1. Introduction
In United States v. Dejon Boone, the Sixth Circuit considered whether repeatedly firing toward an occupied vehicle leaving a gas station supported a federal sentencing enhancement for possessing ammunition “in connection with another felony offense.” The proposed additional felony was an Ohio offense involving the discharge of a firearm upon or over a public road in circumstances creating a substantial risk of physical harm.
Dejon Boone, the defendant-appellant, argued that he fired above the vehicle rather than at it. He maintained that the government had not established the substantial risk necessary to make the shooting a felony and that the district court had inadequately explained its contrary conclusion. The United States defended the enhancement.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed Boone’s 60-month sentence. Its central conclusion was that multiple shots toward a moving, occupied vehicle in an urban setting with bystanders created a strong possibility of physical harm, including harm from a resulting vehicle crash. The sentencing court’s explanation, considered as a whole, adequately addressed the defense’s objections.
2. Background and Governing Law
The shooting and federal prosecution
Surveillance video showed Boone pumping gas at a station in Elyria, Ohio, while a white Ford Explorer exited the property. As the Explorer entered the roadway, Boone left the gas pump, chased after the vehicle, and fired several shots in its direction. Bystanders ducked for cover, and officers later recovered six spent shell casings.
Because Boone had prior felony convictions, a federal grand jury charged him with possessing ammunition as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He pleaded guilty. The federal conviction at issue was therefore ammunition possession, not a conviction for the Ohio shooting offense.
The Guidelines enhancement
At sentencing, the probation office applied the four-level enhancement then located at U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). That provision covered the use or possession of ammunition “in connection with another felony offense.” The opinion notes that the provision was recodified at § 2K2.1(b)(7)(B) in the 2025 Guidelines Manual.
The alleged additional felony arose under Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.162(A)(3), (C)(2): discharging a firearm upon or over a public road or highway in a manner creating a substantial risk of physical harm to another person. Under Ohio Rev. Code § 2901.01(A)(8), “substantial risk” requires a “strong possibility” that the relevant result may occur.
The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Boone’s ammunition possession was connected to that felony. The resulting advisory Guidelines range was 70 to 87 months. The court varied downward and imposed 60 months’ imprisonment.
4. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
The opinion draws on three groups of authorities: cases explaining appellate review, cases identifying substantial risk from gunfire, and cases addressing the adequacy of sentencing explanations.
Appellate review: “due deference” depends on the question
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United States v. Williams, 184 F.4th 474, 484 (6th Cir. 2026), and United States v. Alvarado, 95 F.4th 1047, 1053 (6th Cir. 2024). These decisions supply the opinion’s general instruction to review application of the enhancement with “due deference.” They frame the appellate inquiry without making every aspect of the enhancement equally deferential.
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Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996). The Supreme Court’s explanation that deference depends on the nature of the question anchors the court’s more specific discussion. Some questions warrant no deference; others warrant substantial deference. The Sixth Circuit uses this principle to distinguish legal interpretation, factual findings, and procedural adequacy.
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United States v. Clay. The opinion relies on this case to separate two inquiries. Whether a criminal statute reaches undisputed conduct is a legal question reviewed de novo. A challenge turning on an underlying factual finding is reviewed for clear error. This distinction prevents the general phrase “due deference” from obscuring the actual issue being reviewed.
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United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2011). This decision reinforces that application of the enhancement receives de novo review when it presents strictly a question of law. Its role is methodological: not every enhancement dispute is a factual determination entitled to deference.
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United States v. Logan, No. 24-3264, 2025 WL 1012722, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 31, 2025). This case supports abuse-of-discretion review when the challenge concerns whether the sentencing court meaningfully explained its reasons for applying the enhancement. It is especially relevant to Boone’s complaint about the district court’s treatment of his substantial-risk argument.
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United States v. Brown, 131 F.4th 337, 343 (6th Cir. 2025). The observation that “[m]ixed questions are not all alike” summarizes the court’s approach. A dispute combining law and facts must be examined according to its particular character, rather than assigned an automatic, uniform standard of review.
Substantial risk: direct and indirect dangers from gunfire
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State v. Robinson, No. 31127, 2025 WL 475540, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2025). This is a particularly close analogy. It recognizes that even one shot at another vehicle can endanger people in the bullet’s trajectory and create a risk of a damaging car crash. It supports the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that the analysis extends beyond whether a bullet was likely to strike an occupant directly.
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State v. Spates, No. 100933, 2015 WL 1249711, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2015). The court quotes its proposition that shooting where people are present and within the shooter’s range creates a substantial risk of physical harm. This supports consideration of the bystanders as well as the vehicle’s occupants.
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State v. Ingram, No. 1-08-53, 2009 WL 737777, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 23, 2009), and State v. Windom, No. 97APA03-370, 1997 WL 798774, at *3–4 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 1997). These authorities appear through the quoted discussion in State v. Spates. Their role is supporting the same proposition about shooting near people within range. The opinion does not independently analyze their facts or announce separate rules based on them.
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United States v. Armstrong, No. 22-3540, 2023 WL 6636245, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 12, 2023). This Sixth Circuit authority recognizes that a single shot “in the direction” of another individual can satisfy the substantial-risk element. It supports rejecting an approach that would make precise targeting indispensable to the risk analysis.
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State v. Berry, No. 2020CA00137, 2024 WL 1084597, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2024). This case supports the conclusion that multiple shots in another person’s direction create substantial risk. It reinforces the significance of repeated firing: each additional shot increased the opportunities for injury.
Together, these authorities support a contextual understanding of danger. The court did not need to identify a completed injury or rely exclusively on the precise path of a particular bullet.
Sentencing explanations: substance rather than formula
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United States v. Pineda-Duarte, 933 F.3d 519, 525 (6th Cir. 2019), quoting McClellan, 164 F.3d 308, 310 (6th Cir. 1999). These authorities establish that a sentencing judge need not recite “magic words.” They answer Boone’s suggestion that the court had to expressly parse the distinction between ordinary risk and substantial risk in a particular way.
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United States v. Histed, 93 F.4th 948, 959 (6th Cir. 2024). This decision permits sentencing findings to be understood from the court’s “general tone.” It supports reading the explanation as a whole to determine whether the court rejected Boone’s position, rather than isolating individual phrases.
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United States v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 628, 634 (6th Cir. 2012). Distinct from the 2011 decision bearing the same case title, this authority separates ignoring a defense argument from failing to answer every argument “head-on.” The latter does not necessarily require reversal if the court’s reasoning remains clear.
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United States v. Petrus, 588 F.3d 347, 356 (6th Cir. 2009). The opinion invokes this authority in concluding that the record demonstrated the district court’s understanding and rejection of Boone’s arguments, including his account of firing over the vehicle and his challenge to the government’s proof.
B. Legal Reasoning
The contested issue was the felony-level risk
The appeal focused on whether the shooting created the “substantial risk” required by Ohio’s felony provision. Boone sought to distinguish that degree of danger from the lesser risk he associated with misdemeanor treatment. Establishing merely that the conduct was unsafe would not, by itself, answer the statutory question.
The Sixth Circuit therefore applied Ohio’s specific definition: a strong possibility of physical harm. It concluded that the district court had identified circumstances meeting that threshold, not merely described gunfire as dangerous in the abstract.
The court assessed the entire event
Several circumstances operated together: the vehicle was occupied and moving into the roadway; the shooting occurred in an urban setting; bystanders were nearby; and Boone fired repeatedly. The analysis was cumulative rather than dependent on any one fact.
The court also recognized two routes to injury. A bullet could directly strike a person, but the gunfire could also cause the driver to lose control and crash. This second route matters because Boone’s claim to have fired above the car did not eliminate the danger to its occupants or surrounding people.
The opinion does not establish that every shot fired above a vehicle necessarily creates the required substantial risk. Its conclusion rests on this shooting’s particular surroundings and repeated nature.
Actual injury was unnecessary
No one’s escape from injury disproved the existence of substantial risk when Boone fired. The statutory inquiry concerned the danger created by the conduct, not whether that danger ultimately materialized. Boone’s expression of gratitude that nobody was hurt was consistent with that distinction.
The burden of proof and the risk threshold are different
The district court applied a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard to the enhancement. That required the government to establish that the relevant facts and felony connection were more likely than not.
It did not require proof that physical injury itself was more likely than not to occur. The court needed to find, by the applicable evidentiary standard, that Boone’s conduct created the “strong possibility” of harm specified by Ohio law. Keeping those two inquiries separate avoids overstating the statutory risk requirement.
The connection to ammunition possession followed from the shooting
The same shooting supplied the conduct supporting the Ohio felony and the connection to Boone’s possession of ammunition. The opinion’s substantive analysis concentrates on whether that shooting qualified as a felony; it does not develop a separate, disputed theory of the connection requirement.
The decision also illustrates that the additional felony can be established through sentencing findings. The opinion identifies no separate Ohio conviction as a prerequisite to applying this enhancement.
The explanation was adequate, not optional
The court’s rejection of a “magic words” requirement did not dispense with reasoned sentencing. It emphasized that the district court had actually considered Boone’s position and had examined the shooting’s location, nearby people, and different risks before expressly finding substantial risk.
The distinction is between an explanation that is substantively sufficient without a fixed script and one that fails to engage with a material objection. The Sixth Circuit found the former here.
C. Potential Impact and Limits
Future sentencing disputes. The decision supports using concrete evidence of surrounding people, vehicle movement, repeated shots, and possible secondary accidents to establish the felony underlying an enhancement. A defendant’s characterization of shots as being fired “over” a target will not necessarily overcome that evidence.
Sentencing practice. District courts need not deliver an element-by-element speech, but identifying the circumstances that elevate danger to substantial risk creates a stronger record for appellate review. Prosecutors likewise benefit from proving specific dangers rather than relying on generalized descriptions of firearm misuse.
Appellate advocacy. The opinion encourages precise identification of the alleged error. Statutory interpretation, factual findings, and inadequate explanation can implicate different standards of review, even when they concern the same enhancement.
Limits on the decision. The opinion does not make all roadway gunfire a felony, decide every factual variation involving warning shots, or resolve unrelated federal-possession issues. Its unpublished designation also counsels against describing it as a new, categorical, binding rule. Its principal significance is its application of existing authorities to a well-supported sentencing record.