2. Summary of the Opinion
Procedural Posture and Admitted Violations
Kakol filed his petition after a formal complaint, using the procedure recognized by Bar Rule 4-227(c)(2). He admitted violations of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.7 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, found in Bar Rule 4-102(d). Each rule carries disbarment as its maximum sanction, although that maximum is not automatically required whenever a violation occurs.
The State Bar supported acceptance of the petition. The Court therefore considered an agreed disciplinary resolution grounded in petition-specific admissions, rather than deciding the allegations after a contested merits hearing.
SDBD No. 7987: Repeated Incomplete Filings and a Third-Party Conflict
A homeowner faced foreclosure after his wife’s death caused a default under a reverse mortgage on a residence titled solely in her name. A third-party company told him it could save his home and obtained documents that he believed would stop foreclosure. Those documents required bankruptcy proceedings and probate of his wife’s estate.
The company retained Kakol to represent the homeowner, disclosed that it would pay his fees, and advised that it had a contract to purchase the property. During a joint telephone conversation, the homeowner expressed his objective: stopping foreclosure so that he could remain in his home.
Kakol filed a Chapter 13 petition on December 4, 2022. The bankruptcy court identified deficiencies and set a correction deadline, but Kakol made no corrective filings, and the case was dismissed. When foreclosure was scheduled again, the company paid for a second petition. Kakol filed another skeletal petition but again failed to correct deficiencies. That case was dismissed on March 20, 2023.
For this matter, Kakol admitted violations of Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, and 1.7. The opinion does not state the property’s ultimate disposition.
SDBD No. 7988: Failure to Respond and Inadequate Client Communication
A second client retained Kakol on December 5, 2022, seeking to delay foreclosure. Kakol filed a bankruptcy petition that day and later obtained an order granting a motion to impose a stay. According to the admitted account, the lender continued harassing telephone calls in violation of the stay.
The lender subsequently sought relief from the stay, but Kakol failed to respond to its motion. Both Kakol and the client appeared and testified at the eventual hearing. A later show-cause proceeding resulted in the bankruptcy court determining that Kakol had violated General Order 42-2020, which imposed specific attorney-client communication requirements in bankruptcy proceedings.
Kakol admitted violations of Rules 1.1 and 1.3. The misconduct described was therefore not a failure to appear at the hearing, but failures in preparation, responsiveness, and compliance with communication requirements.
SDBD No. 7989: Uncorrected Deficiencies Followed by Foreclosure
A couple retained Kakol in 2023 to file a Chapter 13 case to stop foreclosure. He filed a skeletal petition but did not submit the corrective filings required by a court order. The case was dismissed.
Kakol sought reconsideration, and a hearing was scheduled for November 9, 2023. Meanwhile, the lender scheduled foreclosure for November 7. The foreclosure occurred, and Kakol withdrew the reconsideration motion. He admitted violations of Rules 1.1 and 1.3.
The Court’s Disposition
After reviewing the petition and the State Bar’s response, the Court accepted the surrender as tantamount to disbarment under Rule 1.0(u). It directed that Kakol’s name be removed from Georgia’s attorney rolls and reminded him of his duties under Bar Rule 4-219(b). All Justices concurred.
3. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
In the Matter of Morse, 266 Ga. 652, 653 (1996)
The opinion cites In the Matter of Morse when describing the State Bar’s assessment under the American Bar Association’s Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. Its role is methodological: it supplies authority for considering disciplinary sanctions within that established framework.
The Court does not reproduce a particular ABA standard or conduct a detailed factor-by-factor analysis. Accordingly, the citation should not be read as an express adoption of unstated findings about Kakol’s mental state, mitigation, or particular aggravating factors.
In the Matter of Dowdy, 247 Ga. 488, 493 (1981)
In the Matter of Dowdy supplies the opinion’s clearest statement of disciplinary purposes. An appropriate sanction serves as “a penalty to the offender, a deterrent to others, and as an indication to laymen that the courts will maintain the ethics of the profession.”
The State Bar argued that accepting the surrender would serve those objectives. This authority connects the sanction to concerns extending beyond the individual lawyer: discouraging similar misconduct and maintaining public confidence in professional regulation. The Court accepted the proposed disposition without separately evaluating each objective.
In the Matter of Kakol, 286 Ga. 469, 470 (2010)
This earlier disciplinary decision concerning the same attorney provides historical context. The present opinion identifies four previous disciplinary measures: a public reprimand in 1994, a three-year suspension in 1998, a letter of admonition in 2007, and a Review Panel reprimand in 2010. The 2010 reprimand involved admitted violations of Rules 1.15(II) and 8.4(a)(4).
The State Bar also identified an apparent typographical error in the 2010 opinion, which had dated the public reprimand to 1984—before Kakol’s admission to the Bar—instead of 1994.
The disciplinary history makes the present misconduct significant as recurrence rather than an isolated episode. Nevertheless, the Court does not expressly assign a particular weight to that history or establish that any fixed number of prior sanctions requires disbarment.
In the Matter of Fleming, 317 Ga. 720, 724 (2023)
In In the Matter of Fleming, the Court accepted voluntary surrender from an attorney who, among other misconduct, violated Rule 1.7(a) by representing a client at the employer’s behest and colluding with the employer to steal the client’s settlement funds.
The relevant parallel is the danger of divided loyalty where an outside party arranges the representation and has interests adverse to the client. Here, the third-party company paid for representation while holding a contract to purchase the home the client wished to retain.
The analogy has limits. This opinion does not find that Kakol stole funds or participated in the kind of collusion described in In the Matter of Fleming. That case supports the availability of surrender in serious conflict-related misconduct; it does not supply additional findings against Kakol.
In the Matter of Farnham, 313 Ga. 801, 802 (2022)
In the Matter of Farnham involved acceptance of voluntary surrender where an attorney admitted, among other violations, breaches of Rules 1.2 and 1.3 for failing to pursue a personal injury claim by failing to file a probate petition.
Its relevance is the failure to complete a necessary procedural step in advancing the client’s substantive objective. Similarly, initiating bankruptcy proceedings did not adequately serve Kakol’s clients when required follow-up filings were omitted.
In the Matter of Grable, 310 Ga. 861, 861 (2021)
In In the Matter of Grable, the Court accepted voluntary surrender where an attorney admitted, among other misconduct, violations of Rules 1.2 and 1.3 through failure to complete the filing of a lawsuit for a client.
This is a close procedural analogy to Kakol’s repeated incomplete petitions. Both decisions demonstrate that beginning a proceeding is not equivalent to carrying out the representation. Together, these cited surrender cases support consistency in sanction, rather than a mandatory sanction for every instance of incomplete filing.
B. Legal Reasoning
Competence Requires Effective Procedural Follow-Through
Rule 1.1 defines competence to include the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for representation. Kakol’s admissions illustrate that competence concerns execution as well as legal knowledge.
A skeletal bankruptcy petition is not inherently an ethical violation. The problem here was repeatedly failing to complete required filings after the court identified deficiencies and imposed deadlines. Those omissions resulted in dismissal of proceedings intended to protect clients against foreclosure.
Diligence Continues After the Initial Filing
Rule 1.3 concerns committed pursuit of the client’s matter. Filing a petition may begin representation, but it does not discharge the continuing responsibility to address deficiencies, respond to significant motions, and comply with applicable court requirements.
The third matter particularly demonstrates the practical importance of timing. A reconsideration hearing scheduled after foreclosure did not preserve the clients’ home. The opinion, however, does not decide whether a particular alternative filing would have prevented foreclosure or resolve civil malpractice causation.
The Client’s Objective Must Govern the Representation
Rule 1.2 requires adherence to the client’s decisions concerning the scope and objectives of representation, subject to the rule’s qualifications. The homeowner in the first matter expressly wanted to remain in his home.
That objective mattered independently of the third-party company’s involvement. Arranging or financing representation did not make the company’s interests controlling. The admitted Rule 1.2 violation confirms that professional responsibility concerns the client’s actual objective, not merely performance of a procedural act requested or funded by someone else.
Third-Party Involvement Can Create Divided Loyalty
Rule 1.7 prohibits representation where a significant risk exists that a lawyer’s own interests or duties to another client, former client, or third person will materially and adversely affect the representation.
The first matter presented an evident tension between a client seeking to retain his residence and a company holding a purchase contract for that property. The Court accepted Kakol’s admission of a conflict violation without offering an extended analysis of the company’s contractual rights or any attempted conflict safeguards.
The decision therefore should not be read as categorically prohibiting third-party payment. Its narrower lesson is that outside payment and referral arrangements require careful attention to the lawyer’s continuing loyalty to the client.
The Sanction Rests on Admitted Misconduct and Established Disciplinary Principles
The Court’s reasoning is concise: the petition and response supported surrender; the admitted violations permitted disbarment; and comparable decisions supported the proposed resolution. Kakol’s prior disciplinary record formed part of the material presented to the Court.
The petition-specific character of the admissions remains important. Acceptance of the petition resolves the disciplinary proceeding, but the opinion does not purport to decide every factual or legal issue that could arise in separate litigation.
C. Potential Impact
- Bankruptcy practice: The decision underscores the disciplinary significance of deadline management and completion of emergency or skeletal filings, especially when foreclosure protection depends on maintaining the proceeding.
- Third-party referrals: Lawyers accepting company-arranged representations must distinguish the client’s objectives from the referring party’s commercial interests.
- Disciplinary consistency: The opinion adds a bankruptcy-specific application to precedents accepting surrender for serious neglect and conflicts.
- Repeat misconduct: The inclusion of Kakol’s disciplinary history highlights its relevance to sanction assessment, without creating an automatic escalation formula.
- Limits of the holding: The decision does not make every missed deadline disbarring, invalidate all third-party fee arrangements, or establish a new bankruptcy rule.