he failed to pay restitution. With a Grade A violation and Criminal History Category VI, the advisory policy-statement range was 51–63 months, yet the court imposed 84 months—an upward variance.

The central issues on appeal were: (a) whether this was a “mine-run” case requiring “closer review” of the variance; (b) whether the court overweighed recidivism or original offense conduct; and (c) whether the sentence created an unwarranted disparity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit held that the 84-month revocation sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the court concluded:

  • This was not a “mine-run” revocation case because the district court relied on factors not captured by the advisory range—most notably repeated supervised-release violations and the seriousness of Taylor’s breach of trust.
  • The district court did not give excessive weight to recidivism: Taylor’s violation conduct (attempted aggravated bank robbery) closely resembled his underlying bank-robbery convictions, and the repeated breach-of-trust dimension was not reflected in the Guidelines range.
  • The district court did not overemphasize the original offense conduct; it did not rely on the original conviction to justify the upward variance (even if the government discussed it).
  • Taylor’s disparity argument—based on Sentencing Commission statistics—failed because it was not meaningfully developed below and, in any event, § 3553(a)(6) prohibits only unwarranted disparities.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

1. Standard of review and the procedural/substantive framework

  • United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475 (6th Cir. 2023): Supplied the abuse-of-discretion standard for revocation sentences and, critically, the boundary between “nature and circumstances of the offense” (original offense conduct) and permissible consideration of violation conduct in assessing breach of trust. Taylor invoked Morris to argue the district court overweighted original offense conduct; the panel used Morris to reject that characterization and to note Taylor did not properly raise an argument about improper reliance on violation conduct.
  • United States v. Walters, 775 F.3d 778 (6th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Price, 901 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2018): Reinforced that revocation sentences are reviewed for both procedural and substantive reasonableness under the same abuse-of-discretion framework applied to post-conviction sentencing. This allowed the panel to focus narrowly because Taylor challenged only substantive reasonableness.
  • United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2018): Provided the definition of substantive unreasonableness as essentially a “too long/too short” claim and framed the inquiry as proportionality and necessity under § 3553(a).
  • United States v. Axline, 93 F.4th 1002 (6th Cir. 2024): Contributed two key ideas: (i) sentences must be “sufficient but not greater than necessary” under § 3553(a), and (ii) when prior convictions are used to justify an upward variance, there should be a “meaningful relationship” between prior conduct and the instant offense showing a need for added deterrence beyond what the Guidelines capture. The panel used Axline to validate the district court’s reliance on similarity between Taylor’s original bank robberies and his attempted bank robbery during supervision.
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): Anchored the “totality of the circumstances” lens and the instruction to consider the extent of a variance while still applying deference to the district court’s sentencing judgment.
  • United States v. Boucher, 937 F.3d 702 (6th Cir. 2019): Supplied the principle that appellate courts owe “considerable deference” when the district court reasonably explains how a defendant’s case differs from a typical one under the guideline, but that “closer review” can apply in a mine-run case.

2. The “mine-run” concept and when closer review applies

  • United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748 (6th Cir. 2020): Taylor’s chief authority for calling his case “typical.” In Perez-Rodriguez, the Sixth Circuit treated an illegal reentry case as mine-run because the key aggravators were already built into the Guidelines (criminal history scoring and an enhancement). The panel distinguished Perez-Rodriguez on the ground that revocation sentencing uniquely centers on breach of trust and supervision performance—factors not necessarily captured by the advisory range.
  • Kimbrough v United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) and United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2009): Provided the conceptual structure: district courts may vary when a case falls outside the Guidelines’ “heartland,” and variances in mine-run cases can receive closer review to prevent unfair disparities. The panel used these cases to emphasize that the district court identified non-heartland features (repeated violations and serious breach of trust).

3. Weighting factors: recidivism, deterrence, and reasonableness limits

  • United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670 (6th Cir. 2020): Via Axline, reinforced that prior conduct must relate meaningfully to the instant conduct to justify deterrence beyond what the Guidelines already incorporate.
  • United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318 (6th Cir. 2007): Supplied the appellate check that a sentence can be substantively unreasonable if the court assigns an “unreasonable amount of weight” to any pertinent factor. The panel concluded the district court did not do so here.

4. Sentencing disparity

  • United States v. Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2008): Emphasized that § 3553(a)(6) targets only unwarranted disparities; some disparity is justified by differing facts. The panel applied this to reject Taylor’s reliance on general statistics without showing the disparity was unwarranted given repeated breach-of-trust and similar recidivism.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Why this was not a “mine-run” revocation case

The panel’s core move was to treat revocation sentencing as distinct from many “typical” initial-sentencing contexts because the revocation framework is centrally about the defendant’s performance on supervision and the resulting breach of the court’s trust. The district court emphasized:

  • Repeated supervised-release violations (a prior revocation episode in 2022, met with leniency, followed by new violations in 2024); and
  • The seriousness of the breach of trust, amplified by similarity to the original bank-robbery conduct.

The Sixth Circuit reasoned that these features were “neither of which was accounted for in the Guidelines” range used at revocation. That conclusion matters because Taylor’s “mine-run” argument depended on the idea that the policy-statement range already captured the aggravating facts, as in United States v. Perez-Rodriguez. By finding that key aggravators were not embedded in the range, the panel treated the case as outside the mine-run and reduced the force of Taylor’s “closer review” demand.

2. Recidivism: similarity plus breach of trust justified added deterrence

The panel accepted the district court’s reliance on recidivism because it was not generic recidivism already reflected in Criminal History Category VI; it was notably similar conduct occurring while under supervision. Taylor’s violation conduct involved attempted aggravated bank robbery, while the original conviction involved multiple armed bank robberies. Under United States v. Axline (quoting United States v. Lee), that meaningful relationship can demonstrate a need for deterrence beyond what the Guidelines capture.

Importantly, the opinion frames the aggravation as two-layered:

  • Conduct similarity (bank-robbery-type conduct recurring); and
  • Status-based seriousness (doing so while on supervised release after prior violations and prior leniency).

That combination supported the conclusion that the district court did not overweight recidivism, and it rationalized the incremental severity from 51–63 months to 84 months.

3. Original offense conduct vs. violation conduct: the panel’s narrowing move

Taylor argued the district court placed too much weight on his original offense conduct. The Sixth Circuit’s response was factual and doctrinal:

  • Factual: although the government described the original offenses, the district court “did not discuss his original conviction in justifying its sentence.”
  • Doctrinal: the opinion quotes United States v. Morris for the proposition that, when considering “the nature and circumstances of the offense,” a court should consider only original offense conduct, not violation conduct. Yet the panel treats the district court’s explanation as grounded in breach of trust and supervision history rather than an attempt to resentence for the underlying bank robberies.

The panel also noted a potential alternative argument—improper overemphasis on violation conduct under the “nature and circumstances” factor—but declined to address it because Taylor did not raise it. This illustrates a common appellate dynamic in sentencing appeals: arguments must be framed precisely to engage the applicable doctrinal constraint.

4. Disparity arguments require comparators and an “unwarranted” showing

Taylor relied on Sentencing Commission statistics to argue his above-range sentence placed him among a small percentage of Grade A/Class A revocation defendants receiving above-range sentences. The panel rejected the argument for two reinforcing reasons:

  • Taylor did not present the statistical argument below, and without specific arguments, the district court was not required to provide an expansive explanation focused on § 3553(a)(6).
  • Even if disparity existed, United States v. Phinazee instructs that only unwarranted disparities are problematic; Taylor did not explain why any disparity was unwarranted given his particular breach-of-trust profile and repeated violations.

C. Impact

Although unpublished and “NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion is still instructive within the Sixth Circuit for revocation practice and appellate framing. Its most significant practical implications are:

  • Revocation “mine-run” analysis may turn on breach-of-trust facts not captured by the advisory range. The opinion signals that repeated violations and prior leniency can move a case outside the mine-run, making upward variances easier to defend on appeal.
  • Similarity-based recidivism is especially aggravating in revocation. Where the violation conduct resembles the underlying conviction conduct, courts may characterize the case as demonstrating heightened deterrence needs beyond criminal history scoring.
  • Disparity claims need developed comparators. General statistics without a tailored “similarly situated defendants” showing—and without a preserved argument—are unlikely to succeed.
  • Issue-framing matters. The panel’s observation that Taylor did not argue improper reliance on violation conduct underscores that appellate courts will often decide what they can reach based on the arguments actually presented.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Revocation of supervised release: After prison, a defendant may be supervised under court-imposed conditions. Violating conditions can lead to revocation and a new prison term. Revocation is not a new conviction; it is a sanction for violating the court’s trust.
  • “Breach of trust”: The central idea in revocation is that the defendant failed to comply with the court’s conditions. Courts may punish that failure, and repeated violations can make the breach more serious.
  • Grade A / Grade C violations: Categories used in the revocation policy statements. Serious new criminal conduct can be Grade A; less serious or technical violations may be Grade C. Here, attempted aggravated robbery was Grade A; restitution nonpayment was Grade C.
  • Guidelines range (policy statements) vs. statutory maximum: The 51–63 months range is advisory for revocation. The statutory maximum (here, 192 months) is the legal ceiling Congress authorizes. A court may sentence above the advisory range as long as it stays within the statutory maximum and is reasonable under § 3553(a).
  • Upward variance: A sentence above the advisory range based on the court’s assessment of the § 3553(a) factors.
  • “Mine-run” case: A typical case the Guidelines are designed to cover. Variances in mine-run cases can receive closer appellate review because of disparity concerns.
  • Preponderance of the evidence: The standard for finding supervised-release violations—more likely than not—lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Unwarranted disparity (§ 3553(a)(6)): The law does not require identical sentences; it discourages differences that cannot be justified by relevant factual and legal distinctions.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Dedrick Anthony Taylor affirms that an above-Guidelines revocation sentence can be substantively reasonable where the district court identifies aggravating features not captured by the advisory range—especially repeated supervised-release violations, prior leniency followed by renewed misconduct, and recidivism that mirrors the original offense conduct. The decision also serves as a caution that disparity arguments require preserved, defendant-specific comparisons and a showing that any disparity is truly unwarranted under § 3553(a)(6).